

A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME II:

Modern and Postmodern
From Descartes to Derrida



NORMAN L. GEISLER

A History of Western Philosophy, Volume II:
Modern and Post-Modern:
From Descartes to Derrida
Dr. Norman L. Geisler
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Cover Art: Rene Descartes is typically regarded as the father of the “modern” stream of philosophy. Jacques Derrida is an influential philosopher in the “post-modern” stream.

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In *A History of Philosophy* by Frederick Copleston, he makes an interesting observation as philosophical thought proceeds from the Ancient and Medieval times into the period of the modern philosophers. This transition begins around the mid 1400's. He notes that the ancient philosophers were more aesthetic, concerning themselves with the surrounding beauty, where they based their viewpoints primarily upon the world around them. However, the thinkers in the Middle Ages did consider the theological aspects associated with philosophy. When considering the beauty and goodness surrounding them, they reasoned as such and considered the 'first cause' of these events. Their reasoning regarding these first causes provided a link in the mind as to the true nature of things. Faith in 'what ought to be' reigned supreme in the medieval mind. This faith was solidified even more when divinely revealed truth was found. Therefore, these thinkers saw philosophy as a handmaiden to theology.

As the modern era begins, philosophers began to focus more on a scientific plain in his search for truth. One of the results of this particular focus is that it becomes more individualized, but yet at the same time, and as the means for disseminating correspondence increases, these finding become more international. As, such, no two great thinkers of this era agreed fully regarding the important issues—each researcher examined his own evidence drawing his own conclusion. The modern scientist demonstrated probable truths based on empirical observations. Their reporting was confined to the facts that they had discovered. They did not regard science as the mere *accumulation* of data. They also were interested in *explaining* their findings.

The entire focus of modern philosophical thought was to uncover those truths that were consistently held in the past, arrived in their time, and could carry them onto into future thought. However, these truths are encapsulated in a historical setting. The study of the history of philosophy is governed by rules of interpretation which comes into play when evaluations are made. Every philosophical method must be able to prove its worth by being able to evaluate other ideas. Using this format, the history of philosophy investigates the other philosophies to see how their conclusions stand up. The result of the investigation is to discover how to set aside errors. For example, the medieval thinkers knew that Aristotle's developed for his time the most complete and systematic demonstration of science and philosophy. Aristotle believed in the arrangement of the nature of things. Aquinas took it one step further and regarded the world as God's creation. He capitalized upon Aristotle's foundation ultimately becoming one of the great philosophers in the history of thought.

The philosophers of the Middle Ages regard for science was only a crude adaptation of Aristotle and other non-Christian thinkers. Science was assumed to have restarted after centuries of inactivity. It wasn't until the time of the Renaissance where this scientific movement gained speed. This period was connected to Ockham and the nominalists. They based their premises on immediate experience and used this as the basis of factual knowledge. It was not that Ockham just focused upon science itself but rather he insisted on intuition as the basis for factual knowledge coupled to his empiricism—as a basis of knowledge. This was the premise that led to scientific investigation. Nonetheless, the leading proponents of this scientific movement were associated with Ockhamism and would become known as nominalists—promoting the idea that universals have no existence and are just mere names given to things positing that nothing really exists. The emphasis upon experience and observation as a basis for knowledge led eventually to the verification process—the ability to explain or give an account for the empirical data. This empiricism, known as logical positivism,

would later be developed by A. J. Ayer.

Modern Western philosophy has five main movements (17-19th cent):

- 1) Rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza)
- 2) Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume)
- 3) Transcendentalism (Agnosticism) (Kant)
- 4) Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)
- 5) Positivism (Comte, Mill, Spencer)

Contemporary Western philosophy has five main movements as well:

- 1) Logical positivism (Ayer)
- 2) Linguistic analysis (Wittgenstein)
- 3) Phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger)
- 4) Existentialism (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Buber)
- 5) Post-Modernism (Derrida, Foucault)

The flow of modern philosophy is through Immanuel Kant (see diagram below). Two main streams flow into him (Empiricism and Rationalism), and two main streams flow out of him (Idealism and Positivism). The empirical tradition is a continuation of Aristotle who stressed that knowledge begins in the senses. That rational tradition is a continuation of Plato who emphasized that knowledge begins in the mind. Kant attempted to synthesize these two streams by claiming that the content of knowledge comes from our senses but the form of knowledge is made by the forms of the senses and categories of the mind. The result was an agnosticism which concluded that we cannot know reality (the *noumena*) as it is in itself but only as it appears to us (the *phenomena*) since we do know what it was like before the mind formed it.


The result of Kant's synthesis was that the empirical tradition was transformed into Positivism (also known as Scientism) which insists that we can only know the empirical scientific data provided through our senses but not the reality behind it. Likewise, the rational stream of thought was transformed into idealism since all we can know is our ideas about reality but not the reality itself.

The main movements in contemporary philosophy tend to be associated with one or the other of these two main movements: Logical positivism (Ayer) and Linguistic analysis followed the empirical and positivistic stream. Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Post-Modernism are a continuation of the rationalism-Idealism flow. Of course, there were minor movements (like Thomism and other forms of Realism) that were not part of the main flow. Likewise, the chart does not represent what was going on in Eastern philosophy but only Western European thought.

Modern philosophy, as will be seen, still battled with the same problems the ancient and mediaeval

CROSSROADS of MODERN THOUGHT

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philosophers and thinkers had combated. These moderns wrestled with the issues of the ‘one and the many,’ the application of metaphysics, the starting point and structure of knowledge, the relation of God to the world (and his creation), and man’s freedom and destiny.

The sixteenth century was occupied with the Renaissance in the intellectual and cultural realm and the Reformation in the religious realm. This Renaissance period was the European cultural movement that began around the mid-14th and ending in the 17th century. It was characterized by its resurgence of classical thought. It began in Italy and spread throughout Europe. Modern philosophy began in the seventeenth century. On the rational side, modern philosophy started with Rene Descartes, followed by Gottfried Leibniz and Benedict Spinoza. On the empirical side, it began with Francis Bacon, followed by John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, and David Hume.

RENE DESCARTES (A.D. 1596 - 1650)



Life and Works of Descartes

Ironically, modern rationalistic philosophy had anything but a rational origin. Its founder, Rene Descartes, was prompted to philosophy by a series of dreams (on November 10, 1619) of a man selling water melons! He concluded that these were a divine sign of his destiny in philosophy. Descartes was born at La Haye in Touraines in 1596. He came from a family that was well to-do and characterized as gentlemen and civil servants in their home town. From 1606 to 1614, Descartes received his basic education at the newly founded Jesuit college of Henry IV at La Fleche. Even though his health was delicate, he showed remarkable intellectual promise as a child. While in school, he took the regular curriculum consisting of grammar, poetry, history, and rhetoric, and then in courses focusing on logic, the philosophy of nature, metaphysics, ethics, and mathematics. In 1616, he received the degree of bachelor and a license of law at the University of Poitiers. While at the university, he also took instruction in medicine. Later, he enlisted in the army in the Netherlands where he increased his knowledge of the world and customs. After retiring from the military in 1621, he sold the estates that he acquired from an inheritance and devoted his time to writing on philosophical, mathematical and scientific matters. While meditating upon the solution that would solve all geometrical problems by a single method, he conceived of a plan that would deal with all philosophical problems by means of a single mathematical oriented method. This conception was geared to bring about a unity among all the sciences. By 1627/28, his new system was fairly established. He was quite confident in his method that he began to conduct public discussions in Paris. His methodology was later written in the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* around 1628 and published in 1701. Shortly after this accomplishment, he expanded his metaphysical notes and created the work titled *Meditations on First Philosophy*. While in the Netherlands, he worked on *The Treatise on Light*, however, this work was never published during his lifetime. However, the suspension of this work was due to the situation surrounding the condemnation of Galileo's by the Holy Office. Descartes wrote scientific works entitled *Dioptrics*, *Meteors*, *Geometry* and the *Discourse of Method* followed by his *Meditations on First Philosophy* in 1641 which was considered his metaphysics masterpiece. In 1644, he wrote *Principles of Philosophy* then *The Passions of the Soul* in 1649.

Descartes was a kind, generous man with very few friends. He found the quiet retired life essential for his work. He never married. Professing to be a pious Catholic, he died in 1650 after giving 5 a.m. philosophy lessons to Queen Christina of Sweden. His main works are *Meditations* and *Discourse on Method*. Descartes was a great mathematician, but he learned his philosophy from the Jesuits. His religious point of view was such that he thought the road to heaven was open to both the ignorant and the learned as well. He thought that the revealed mysteries transcended the

comprehension of the mind. Thus, he occupied his mind with the problems, in his opinion that could be solved by reason alone. Though he was not a theologian, he was a philosopher and mathematician.

His Philosophical Method: Universal and Methodical Doubt

Unlike St. Augustine who worked his way out of actual doubt to certainty, Descartes was never *actually* a skeptic. However, he did seek certainty and found it by beginning with *methodological* doubt.

Descartes wanted to singlehandedly reconstruct a new philosophy based upon the same rational power that operates in mathematics. This system of thought was intended to close the gap between science and wisdom, while at the same time, preserve wisdoms natural basis and its concern for practical moral issues. He was not promoting a philosophy that embodied all the features of mathematics but rather a philosophy that employs the same kind of method and cognition as in mathematical inquiry—this power of reasoning and a methodology applied to the thinking man. (To say that Descartes theory that all sciences are ultimately one science, positing a one universal scientific method, separates him from the Aristotelian perspective.) One starts with certain definitions, considers that the postulates will move towards concluding axioms. These philosophical principles would be too obvious to be doubted and at the same time be independent of other truths. Thus, the first principle of philosophy which was his starting point was to withhold doubt only from whatever is indubitable. When he applied this, he discovered that he could doubt just about everything. He could doubt his senses since they sometimes deceive him (e.g., a stick in water seemed crooked when it was actually straight. He could doubt that he was awake since he might be dreaming that he was awake. He could even doubt that $2+3=5$ --since his memory may fail to remember the numbers. He could even doubt that there is an external world since an evil demon may have been deceiving him in believing the world was real. His primary aim was to produce a well-ordered philosophy which could arrive at certainty. So, his enemy was not scholasticism but skepticism.

There are two methods of arriving at truth: intuition—undoubting conception of a clear and attentive mind, and deduction—all the necessary inferences gained from other facts that are known with certainty, even though deduction is grasped by the intuition. These distinct ideas of the mind were not arrived at through the senses, are found in innate ideas with which we are born. Descartes doubted the senses and instead sought after a pure intellectual intuition. Simply stated, his philosophical methodology would follow this protocol: first, avoid prejudicial judgments; second, resolve difficulties; third, reflect; and fourth, review. This method is similar to the solving of problems in geometry.

From Dubito to Cogito to Sum (From 'I doubt' to 'I think' to 'I am').

Descartes realized that his philosophical system required a metaphysical foundation since it was not based on the senses and geometry is a non-existential discipline. However, it is resisted on doubts. So, he reasoned from "I doubt" to "I am." From that he reasoned, "I think, therefore I am." His *cogito to sum* withstood the test of universal doubt. Doubting one's existence is to imply that one does indeed exist (because of the existence of a doubter).

The one thing that he could not doubt was that he was doubting. So, doubt was indubitable. First, he doubts everything in existence that is possible to doubt. Here he finds that the senses often deceive. Second, he found that the accuracy of his memory also must be doubted. However, he does find what he cannot doubt, that being, his own existence. But if he was doubting, then he must have been thinking for doubt is a form of thought. And if he was thinking, then he must have existed since only thinking thing can think. So, he moved from doubt to thought to being—from 'I doubt' to 'I think'

to 'I am.' Answering the question, "What am I?," Descartes replies that "I" am a 'thing' that thinks, doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, feels, etc. And, a 'thing' that can do all of these must be a soul whose principle attribute is thought. Thought implies a thinker.

Then Descartes reasoned that there is a difference between a thinking thing and an extended thing. My mind is a thinking thing—and I cannot doubt its existence. However, my body and the world are extended things—and I can doubt their existence. So, I can doubt there is a world of material things, but I cannot doubt that my mind exists. There were some who objected to his proposition and conclusion. His reply was that he was not creating a syllogism but was rather an illustration of a simple movement of thought known as 'direct intuition' where the 'I think' implies the 'I am' of me.

To combat these objections about circular reasoning, he states that whatever thinks must exist because it is a basic intuition of the mind. Second, doubt is applied to real and existing things. Lastly, though it is true for the 'here-and-now,' the *cogito* does not guarantee truths associated with the future. It was precisely this unforeseen crisis that led Descartes to offer a proof for the existence of God. If he could prove the existence of a non-deceiving God, then he could validate the possibility of future truths as well. Through his validation process, he could posit that a good God would not permit man to take a falsity as a truth.

God's Existence can be Proven in two Ways

Even though the imagination can produce an idea of God, these ideas are not produced by natural forces. The mind is able to conceive of an absolutely perfect being who is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, and all-powerful by which everything else has been created, including man himself. Since man is finite and imperfect, he could not by himself have formed the idea of this infinite being in his mind because any effect must have a cause adequate to have produced it. Since he could not have imagined this on his own, there must be a Being (God) who does actually exist. From this point Descartes devised two proofs for the existence of God. The first was an a posteriori proof from effect to cause.

An A Posteriori proof for God

Descartes reasoned that if I doubt, then I am imperfect (for I lack in knowledge). But if I know I am im-perfect, then I must know the perfect (otherwise I would have no way of knowing that I am not perfect). In view of the nature of time, time had to come from one who is eternal in nature. This time has come to others as well in different time as well. In addition, this being is a conserving being for those who are in existence for a period of time. (This form of reasoning eliminates the precepts of animism—that natural objects and the universe have souls. The Realists and Idealists were disposed to agree with Descartes in principle because the mind cannot be aware of a limit unless it has already passed it: the mind cannot know the finite unless it already knows the Infinite.) But knowledge of the perfect cannot arise from me, since I am imperfect, and an imperfect mind cannot be the source (basis) of a perfect idea. Hence, there must be a perfect Mind which is the source of this perfect idea.

Descartes's Proof for the World

Unlike most philosophers before him who argued from the world to God (see Thomas Aquinas), Descartes argued from God to the world. He reasoned that I am receiving a strong and steady succession of ideas of a world which are not under my control. Hence, I cannot be erring about them. Now either God is making me believe them falsely or else there is a real external world causing them. But God will not deceive me (nor allow me to be deceived) in what I am perceiving

clearly and distinctly, since He is perfect (and deception is a sign of imperfection). Therefore, it is true that there is an external world. Since the same argument applies to my body, it is true that I have a body.

An 'a priori proof' for God

Descartes also devised an Ontological Argument for God (following St. Anselm). He reasoned that it is logically necessary to affirm of a concept what is essential to its nature (e.g., a triangle must have three sides). But existence is logically necessary to the nature of a necessary Existent (i.e., Being). Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist. If such a being did not exist, it could not be infinite and perfect since it would lack the one essential quality of existence. This argument appealed to some Rationalists after Descartes because it rests on two assumptions: 1) existence is a quality of an absolute perfect being and 2) this existence can be discovered without an appeal to empirical evidence. For any idea of God to happen there must be a God in order to make such an idea possible. (The effect of the idea presupposes the cause or the existence of the idea. If the imprint of the idea is on the finite minds of man then there is no doubt an infinite Being who has produced the idea.)

Descartes' ontological proof was opposed by Caterus the priest. He insisted that the argument proves only a conceptual existence of God. He insisted that the complex of words "existent lion" is conceptual necessary, but this does not prove that a lion exists (only experience can do that).

Descartes' reply to Caterus, who remarked that his second proof resembled Aquinas' proof from efficient causality, was that he had refuted another argument, not his. He affirmed that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true. Descartes started his argument from immaterial entities rather than from efficient causes. He started at this point because the existence of sensible things was still under debate. Descartes incorrectly thought that Aquinas' proof from efficient cause was based on the impossibility of infinite regress. Descartes started with self as the thinking agent having the idea of an infinite being. And we clearly and distinctly perceive that existence must belong to a necessary Existent. So, it must be true that a necessary Existent does exist. Further, Descartes' insisted that whatever is of the essence of something must be affirmed of it. But existence is of the essence of a necessary Existent (=God). Hence, existence must be affirmed of God.

Further, Descartes' claimed that God's existence cannot be conceived as only possible but not actual (for then he would not be a necessary Existent). And we can conceive of God's existence (it is not contradictory). Therefore, God's existence must be conceived as more than possible (viz., as actual).

Another opponent of Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, objected to his ontological argument, claiming that God need not exist anymore than a triangle, since the essence of each can be thought of apart from its existence. For existence is not a property for God or triangles. Thus, it begs the question to list existence as part of God's essence. Essence and existence are not identical or else Plato as well as God would exist necessarily (and if they are not identical, then neither exists necessarily. We are just as free to think of God as not existing as Pegasus. We must prove triangles have three sides (not just assume it). Likewise, we must prove God exists (not merely assume it). In short, Descartes did not really prove God's existence is not logically impossible. Hence, he did not prove it is logically necessary.

Descartes' reply to Gassendi was that existence is a property in the sense that it is attributable to a thing. Further, only God has necessary existence, not Pegasus or anything else. One it is not

begging the question to include existence among the attributes of a necessary Existent (Indeed, it is necessary to do so). Existence and essence cannot be separate in a Being that is a necessary Existent (Hence, God must exist).

It is noteworthy that Descartes did not really answer objection seven (Leibniz later attempted by arguing that existence is a perfection and as such is a simple and irreducible quality which cannot conflict with others. Hence, God can have all perfections, including existence. (But Kant later critiques this view).

The Test for Truth and the Origin of Error

Only clear and distinct ideas are true (not mixed ones), namely, those ideas known by rational intuition as self-evident, or those which are (geometrically) deducible from self-evident ideas.

There are four rules of valid thinking. First, the rule of certainty which affirms that only indubitably certain (clear and distinct) ideas should be accepted as true. Second, there is rule of division which reduces all problems to their simplest parts. Third, the rule of order proceeds in reasoning from simple to complex. Fourth, the rule of enumeration involves reviewing and rechecking each step in the argument.

A second proof that Descartes offers is that the individual thinker is not the author of his own being. He is not an independent being. Man's finiteness is evident in that he not perfect, is able to increase in knowledge, has a desire for an infinite good that is beyond his own nature. Errors arise in judgment (by the will), not in thought. No idea taken by itself is either true or false until an assertions is made about it. If assertions are confined to what is intuitively and demonstratively clear and distinct, one would never fall into error. But if these are clouded by emotion, prejudice, or confusion, then the will is allowed to run away to make false judgments based upon inadequate evidence. They come about when we judge to be so what we did not clearly know to be so.

The proof of the Existence of a Soul

Descartes was not a materialist when it comes to the existence of the soul. The soul to him is a substance having the attribute of thought. This notion is established by the *cogito ergo sum*. The relationship of the soul and the outside world is that the soul receives sensations. Confused ideas are caused by the emotions and as the result, judgments made concerning sense data. There exists the principle of interactionism—the body affecting the mind and the mind affecting the body. Descartes contended that since the mind was an immaterial self. This conclusion supplied sufficient belief of the mind's survival after the death of the body. Since it is immaterial it *could* exist after the body's dissolution.

The basic problem about the nature of man is posed as follows: how can the immaterial mind of ideas initiate or determine the direction of a material sensing body. These two different substances are independent of one another. In Descartes' work titled *Passions of the Soul*, he considered the pineal gland in the brain (for which they knew no function) as the point where the body and mind meet. Another problem arose regarding the origins of ideas in the mind. Although the mind as such is purely intellectual, it interacts with sense experience, the imagination, and memory as references to material objects. This substantial "co-mingling" of mind and body is a contingent union.

It is only by the fact of experience that there can be any certainty of the existence of this composite unity. Moreover, this notion is not able to be proven a priori through scientific deduction.

This unity of composition is a fact shown by experience even though its nature is incomprehensible.

Descartes View on Morality

Since Descartes believed that God is incapable of being a deceiver and thus cannot be charged with error, and man who has the potential to make false or erroneous errors, the responsibility of morality lies completely on man's shoulders. Regardless, man is vulnerable to his exaggerated perceptions which are induced by his passions. Man often displaces right reason and trades it for irrational emotion. Though it is evident that God ordains all events, it is also clear that man experiences the freedom of exercising his will and is held to moral responsibility. Descartes basic precepts of morality in *Discourse on Method* reflect the Stoic attitude of the late Renaissance.

The moral life consists of mastering the six primitive passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, pleasure, joy, painful sadness) by training the mind to properly judge, not by immediate satisfaction, but according to their real nature. This is accomplished through a particular course of action in search for true happiness. This true happiness, outlined in his *Discourse of Method*, is based upon adherence to laws, traditional religion, moderate opinions, and conquering oneself rather than in seeking for great fortune. In order to gain self-control, there needs to be an awareness of God who provides loving providence. There must also be an adherence to God's will. Benevolence must govern all events. In addition, the reminder of the immortality of the soul, the fear of death, and the application of the mind to overcome dangers, all work together to point man in the direction of the good resulting in the contentment of the mind.

Criticisms of Descartes' Views

Descartes disjunction between mind and matter cause a problem that has plagued modern thought as to how the two interact? And how can the mind know reality? He avoided mysticism which accepted beliefs uncritically, and positivism which confined itself to only the bare facts. He also avoided the problems of empiricism not being able to go beyond sense experiences. In so doing, however, he set up a dualism which seemed to isolate matter and mind. Hence, his books were listed as forbidden materials in Rome in 1663. There was also the exclusion of his texts in the French universities and in Holland's orthodox Protestant ministries as well.

A number of criticisms have been leveled against Descartes' views. First, it is noted that he has an unbridgeable dualism of mind and body that has been called "a ghost in a machine."

Second, his starting point is rational (in ideas), not existential (in reality). But if we start with pure ideas, how can we ever get beyond them?

Third, his method is mathematical, not metaphysical. It is a priori, not a posteriori. But Math as such has nothing to do with the real empirical world. It deals only with the theoretical and abstract.

Fourth, his method is unnecessarily skeptical. Why doubt the obvious, for example, that I exist.

Fifth, his Ontological Argument has an unproven assumption, namely, that something exists. But it is logically possible that nothing exists or ever did. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to posit that something exists. But this is the starting point of a cosmological, not an ontological, argument.

Sixth, Descartes assumes, but does not justify, his use of the principle of causality. But in order to support his a posteriori argument, he needs to justify the principle of causality. Without it no causal connection can be made between this world and any alleged Being (God) beyond it.

Seventh, he does not prove that an imperfect mind cannot manufacture the ideas of a perfect Being. He does not seem to distinguish between *having* such an idea and *creating* it. For example, why can't we have an idea of an infinite being without being infinite ourselves.

Eighth, Descartes a priori starting point neglects the crucial role of experience in the pursuit of truth. This point, of course, was made by David Hume and the empiricists.

Ninth, his criterion of truth is not clear. It can't apply to concepts, since only judgments are true, not concepts. And it can't apply to judgments, since he admits some of them are false.

Tenth, his view reduces to mental solipcism in which one can know only while he is thinking—right now—and not and not any other moment or when he is not thinking.

Eleventh, he gets de carte before de horse. We do not exist because we think; rather, we think because we exist. Existence must be the starting point for any philosophy about existence.

BENEDICT SPINOZA (A. D. 1632 - 1677)



The Life and Works of Spinoza

Baruch (Latin: Benedict) Spinoza was born (in 1632) to Spanish and Portuguese Jewish refugees seeking asylum in Amsterdam because of the onslaught of the Inquisition. His ancestors may have been Marranos—Jews who in the last decade of the fifteenth century outwardly accepted Christianity in order to avoid expulsion from the land but inwardly were still Jews. Benedict Spinoza received training in Hebrew literature and was well versed in the Bible, the Talmud and the Cabala (an esoteric and mystical Jewish belief system based on Hebrew Scriptures). Under the influence of his Platonic allegorical method, he rejected the literal interpretation of the Bible and its corresponding rabbinical interpretations. Because he was dissatisfied with representations of God in the Talmud and the Cabala, he turned his focus to Maimonides, Gersonides, Crescas, and other Jewish medieval thinkers in order to find rational statements about God and the world. These sources influenced his opinion regarding the power of reason, the oneness of God, assigning to God the natures of infiniteness, indivisibility, pan-psychism, and a determined procession of the world from God.

Vocationally, he was a self-supporting lens grinder by trade. Because of his pantheistic views he was expelled from the synagogue (see below). He furthered his interests in non-Jewish thought between 1651 and 1654. Besides his studies in physics and mathematics, he also read some of the Renaissance writings on Neo-Platonism and Stoicism, even consulting some Dutch Protestant Scholastic handbooks. He was excommunicated from the Synagogue (1656) after an examination by Jewish theologians for believing God is extended in space (=pantheism), that angels are imaginary beings, and for denying the biblical teaching on the immortality of the soul. These heresies were allegedly brought to these religious leaders via Spinoza's sinister sister. After his excommunication, all Jews were forbidden to have any relationship with him, neither were they to come within four cubits of him, nor were they allowed to read any of his works. From here on out that Spinoza assumed his Latin first name, Benedict, to then live among the Christians. He regarded the Christian and Jewish religions as fundamentally true and important and even believed that Jesus Christ was the best interpreter of these truths.

He never taught philosophy publically but only on a private basis. He was offered a professorship at the University of Heidelberg but turned down the offer because of unmet conditions imposed on him by Louis XIV. Nonetheless, he pursued his interest in philosophy. Wherever and whenever he stayed in villages, he would seek out those in the intellectual community to engage them in philosophical discussion.

His first work was titled *Parts I and II of Rene Descartes' Principles of Philosophy*,

including an appendix titled *Metaphysical Thoughts*, and was issued in 1663. Without explicitly criticizing Descartes, Spinoza wanted to interest the Cartesian reader in his philosophy by making some veiled criticisms of Descartes' work. Spinoza also wrote a work called the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being* but the Latin original were lost but, however, two Dutch translations were found and published in 1862 and 1869. His work titled *Treatise on Healing of the Understanding* was never completed but was published posthumously in 1677. His *Ethics Demonstrated according to the Geometrical Order* was interrupted in order for him to write his *Theologico-Political Treatise* arguing that the Church as such had no sovereignty either within or alongside the state. In this work he also undermined the clergy's authority by providing his rationalistic interpretation of revelation and miracles. Spinoza did this work coming to the aid of a friend (Jan De Witt) who was attempting to disestablish the Reformed Church in the Netherlands and instead attempting to maintain popular government with freedom of thought, speech, and publication and religion. Later, during 1670—1675, he revised the *Ethics* but the work was never published during his lifetime. After his death in 1677, this work as well as the *Treatise on Healing* appeared as well as the uncompleted Political *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670); *Ethics* (1674). The former was so controversial that it was not published until after his death and then only pseudonymously. It went through over two dozen editions with a few decades after his death from 1670 to 1677 and later became the basis of higher critical views on the Bible.

Influences on Spinoza

Spinoza was influenced by several important thinkers. Moses Maimonides bequeathed to him the belief that God is a Necessary Being known by reason apart from revelation. From Judaism had gained a stress on the unity of God. Philo taught him that God is ground of all being, and the Bible is not to be interpreted literally but allegorically. He derived his pantheism from Plotinus. From the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides he derived his rationalism and allegorism. His geometric deductivism he borrowed from Euclid and Descartes. From Sir Isaac Newton he learned that nature laws are universal laws like the law of gravity.

Spinoza's Philosophical Method

The basic tenet of Spinoza's philosophy is that there is only one infinite divine substance which is identified with Nature—God. Arguing against Maimonides, Spinoza claimed that it was non-productive to look for philosophical truth in the Scriptures except for some basic moral truths. However, at the same time, he maintained that there cannot be any contradictions between true philosophy and the Scripture. The problem is that they do not speak the same language. Philosophy posits truth that is purely rational and not pictorial, whereas the Bible speaks allegorically.

The purpose behind Spinoza's methodology was to promote the theoretical explanation of reality and to nurture the soul in its search for everlasting happiness. The moral context of Spinoza's methodology is clear: knowledge gained for the pursuit of the highest good which is the source of supreme happiness. Not having truth deprives one from attaining true happiness. The offshoot of this is the recognition of the source of evil when compared to the good. Spinoza thought of his philosophical method as the healing the understanding from error. He had four levels of knowing or degrees of perception: 1) Hearsay and conventional signs. These are unreliable; they never attain the essence of things; 2) Undisciplined experience is better, but it is inferior to 3) Scientific inference from effect to cause whereby we can understand the essence of things indirectly. However, the highest level of knowledge is 4) Direct [in]sight of essential nature--understanding essence directly. This is

possible only by knowing self-evident propositions and drawing the necessary conclusions from them the way Euclid did in geometry.

The goal of philosophy is union of the mind and the whole of Nature. Spinoza had been taught to love God with his mind, soul and strength. Moreover, the God of Spinoza could not be a being with emotions and changing moods as was (anthropomorphically) described in the Old Testament. Instead, Spinoza saw God as infinite and eternal, a being of mathematical necessity and scientific law who was compatible with modern knowledge. If men can identify themselves with the proper idea of God then they will possess an inward peace of mind that the world cannot take away (nor give to replace it). This will bring healing of the mind which has been injured by error. The procedure used is meditation (thinking) on the absolutely perfect idea (God).

Spinoza believed that knowledge is ultimately grounded in the direct apprehension of the formal essence of the thing. If not, then there is an infinite regress with no starting point. Ideas are true based on their own nature without any additional reasoning added to it. If they are true, they are true within themselves. In addition, true ideas conform to reality. The best idea is the idea of the most perfect being who is God, the origin of all things. (Here is where Spinoza is critical of Descartes *cogito ergo sum*.) The correct order and right method begins with God, the Perfect Idea, not with human thinking and doubt.

Rationalistic (Geometric) Epistemology

The right approach is to define axioms and make logical deductions from them. This has the advantages of aiding a weak mind, being impersonal, and yielding certainty in its conclusions. When this method is applied it yields not only absolutely certain conclusions but also a whole metaphysics of God and His creation.

Pantheistic Metaphysics

Spinoza's metaphysics illustrates that the human mind is wired as a thinking thing that naturally rises to true ideas. Spinoza's method has no need for Cartesian doubt. Spinoza creates a correlation between philosophy and methodology. His philosophy consists of a formal logic and his methods of reflection begin with precepts of the idea of God. By using reflection, one can achieve the unity of thought. Therefore, philosophy becomes an interconnected system of true ideas through a chain of activity of things and the modes of God. The result of Spinoza's epistemology is a pantheistic ontology (view of being).

Spinoza's initial idea of God came from his Jewish religious roots. However, he soon rejected its theistic theology because his mind was influenced by pantheism based upon his study of the Neo-platonic philosophers and the Renaissance thinkers, such as Giorano Bruno. This pantheistic view of God saw Him as infinite, but lacking any realistic view of analogy, infinite Being ended up being the only Being. God must include within God all beings and all reality. Thus finite beings are only modes of God. Thus, his ontology includes the following elements: First, God must be conceived as a being existing through Himself (i.e., self-caused). Second, there can only be one absolutely independent Being (Monism). Third, all other beings are modally dependent on God. These modes are not accidents (which imply imperfection). They are moments or aspects of God. Fourth, God's attributes are what he is in himself, and his properties are what he is to us. Thus, the only two attributes of God we know are thought and extension (of God infinitely in space).

All of this presupposes that one can gain a true idea of God and that error is able to be

identified and explained. Spinoza has no tolerance for those who choose to live in a cautious, skeptical life of unwillingness to take the risk of using their minds to gain real knowledge. These are identified as the speculatively dumb who subject themselves to the necessities of life remaining unconscious of their own real natures.

Truth and Error

In Spinoza's *Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding*, he presents four levels of perception. Level one, the lowest, is perception by hearsay—things known not by personal experience but by what is known to me provided by others (“I was told . . .”). Level two is perception by vague or confused experience—ideas asserted because it was demonstrated in others (“I see that others undergo. . .”). Third, the essence of a thing is inferred from the essence of another thing but the inference is incomplete (“I see that . . . had a cause . . . but I am uncertain as to how . . .”). Finally, a thing is perceived through its essence alone or through a knowledge of its immediate cause (“This I know, . . . and I perceive it clearly”).

For Spinoza truth is known only through a true idea. And perfect truth is known only through the perfect Idea (God). Error has four causes: 1) The partial nature of our minds provides only fragmentary expression of ideas; 2) Imagination is affected by physical senses and confuses us; 3) Reasoning is often too abstract and general, and 4) The failure to begin with the perfect Idea by beginning in the senses or in doubt.

Error is caused by the fact that man is a composite finite being and is in need of remediation. The cure for these errors is the return to the idea of God who is immanently a part of man's nature. The remedy for error is to return to perfect Idea of God. This is accomplished by four considerations. First, the mind must focus on the idea of the most perfect thing. The more perfect the mind becomes itself, the less it will be subject to the partial or imperfect. Second, the development found in the first step the more the mind will rely upon its inward resources. These trained inward resources will be able to distinguish between the inadequate and the adequate, the imperfect and the perfect. Third, the idea of God is to be a supreme concrete principle. This is not to be confused with abstract or indistinctive things. Last, thoughts must begin with the simple nature and power of God thereby focusing the mind away from error and doubt. The correct order in philosophy is initially the concentration of the thoughts so that it will align itself with the eternal order and law of things as ordained and stipulated by God himself. The more we feed on the perfect Idea the more perfect we become. Inner growth which results helps us distinguish confused sensations from clear ideas.

Proofs for God's Existence

Spinoza offers four arguments for God's existence. The first one argued that there must be a cause for everything, both existence and non-existence. First, the existence of God is shown through the ontological argument—the clear and distinct concept of God not lacking any qualities of infinitude or existence. And a necessary Being must necessarily exist, unless there is a cause adequate to explain its non-existence. Second, the first argument points out that this conception of God involves no logical contradiction that making God's existence impossible. But there is no cause adequate to explain why a necessary Being does not exist. For such a cause would have to be either inside of God's nature or outside of it. But no cause outside a necessary Existence could possibly annul its existence. Third, our existence is finite and unable to produce another like ourselves *ad infinitum*. This necessarily leads to a being that is the cause of man's existence. And nothing inside a necessary Existence could annul it. That is, nothing inside a Necessary Being denies that it is a Necessary

Being. Hence, there is no cause adequate to explain why a necessary Being does not exist. Last, this infinite creator of the finite beings must have the power to not only create but also sustain and maintain what he has created. Therefore, a Necessary Being necessarily exists. Spinoza is committed to using the ontological argument otherwise God would not be *a priori* in the sequence of ideas. Starting with God and proceeding to the finite rules out any contingency in the universe.

Spinoza also offers additional proofs regarding the attributes associated with God. An attribute, he states in *Ethics* is “that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.” For Spinoza, God, whether this means nature, universe, or substance, is both at once mental and material extending infinitely in space as something physical. God is the universal substance who is the ultimate ground and essence of everything mental and physical. This is Spinoza’s parallelism of body and spirit as opposed to Descartes’ view of interaction between the two. Spinoza’s doctrine is called *panpsychism*—everything has a soul—where the mental and the material are one and, thus, do not have an effect on one another. Moreover, he is careful to point out that these infinite attributes have none of the ordinary characteristics of a man.

The second argument for God reasons that something necessarily exists. And this necessary Existence is either finite or infinite. But no finite cause can hinder infinite Existence. And it is contradictory to say an infinite Cause hindered infinite Existence. Therefore, there must be an infinite Existence.

For Spinoza, God is eternal, the immanent cause, perfect, all-inclusive, knows all, without emotions (like those passions found in man coerced by external causes), does not reason nor does he plan to carry things out, and has no will (like that of man) or intellect in the human sense. In addition, it seems foolish to Spinoza to think of God who would create things for the benefit of man or to perform miracles on their behalf. (It was no wonder why Jewish and fundamental Christians of his time called him an atheist because he seemed to deny the existence of the Deity who loves and cares for mankind. However, Spinoza’s view of God is not really atheism but should rather be called pantheism, though not an absolute pantheism as in Parmenides or Shankara, but a modal form of pantheism)

Creation ex Deo

According to Spinoza’s pantheism, all modes flow necessarily from God as 180 degrees flow from a triangle. Creation is *ex Deo* and not *ex nihilo*. In other words, God produces the world by the necessity and power of His own divine nature. (Aquinas spoke of God creating through the intellect and will of the divine nature, but Spinoza asserts that God’s intellect and will are modes of God’s divine nature.). Spinoza, after consulting the Protestant Scholastic manuals, agrees that applying accidents to God is not proper because of the intrinsic imperfections associated with subjects of creation. Therefore, when it comes to God, it is his modes of affections must be considered, not his accidents. It can be seen again that Spinoza bases his proofs for the existence of God on an *a priori* idea of God’s essence (thereby neglecting any *a posteriori* proofs). So the effect must be as infinite as their Cause. In fact, Creator and Creation are one substance like two sides of one saucer. According to Spinoza, the world is a world of modes. This means that everything in the world is either in motion or it is at rest. The total sum of ‘stuff’ is neither increased nor decreased. God contains the infinite and immediate mode of intellect called by Spinoza the ‘idea of God.’

Will is not an attribute of God but only a mode in God. Since this divine essence is infinite, it must express itself in an infinite number of attributes. Even though these attributes are independent of

each other, each one is infinite in its kind. However, only two of the divine attributes are known by man: thought—the modal expressions perceived as composed of finite parts, and extension—the notion of extending things as infinite and without parts thereby pointing to the attributes of divine essence. This extension is not found in God himself but is rather some perfection that posits God as the first cause of extended modes of being. Hence, God did not create freely, but creation flows necessarily from God like rays from the sun or a flower from its seed.

Thus, this world is the most perfect world possible, including all the evil in it. Evil is necessary. The natural world operates by natural scientific law. Newton's newly discovered law of gravity became the model for all natural laws which were held to be universal.

The Argument against Miracles

In his controversial *Theologico-Political Treatise* Spinoza drew out the theological implications of his monistic views. Very simply it was a rigid form of naturalism or anti-supernaturalism. His argument against miracles went like this: 1) Natural laws are immutable; 2) A miracle is a violation of a natural law; 3) But it is impossible to violate an immutable law. 4) Therefore, miracles are impossible.

The consequences of denying miracles are serious. These include the belief that Moses did not write much of the Pentateuch; that the Resurrection account in Gospels are not authentic; that the Bible merely "contains" the Word of God (vs. Bible *is* the Word of God); that none of the miracle recorded in Bible actually happened (in other words, they are myths). In short, anti-supernatural metaphysics demands a de-supernaturalized Bible and theology.

Human Nature and Destiny

Spinoza's philosophical anthropology follows from his epistemology and his metaphysics. The result is what human nature ought to be rather than what human nature is shown to be through evidences. Again, it is an *a priori* approach. It is determined by a preconceived notion based on the backdrop of a modal consequence of God's attributes. Human are finite modes coming from the divine nature. Following this modal concept, he considers the body as the same thing as the mind (or soul). These proceed from God under the attribute of thought. There is no causal interaction between the mind and body.

The human body is limited in the number of images it can form in the mind. Anything above this standard results in confusion. Spinoza makes two points regarding the functions and levels of activity found in the mind. Knowledge obtained by vague or causal experience is all those things that are useful in life functioning as practical utility. Privation arises from inadequate or confused ideas. The second point involves scientific ideas or the level of reason that are common to all men (as compared to the causal experienced knowledge or imagination). All men have adequate ideas and reflections upon the common properties of things in order for them to be understood. These common notions are the foundation of the fundamental principles of mathematics and physics. In addition, these common notions also cover those self-evident truths found in the material world. Based on these self-evident truths there is no need for confirmation. A true idea has to be true in itself and is known to be true. Truth here is its own standard. To doubt a self-evident truth is impossible.

Human beings are controlled largely by passion; only philosophical knowledge can control passion. Good action flows from good ideas. As Plato held, to know the Good is to do the good. Good and evil are respectively what is helpful or harmful to our conatus (drive). Spinoza calls good

and evil products of the mind when the mind is subjected to the imagination and external causes. Good and evil are relative notions having no absolute standard. These standards are the ideal of human perfection conjured up in the mind. Anything approaching the ideal is good, anything moving away from the standard is evil. Good and evil ideas are nothing more than useful (good) and harmful (evil) ideas. The usefulness and harmfulness can be calculated by the individual's conatus—the factors that determine whether or not good or evil increase or diminish one's power to act. Conatus is what is meant by freedom, namely, inner determination.

In comparison to these infinite modes, there are also finite modes which are found in human beings, plants, animals, stones—basically, every 'particular thing' in the world. He goes further and states that everything in the universe belongs to the universal substance and to the two attributes of thought and extension—in other words, everything is simultaneously both mental and physical. Spinoza argues that the mind and body is only one substance present in man. This one substance is the infinite substance of God and not a finite human substance. This composed human substance is only a modal unity under the divine attributes of thought and extension. The mind is the idea of the body; the body is the physical counterpart of the mind—*they are one and the same thing*. (Some modern psychologist favor Spinoza's psycho-physical parallelism.) However Spinoza's rationalism does not address all of the problems associated with epistemology—the science of knowledge. Therefore, Mind and body are correlative; with no causal interaction. There are like two sides of the same coin. This is known as the metaphysical double aspect theory (see Appendix 2). It could also be called anthropological monism.

Virtue, Ethics, and the Salvation of Man

The conatus (drive), as mentioned above, is the basic and sole foundation of virtue in an ethical context. This virtue is the same thing as the human essence of a man, it has the power to perform deeds that can be understood through the laws of *his* nature alone. Spinoza says in *Ethics*, that "[e]very one is bound to seek his own profit" (*Ethics*, IV, 18, Scholium). To be virtuous is to follow one's own nature to the good. It results in whatever is profitable to us and avoids what is considered evil or harmful. When one's seeks his own profit, he is basically seeking to heal and improve his understanding. The necessary law of the inner nature is the law of reason itself. According to Spinoza, there is a converging of virtue to goodness and power. When these synthesize, the act of knowing God is achieved. Man's knowledge is most benefitted when it is the result of contemplating the divine essence. Furthermore, the human conatus is the point of greatest activity and is the most powerful when the mind is sharing in the vision of God. The focal point of Spinoza's philosophy is in the assertion that the human mind is able to acquire this contemplation of God. The ultimate is when man can pass from passion to action, from bondage to liberty and blessedness, even though this ultimate is not completely obtained in this life.

It is this highest intuitive knowledge of God that springs forth to an intellectual love directed towards God. Through this intellectual love, man partakes in God's own love for Himself as He expresses Himself through the eternal essence of the human mind. God loves Himself and makes our intellectual love for Him a part of His infinite love for His own nature. Man's salvation is the constant and eternal love toward God or the love of God toward man. This increase in knowledge along with the liberation from the passions is the process of transforming the entire being of man.

Basically, Spinoza's philosophy is his doctrine of salvation. His philosophical reasoning is coupled to the virtuous life of morality. The content of his religion is the seeking of personal

perfection, social friendship and cordiality. It is a religion based on rationalism.

However, Spinoza's rationalism, as illustrated in his *Theological-Political Tractatus*, negates the need for miracles and claims that they are just natural events. He denies the Pentateuch authorship of Moses and regards prophecy as each prophet coloring his own works as personal opinions. Revelation found in the Bible is to only be relegated to religion when it concerns itself with matters of faith. This is clearly anti-supernatural. Faith, according to the Spinozian doctrine, has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. Instead, faith is associated with repetitive instructions of piety and obedience. Thus, for Spinoza, faith and philosophy are completely separate.

Human Immortality

There is no individual immortality for human beings. We survive only as modes or moments in God. We achieve our own salvation, which is an intellectual love of God, by way of philosophy of clear ideas. The only role for religion is to encourage piety and obedience, not to find the truth.

The goal of life is union with God. Imagination hinders this. Meditation (rational) can overcome passion and feed the conatus (drive) to have an intellectual union with God. Therein lays our immortality, namely, as modes or moments in God.

Human Freedom and Determinism

It is no surprise that Spinoza does not believe in the freedom of the will. Every act occurs with mathematical necessity. Based upon man's position within the modal world, he is by definition, subject to divine rigorous determinism, whether it affects his body or his mental capacities. In addition, there is no need to separate the mind and the body. There is no distinction between knowing and willing—willing is nothing more than affirming (or denying) that which is true (or false) in the mind. The act of judgment is also subjected to the same determinism that governs all cognitive operations. However, Spinoza does differentiate between human freedom and human bondage. Man is enslaved to his emotions, passions, and confused ideas, owing their causality to something outside of man's control. Freedom comes by thinking (or rethinking) clearly and distinctly. Human freedom therefore is the acceptance of the universe's mathematical necessity resulting in peace of mind, freedom from passions, and the ability to return good for evil.

The understanding in the mind is the highway to freedom from the bondage of the passions. The understanding is the highest function of the mind where it is to know God. The more man knows about God, the more he will love him [This is the venerable Platonic principle that "To know the good is to do the good."]. God causes all things, even pain. Hence, pain ceases to be a pain because man rejoices in the fact that God causes all things, even pain.

For Spinoza, God and Nature are the same. Man conceives this as part of the logically connected infinite system which brings pleasure to the mind of man because he is a part of this system. When the mind understands that the idea of God as the eternal cause, then it moves towards an intellectual love of God. This intellectual love of God is the love of God with which he loves himself. This is where God can be expressed through the essence of the human mind. Furthermore, it is this love of God for men and the mind's intellectual love towards God that is one and the same thing. Spinoza goes so far as to state that this love of God is our salvation, blessedness, and liberty.

Influences of Spinoza on Others

Spinoza had little influence on his contemporaries. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that German scholars recognized his contributions. The influences of Spinoza (d. 1677) on

others after him are immense. First of all, he was Father of modern anti-supernaturalism almost 100 years before Hume who died in 1776. Second, he was grandfather of modern biblical criticism which was fathered by Richard Simone. And he was some 200 years before the Bible critic Julius Wellhausen (d. 1918). Further, Spinoza influenced Schleiermacher the father of and modern liberalism (d. 1834).

GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ (A.D. 1646 - 1716)



The Life and Works of Gottfried Leibniz

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Germany in 1646 and died in 1716. He was born into comfortable circumstances in the surroundings of an intellectual atmosphere. His father, a university professor of moral philosophy, died when he Gottfried was six years of age, but he left the family with an excellent library. Leibniz was a child genius, knowing both Greek, Latin and, Scholastic philosophy. His father also left the family with the means to allow Gottfried to do as he desired vocationally. Since he did not need to busy his time in learning a trade, Gottfried pursued academic interests on his own taking advantage of the library left by his father. Being proficient in Latin and Greek, he became familiar with Cicero, Quintilian, Seneca, Pliny, Herodotus, Xenophon, Plato, and the Church Fathers. At thirteen, he read works of Francisco Suarez, the last of the great scholastic philosophers.

At fifteen, he entered the university and was exposed to the ‘modern’ thinkers like Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, Descartes, Kepler, and Galileo. He rejected Aristotle’s theory of substantial forms and final causes and replaced it with his own view of monadology (see below).

In 1663, he went to Jena (the university at Leipzig) to study mathematics. He furthered his academics by also studying jurisprudence, eventually taking his doctorate in Law in 1667. He was refused a law Masters at Leipzig because of his youth. While at Altdorf he did a Doctorate, however, he was refused a position at the school. He later took a post in the court of the Elector of Mainz, being sent as a diplomat to Paris in 1672. In Paris, he met men like Malebranche and Arnauld. In 1673, he met Boyle and Oldenburg while he visited England. He returned to Paris and stayed there until 1676.

On his way to Germany, he visited Spinoza with whom he was also in written communication. Leibniz criticism of Spinoza’s work lead Leibniz to draw the following conclusion: the philosophy of Descartes leads by way of Spinozism to atheism. In 1700, Leibniz became the first president of the Society of the Sciences at Berlin, which later became the Prussian Academy. He also occupied himself with the problem associated with the Christian Confessions in order to find a common ground of agreement between the Catholics and Protestants. He made unsuccessful attempts to unite the Calvinists and the Lutherans.

Along with Sir Isaac Newton, he co-invented the calculus in 1676. He wrote a doctoral dissertation on symbolic solutions to philosophical problems. He made contributions to logic, physics, mathematics (most notably in the discovery of the integral and differential methods in calculus), law, theology, and invented a calculating machine. He was also a natural scientist, historian, philologist, jurist, and theologian and a religious apologist. He was influenced by Spinoza's Ethics, though he was a theist and not a pantheist like Spinoza. His main works were: *Monadology*,

His works appear to be short summaries that were prepared for individuals who had an interest in a particular area or they were journal articles. Some of his ideologies are found in letters of correspondence to others. His other works include the following: *Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of the Individual* (1663), illustrating an acquaintance with Suarez and other scholastics, as a requirement for his bachelor's degree, in part, to answer some of his curiosities about the nature of the individual. *On Perplexing Cases of Law* (1666) was his master's dissertation. His published work titled *Dissertation on the Art of Combination* (1666) setting forth a universal set of symbols where all philosophical problems could be solved with mathematical exactness. The *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686), *New Essays concerning the Human Understanding* (completed in 1704, published in 1765), *Essays on Theodicy* (1710), *Principles of Nature and Grace* (1714), *The Monadology* (German publication in 1720, French original publication in 1840), are more of his works.

His Theory of Knowledge

Leibniz believed that philosophy is 'alive' and matures from one generation to the next. He believed that each philosopher was, for the most part, right in what he affirmed. When he did find fault, it was usually in what the philosopher failed to see and therefore denied. He was rationalistic, though it held that knowledge begins in the senses. His goals were the love of God, human welfare, and the perfection of reason which he believed all stand and fall together. Basically, Leibniz concludes that happiness depends upon the knowledge of God and the soul. He was convinced of the common thread that connected the love of God, the promotion of human welfare, and the perfecting of reason. These three goals were the focus of his work to which he gave most of his energies. Without the intertwining of these three threads, he thought Western culture would come to a barbarous end. The purpose of philosophy had a religious and moral orientation directing the mind to contemplate the love of God and to direct a well-ordered relationship between men.

Leibniz agreed with Descartes on two main points: 1) the mind can work out in detail common scientific methods, and 2) its analysis and synthesis must be applied to construct a common logic of the sciences. His method is mathematical, yet it was empirically grounded. He began by analyzing scientific findings and not merely ideas as Descartes did. The goal of this method is to reduce scientific inquiry to a 'catalogue' of simple thoughts. As a result, there would be the collection of primitive terms and certain universal principles which would provide a foundation for all scientific knowledge. Of course, Leibniz did not think that *all* truths could be deduced *a priori* since there are truths that can be demonstrated only by the facts of history, not by logical deductions based on definitions. Everything begins in the senses except the mind itself. Purely logical grounding of science is not possible. But reason is necessary to complete knowledge, since there is no universal collection of sense data, and the senses cannot organize and relate all the data. Metaphysical (universal) knowledge is possible only because God made all things according to harmony. The harmony that Leibniz wants to promote is not an autonomous, impersonal, cosmic principle. This harmony is the expression of God's understanding and of his will—God is the seat of harmony and the principle of reconciliation. All ideas are innate, generated by the mind with parallel in senses. Not only was Leibniz interested in creating a universal logical method but he also wanted to apply this to philosophical truths as well. His deductive system of logic (or mathematics) provided general truths illustrating that the universe is a system. This also includes the application in science of metaphysics.

If dependence upon outside stimulation was the basis for knowledge, there could never be any certainty of truths. Knowledge of truths must be derived from innate ideas which are not realized until particular circumstances occasion one's attention. Leibniz held that first principles are necessary for all knowledge. There are several first principles:

First, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the ground of all true propositions and intelligibility. "There is a sufficient reason for everything, either in another or in itself." The connection between truths of reason which are necessary and truths of fact is not always necessary. This is true analytically, namely, predicate can be deduced from the subject. For example, a round square is contradictory and impossible.

Second, the Principles of Non-Contradiction which affirms that "Something cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same sense." All truths of reason are concerned with the domain of possibilities. (The exception to this rule is the proposition that God is a possible Being.)

Third, the Principle of Identity asserts that "A thing is identical to itself" (I am I). Sufficient Reason regulates all truth, but Contradiction and identity establish all necessary truths. Truths of reason state what is true in every case. However, true existential judgments depend on God's choice of one particular world.

Fourth, the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: "Where there is no discernable difference, things are identical." No two substances (=monads) in the world are alike. The World is filled with qualitatively different things hierarchically graded. If two things were the same, there would be no sufficient reason God would choose both of them in a maximally good world which he makes (see below).

Fifth, the Principle of Continuity claims that the "World is full; there are no gaps in the hierarchy of beings in the best world." Nature never acts by leaps.

Sixth, the Principle of Contingency affirms that "Every contingent thing has a cause." Possibility does not explain actuality. The basic question is "Why is there something rather than nothing?"

Seventh, the Principle of Perfection claims that "Good tends to maximize." Like scholastic principle of finality, it affirms that agents act for a good end. But like Platonists, he claimed that it is better to exist than not to exist. Thus essences have a drive (*conatus*) toward existence.

Leibniz's Metaphysics (Monadology)

The underlying fundamental reality behind objects—material in space and time—is the principle of force as it is understood in life's experience and registered through the mental capacity. According to Leibniz, these centers of force are the ultimate realities of the universe which he calls monads (realities). These monads are indestructible and immortal. In Leibniz' *Monadology*, he makes these two propositions: "1. The monad of which we shall here speak is merely a simple substance, which enters into composites; simple, that is to say, without parts. 2. And there must be simple substances, since there are composites; for the composite is only a collection or aggregation of simple substances" (1-2). Leibniz posits the existence of monads which is like an immaterial monad or 'metaphysical atom', a tiny, invisible and unique quality. Monads differ qualitatively in shape, size, space, and quality. Monads can only be created or destroyed, neither are they composed of parts (and therefore cannot decompose); they cannot change. They are only subject to internal change. Each one depends on God for its existence and operation. Each monad has unconscious perception (established

by God) and a God-given desire (drive toward perfection). Each monad endeavors to perceive more clearly and distinctly. The consequence of this is the attainment of a higher order of perception by pleasure—an consciousness of increasing perfection. (The opposite direction then is in the direction of pain.) Monads “have no windows through which anything can enter or depart.” (*Monadology*, 7) Each monad is a world by itself, a “little divinity.” They are windowless and do not interact of themselves. The harmony among monads is pre-established by God (this is also true of monads in the body and soul).

There is a hierarchy of monads. Each monad differs in their subjective ability to achieve distinct perceptions of the things in the universe. All monads mirror the same world; they differ only in the distinctiveness of their perceptions. The range is from unconscious perception to the highest level where perception is occupied. This occurs through reflective knowledge. There is an act of perception and the substantial self from which these actions proceed. There are different (higher) monads in souls from those (lower ones) in bodies. This hierarchy is arranged by God. God is the Super or Supreme Monad who created all other monads and gave them nature and drive and He alone is the self-existent monad of pure spirit. He alone is infinite, eternal, absolutely good and wise. He is Power, Knowledge, and Will. God has created all the monads with identical contents and he pre-establishes harmony between them rendering them all in agreement at all times. God maximizes the good among monads working through them to achieve the greatest good. Human beings possess reason. The monad that is the human mind is a reasonable spirit. In reasoning, the monads employ the logical principles of sufficient reason and contradiction (as illustrated above). However, many perceptions are confused.

Leibniz's Proofs for God

Leibniz offered several proofs for the existence of God. The first is the Argument from Perfection or Harmony. Leibniz links this notion of perfection to his monads (see above). Each monad, separated from the others, lives harmoniously with these other monads. All stand under the guidance of a single intelligent Cause outside the world at the same time function within the world as well. The implication of this is that there is no direct physical influence of one finite substance upon another. Each is, in a sense, a ‘world’ apart from all others. Leibniz refers to God as this supreme intelligent perfect necessary monad. He comes to this conclusion because created monads bare some resemblance to the Supreme Monad. However, these created monads have their own imperfections and limitations based upon their inherent natures. The Argument from Harmony begins with the affirmation that pure essences are eternal possibilities. It adds that it is better to exist than not to exist. All things have a drive toward existence (*conatus*). Some things are incompatible with others. All can’t exist at a given moment. However, all strive to exist. Yet there is harmony in the universe. Hence, there must be a God who orders all things, keeping them in harmony with one another.

His cosmological argument begins with the fact that the entire observed world is changing. Then he notes that whatever changes lacks the reason for its own existence. But there is a sufficient reason for everything. Hence, there must be a cause beyond the world for its existence. This cause is either its own sufficient reason or there is one beyond it. But there cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons for the failure to reach an explanation is not an explanation, and there must be an explanation. Therefore, there must be a first Cause of the world that has no reason beyond itself but is its own sufficient reason.

The ontological argument has only a moral force—the idea of God’s existence. The proof for

the real possibility of God's existence through the ontological argument is simultaneously a proof for the infinite perfection of God's essence. Other finite things are only possible contingent existences. If they do exist, it is in a harmonious relationship with the infinite existing divine essence. Since finite existences are not perfect in their beings, it must be the case that they draw from the infinite being who is perfect and sets the standard of perfection. Hence, all contingent imperfect existences can be traced back to the necessary perfect existence of God. His Ontological Argument combines both forms of Anselm's. It reasons that if it is possible for an absolutely perfect being to exist, then it is necessary for it to exist. For by nature an absolutely perfect being can't lack anything. But if it didn't exist, then it would lack something. And an absolutely perfect being cannot lack existence. Further, it is possible (non-contradictory) for an absolutely perfect being to exist. For a perfection is a simple irresolvably simple quality (=monad) and each one differs in kind. But whatever is simple cannot conflict with another simple thing. Hence, it is possible for one being (God) to have all perfections. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect being exists. Leibniz believed this filled in a premise lacking in Descartes' ontological argument.

The ontological argument in its purest format is the attempt to show that the propositions for God's existence are analytic by *a priori* premises—the notion of God, a supremely perfect Being, leads to the existence of God. However, the ontological argument cannot be used as a strict demonstration—possibility does not necessarily prove actuality. Leibniz's ontological proof states that there are contingent truths which may or may not occur. There must be necessary truths that make these truths possible. For anything to be possible, it must have the capacity to become actually brought about by some means outside of itself. The existence of God as an infinite being is possible. There is no logical contradiction in the notion of God's existence. The idea of God is one that has no limits, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the actual existence of God from occurring. Thus, the conclusion is that God actually exists. In addition, when focusing on *a posteriori* evidences, he also uses the principle of sufficient reason to illustrate truths for positing the existence of God. He does this by stating that finite existences require some infinite source for their finiteness.

However, the ontological arguments assume that the mere idea of God proves the existence of God. But the argument from harmony assumes a prior acceptance of the doctrine of monads and can only appeal to those who are convinced of it. The argument from perfect harmony observes that there are many substances, having no communication with each other, do indeed have one common cause. There is so much order, harmony and beauty in nature (and its substances) that there must be a metaphysical necessity for it.

Leibniz's Theodicy (View of the Problem of Evil)

The two difficulties for every theist are: 1) the existence of evil in light of a benevolent God, and 2) how to show that God is not responsible for moral evil in the world. According to Leibniz, this is the best possible world that God could have (and did) create. Morally speaking, God could have created a different world but has instead only created the best possible world. Even though there is evil in the world, it is still the best possible world that God could have created.

God created all things, including free creatures. Freedom is the spontaneity of an intellectual being. Reason persuades (not coerces) will. The will always chooses a good, even when it is the lesser good. God foreordains all things by foreknowledge (without forcing free will). On the side of God, a fundamental distinction must be made. There is God's *antecedent will* where he wills the production of the good and the prevention of the evil. These are directed towards essences without

reference to existence. God's *consequent will* is a result of all the antecedent wills (those toward the good, those repelling evil) and the allowance of evil 'consequently' by God who 'antecedently' desires the good resulting in the best possible world. This provides a means for the greater good and a means for the penalty of sin. His consequent will never wills moral evil. God's antecedent will is for only good; His consequent will is for the best world (with evil in it). As the Best of all possible Beings, God wills the best of all possible worlds. Since this world is willed by God, it must be the best possible world. "Best possible" means least defective. So of all possible combinations, our world is the best.

There are three kinds of evil: (1) metaphysical evil—mere imperfections in finite beings that is the root of error and evil; (2) physical evil—suffering, as a result of moral evil, which can act as a penalty for sin and as a means of perfecting the good; and (3) moral evil—sin or the privation of right order in the will. Metaphysical evil is due to finitude; moral evil is due to sin, and physical (e.g., suffering) involves both finite and sin. Sin is result of ignorance, a confused or unclarified state. Evil is part of a total picture of good as a shaded area is to a light one in the overall beauty of a painting. God is working to perfect the universe, which can only be done by perfecting mankind. This perfection presupposes the immortality of the soul since it is not achieved in this life. The perfecting of the universe requires a distinctive perfecting of man in his moral and spiritual being. The reconciling of the physical and moral realms of being is the work of divine omnipotence by God who is both architect and monarch of the kingdom of these spiritual beings (Collins). This perfection manifests itself in the universal Catholic Church (cf. Augustine's *City of God*).

First, Leibniz points out that evil is a privation and not a positive entity of itself. Secondly, God does not permit but only allows its occurrence whereby it can serve as a means to a good end. God cannot be held accountable for the origin of evil by the mere fact that he created the world of finite imperfect creatures (which was his only option because he cannot create infinite perfection like himself. God willed 'antecedently' the good resulting in the 'consequential' divine best world. God could not have given creatures *all* without making them 'god's' themselves. Therefore, there exists different degrees of perfection and limitations associated with every kind of creature. Mankind is an image bearer of God with limited perfection providing the allowance for imperfection.

An Evaluation of Leibniz Views

Leibniz's philosophy of monads has not seen a wide acceptance. However, his rationalistic views had great influence throughout the eighteenth century, especially in Germany where his philosophy reigned up to Immanuel Kant. Interest in Leibniz increased in the twentieth century, not only in philosophy but also in mathematics and physics. Despite their brilliance, Leibniz's views are open to criticism.

First, many believe that his view of innate ideas is contrary to experience, as Locke and Hume argued. Further, his dualism of mind and body leads to unlikely views of parallelism, occasionalism, and pre-established harmony of mind and body.

Second, even the Principle of Sufficient Reason is subject to serious problems: Two are worth mentioning. It leads logically to a contradictory (self-caused) Being, and it is not rooted in reality but only in the realm of ideas.

Third, the Ontological Argument is based on the widely rejected premise that existence is a perfection. But since Kant this is a widely rejected premise.

Fourth, His Cosmological Argument gives no certain starting point since it is based only in the

observation which is open to debate and deception.

Fifth, his view of free will is indeterministic which violates the principle of causality that every event needs a cause. He fails to understand self-determinism (free will) as a viable alternative.

Sixth, his theodicy implies that the best God can do still involves evil. It was appropriately satirized for this by Voltaire's his book *Candide*. His theodicy has no final Eschaton in this world. He fails to see that this present world is not the best possible one; it is only the best way to the best world.



The Life Works of Pascal

Blaise Pascal was born in Clermont in Auvergne France in 1623. His father was a government official. His mother however, died when Blaise was around three years of age. In 1631, the family moved to Paris to then flee the country seven years later due to his father's opposition to particular governmental rules and regulations. Having been educated by his father and having mastered Latin and Greek, Blaise was later taught mathematics by his father, himself a mathematician. At age twelve, Blaise began extensively working out the principles of geometry. This led to him and his father regularly participating in mathematical lectures. At age sixteen he completed an original treatise on cone-like sections of geometric figures. He wrote his first major work titled *Essai pour les coniques*, published in 1640. Two years later, he invented the calculating machine aimed to help his father in his tax work. He spent the rest of his life on mathematical endeavors and making major contributions to mathematics. He made contributions to the development of differential calculus, and originated the mathematical theory of probability. Several mathematical propositions and demonstrations have been named in his honor: Pascal's arithmetical triangle, Pascal's law, and Pascal's mystic hexagram. Blaise had his first major religious experience in 1654. His later writing was his most important work in the philosophy of mathematics called *L'Esprit geometrique* in 1657/58.

Pascal's Religious Experience

Pascal's religious and philosophical leanings grew out of his involvement with the Jansenist movement (founded by Cornelius Jansen, 1585—1638) within Catholicism which was strongly opposed by the Jesuits. Jansenists posited (like Calvinists) that salvation is limited to those who are subject to supernatural determinism and the rest are assigned to perdition) in 1646 following his religious experience. This religious experience was associated with two Jansenists who were taking care of his father who was stricken by an accident. Later, The Pascal family became followers of the movement. However, from 1652 through 1654, Blaise turned away from his religious focus and became heavily influenced by a more liberal lifestyle. He got involved with friends who were gamblers, womanizers, and more free in their thinking. This led to him becoming contempt for the world and the people in it resulting in no interests towards things of God.

In 1654, Pascal had yet another religious experience—this time turning him back to God and religious activities. This spiritual experience stayed with him for the rest of his life. This time, he discovered the “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars” (Pascal, 311). After the condemnation of the Jansenist apologist by Jesuit theologian Antoine Arnauld in 1655, Pascal wrote his eighteen *Lettres provinciales* (1656–57) which attacked the Jesuit theory of grace and morality. Pascal continued to defend Jansenism until 1659 when he became quite ill leaving

him unable to write. His most famous work is *Pensées* (meaning *Thoughts*). However, he left the *Pensées* unfinished to be later emended and published by editors after his death. One such edition lists sections one through five of the *Pensées* as follows: “Order,” “Vanity,” “Misery,” “Boredom,” and “Cause and Effect.” The sixth and seventh sections focus on man’s philosophical problems—the path to finding truth and happiness. It is both reason and the heart that confirm truths to be certain, thus eliminating the need for required proofs. The eighth section is titled “Contradictions” stressing the value of first principles. The *Pensées* vindicated Christianity through the presentation of facts and fulfillment of prophecy and by an appeal to the heart (Cross, 1036).

According to Pascal, the problem of knowledge is a religious issue. Only when one accepts God’s revelation and is submissive to Him can he gain complete knowledge. It is in the *Pensées* that Pascal tries to show that men avoid recognizing their situation through diversions and philosophy. Pascal thinks that philosophy only leads one to skepticism where there becomes a dependence on one’s own initiative regarding the knowledge of truth. The result is a seeking after happiness without religion, hence leading to failure. It is here where he provides his famous wager.

He also attempted to show how religious belief can be gained by controlling the passions and submitting to God. Reason can also be used to realize that true religion is beyond reason. This true reason can only be known through Jesus Christ. Reason can also expose the futility of science, mathematics, and human philosophy when solely it is used to find truth and true happiness.

The final sections of the *Pensées* is devoted to apologetics. He argues that the true source of religious knowledge comes from historical data, moral precepts, miracles, and fulfilled prophecies.

Faith and Reason

Pascal opposed the Cartesian model of rationalism and as a result was given the undeserved title of fideist. He has been compared to Kierkegaard in terms of anti-philosophical and fideist statements of Christianity. In addition, many existentialists also have studied Pascal because of his portrayal of the human condition. Yet he offered many evidences in support of the Christian Faith. In the tradition of Augustine, in which he was nourished, he believed that only faith could free one from sin and put him in a personal relationship with God. Faith brings an element of risk, but Christian faith is worth the risk. He argued that the “heart has its reasons of which reason knows not.” However, this inner certainty does not exclude the use of reason in supporting the truths of the Christian faith.

Pascal's Apologetic

Pascal's rational apologetic for Christianity can be divided into three parts: his appeal to evidences, his appeals to fulfilled prophecies, and an appeal to his famous “wager” (see below).

The Use of Evidence and Prophecies

Pascal argued that “it is a sign of weakness to prove God from nature” (*Pensées*, no. 466). He further adds, “It is a remarkable fact that no canonical author ever used nature to prove God” (*Ibid.*, no. 463). However, he did list twelve so-called “proofs” for the evidence of Christianity:

1. The fact of its firm and gentle establishment though it is so contrary to nature.
2. The existence of the holiness, sublimity, and humility of a Christian soul.
3. The miracles of Holy Scripture.
4. The existence of Jesus Christ in particular.
5. The existence of the apostles in particular.
6. The existence of the man Moses and the prophets in particular.
7. The existence of the Jewish people;
8. The prophecies that have been recorded (*Pensées* nos. 483–511).
9. No other religion enjoys perpetuity (i.e., its ceaselessness).
10. Its associated doctrines and the accounting for all things.
11. The holiness of its Law.
12. The order of the world (*Ibid.*, no. 482).

Pascal makes mention of the supernatural nature of prophecies, since they were “[written] down [prior to] these things long before they happened” (*Ibid.*, no. 484). He points out their specificity, for example, citing Daniel's prediction of what year the Messiah would die (*Ibid.*, no. 485). With regard to messianic prophecy, Pascal lists numerous detailed predictions, such as Christ's precursor, John the Baptist (Malachi 3), Christ's birth (Isaiah 9; Micah 5), and his work in Jerusalem to blind the wise and learned, (Isaiah 6, 8, 29) (*Ibid.*, no. 487).

Pascal's Wager

There are two assumptions required for Pascal's wager. First, one has to assume that he cannot know for sure by reason alone whether God exists or not, and second, the un-assuredness of what constitutes life beyond this present human existence. The questions that follow becomes: How

then should one live in this life? What are the odds for there being a God and an afterlife? To answer these inquiries, Pascal wrote:

Either God is or he is not. But to which view shall one be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance, a coin is being spun which will come down heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong. . .

Yes, but you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed. Which will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be made, let us see which offers you the least interest. You have two things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. . . . Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist. . .

Pascal added,

“I confess, I admit it, but is there really no way of seeing what the cards are?” “Yes. Scripture and the rest, etc.” “Yes, but my hands are tied and my lips are sealed; I am being forced to wager and I am not free; I am being held fast and I am so made that I cannot believe. What do you want me to do then?” “That is true, but at least get it into your head that, if you are unable to believe, it is because of your passions, since reason impels you to believe and yet you cannot do so. Concentrate then not on convincing yourself by multiplying proofs of God’s existence but by diminishing your passions. You want to find faith and you do not know the road. You want to be cured of unbelief and you ask for the remedy: learn from those who were once bound like you and who now wager all they have. These are people who know the road you wish to follow, who have been cured of the affliction of which they began. They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile.” “But that is what I am afraid of.” “But why? What have you to lose? But to show you that this is the way, the fact is that this diminishes the passions which are your great obstacles. . . .

I tell you that you will gain even in this life, and that at every step you take along this road you will see that your gain is so certain and your risk so negligible that in the end you will realize that you have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you have paid nothing.

According to the wager above, one cannot lose by wagering that God and immortality do indeed exist. Even if one cannot prove the existence of God, or an afterlife, it is a good bet to believe in God. Man has nothing to lose. If it could be shown that God does not exist, the life of the believer is a great life anyway. If God does exist, then this life is even better all the more. Adding to this, the life to come will be even greater. Therefore, believing in God and a life to come is a good bet, for both this life and the one to come. It follows that one must either believe in God or not, however, the odds are in His favor. To gamble on the lower odds of God not existing and that He will not be met after the grave, is a great gamble not worth taking. In Pascal’s own words, “That leaves no choice; wherever there is infinity, and where there are not infinite chances of losing against that of winning, there is no

room for hesitation, you must give everything.”

It is not Fideistic

Though in the *Pensées*, number 149, he emphasizes the heart and faith, he is not a fideist. A fideist is someone who believes without any appeal to reason whatsoever. Pascal did appeal to reason, as is evident from the words he put into Jesus' mouth:

I do not mean you to believe me submissively and without reason; I do not claim to subdue you by tyranny. Nor do I claim to account for everything. . . . I mean to show you by clearly, by convincing proofs, marks of divinity within me which will convince you of what I am, and establish my authority by miracles and proofs that you cannot reject, so that you will then believe the things I teach, finding no reason to reject them but your own inability to tell whether they are true or not.

His Claim Regarding Prophecy was Critiqued

Pascal's view on prophecy came under heavy criticism in the eighteenth century. Criticism from deist Francois-Marie Voltaire (1694–1778) was typical. Regarding Pascal's argument for miracle claims, Voltaire wrote: "not a single one of the prophecies that Pascal referred to can be honestly applied to Christ; and that his discussion of miracles was pure nonsense" (Torrey, 264). However, the deists' questions have been challenged by those who point out that there is evidence that many biblical prophecies that were written well before the events were clear and have been literally fulfilled (see Barton Payne, *Encyclopedia of Biblical Prophecy*).

Pascal's Views Criticized by Voltaire

Voltaire again in his twenty-fifth philosophical letter declared that Pascal's Christian view of the fall, redemption, divine providence, predestination, and grace was neither enlightened nor humanitarian. Instead, according to Voltaire, it encouraged fanaticism.

Regarding Pascal's Wager, Voltaire was shocked that Pascal would resort to such a means to prove the existence of God. If Scriptures say that "the heavens declare the glory of God," then why did Pascal downplay this external evidence as proof, and in trade, propose the wager?

Atheist Walter Kaufmann (1921—1980), German-American philosopher) of Harvard, once quipped that maybe Pascal's God would "out-Luther." That is, "God might punish those whose faith is prompted by prudence" (Kaufmann, 177). However, at best, it would only exclude those who believe in God on such grounds. In addition, the atheist's argument is based on a flawed view of God's character. No morally worthy God, to say nothing of a rational one, would punish someone who uses wisdom in thinking about his ultimate destiny.

Atheist George H. Smith (b. 1949, atheist author who wrote *Atheism: The Case against God*, 1974) argues that one loses too much by making such a wager. "What have we got to lose? His response is that we have lost intellectual integrity, self-esteem, and a passionate, rewarding life for starters. In short, everything that makes life worth living. Far from being a safe bet, Pascal's wager requires the wager of one's life and happiness" (Smith, 184). However, it is not at all clear that this is the case. Pascal himself was a man of great intellect and great integrity, as even most of his enemies are willing to admit. Moreover, certainly it is simply false to hold that Pascal and other thinking Christians do not have a "rewarding life." Indeed, this is part of Pascal's wager, namely, that we have nothing to lose, since this life of faith alone—even if there were no God—is eminently worthwhile. Finally, Smith overlooks the major point Pascal makes: The believer anticipates eternal reward as

well. “Everything to gain and really nothing to lose.” On the other side of the coin, unbelief has a difficult time answering Pascal.

One could challenge the premise that believers have nothing to lose. If there is no God, Christians submit to a life of sacrifice for nothing (2 Cor. 11:22–28; 2 Tim. 3:12). They missed a lot of fun by being a believer. However, considering that the believer has true joy and peace, forgiveness, and hope, even in suffering (Romans 5, James 1), this is hardly a telling point.

The wager, however, is not offered as a proof for the existence of God, but only a path of prudence. It merely shows that it is foolish not to believe in God. The question remains as to whether the “wise” path leads to truth.

Final Thoughts

Pascal attempts to drive home his ultimate conclusion by taking a christocentric view of the meaning of life and death. He wrote: “. . . Apart from Jesus Christ we cannot know the meaning of our life or our death, of God, or of ourselves” (*Pascal’s Pensées*, Penguin Classics, 417).

Pascal’s effective literary style points to the undeniable fact that people are unhappy, and it is this unhappiness that pervades his life experiences. His peril is contrasted with the fact that he seeks for truth and happiness, however unable to find it outside of Christianity which he believed was the only adequate explanation for both human wretchedness (the cause of his unhappiness) and his greatness as image bearers of God leading them to fulfillment.

Pascal offered his “Wager” to challenge the heart and mind of man even though this was not his primary concern. It was used as another step along the path pointing man back to God. His “reasonable bet” is not intended to prove God’s existence, but rather to illustrate after all has been said that God is the only reasonable “wager” that must be taken. This wager, numbered 418, is just another rung on the ladder. The wager follows after the dreaded human condition is exposed leading to his unhappiness. Humans attempts to hide their despair through divergences they create in their life or through indifference. Though humans desperately seeks for truth and happiness, there is hope when their sights are set on God. True happiness is found after following the clues that of Himself God has left behind. The wager appeals to natural reason, not to supernatural faith. Pascal believed that it is the uniqueness of Christianity with its reliable and historical Scriptures, claimed miracles, and witness of the Jewish nation that point man back to God where he belongs. It is not just a wager on the existence of God but rather on the God of Christianity who promises salvation.

Some Sources on Pascal

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FRANCIS BACON (A.D. 1561 - 1626)



The Life of Bacon

Francis Bacon was born in London during the Elizabethan era. His father was a Lord Keeper of the Great Seal under Queen Elizabeth. His mother was a well-educated Puritan woman. At the age of twelve Bacon entered Trinity College at Cambridge to study law. After reading Michel Montaigne (the Father of modern skepticism), he was led to dislike Aristotle. From 1576-1579 Bacon served as the English ambassador to France. At the age of twenty-three he entered Parliament. Between 1607 and 1618, he held a number of high offices of the state: Solicitor General, Attorney General, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Lord Chancellor, created Baron Verulam (1618) and Viscount St. Albans (1621). Under King James I, he became Lord Chancellor. In this position, he was accused him of accepting bribes (some believe unjustly). However, he was found guilty, and was subsequently stripped of all official positions and was denied access to the court. Going into retirement, Bacon spent the remainder of his life in historical, scientific, and philosophical studies. He became a prominent speaker, lawyer, and judge. In 1621 he was found guilty of taking bribes and was imprisoned. While imprisoned he began his work in science. He died of bronchitis while doing an experiment to see if animal bodies could be preserved by the cold.

Bacon is neither an idealist, nor a scientific skeptic, nor a pragmatist, but rather, he is an empiricist depending upon the results of careful observation. He heralded his new method as a means of reconciliation between the empiricists (exalting nature and experience) and the rationalists (making reason and universal concepts supreme). This combination of reason and experience are evident in his classic work titled *Novum Organum* [the new organ or logic].

The Writings of Bacon

He published his work titled *Essays* in 1597. They contained the following: the *Meditationes Sacrae*, *Colours of Good and Evil*, *Elements of the Common Law of England*, *Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature*. In 1605 he published *The Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*. His famous *Novum Organum* was published in 1620. After his death his book the *New Atlantic* was published in 1627 by his secretary Rawley.

The Scientific Endeavors of Bacon

Bacon is known as the Father of modern science. He acknowledged that the roots of modern science were in the doctrine of creation. He spoke of it in several places (see below).

Bacon's Division of Philosophy

Philosophy deals primarily with natural reason while excluding data gleaned from revelation or sacred doctrine. (Therefore, he is eliminating the philosophical discussions which were central to the Scholastics.) Bacon states that there are three branches of philosophy: the philosophy of nature, of

man, and of God. The philosophy of man deals with man as a composite individual and his relationship in society. The philosophy of nature does not answer questions of First Mover, the final end of things, nor of the substance of the immaterial soul. Rather, there is a division in the philosophy of nature broken down into the speculative and practical. The speculative studies the natural causes for the sake of knowledge itself and the practical determines how to use it in relation to nature and man. The second branch is the operative philosophy of nature. The philosophy of God is concerned with this rather than the theological. Nature does not contain God's true image but only faint traces of His presence. Hence, philosophy can say nothing about the divine essence of God or anything about his will or decrees.

The Origin of Science in Creation

Bacon believed that the basis for modern Science is found Gen.1:28 (the Divine command to subdue the world). He wrote: "The beginning is from God" (*Novum Organum* 1.93, 91). "God on the first day of creation created light..." (1.70, 68). He spoke of "the Creator's own stamp upon creation..." (1.124, 114). He said, "Only let the human race recover that right over Nature which belongs to it by divine bequest [in Gen. 1:28]..." (1:129, 119). Likewise, Galileo and Kepler were motivated in Science by their belief in the Creator. Alfred North Whitehead later acknowledged that belief in a Creator was at the basis of Science, affirming that "The faith in the possibility of science... is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology" (*Science in the Modern World*, 13).

The Reconstruction of All Knowledge

As an empiricist, Bacon believed that human knowledge begins with sense experience. This knowledge can be expanded by careful observation and experimentation, drawing careful and slow inferences from the data in order to create facts. Bacon saw that a new foundation based on natural science and the use of logic would point scientists to make new discoveries and provide philosophy with substance for interpretation. His motivation was to reveal the errors of the past (referring to the Ancients and the Medievals) which made it necessary to start anew.

Bacon expressed to James I of England his dissatisfaction with the state of the learning process. It seemed to have suffered from three infectious diseases: *contentions*—where the Schoolmen were musing over traditional texts rather than exploring the riches of nature and pondering over its creativity; *affections*—some were paying greater heed to the use of fine words and classical authority rather than to the matter actually being expressed and to its truth; and *fantasy*—some were receiving and presenting their statements about the nature of things in a loose way. Old wives tales were accepted as natural history and the Ancients were worshipped as idols. He considered Ancient and Medieval views to be rubble. Bacon's view was a reaction to Aristotle, replacing his deductive method with an inductive (and experimental) method.

Bacon posed a radical reconstruction which could only be accomplished by a new method which would uproot the old fixed habits of learning. Scientists looked to Bacon's new method for inspiration in unlocking the mysteries of the universe. He rejected any notion of teleology (purpose) or final causality in science. He once said, "Inquiry into final causes is sterile and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing" (See Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 3:108).

Bacon coined the phrase, "Knowledge is power" (*Novum Organum* 1:3). The scientific method is the means to increase power over nature (*NO* 1:116). To achieve this, one must overcome the corruption of the mind that hinders scientific progress. He attempted to do this in several ways: by criticizing the natural human reason, by evaluating the prevailing philosophical system, and by

incorporating the new logic of demonstration. This was to be accomplished in conjunction overthrowing the false notions that people had about the world.

Overcoming the Corruption of the Mind

This new method was based on divine ideas. These ideas would give rise to a true and exact model of nature's actual being. This was in contrast to the baseless figments created in man's minds (idols). These baseless idols were divided into four different kinds: idols of the mind, the cave, the marketplace, and the theater. The first three are natural fallacies whereas the fourth is an artificial idol. Bacon believed that there were certain idols (phantasm) which kept the mind from properly viewing Nature which included:

Idols of the Mind. These tribal idols are those human desires which "read into" Nature what their ethnic group believes rather than reading out of nature what is actually there. These are the superstitious and erroneous beliefs which human nature is so inclined towards. These provide no information or they provide false information. Where there are instances of 'popular opinion,' the associated evidence that affirms the opinion is observed whereas anything contradictory to the evidence is neglected. Sometimes popular opinion results in men jumping to conclusions regarding other unrelated cases (called the fallacy of hasty generalization) because of dulled minds and clouded the emotions. Because of their impatience, this makes them ready to believe what they wish without considering the conclusions resulting from research. (This is why people believe in dreams, omens, astrology, and other superstitions.)

Idols of the Cave are derived from a metaphor found in Plato's analogy of the cave in his *Republic*. These arise from man's individual histories providing man with a particular bent. Bacon said that people have these as the shadow-like biases that people obtain through education and authorities. Every man lives in a 'cave' of their own idiosyncrasies based on heredity, education, habits, and circumstances. These limit men in their thinking, insisting that "The rest of the world must function the way mine does."

Idols of the Marketplace are the problems that people have in trying to develop a proper language in order to pursue the truth. Man thinks that he is the master of words only to find out later that his words entangle him in error. Words are a substitute for things man does not understand, but these words can also end up being phantasms of the mind. Men are unable to dispute about words because they are unable to define them properly. This is a result of confused opinions of the past or from words that are so deeply rooted in culture which also ends in confusion.

Idols of the Theater idols are the ideas of prevailing philosophical systems. These came from the dogmas of philosophy and from improper laws of demonstration. These hinder pure thought because they build a wall between the real world and the abstract world of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. (Here is where Bacon condemns Aristotle as a representative of the Rationalists because he attempted to fashion the world out of categories, first drawing conclusions, then afterwards resorting to experimentation.) In addition, there were those philosophers who were corrupted by their superstitions or by an admixture with theology. Bacon strongly opposes *any* attempt to base anything scientific or philosophical upon a literal application of anything affirmed in revealed religion. Founding a system of natural philosophy on the first chapters of Genesis or the book of Job is "seeking the dead among the living." Here is where Bacon was trying to free science and philosophy from dogmatic theology. There is no expectation placed on a physicist to introduce religious convictions into scientific inquiry. Nor is there the need to interpret nature so as to make it

conform to the creeds.


Further addressing the issues surrounding philosophical thought, Bacon states the three main schools of philosophy and their inherent problems. The superstitious or theological thinkers mingle theological considerations with philosophy by appealing to transcendent entities, first causers, etc., as grounds for explaining natural philosophy. Second, the empiricists fail to provide a place for sound reason. Instead, they jump to conclusions based on their experiments with the proper reasoning. Lastly, the rationalists (or scholastics) seem to neglect the study of individual facts. With them, deductive reasoning predominates while experimentation is kept at a minimum.

Installing the New Inductive Method

Bacon opposed the old deductive logic of Aristotle with the new inductive logic of scientific investigation. Bacon's *Novum Organum* (New Organ) on inductive logic was intended to replace Aristotle's *Organon* which was a reliance on the deductive methods of the syllogism. The old Aristotelian method began with hasty generalizations and then deduced conclusions from them. Bacon relies heavily on the theory of nature—traits that are manifested in the mind—and forms—the thing in its essential nature. Bacon's inductive method allows for both an experimental and a rational approach for knowledge coming into being. It does not exclusively focus on an experiment's singular collection of data nor does it only consider deductive principles alone. The method of induction starts with particular facts from observation. Man cannot impose laws upon nature nor can he in advance of the experience (empirical observation) reason out what these laws of nature must be. The difference is that only at the end of the inductive process can axioms be contrived warding off hasty deductive generalizations. From these facts one can come to valid generalizations. Bacon was liberating modern thought from the blind acceptance of past authorities yet warding off blind imaginative speculation of the imagination. Bacon employed lively descriptions to make his point. He rejected scholastic spiders who spin truth out of their own mind. Rather we should be Baconian bees who extract the honey from nature and form it into practical products.

Bacon disliked and distrusted theories that were a hangover from Medieval metaphysics. Previously, scientists made bold assumptions to form their 'speculative' hypotheses which furthered their deductions to substantiate their hypotheses. However, Bacon's inductive method, revisiting the scientists' claim, was used to establish the truth or falsity of their claims. Likewise, he distrusted mathematics which hindered pure observation. The Table of Inquiry was at the heart of Bacon's inductive procedure. These tables enable the mind to sift out relevant facts that bear on a specific inquiry. They also allow for the recording of particular facets of the research. These tables are: the table of essence or presence, the table of deviation or absence, the table of comparison and degrees. This involves listing all the cases where a particular expression such as heat is present. Then, it calls for listing all of the similar cases in the first case, but note where the effect is missing. Finally, one should construct a table comparing the presence of the effect and where the effect is not present. Bacon's method of relying on the empirical data by his means of comparative tables was in a sense neglecting the mathematical deductive process. However, Bacon was one who insisted that person's senses can deceive him if he hastily bases his conclusion on his limited and immediate perceptions. Bacon's tables of induction and his other aids to the understanding laid a foundation for scientific inquiry later developed by John Stuart Mill which is known as the Law of Concomitant Variation.

GALILEI GALILEO (A.D. 1564 - 1642)



Introduction

Up until the time of Galileo, physical science was considered a part of philosophy and was taught as such in the universities. This led to a science that was largely deductive. It was Galilei Galileo and some of his predecessors that questioned this methodology. After some experimentation of his own, specifically focusing on Aristotle's principle of motion, he came up with some new results and principles. To him, observation, experimentation, and reason alone based upon the certainty of mathematics could establish physical truth. (It was Descartes who criticized Galileo's attempts to investigate physical effects without *a priori* knowledge of their causes.) Accordingly, he disputed the right of philosophers (and theologians as well) to employ dominance over scientific inquiries or even the theories associated with science. In formulating his theory against the mainstream, he was careful *not* to make the same mistakes as Bacon and Bernardino Telesio (A.D. 1509—1588, an Italian philosopher and natural scientist) did. Galileo relied solely on sensory evidence because he knew of the potential for misinterpretation. In the end, it was the example of Galileo that was followed, not that of Descartes, which modern science has followed. This scientific theory of knowledge had risen to a position of pre-eminence in modern philosophy, even in some quarters threatening to expel metaphysics entirely (see Logical Positivism below).

His Life

Galilei Galileo was born in 1564 and died in 1642. In 1581/1582, he enrolled in the school of medicine at the University of Pisa. His interests turned to mathematics in about 1583, leaving the university in 1585 without receiving his degree. In 1589, he secured a chair of mathematics at Pisa. He made fundamental discoveries in dynamics (inquiries into the cause of motions in bodies versus bodies at rest). Galileo is noted for his advancement of the telescope which was first invented in the Netherlands. His view of mathematics set him in opposition to the Aristotelian followers who looked unfavorably on the introduction of mathematics into physics. In 1591, he left Pisa and continued his mechanical research. In 1604, he disclosed in a letter to a friend his law of a freely falling body. In 1609, he devoted his interests to the development of the telescope. By the time he wrote his final work (*Dialogues*) in 1638, he was totally blind, relying upon assistants to aid him in his work until his death in 1642.

Galileo's Works and Writings

There was strong opposition to his 1612 publication of *Discourse on Bodies in Water* because he ridiculed Aristotle's theory of the elements. The 1613 publication titled *Letters on Sunspots* aroused theological opposition because of its support of the Copernican theory which

appeared to contradict the Bible's assertion of the motion of the earth and the stability of the sun. Having been attacked by philosophers and priests, he responded and claimed that the biblical passages had no authority in scientific controversies. Rather, the Bible should be interpreted in the light of man's knowledge of natural phenomenon, gained through reason and observation. Because of his larger telescope, Galileo was able to make greater celestial discoveries and recorded his finding in *The Sidereal Message* (1610) he supposed that all the planets consisted of basically the same sort of matter as the earth. This was a radical break with earlier views that heavenly bodies above the moon moved in circular and eternal motions. In his *Letter to Christina* (1615, pub. 1636), he makes the distinction between two spheres: that of faith and that of science. Whenever a natural phenomenon is under consideration, the language of the Bible is to be interpreted by the findings of science whereas the interpretations of the super-natural texts should be left to the theologian. The idea behind these two languages was further elaborated in his *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences* (1638). *The Assayer*, a polemic over the nature of comets, in general contains the theme of the proper and improper use of observation and experiment, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the necessity for clarification of language in regards to physical concepts, and the infinite scope of natural phenomenon.

His Philosophy

Galileo created no systematic philosophy even though his influence on modern philosophical thought is apparent. He made a definite separation between physical science and philosophy. He posed an abandonment of authority as a criterion of scientific truth and held a distinction between objective and subjective qualities in observable phenomena. He introduced (or rather reintroduced) empirical and skeptical elements into philosophical investigations. His writings marked the beginning of an anti-metaphysical movement in philosophy exemplified in later times by Positivism. The revival of atomism and the removal of occult qualities from the concept of causality owed much to Galileo.

Galileo philosophical contribution is seen in his scientific investigation carried over into the field of epistemology. The conditions of his education and career led to intimate familiarity with Aristotle though in his polemic work he refers to him with disfavor. He also refers more favorably to Democritus, Socrates, Plato and Seneca. During most of Galileo's life, his favorite reading was literary rather than philosophical. Opinions vary on those who have attempted to determine Galileo's position—some think he was Platonic, others think he was a strongly Aristotelian, and still others see him as having a preoccupation with method that excludes any dogmatic philosophy.

The Aristotelians were mainly interested in progressing from the *that* to the *what* and *wherefore* of a thing's nature. Galileo, on the other hand, restricts scientific inquiry to the *how* because this is equivalent to a mathematical description of the nature of the object as it moves in time and space. The senses reveal the fact of the phenomenon whereas doubt urges the intellect to greater formulations of the nature of the thing. Here is where Galileo says that in philosophy doubt is the father of invention paving the way for the discovery of truth. Hence, his scientific methodology can be stated as follows: from sensation, to doubt, to resolution-reduction-analysis, to composition-deduction-synthesis, and finally to experimental verification.

Galileo had observed that the human mind avoids any extreme position. However, even though the mind is not omniscient, it is totally capable of attaining truth. Though the mind is certainly not a 'divine' mind, and in this regard, nonetheless, it knows some genuine truths about nature. Because he never wrote a philosophical treatise, he was interested in epistemology even though his thoughts on

scientific methods were read by many philosophers in his day. In regards to the intellect and the creation of man, he states that God first created the world followed by man fitted with intellect allowing him to conform to and with the world around him.

Galileo considers a great philosopher as one who looks at the ‘book of nature’ rather than books of previous philosophers. This great ‘book of nature,’ whose author is the ‘geometrizing’ God, is governed by laws of numbers, written in the language of mathematics where its character illustrated circles, triangles, and other mathematical objects. This is why, according to Galileo, mathematics, rather than logic, is the only instrument for the discovery of truth in natural philosophy. Mathematics alone is able to decipher the very language in which the natural phenomenon is written for man to discover. Even though Aristotelian logic is an excellent tool for analyzing thought and showing consistent proofs of truths *already* discovered, it cannot advance the original truths about nature—it is exclusively a logic of exposition whereas a logic of discovery is needed.

His Influence on Other Philosophers

Galileo reaffirmed certain skeptical premises which had lapsed during the mid-fifteen hundreds. This was known as the time of authority in every sphere of activity—political, religious, and philosophical. Galileo’s objective-subjective qualifiers reinforced the separation between physics and philosophy. The source of this position certainly seems to be the Greek atomists, however, from his own writings he seems more of a naïve realist.

Because Galileo restricted his philosophy of nature to primary affections of bodies (number, motion, rest, figure, position, size, physical touch or contact), this made possible the phenomenalist assertion that these bodies did not contain any real substantial essence on their own but rather existed somewhere ‘behind’ the ascertained properties.

Second, the concept of divine freedom supplied by Galileo raised serious question. He held that God is His freedom could conceive of several possible mathematical systems that could be realized in nature. For Malebranche and Leibniz, the question was, “Is there any possibility for an alternative universe?” They believed that Galileo, making claims to particular mathematical explanations that rested on grounds of a standard of simplicity of which God must adhere, endangers the concept of divine freedom.

Because Galileo made the discoveries that he did, including his philosophical insights, Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz, and others as well, were compelled to discover ways in which the human side of reality might be made the subject of philosophical analysis. Like Bacon, Galileo raised the issue for latter philosophers to deal, namely, whether a single method could be devised to encompass both man and nature from a common perspective.

The Condemnation of Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church

The condemnation of Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church has left a wound that has never fully healed. For the Church condemned Galileo’s discovery that challenged the outdated Ptolemaic geocentric universe. Using his telescope to view the heavens, he adopted the Copernican view that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the solar system. This, of course, was opposed to the prevailing theological position of an earth-centered system held by the Roman Catholic Church.” In 1616, the Copernican theory was condemned by Rome and Galileo was summoned by the Inquisition (shortly thereafter in 1632) where he was tried and punished for heresy. Some Catholic scholars claim that no *ex cathedra* was given in Galileo’s case, but, the charges leveled at him came with

papal authority. To this day the Church struggles to regain respect in the scientific community for this fallible pronouncement. What is more, it has given support to the complete separation of making scientific pronouncements based on theological teachings. In fact, Galileo's famous statement has gained widespread acceptance, even in some non-Catholic circles when he contended that the Bible was intended to tell us how to go to heaven, but not to inform us on how the heavens go.



The Life and Works of John Locke

John Locke was born in the small town of Wrington, near Bristol, England in 1632, the same year as Spinoza. Like Spinoza, Locke had delicate health. His mother, who seemingly died when he was a youngster, was recalled by Locke as a 'pious and affectionate woman.' Locke's father was a country lawyer and raised the boy with strictness. Locke's Puritan upbringing taught him traits of piety, prudence, conscientiousness, integrity, industry, self-reliance, and the love of liberty. Locke was educated at home until he went to Westminster School at the age of fourteen. In 1652, he entered the university at Christ's Church at Oxford as a junior student. After his BA and MA degrees in 1659, he was elected to a senior studentship at Christ Church. After Locke completed his undergraduate studies at Oxford, he was granted a post that provided graduate studies along with his teaching position. He began giving instruction in Greek, rhetoric and later in moral philosophy. His scientific studies were in the fields of physics, chemistry, meteorology, and medicine. During his years at Oxford, he spent much time in scientific investigation. He became a close assistant to Robert Boyle and provided his assistance in numerous chemical experiments. While at Oxford, his religious loyalties focused on the Church of England because it had a broader basis for national unity. Sometime later, he decided to become involved in public affairs but only in a minimal capacity.

He regarded his undergraduate studies in philosophy as unintelligible. However, during this time, he did have access to Descartes' writings. This exposure gave him a new enthusiasm for philosophy. He was reassured that clear and rational thinking was just as possible in philosophy as it was in the empirical sciences.

It is interesting to note that while Locke was political confidant to first Earl of Shaftesbury that Locke had the role of secretary to the founders of the colony in Carolina. The Earl, having died in 1683, took an active role paving the way for the Revolution of 1688. Locke was sympathetic to this endeavor. However, as a consequence of his political leaning, he was deprived of his place at Oxford at the order of Charles II. Locke was forced to live in exile in Europe. Nevertheless, spending most of his time in Holland, he utilized his time and developed his philosophical skills.

It was during this time that he began his work titled *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (where the first drafts were started in 1671 and the first edition was published in 1690). Locke continued to add to this work which resulted in four editions. Locke also wrote *Letter concerning Toleration* (1689), *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693), and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695).

Locke never married and lived modestly allowing himself time to review his philosophical

notes of the past twenty years. This time allowed him to complete the manuscript *Essay on Human Understanding* as well as other writings. After the breakout of the Revolution in 1688, Locke returned to England and spent his last declining years under the care of Sir Francis' wife and daughter. In 1700, Locke permanently retired from public service and died peacefully in October 1704 while Lady Masham, daughter of Ralph Ondworth, was reading the Psalms to him. Ralph Ondworth was a Cambridge Platonist and perhaps this is where some of Locke's platonic views came from.

Locke was an empiricist in the sense that he believed that all material knowledge is supplied by sense-perception and introspection. However, he was not an empiricist in the sense that this is the only way one can know things.

The Empirical Epistemology of John Locke

Instead of discussing the nature of God first, Locke posits that first there needs to be an inquiry into the nature of knowing itself. To bypass epistemology—how we know—is to begin at the wrong end of philosophy. One needs to start with epistemology then proceed to metaphysics, then ethics, and finally to the cosmological topics of philosophy. He states this procedure in the *Essays*: “To inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent” (*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Introduction, 2). Locke called his view “the plain historical method,” meaning, that he treated ideas just as they appear in our minds. His goal was to discover the origin, extent, and degree of certainty in our knowledge.

Second, in Locke's methodology, he begins with an analysis of the ideas, which are defined as “whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks . . . whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking” (*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 8.). By starting with the ideas as the ‘atomic’ elements of knowledge, he accepted the Cartesian analytical approach. (Spinoza and Bacon focused on evaluating the effects—trying the ideas first that were related to definite realities—whereas Locke first makes inquiry into the cause of the ideas that fall within the mind's range of thinking.)

Ideas are not Innate

Conservative thinkers in England revived the ancient Stoic conception of innate ideas. These innate ideas included the fundamental principles implied in all logical reasoning, which included the basic principles of morality, conscience, and God. Their motivation was to find a basis of morality, religion, and science. Descartes and Leibniz believed in innate ideas. He maintained that natural ideas and knowledge were grounded in experience resulting in no innate ideas. Locke argued that if God had given any innate ideas to man it would be innate ideas of Himself, and according to Locke, God has not done this.

Locke disagreed with what was customary belief that there are some speculative and practical principles that are innately imprinted on men's minds. He based this on the premise that even though men agree about these certain principles, this does not prove that these principles are correct. No proposition can be made that these imprints already existed even though it was not conscious of them. According to Locke, the mind is furnished with ideas that come from experience—sensation and reflection, elevating intuition and demonstration. However, Locke did grant that human nature has certain inborn powers which are not derived from experience. These would include the appetitive powers resulting in actions (like certain prenatal activities), yet all the while rejecting innate

cognitive principles proposed by others.

There are Two Sources of ideas

If there are no innate ideas, then ideas must only be drawn from experience. This is the thesis of Locke. However, for Locke experience can be either ‘operations of experience’ or ‘objects of experience.’ An idea is defined as an object of thought. There are two kinds of ideas. First, in order of priority, sensation is the experience of an external object which presses on body and produces an idea in the mind. Locke considers these simple ideas as ‘the atoms’ out of which all knowledge is compiled. This compilation comes from either one of the senses (color, sound, taste) or a combination of one or more of the senses (space, figure, motion).

Next, reflection is the experience of internal operations of the mind. Reflection is the mental process taking a simple idea and turning it into perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, knowing, and willing. There are also simple ideas received from *both* sensation and reflection. These would be things like as pain, pleasure, existence, and unity. However, there is an exception—power. Power is illustrated by a thought that turns into some motion, for example, thinking about moving a finger.

As noted above, Locke states that there are no innate ideas—a mind devoid of contents yet ‘innately’ having powers to relate and abstract. In the natal condition, the mind is comparable to an empty cabinet, a blank paper, or a dark room. The proof of this is that the mind of a child prior to any sensations is born a *tabula rasa* (a blank slate) without a storeroom of ideas. What Locke means by *tabula rasa* is that the natal mind is devoid of contents. Locke does give account to the mind ‘powers’ that are evidently innate. These ‘powers’ allow the mind to compound, compare, relate, and create abstractions from simple ideas. Where there are different experiences, there are different ideas. Where there is no experience, there is no corresponding idea. For example, person born blind has no ideas of sight, and persons born deaf has no idea of sound. We only have ideas that fit one or more of the five senses (or combinations thereof).

Two Kinds of Ideas

There are simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas, not fabricated by the mind but rather imposed upon the mind, are one uniform concept or appearance in the mind conforming to external objects. The content of a simple idea are the single, unmixed appearance of the object. The mind neither creates nor destroys these; it simply stores them. The mind is passive with regard to this. Complex ideas are a combination of simple ideas. The content of a complex idea is the compounding of several simple ideas. The mind is active here. Operationally, simple and complex ideas are quite different. The mind is relatively passive in reference to simple ideas whereas it is active in the formation of complex ones. The passive mind is initially receptive to simple ideas inputted from the sensible world. They cannot be invented but rather require at least a minimal amount of conscious attention to the sensible world.

The mind does not know things immediately. It thinks by the intercession of the ideas it has about objects. Complex ideas are made out of simple ideas in the mind. This occurs basically in three ways. The mind can combine several simple ideas into a compound one (beauty, gratitude, man, army); combine simple and complex ideas together (relations such as father and son, bigger and less, cause and effect); or abstracting of an idea from accompanying ones to form a universal concept (the color white from chalk, snow, milk to form the universal of ‘whiteness’). This is known as Locke’s principle of combination, relation, and abstraction. Even though the mind thinks through ideas, the world exists independent of the mind. Thus, Locke was a forerunner of 20th century Critical Realism.

Four Classes of Ideas

Based upon the two abilities of sensation and reflection, the principle of division among the simple ideas can now be further understood. Simple ideas belong to four classes. First, there are ideas from the individual senses. Locke breaks this down into primary and secondary qualities. A quality is a power in a real thing to produce ideas of qualities in the mind. The primary quality of the idea is simply the likeness of the object in the mind. The secondary quality is only the idea of it that is present in the mind bearing no resemblance to the real power of the thing. Locke emphasizes that things such as color, taste, sound, odor, heat, and solidity are only the bare powers of the object where these depend upon the primary qualities.

Second, there are ideas of substances from seeing and touching such as space, extension, figure, rest, and motion. Sensation and reflection say nothing about the nature of the substance as such. The mind can only go as far as the qualities and powers which produce the ideas. What results is a vagueness of the object.

Third, there are ideas from reflection only which is a voluntary attention given an idea described in the following abilities. Here is where Locke focuses on the efficient cause. The cause is what functions in the production of a simple or complex idea where the effect (resulting from the production) is that idea that is produced. The causal principle thus states that ‘everything that has a beginning must have a cause.’ Retention is the ability to keep or revive an idea. Discerning is the ability to distinguish one idea from another. Comparing is the ability to relate ideas to time, place, etc. Compounding is the power to combine simple ideas. Naming is the use of signs and labels for ideas. Abstracting is the using of ideas from particulars to represent general classes.

Fourth, there are the ideas of from sensation and reflection. These include: 1) pleasure and pain—of what is desirable and undesirable: 2) existence and unity of things actually present as one; 3) Power and causality which is the ability of persons or physical objects to do things. Finally, there are ideas of succession, that is, of thoughts in passing trains.

Three Kinds of Complex Ideas

As there are more and more simple ideas being generated along with the developmental power of the mind, the reservoir of these ideas create the formulation for complex ideas easier. These complex ideas are a result of combining, comparing, and separating these in the mind. Locke also posits modes as either simple or mixed. First there are Ideas of modes (accidents), namely, that which depends on a substance. These simple modes are: modes of motion, sound, color, processes of thought, pleasure and pain, power, good and evil, the freedom of the will, and happiness. This could be a variation of one simple idea—dozen, score, etc. Or, it could be compounds of different ideas—thrift, beauty, murder, etc. He also states that there are complex modes, such as gratitude, beauty, and obligation, Law and morality that are composed of these complex modes.

Second, there is the idea of substance. Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in different senses. In general, by ‘substance’ is meant the combination of ideas to represent one subsisting thing. It is an unknown substratum for many simple ideas, namely, a support for accidents, i.e., the unknown something where the observable qualities belong to the unknown substance. Substances can be either Spiritual or material. Spiritual substance is known from within and is an immaterial entity that thinks and excites motion in others by mind or will. A corporeal is known from without) and is what has cohesion of solid parts with power to cause motion by impulse.

There is also the idea of relation which is the means of comparing one idea to another. Important to these relations are the intercourses of cause and effect, identity and diversity. (Locke's treatment of these associations of ideas marks an important maneuver in the development of this school of thought. However, these common-sense views of relations of causality and identity will later be criticized by Hume (see).

The Two Causes of ideas

Ideas can be caused either externally or internally. External bodies cause simple ideas, and internal operation of mind cause complex ideas. The causes of primary qualities are inseparable from body with the power to produce ideas in us such as, solidity, extension, motion, rest, number, and figure. The causes of secondary qualities which do not exist in the external body; this cause merely has the power to produce these qualities in us. The evidence is that bad food is not sick; it only causes sickness. A prism is not colored; it only refracts color. Fire is not hot and in pain; it only causes these.

The Two-fold Nature of Knowledge

All knowledge is either agreement or disagreement. This agreement/disagreement is of four kinds. The first is the original act of the mind where it perceives and identifies. Second, it makes immediate discernment of the relations between ideas. Next, there is the observation of the coexistence (or the non-coexistence) of ideas of the same object. Last is the knowledge of the real existence, basically, what in the real world corresponds to the idea.

There are three degrees of knowledge—intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive. Intuition is where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas without any interventions. Intuition is the agreement between two ideas immediately perceived (e. g., "I" and "exist"= I exist). This is the most certain knowledge possible. When the mind cannot reach a verdict it goes to the demonstrative knowledge which depends upon proofs for verification. Demonstration is agreement between two ideas seen by way of a third (e.g., God exists)—less certain to us only because of chain of argument makes it so. Sensation is agreement between an idea and an external object (e. g., the world exists) is less certain. The sensitive knowledge is derived from simple ideas of sensation. The sensitive knowledge ensures us that the world exists. Proof of external world is that there must be a source of our ideas. But some ideas are more likely than others. And we have the combined testimony of several senses. Further, pleasure and/or pain repeatedly occur upon contact with it.

Language

Locke attempted to refute those types of rationalism that were still influential, especially regarding concepts or universals in regards to communication and language. Locke held that it may be convenient to assign a word to every particular thing, but is impossible to provide a specific proper name to *every* particular thing. Quality is what defines and distinguishes one thing as different from something else. The meanings or words of things are somewhat dynamic and are subject to change over a course of time. Not only is there the possibility of change but there is also the possibility of an equivocation. The mind equivocates when it takes a combination of ideas and puts them together. The result is an essence of the thing of one's *own making*. The extent of human knowledge can go no farther than the ideas of a thing and the connections that have been perceived in the mind about that idea. The mind at times is unable to find the 'middle term' that it needs in order to link ideas together. Couple this problem to sense knowledge that is regulated to only the here-and-now.

Translation from one language to another creates even further problems: a word in one language that is unable to be translated to another language because no word exists. According to Locke's philosophy, opportunity for equivocation or misunderstanding does not apply to God because he thinks that the existence of God comes within the realm of absolutely demonstrative knowledge.

Proof for the Existence of God

Man intuitively knows his own existence, but he knows God's existence by demonstration, beginning with sensations from the external world. Locke rejects the Cartesian *a priori* argument for the existence of God: that the *idea* of the infinite has an empirical origin and that an existential demonstration cannot be made from a pure *idea*. According to Locke, the demonstration of God's existence must start from an intuitive and existential basis that is provided through the apprehension of one's own existence. The weakest kind of existential knowledge is that of 'things'. When Locke's philosophy for the existence of God is based upon sense knowledge, its conclusion can only afford probability. Rather, existential knowledge should be based on the self and on God. The existence of one's self does not in itself prove the existence of God. There is the need of additional intuitive truths.

Locke's argument that God exists begins with something exists. I know that I exist by intuition and that the world exists by sensation. This something comes either a) from itself, b) from nothing, or c) from another. But **only** something can cause something. Something cannot be caused by nothing. Further, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes of the existence of the world. For if there were, then the whole world would rest on nothing. But this is impossible, for in this case (since nothing cannot cause something) the world would never have come into existence. Therefore, there must be a First Cause of my existence and the world. This eternal Being must be most powerful and most knowing. It must be most powerful because it is the source of all power, and it must be most knowing because the cognitive cannot arise from the non-cognitive.

When Locke considers the existence of an eternally existing being, the question arises as to the (additional descriptors associated with the) nature of this being. Locke uses the principle that whatever human being has as its finite 'being' and beginnings must originate from an eternally infinite existing being that also exhibits these traits. (For example, man finds that he has powers, perception, intelligence, knowledge, etc. Therefore, this eternally existing Being must also have these qualities in greater proportion. Hence, man is created in the image of this eternally existing Being.)

Locke's View of Ethics and Government

Locke believed in God and it is quite evident that his moral philosophy is decidedly based in God. He held that moral science could be demonstrated just as stringently as mathematics. Locke's conclusion is that ethics is a demonstrative science. He realized that in the elaborations of ethical teachings that difficulties are present because of the complexity and mixture of ethical ideas. He also saw that the vagueness of language and meaning of words, coupled to special interests and passions, were also a part of the problem. While men have no innate ideas, man does have an innate 'desire' to experience pleasure and an 'uneasiness' wanting him to escape pain in this life and the next. The end of human action is the acquisition of happiness. The motivation to adhere to moral law is often hedonistic in nature rather than doing so because of rational obligation.

Morality, based on the will and the law of God, is exercised between human actions and law. Law is found in God—the true ground of morality set up for man to find and follow, in civic community, or in private rule of opinion or reputation. If the divine law of God were arbitrarily imposed by God then it could only be known via revelation. According to Locke, divine law is by the

light of nature, reason which is the 'voice' of nature. Obligatory conformity to established rules, especially those from divine origin, is where finite human beings owe their dependence and free service.

Locke defines good and evil in reference to pleasure and pain. Moral good is man's voluntary adherence and conformity to some law—good results in pleasure, evil results in pain. Good coincides to the will of the law giver. Locke posited that by considering the nature of God and that of man (and the relationship between them), that man would arrive at these deducible self-evident moral principles. (Descartes emphasized man's ability of reason, as compared to Locke's stress on the natural [divine] light of reason, which did not have as strong of an appeal.

Locke's greatest influence was in social and political philosophy. As was mentioned in the above summary of Locke's life, he defended political thinking that provided the backbone for English-speaking countries for several generations. Locke's first *Treatise of Civil Government* was his argument against the divine right of the kings. This right was upheld by Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1680) and suggested that men are not naturally free. This teaching provided the foundation for an absolute monarchy. In his second *Treatise*, Locke supplied the ideas that all men are free and equal but not free to do as they please. This included the notions of personal liberty, rights for private property, social contract, and the idea of the rule of the majority. He reaffirmed his ideals concerning natural law as the will of God. Natural law binds the conscience independent of any State's legislation. Although he had confidence in the operation of natural law, Locke also constructed his social and political philosophy on the conviction of the individual's right to self-preservation. Not only did Locke stress the natural rights of persons, he emphasized ownership of personal property. God gave men the earth and its contents so he could support his well-being.

Locke believed that the "law of Nature" teach us that "being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker..." (Locke, *An Essay concerning Toleration*, 2). Thomas Jefferson took this Locke, stock, and barrel and put it in *The Declaration of Independence* (1776) when he wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

Final Thoughts

Locke may be thought of as a cautious defender of traditional Christianity. Indeed, he wrote an apologetic book titled *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) in which he defended the existence of God, miracles, and the Christian Faith. So, he stands in contrast with the Deists of the Enlightenment period. However, in some ways he did open the way for the Deists of the eighteenth century since Locke did not defend Trinitarianism. However, these Deists went far beyond what Locke had intended. They rejected as contrary to reason *all* that could not be established by reason itself. They eliminated everything that was based on special divine revelation. They also denied miracles and reduced religion to strict rationalism.

GEORGE BERKELEY (A.D. 1685 - 1753)



The Life and Works of Berkeley

George Berkeley was an Irishman of English ancestry. He was born in Kilekenny, Ireland in 1685. At the age of fifteen, he went to Trinity College in Dublin and there received his Bachelor and Master of Arts degrees. Sometime later, he earned additional degrees of bachelor and doctor of divinity degrees. He studied Locke and Descartes at Trinity College, Dublin. While at Trinity, he also studied Malebranche, Newton, and Clarke, including views promoted by Hobbes. The Deism of Toland, the Irishman who wished to eliminate the miracles from Christianity, caused considerable controversy for the attendees at Trinity. The young Berkeley became an ardent defender of Christianity and subsequently published his *Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* in 1710. In He was ordained in 1707 and while attending Trinity he was appointed as Fellow. In this position, he served as tutor and lecturer from 1707 to 1713 and later from 1721 to 1724.

Returning in 1713 from a visit to London where he had entered into intellectual discussions with the Prince of Wales, Berkeley became enthusiastic about the possibilities associated with the 'new world.' He persuaded Parliament to grant him 20,000 pounds to establish St. Paul's College in the Bermudas. It is here that he could train ministers of the gospel for the colonists and educate and civilize the Indians. It is here where he attempted to start a college in Rhode Island. At this time, he also married a young woman, choosing her ". . . for the qualities of her mind and her unaffected inclinations to books. . ."). On the way to the new college, he sailed to Virginia and stayed there for three years. While there he was well received and won adherents to his new philosophy, especially those among the ministers and college professors. After his faithful service in the Church of Ireland, he resigned and was appointed Bishop of Cloyne in 1734. Berkeley died in 1753.

His main philosophical writings include the following: *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710); *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713); *The Analyst; or, A Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician* (1734). While in America, he corresponded with the idealistic philosopher Samuel Johnson. During his stay he wrote a critique of freethinking titled *Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher* (1732). Johnson came under the influence of Berkeley while he was in Rhode Island (1729—1731) while waiting for the funds to arrive for the Bermudian college. Berkeley dedicated his work *Elementa Philosophica* to Johnson, which appeared in 1752. His last important writing was *Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar Water and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Arising One from Another* which defended the virtues of tar-water as a medicine.

The Empirical Epistemology of Berkley

After studying Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Newton, Berkeley became familiar with

the main trends of the seventeenth century. These trends pondered how the human mind could bridge the gap between its own ideas and the sense world in order to achieve some certainty about what is real. Berkeley stated his presupposition: there is a real difference between sensible things and the mental objects in the mind. It is on this supposition that Berkeley rests his philosophical efforts. He asked: How can a coherent account be given of the world, if the mental object and the real sensible thing are one and the same? In Berkeley's *New Principle*, the focal point is determining the meaning of being or existence. His response was that to-be-perceived is the kind of existence that belongs to the sensible thing where this to-perceive is proper to the mind. In order to drive his *New Principle* forward, he had to accomplish both a negative and positive task. The negative step was to analyze Locke's theory of abstraction and general ideas and decide where he would differ. Locke's method, according to Berkeley, was not a realistic process because it involved the manipulation of ideas rather than penetrating the intelligible structure of the real object itself. The positive step was to offer a new definition to the meaning of sensible things. Therefore, the introduction of his metaphysical philosophy introduces what is called 'empirical immaterialism.' This philosophical concept eliminates material substance. The human experience is explained as a function of the infinite mind, the finite mind, ideas, and the notions.

Berkeley believed that the cause of philosophical difficulties was abstraction. Locke had cast aside the notion of innate ideas and Berkeley rejected abstract ideas. However, Locke did admit that there was the notion of a 'substratum'—identifiers of qualities of material objects where there is no direct experience with it. These identifiers would be things like extension, color, motion, man, animal; ones where the mind cannot have an idea of these alone. We can imagine, compound, divide, and symbolize (generalize) and no more. General ideas are only particular ones made to stand for a group (e.g., a triangle). (For example, Berkeley would ask if someone could think of a triangle dismissed of the qualifier of equilateral, scalene, right, and so on.) The error of abstraction arises from language. We wrongly believe that words have precise meanings; that every word stands for an idea, and that language is primarily for communication. It also arouses passions and influences attitudes. These points were later developed by linguistic philosophers.

The cure for this problem is to confine thoughts to naked ideas free from traditional names so as to avoid purely verbal controversies; avoid the snare of abstractions, and be clear in ones ideas. The universality of meaning is not in the abstraction associated with the objects common nature but is rather in the function of certain particular traits that act as a sign applied to other objects as well. The result will be that won't look for the abstract when particular is known, and we won't assume all names represent an idea.

The Principles of Human Knowledge

The source of all ideas is sensation, internal perception, memory and imagination. The subject of all knowledge is a perceiver, a mind, me. The nature of ideas is that they are passive object of perception through sensation and reflection, and better known as 'mentalism.' As Berkeley said, "To be is to be perceived. He insisted that all the ideas attributed to the outside world are passive. It is impossible of any idea to do anything or be the cause of anything else. This passiveness of ideas regarding the outside world is key to his philosophy. In this, which shows the influence of Malebranche, there seems to be the conclusion that God is the cause of such ideas. The result, according to Berkeley, is metaphysical Idealism.

In the subtitle of Berkeley's work titled *Principles of Human Knowledge*, he aims to focus in

on “the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of skepticism.” He opposed atheism where we can only know our own ideas directly and materialism where the material universe is self-existent requiring no need or support from a God, positing that the first principle of the world is only material (cf. *PHK*, I, 86-96). He believed that these three challenges could be addressed and refuted together with the rejection of matter as a real entity. It is here where Berkeley sees the failure of Locke and Malebranche refutation of these errors. However, a dilemma was formed: in order for matter to be known it must be reduced to the status of an idea or else matter must be placed beyond knowledge. He chose the former.

The Metaphysics of Berkeley: Idealism

Only minds and ideas exist. The three discoveries of the mind are: ideas of sense, ideas of imagination, and minds—understood only as an internal operation. If the *esse* of ideas is *percipi* (the condition of being perceived or “to be is to be perceived”), then the *esse* of mind is *percipere* (the mind as self-knowing or ‘to be is to perceive’). To be is to perceive (*esse is percipi*), and to be is to be perceived (*esse is percipere*). Ideas are passive and inert whereas minds are active and causal. Ideas are fleeting, dependent, and perishable. The mind however is enduring, subsisting, and incorruptible. And in a sense, the mind is unknowable because it cannot be known through ideas. In addition, the mind (or the personal self) is an active reality that contains understanding (both a passive aspect as a receptor of ideas from God and an active aspect as a perceiver of received ideas) and will, both being functional expressions of the mind (rather than ‘powers’ according to the Lockean sense of the mind). The personal nature of God is an immediate consequence of the presence of the infinite will and understanding, both as expressions of His spiritual beingness. No “matter” or extramental beings exist for several reasons: 1) There is no way to separate being from being perceived. 2) What argues against existence of secondary qualities also apply to primary ones. Extension cannot be known apart from color and bulk. Number is based on unity which cannot be perceived. Figure changes with one’s perspective. Motion is relative. 4) “Things” cannot be known apart from thought; they exist only in thought. 5) Belief in “matter” charges God with a useless creation (cf. Ockham). 6) It is impossible to conceive of anything existing outside of a mind. Perceiving is an operation of the mind; what is being perceived is outside of one’s control. The source of ideas about the sensible world comes from some voluntary spiritual principle. Therefore, these ideas cannot come from any material substance. To do so is a power of mind to form an idea in the mind (not outside of it). But nothing can be conceived as existing unconceived.

Some Objections Berkley Anticipated and Addressed

The first objection to his mentalism seems to be that he is banishing all things from the world and therefore all things become a fanciful illusion. Berkeley’s replies: The sensible world really exists and are involuntary ideas given by God who maintains them according to his natural law. First, this does not do away with Nature. For Nature is the set the rules by which God regularly excites ideas in our minds. The only thing Berkeley rejects is Locke’s philosophy of material substance where he would say something like “we eat and drink and are clothed with ideas.”

Second, it does not do away with Substance for it is only it is an idea gained from a group of sensations. For example, real pain and perceived imaginary pain are both universally admitted to exist in the mind. However, there is a great difference between real pain and perceived pain. Real pain is an involuntary idea given to man by God in accordance with constant natural laws.

Third, it is objected that it sounds harsh to eat and wear ideas. However, responded Berkeley,

but this is only because of the customary use of words.

Fourth, distant objects are no problem for they are in our dreams. And the sight of a distant object is merely the prognostication that I may soon to feel it. It would seem absurd to think that objects that are seen at a distance and perceived in the mind should be near to us as our own thoughts. Berkeley replies that the ideas of sight are signs which through experienced are learned (similar to the ideas of touch that are learned). These ideas are in the mind and thus we perceive them differently.

Fifth, fire and idea of fire differ, but this is only because fire is more lively idea, and the idea of it is less lively.

Sixth, to the charge that everyone believes in matter, Berkeley responded that Plato didn't. Furthermore, universal beliefs have been false. All men may act as if there is matter, even though it is philosophically untrue.

Seventh, Ideas and things differ but only because the former is passive, and the latter is an active idea from God. If extension and figure only existed in the mind, it would follow that the mind itself must be extended and figured. He replies by saying that extension and figure exist in the mind as ideas not as attributes of the mind itself.

Eighth, Berkeley argued that his idealism did not destroy motion. For motion is reducible to sense phenomena, and all we have is ideas of sense phenomena.

Ninth, things not thought about do not cease to exist because God is always thinking about them. It would seem that all sensed objects are annihilated and then created again, depending on whether we are thinking about them. Berkeley responds by saying that all things in the sense world endure continuously in the mind of God (as qualities of spiritual substances instead of matter). This is expressed beautifully in a poem by John Knox:

There was a young man who said, "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If He finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."
Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the Quad.
And that is why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.
(by John Knox)

Tenth, it would seem that Berkeley's idealism made everything a direct result of God and everything else artificial because there are secondary causes. However, he replies that ideas combined into regular patterns are what we call Nature and this is sufficient for the practical purposes of life. Great strides were accomplished in physics to which their conclusions drew correlations to natural phenomenon in terms of matter and motion. In Berkeley's philosophy, he rejects some of the notions about natural science. Making his defense, he states that 1) he is not

challenging the validity of physics or other natural science, but rather, 2) it is in the domain of metaphysics where the issue arises, giving rise to 3) where the mentalist says these laws furnish the signs for the prediction of the appearance of ideas sensed because God provides the constant and regular manner of objects that physics records in descriptive formulas. It is the mentalist who basically promotes the idea of 'absolute mind.'

Eleventh, since the Bible speaks of physical bodies, it would seem that Berkeley's denial of matter would be unbiblical. However, Berkeley responded that bodies are only a collection of sense impressions of which we know as ideas, but not really material things.

Twelfth, miracles don't lose their force because things are real because they are real perceptions. For example, the disciples really perceived they were touching the resurrected body of Christ, but it was not made of matter.

Berkley's Proof for God

Berkeley was a theist and relies heavily upon the existence of God in order to secure the identification between sensible *esse* and *percipi*. This God is an infinite and actual perceiver. Hence, his New Principle serves as the basis for the proof regarding the existence of God. In addition, the New Principle needs God's existence as its foundation.

Berkeley's reason for belief in God was a posteriori. He argued that all ideas are passive objects of perception. Minds perceive, but ideas are only perceived. And I am receiving a strong, steady secession of ideas coming from outside me, forced upon me, and over which I have no control. This we call "world." And so does everyone else. If one agrees with Berkeley, that a person directly perceives things as they are, then there is no other external reality to know except other spirits who are similar to us. This assures the possibility of knowledge. Therefore, there must be a Mind (i.e., God), an active Spirit causing the "world" of ideas that we are receiving from outside our minds. We do not directly perceive this Mind but only its effects, namely, the ideas it causes).

Berkley's Conclusion about the Value of His View

Bishop Berkeley believed that his view had great practical and theological value. First of all, he believed that it destroyed the basic for skepticism as to whether our ideas corresponded to reality. By removing matter from the world, he thinks that skepticism will fail in its attempt to make knowledge impossible. As long as matter exists, philosophers will be puzzled as to how the mind operates, asking how matter operates *on* the mind? There is no material reality since the ideas are reality.

Second, the cornerstone of atheism gone since they held that Matter in motion eternally eliminates the need for God, but there is no matter.

Third, the basis of idolatry is eliminated, for who could worship the mere idea of an object in their mind.

Fourth, the Socinians lose their objection to the resurrection, since there are no material particulars to be resurrected.

Fifth, philosophical puzzles (like Zeno's) are solved, since there is no matter to be infinitely divided.

Another consequence is that atheism is overthrown by showing that the existence of God is an absolute certainty. All men think and therefore know that other men think as well. Man also receives

ideas that cannot be attributed to or caused by another man. Rather, these ideas come from an infinite spirit. This illustrates the existence of God who is the author of nature.

This leads to another consequence of Berkeley's philosophy: the natural immortality of the soul. What is shown is that physical bodies are in reality just mere passive ideas in the mind which are different than any of its ideas. Taking his cue from Descartes and Locke, with the notion originating with Plato, Berkeley repeats the argument that the soul is a simple and indivisible immaterial substance unable to be dissolved. (The conception of the soul will be later rejected by Hume and Kant.)

A Brief Critique of Berkeley's Idealism

In addition to the implausibility of many of Berkeley's responses to criticism (listed above), there are more fundamental criticisms. Two can be mentioned.

First, the whole system begs the question. For he defines all that exists as either minds or ideas. But this is precisely what is to be proven. If one assumes this to begin with, then of course it follows that only minds and ideas exist. So, the whole system is *petition principii*—begging the question.

Second, Berkeley wrongly assumes that all we know is ideas about things, not the things themselves. But this too begs the question. Perhaps the realist is right that we do not know merely the idea but that we know reality through the idea. That is ideas are not the formal object of the mind but merely an instrument through which we know reality. In this case we would be knowing reality through the ideas and not merely knowing the ideas. Thus, the senses (by which ideas are brought to us) are the windows of the mind. They are like a window through which we see reality, not a wall which we see. Or, to put it another way, we do not see only the window; rather, we see *through* the window at the reality beyond it.



The Life and Works of Hume

David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His father, a land-owner at Ninewells, died when David was a baby. His father left a tiny estate at Edinburgh that provided for his widow and three orphaned children, David was the youngest son and has another brother and sister. His mother schooled him as a child at Ninewells until he attended the University of Edinburgh as a youth at ten years of age (1721—1725). His educational experience included proficiencies in Latin and studies in Greek, logic, metaphysics, and Newtonian natural philosophy. David grew to love literature. However, by this time he also had already forsaken the religious views of his relatives and acquaintances. He also received training in ethics and history and made attempts at studying law with the hopes of entering commerce. However, his heart was fixed upon religious and philosophical issues. In 1734, Hume retired at Reims and later at La Fleche (where Descartes was educated) in order to delve into his philosophical studies. It was during this time that he carefully planned his future enabling him to concentrate his efforts upon writing. He was certainly familiar with Locke, Berkeley, Hutcheson, Malebranche, and Bayle.

Prior to 1737, he completed his work titled *A Treatise of Human Nature*. The first two volumes were published in 1739 and the third in 1740. His *Essays Moral and Political* (1741-1742) became more popular than his first work which encouraged him to revise and polish the *Treatise*. In the meanwhile, Hume was unsuccessful in obtaining the chair of “ethics and pneumatic philosophy” at the University of Edinburgh because of his reputation as a skeptic and atheist. Because of this setback, Hume obtained a post as secretary to General St. Clair and accompanied him on his ill-fated expedition against the French.

While on a diplomatic mission to Vienna and Turin, Hume revised the *Treatise* and eventually changed the title to *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* which highlighted the problems of causality and skepticism. This work also included chapters on miracles, providence, and immortality. After he returned to Ninewells in 1749, he wrote *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) and *Political Discourses* (1752). Later, he wrote *Discourses Concerning Natural Religion* published in 1779. In this work, he aimed at expressing the problem of God’s existence and the nature of religion.

Hume also made attempts at writing his *History of England* (completed 1754—1761) and editing of another work and left a work posthumously published under the title *Two Essays on Suicide and Immortality* (1777).

Hume became a famous philosopher and a renowned historian. Retiring at Edinburgh in 1769 and later died in 1776 after ensuring in his will that the *Dialogues on Natural Religion* would be published. Prior to his death, he wrote a sketch of his life describing his own character: “a man of

mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social and cheerful humor, capable of attachment, but little of susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. . . .”

Introduction

The empiricism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been developed by this time. The language used to express it was somewhat different from the language employed by the classical empiricists. During the eighteenth century in France, as well as in England, philosophical inquiry was primarily *not* exercised by professors of philosophy in the universities. For example, Hume was primarily an historian as well as (secondarily) a philosopher; Voltaire wrote dramas. It was however Hume who is one of the greatest figures of the Enlightenment. Hume’s plan was to extend to philosophy the methodological limitations found in Newtonian physics. Like everyone else, Hume had his moments of dogmatic certainty and moments of skeptical doubt, frequently oscillating between belief and doubt. However, his motto was, “Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man” (*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, I).

The philosophy of David Hume represents the culmination of classical British empiricism. Hume’s program was to extend the reigns of science from the study of the non-human material world to the study of man himself. This collaboration would create a science of human nature. Hume demanded that the experimental method of inquiry, which demonstrated great success in the physical sciences or natural philosophy, be applied to the fields of human aesthetics, ethics, and politics, as well.

The Influences of David Hume on Others

Hume’s philosophy excludes the materialism of Hobbes, the dualism of Descartes and Locke, and the mentalism of Berkeley. According to Hume, all we know are perceptions. Hume, calling his own view skepticism, is the forerunner of the nineteenth century positivists like Comte and Mill, and agnostics like Spencer and Huxley. Immanuel Kant (an agnostic) declared that he was awakened from his dogmatic (rationalistic) slumbers by reading David Hume. David Hutton, the father uniformitarian geology was influenced by the antisupernatural argument of Hume. Likewise, David Strauss wrote the first desupernaturalized life of Christ in the wake of Hume’s views. Modern skepticism, deism, atheism, and naturalism all owe a debt to Hume’s writings.

Hume's Epistemology

Hume’s Foundational Problem: Doubt

There are two types of dogmatism: one supporting practical decisions and the other is associated with uncritical convictions that are more speculative in nature. Hume took skepticism a step further and differentiated between antecedent skepticism and consequent skepticism. The first is represented by the Cartesian methodic doubt. This method does not discredit the thinking self as the starting point in philosophy. The second type of skepticism is based on detailed inquiries into the actual exercise of the mind. This skepticism is against the senses because the data incurred does not go deep enough. Rather, it only proves that the senses by themselves were insufficient for obtaining truth. Absolute skepticism renders one unfit for action as well as for speculation. Hume moved towards a more moderate type of consequent skepticism. This skepticism is based on two premises: 1) a concentrated analysis regarding the problems of man and 2) an adaptation of Newtonian physics in order to achieve this purpose. (See Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Intro.) In addition, the true skeptic must avoid any appeal to occult powers (those things hidden from view) evident in nature

or in the mind. There must also be an avoidance of purely abstract and rationalistic hypotheses about reasoning abilities. Instead, one must draw evidence from experience and observation. All propositions must refer to their sensory origin. These propositions must exercise frugality in explaining causality. Last, great care must be exercised when proceeding to make only a few general principles that are shown to govern all mental phenomena.

His View on Abstract (Rationalistic) Philosophy

Locke proposed ‘ideas’ whereas Hume proposes ‘perceptions.’ Hume goes further and divides these into impressions—those things that strike the mind with force and vivacity, and ideas—those copies that are seem to be weak and lackadaisical. Hume designates an impression as any sensation, passion, or emotion that makes its first appearance in the mind. An idea is just a faint copy of an impression. A simple idea differs from a simple impression in that it appears later and as being fainter, as in the case of ideas stored in the memory. These memories are even fainter than those of the imagination. (For example, hearing a sound or seeing a color is first vivid but later when recalled is similar to the original but yet its recollection is faint and dull.) While Hume begrudgingly acknowledged that abstract thinking provides exactness necessary to serve society. However, he believed that its disadvantages are far greater since it is the source of endless confusion and errors. Thus, he called for a fresh mapping of the mind's powers and limits. This he attempted to provide in his famous *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

Two kinds of Perceptions

The most basic kind of perception is called an impression. This is an original and more lively perceptions. Thoughts or ideas are less lively reflections on original impressions. These two are building block of all knowledge. A complex idea does not need to be either sensation or reflection of a complex impression. To form a complex idea the mind can through the efforts of imagination (or errors of memory). These complex ideas can be a combination of details of copies originating from simple ideas previously perceived. The essential distinction between impressions and ideas is that the former appears first in the consciousness whereas the latter are just copies. Impressions of reflections can be traced to ideas where there remains some idea of the event. When it is recalled in the memory or imagination, it will produce a new impression of desire or aversion. This new state is an impression of reflection.

The Limits of Knowledge

In the discussion above regarding complex impressions and ideas, it can be seen that there is a relationship to truth. All knowledge is derived from impressions. In order to find the truth of any simple or complex idea is to back track to the original impression. All knowledge for Hume consists of ‘perception’ (or what Berkeley called ‘ideas’). All true knowledge is limited to sensations. Impressions are ideas derived from simple sense impressions. The ideas of memory and imagination differ in two respects. Memory is ordinarily more vivid and restricted to the same order and form of the original impression. Imagination—the power to reduce everything to arbitrary combinations—often departs from the order and form of the original impressions. These simple ideas are often loose and unconnected but may be separated and united to other forms through the association of ideas proceeding from resemblance, contiguity, and the relation of cause-and-effect (see below). Every idea of the imagination has at least a logically irrefutable claim to realities attainable in experience. The proof is a defective sense organ is always accompanied by a defect in corresponding idea. The result is that any idea without an original sense impression is bogus. Of course, there is imagination

which is the unbounded possibility of combining ideas. But the only ideas it has to combine are those received from sense impressions. For example, one can imagine a pink elephant only if he has had the image of an elephant and the image of pink from previous sensations.

On Innate Ideas

Like other empiricists, Hume rejected innate ideas, insisting that we are born a *tabula rasa* (a blank slate). The only original (not copied) ideas we have are from sense impressions. These alone are the brick of which the whole house of knowledge is constructed. Along with Hobbes and Malebranche, who state that the imagination is not completely erratic but does exhibit some constants leading to combinations of ideas in definite ways, Hume investigates the ‘nature’ of things that is working in the subjective side of the mind. This ‘force of association’ inclining the imagination to make these connections seem to be uniform and unceasing where one idea introduces another idea in the mind. (It is here that Hume professes to remain ignorant when it comes to this principle or origin of ‘mental nature.’) This ‘nature’ is a kind of universal attraction similar, not in kind, to the Newtonian force of gravity. However, the forces of mental attraction differ from those of physical attraction (i.e., not atom like). In Hume’s philosophy, this ‘nature’ remains as an *unanalyzed given factor* (cf. *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, VII).

Hume stands behind Berkeley supposition—the rejection of all abstract ideas including those of material substance. If substance were a real idea, then it would be developed from either impressions of sensations or reflections. If it came from sensation, it would have to come through one of the specific senses, which it obviously does not. The impressions of reflection resolve themselves into passions and emotions, which could not represent a substance. There is no justification to refer to simple ideas as a combination of so-called substances as Locke did. Locke posited a substratum that is not perceivable. According to Hume, as well as Berkeley before him, there is no evidence for the existence of matter. However, Hume does reject Berkeley’s claim that man has a ‘notion’ of a *spiritual substance or self*.

Hume asserts that our selves are just a bundle or collection of different perceptions succeeding from one to the next with inconceivable rapidity. These perceptions are in a state of perpetual flux and movement. The mind is basically a kind of theatre where perceptions are making sequential appearances (see *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI.). Based on Hume’s testimony, skeptical empiricism affirms that human knowledge cannot go beyond perceptions while at the same time he denies the existences of all substances, spiritual as well as material.

Three Ways Ideas are Associated

Of course, ideas derived from sense impressions can be associated in various ways. First, they can be related by resemblance, as a picture leads us to think of the original. This is based on the distributed quality and the force of association leading the mind from one comparison of the object based on quality to the other through some similitude. Second, they can be related by contiguity, as one apartment leads us to think of the next one. Third, they can be related as cause and effect, as a wound leads us to think of pain. These principles of cause and effect bear upon ideas that do not have any intrinsic linkage, in other words, they are somehow unconnected. Their union is based upon some force generated by custom.

Hume enthusiastically posits that these three principles constitute a “universal principle, [having] an equal influence on all mankind” (cf. *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, III) and found uniformly among all men. However, there are no essential relations of ideas gained from

sense experience. For, as Hume put it, “all events seem entirely loose and separate” (*Enquiry*, Sect 7, Part 2)

Only Two Kinds of Meaningful Statements

According to Hume there are only two kinds of meaningful statements: relation of ideas and matters of fact. Demonstrative reasoning looks into the relationship between ideas. The mind is primarily interested in the definitions of the existences rather than the actual existences themselves. The mind uses the relationship between quantity and number. The basis for this is on the mathematical sciences that yield demonstrative knowledge. Therefore the result eliminates any conclusion that would entail a contradiction. These are mathematical and definitional. In order for moral reasoning proper to go beyond what is presented in sense perception and memory, it needs to find something about the existence of the object. Moreover, it needs to find what is lying beyond the experience. The result is based on cause-and-effect. Hume says that all “metaphysical” reasoning relies upon an appeal made to causal relations where inferences are concerned with matters of fact. It is these that must submit to the limitations placed upon moral reasoning. As a result, in the existential order, there can never be any hopes for demonstrative knowledge. And as a consequence, moral reasoning can never provide more than just degrees of probability. They are known by intuition and are absolutely certain. For example, three plus three equals six” or “all triangles have three sides.”

The other kind of statements are matters of fact. They are known from sense experience and are not certain since the opposite of them is always possible. Matters of fact are investigated by moral reasoning based upon the certitude of memory. However, memory never attains full certitude because of the difficulties that surround its verification process. In the realm of matter of fact, whatever *is* may also *not be*. Hume says, “The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, . . . *Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible*” (see *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, ii, 2). They have varying degrees of probability. Hume concluded that one cannot say that he ‘knows’ that every event has a cause. All that can be attempted is to find a psychological explanation of belief or persuasion regarding the event. Hume’s treatment of cause and effect shows the opposition between reason and experience.

Metaphysically, reason is supposed to operate in a purely abstract and *a priori* way. Reason is supposed to be divorced from the guidance of sense observation. However, reason is the major component that shapes experience where causes and effects are discovered by experience and not by reason alone. These two kinds of statements formed the basis for the later Logical Positivist’s Principle of Empirical Verification (see A. J. Ayer below).

Hume’s empiricism had led to a rejection of metaphysics. This rejection has taken effect more recently at the hands of neo-positivists, logical positivists, or radical empiricists where metaphysical statements serve nothing more than an ‘emotive’ significance. This conclusion seems to provide the link between Hume’s philosophy and modern radical empiricism.

Hume regards metaphysics as an effort to prove the existence of three supra-empirical objects: the world of external bodies, the personal self, and the existence of God. His elaborate discussion of this kind of causality provides the principles for criticizing and evaluating the claims associated with metaphysics. In short, he argues that his critique asserts the possibility of having ‘knowledge’ about these existences because it illustrates through the metaphysical teachings that only degrees of probability are obtained and not through any scientific demonstration. If this is the case, then these teaching should be “tossed to the flames.” Put succinctly, metaphysics has no foundation in

a system that reduces knowledge of existences to only an awareness of the precept as an object being perceived

Resultant Epistemological Skepticism

All reasoning about matters of fact is based on our belief in causality. For since we sense only empirically separate data, the only way to go beyond this is by causal inference. But all causal inferences are based on experience. It is not known a priori. And all experience is based on custom, that is, on habitual con-junction of events in our experience.

As argued that “reason, as distinguished from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cause or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence” (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, iii, 14.). In addition, Hume rules out the abstract use of reason as a method to determine causal matters of fact, or, stated succinctly, no demonstrative proof can be posited regarding the principle of causality.

Custom is the Basis for Positing Causality

Since we cannot *know* causal connections, we can only *believe* in them based on past observation of repeated con-junction of events. Hume believed that something this important is better left to practical belief than philosophical proof.

No necessary connection between events can be demonstrated because these apply only to relation of ideas, not to facts. It cannot be proven a priori. Nor can it be proven a posteriori. The repetition of an experience of con-junction does not increase understanding of the relation among the objects. It only generates a habit in the mind that links them together. This connecting principle is unintelligible since it operates ‘naturally’ by producing a tradition associated with the ideas. When the con-junction of ideas is working as a tradition it becomes forceful as it provides strength to the original impression that was made on the mind. Eventually, this causal inference becomes a decided belief. It will never carry the same certainty as scientific knowledge but it will have more than a reckless guess. All in all, it provides assurance shaping practical life with some certitude and understanding.

Causality Defined

For Hume causality is not defined as one thing producing another, since this kind of causality is never sensed. Only separate events are sensed. Nor is it known by reflection (as Locke) or by volition; we don't know internal connections any better than external ones. So, causality is defined as one thing following another. For example, in the mind where the appearance of one idea is always followed by another. Or, in the world where the occurrence of one event is always followed by another. However, Hume never maintained the proposition that anything might arise without a cause. Rather he held with certainty that the falsehood of a causeless beginning cannot be demonstrated or held by intuition. His concern is with showing the non-demonstrative and extra-logical nature associated with the rejection of causeless beginnings. He does refer to the secret causes operating in nature, however, these references have no empirical basis.

So, while we cannot know causal *connections*, we can believe in them based on customary *conjunctions*. There is no theoretical way to defend causality, but it is absurd to deny it certainly practically. Thus, there is a difference between belief and fiction since belief is based on repeated customary conjunctions and fiction is not.

Demonstration is possible only of relation of ideas, not of matters of fact. Probability is based on matters of fact known through the senses. However, since some things are so strongly probably based on past experience, Hume is willing to use the word “proof” of them. An example, would be the belief that people do not rise from the dead since uniform past experience informs us that this has never happened.

There are two sides to Hume's causation: the logical approach and the psychological approach. The logical approach defined by Hume is that “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter” (cf. *Treatise*, Book I, Part III,). Hume regards the causation and uniformity of nature as postulates which cannot be demonstrated. However, these are useful and indispensable to practical life and to the inquiries of all scientific investigation outside that of mathematics. The psychological approach, broken down into contiguity and succession—both found immediately within impressions and connection—the requirement of these showing cause and effect, even though the mind has added this perspective after the impression of sensation.

No Immortality

Hume's doctrine on knowledge and causality does not allow any room for the immortality. The reason is because it would not be consistent with his position. There cannot be any demonstration of immortality since there is no clear idea of immateriality. In addition, if immortality is possible then it opens the door for the existence of things beyond human perception. And, even if immortality and freedom could be established, they have no bearing on moral conduct. The only freedom that Hume's does consider is the power of acting (or not acting) based on the determination of the will where he defines the will as a cause giving rise to action having a necessary connection with its effect. In the end, man, like animals, will eventually lose consciousness and dissolve because of universal frailty.

Hume's View on Miracles

Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural religion* deals primarily with the proofs for God's existence. In Book X of Hume's *Enquiry*, he launched one of the most aggressive and lasting attacks on miracles in the history of thought. He divides his arguments into several categories.

The Argument against Miracles in General

Since Hume is confident in his uniformity of nature and causal determinism, he uses these as a starting point to attack his disbelief in miracles, providence, and freedom of the will. He argues that a miracle is “a violation of the laws of nature.” Hume’s argument can be stated in several premises. 1) A miracle is a violation (exception) of a law of nature. 2) The laws of nature have the highest degree of probability (from past experience); 3) Hence, miracles (as exceptions) have the lowest degree of probability. If a miracle has alleged to have occurred, it is in violation to natural laws. It is more probable that the original witness has been mistaken or perhaps the transmission of the event was inaccurately conveyed. 4) Now the wise person should base his view on the highest degree of probability. 5) Therefore, the wise person should not believe in miracles.

The Argument against Miracles Used to Support a Religious System

This argument zeros in on alleged miraculous support of one religion over another. Hume reasons that: 1) No miracle can be used to support a religious system if any contrary religious system has a miracle to support it. Contraries cannot be true; they cancel each other out. 2) But all religious systems use miracles to support their claims. Therefore, no miracle can be used to support a religious system.

Objections to Miracles in Practice

Hume insists that: 1) There never have in fact been a sufficient number of educated men to secure against delusion nor with enough integrity to show no deception; 2) The proven tendency of men, against all probability, to readily believe the miraculous and the many actual forgeries argues against miracles. 3) Miracles abound chiefly among the uneducated and uncultured (The advantages for starting an imposture are greater there than among the educated). 4) Every miracle is in fact self-defeating, for in defending its system versus opposing systems it thereby destroys the ability of any miracle to defend any system.

Objections to Christian Miracles in Particular

Further, Hume insists that the alleged Christian miracles in particular are without foundation for several reasons. 1) The people reporting and believing them were ignorant and uneducated. 2) The record of these alleged miracles comes from a period long after the alleged events. 3) There was no corroborative or concurring testimony for the miracles. 4) These miracles resemble the fabulous accounts every people have of their origins. Hence, there is no credible basis to believe in the miracles recorded in the Bible.

Hume's Criticisms of Arguments for God's Existence

Like Immanuel Kant after him, David Hume leveled repeated criticism on any attempt to reason for the existence of God. They can be summarized as follows: 1) Since the world is finite, only a finite cause need be posited to explain it; 2) No proposition about existence can be logically necessary since the opposite is always possible; 3) A Necessary Being can't mean logically necessary, since His non-existence is conceivable. 4) If Necessary Being means only imperishable, then the universe may be the Necessary Being. 5) An infinite regress is possible because cause implies priority in time and nothing can be prior to an infinite. Hence, there can be no cause of an infinite series. 6) There is no way either in experience or in reason to establish the causality necessary to prove God's existence.

Assuming Design

Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* Hume does *not* side with the atheists in their outright denial of God's existence nor does he side with the Deists in their rational claims for God existence. Hume is inclined to admit the following: "The cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence" (*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, XIII). To say that this intelligence is the existence of God is according to Hume a "plain, philosophical assent."

However, even assuming design, the conclusion is not one God who created the world since: a) God must be as DIFFERENT from man (as human inventions differ from nature); b) He must be FINITE (for the effect is finite); c) He must be IMPERFECT for there are imperfections in nature; d) there must be MULTIPLE for many gods making many mistakes is more like the way men make things like a ship); e) there must be MALE AND FEMALE gods for this is the way man generates; f) the gods must be ANTHROPOMORPHIC for his creatures have eyes, ears, noses, etc. Hume's conclusion, assuming there is design, is that the best we can say is the world arose from something like design. But world may be no more than a crude produce of some infant deity or inferior product of some senile god.

Not Assuming Design

Hume was not willing to concede that the adaptation of means to end in Nature proves design. He argued that it is possible that the world arose by chance. For granting matter in motion eternally, world could have resulted by chance/a "happy accident" for every possible order would have resulted an infinite number of times. And the arrangement which "fits" best would tend to perpetuate itself. What doesn't "fit" moves around until it too "settles down." Further, Animal adaptations don't prove design, for they could survive without it. Extra organs that are not needed for survival (viz., two ears and eyes) or extra animals (horses, dogs, sheep) are difficult to explain by chance but this is not definitive. The design theory has problems too. So, the best course is complete suspense of judgment (especially in view of contradictions and absurdities in religious systems).

Hume's Basis of Religion

Hume considers religion as a *species* of philosophy: only a cognitive assent to God's existence. Therefore, this 'philosophical religion' does not acknowledge (divine) revelation, nor rituals, nor miracles (see above), nor special merits or demerits, nor 'religious' duties, and no 'religious' feelings. It is based solely on the empirical with no regards to human conduct and its associated repercussions. Belief in God rests on feeling, imagination, and custom, rather than on any

abstract reasoning. In his *Natural History of Religion*, Hume attempts to trace religion back to its sources in human nature. He states that religion is founded upon primary passions such as fear and hope—fear of natural disasters and hope for a better life. In addition, he thought that religion originally was polytheistic and that it grew to the notion of a singular infinite power. As a result, this religious monotheism did coincide with the best philosophical views of God. Even though Hume's theory of God and religion is limited in its theoretical explanation, his ideals have exercised great historical influence. Hume notion of religion also influenced the Deists. (It was during this time in history that Samuel Clark wrote his *Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God* in 1705. This was taken as the standard argument for God's existence.)

Hume Standard of Ethics

The moral theories of Hume in England (or the Encyclopaedists of France) insisted on autonomy when it came to moral consciousness. They also stressed a separation of ethics from theology. Hume does not adhere to an ethical system or morality made up of absolute and immutable principles that are known by intuition or demonstration. His treatment of ethics is connected to his psychology and his belief in the empirical science of ethics. The foundation is associated with the reflections in the mind (perceptions and memory) regarding pleasure and pain. The decision and direction of the will is always the result of emotions and passions. Whatever brings pleasure in the long run, either to one's self or to others, is utilitarian in its final outcome. Virtues are beneficial because of their utility promoting good, like parental affections and benevolence. Virtues are good because of the appeal to the moral sense. Hume considers the passions from a phenomenalist perspective—passions always have an object and a cause. All causes of passion have either one of the two common traits: either an outcome of pleasure or pain or some reference to ourselves or others.

Hume's concept of moral sense influenced the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson. Hume's use of 'sympathy' paved the way for Adam Smith. Hume's treatment of 'utility' makes him a forerunner of Bentham and the other Utilitarians of the nineteenth century.

A Critique of Central Ideas in Hume's Philosophy

In a candid passage by Hume, he remarks on the existential inadequacies of his own skeptical reflections. "I dine, I play a game of back-gammon and I am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further" (see *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VII.). In spite of this, Hume took great strides to show that the psychological approach of Locke and Berkeley, when taken to their fullest extent, led to his conclusion that belief in the continuous existence of objects in the outer world, or of our own selves, becomes impossible on rational grounds.

Several of Hume's central ideas call for criticism. Indeed, realists and theists have offered responses to all of Hume's above stated arguments:

First, Hume's claim that there are only two kinds of meaningful propositions is self-defeating. However, critics point out that this very statement is itself neither a relation of ideas nor a matter of fact. Thus, it must be meaningless. So, the Principle of Empirical Verifiability is itself not empirically verifiable. Hence, according to Hume's own exhortation, it should be "thrown into the flames."

Second, Hume's claim that all "events seem entirely loose and separate" is unsubstantiated and self-destructive. But critics note that this is a form of empirical atomism that, if true, it could not even be meaningfully expressed. For the very claim has meaning only if all events are not loose and separate, otherwise the statement itself would have no unity.

Third, critics also note that Hume's general argument for miracles is unsound. It confuses probability and evidence. For Hume the improbability of an event never has more weight against an event than the good evidence that an event has occurred. But on Hume's grounds one should not believe in a miracle even if it has happened. But it is absurd to reject a fact on the basis that there was a high probability that it would not happen. Or, to put it another way, if a miracle is rejected because it is a singularity (that has not occurred over and over), then the Big Bang cosmology, the

origin of first life, and even macro-evolution—all of which are accepted by current scientists—would be rejected for the same reason.

Fourth, the argument against miracles because of the alleged lack of good evidence is also open to criticism. For there are more early documents and contemporary witnesses for the Gospel miracles and particularly the resurrection of Christ than for almost any event from the ancient world. There were nine writers who wrote of twenty documents containing the record of over 500 witnesses who saw Jesus alive after his death. Nothing like this exists for any other event from antiquity. Hence, to accept Hume's view one would have to reject history. Yet Hume himself was a noted historian, having written a major work on the history of England.

Fifth, critics also observe that since no other religion has like contemporary witnesses for contrary claims, then Hume's argument against Christianity based on self-cancelling claims also fails. In fact it boomerangs into an argument in favor of the uniqueness of the Christian claims.

Sixth, as for Hume's attack on arguments for the existence of God, critics note that it fails for many basic reasons. First, even Hume admitted that it is "absurd" to deny the principle of causality. He said in a letter that "I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause" (*The Letters of David Hume* I:187). But if ever every event needs a cause, then surely the event of the universe coming into existence (at the Big Bang) calls for a cause too. Or, surely life with all its specified complexity in the DNA coming into existence needs a cause too. Indeed, even Hume admitted that a passing succession of moments of time cannot be eternal. If so, then the temporal world had a beginning and needs a beginner.

Seventh, Hume's anti-design argument is open to serious criticism because on his own basis for positing a cause on customary conjunction there only known cause that can produce the specified complexity in first life is an intelligent being since we see this repeatedly when human intelligence produces a sentence, paragraph, or book—to say nothing of the thousands of volumes of information in a one-celled animal in its DNA.

Finally, Hume's opponents have pointed out that he misstates the principle of analogy. The Cause does not have to be like its effect in all respects and it cannot be like its effect in some respect. We know from repeated observation that a mind is not like the art, structures, and books it creates. For the mind is immaterial, and these are all material. So, God does not have to be limited and finite like his creation. Indeed, the principle of causality demands that all finite things need a cause, then God cannot be finite, otherwise, He would need a cause. But He does not since He is the First Cause. So, God must be not-finite, that is, infinite. Thus, He cannot be material, multiple, and have finite parts like the thing He makes.



The Life and Works of Kant

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, East Prussia in 1724. He spent most of his entire life near Königsberg of about fifty-thousand residents. Kant's younger brother became a Lutheran minister. Immanuel's mother died when he was just twelve years of age; his father passed away when Immanuel was twenty-one. Both parents were rigid Pietists which resulted in strict training stressing personal fervor, moral responsibility, and enterprise. From 1732 to 1740, he received additional and more rigid instruction in Pietism from a local school. It was there where he also studied the classical languages. In 1740, at the age of sixteen, he entered the University of Königsberg where he studied philosophy, the natural sciences, and mathematics. He was also well educated in Latin. He studied and later taught at Königsberg University.

Professor of logic and metaphysics Martin Knutzen, a disciple himself of Christian Wolff, influenced Kant the most while he attended the university. Here he became well acquainted with Newtonian science. After he read Newton and Christian Crusius, he was convinced that philosophy must follow the models of physics rather than mathematics. In 1772, Kant was awakened from his "dogmatic slumber" when he read Hume, realizing that if 'causal connection' analysis was correct, then metaphysics, mathematics, and the physical sciences could be undermined.

Kant was a brilliant university student, and after supporting himself as a tutor, he returned to the university in 1755 as a private lecturer and subsequently promoted to Professor in 1770. During his teaching career, he taught philosophy, mathematics, physics, physical geography, anthropology, education, and other subjects as well, still finding time to publish his works.

The major viewpoint of the university was Pietism, but Kant reacted against religious observances. Wolffian philosophy (i.e., Leibnizian) was also a focal point at the university. In 1755, Kant received an equivalent to a doctorate degree for his scientific writing on fire. He was recognized as a lecturer at the University for his essay criticizing Leibniz and Wolff regarding the principle of sufficient reason and intellectual knowledge in *A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge*. Kant never married and lived a very regulated life. He died at nearly eighty years of age, in 1804.

Kant's early Pietism training left a lasting impression, though later he disliked attending church. He remained sensitive as to how philosophy could shed light on the topics of God, human freedom, and morality. He was a man who had a strict sense of duty because of early training as a boy. He was also a lover of exactness found in mathematics. His frail physical condition caused him to become concerned of how to maintain his health.

Kant's works are numerous. The following list reveals his philosophical positions. *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1747), *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), *An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Fundamental Principles of Natural Theology and Morals* (1764), *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766), *Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* (issued 1770), *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787), *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *Critique of Judgment* (1790), *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), *Perpetual Peace* (1795), and lastly *Opus Postumum* (pub. 1920 and 1938).

Kant's major Works include: *General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1790), *Critique of Judgment* (1790), *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

Kant's Metaphysics

Kant thought that metaphysics, once called the queen of the sciences because of its reference to the Supreme Being, was now in a state of low esteem. It has been replaced by the advancement of mathematics and natural science. Kant did not accept Locke's theory of empiricism neither did he accept the idea of innate ideas. He did believe in a priori concepts and principles within the mind. Metaphysics is to be evaluated by pure reason asking the question: What and how much can the mind reason and understand things apart from experience?

Kant's Epistemology

Kant is the crossroad of modern philosophy. He began with the rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff and evaluated it with the aid of empiricism. This gradually left him in a decisively critical position. He synthesized the streams of rationalism and empiricism flowing into him and transformed them into idealism and positivism flowing out of him. One major issue was how sense perception played a role in the acquisition of knowledge. In this quest, he followed the lead of Christian Crusius (1715—1775, German philosopher and Protestant theologian).

Kant's development of thought falls into three periods. Like most German philosophers, he was at first a rationalist. Following his rationalism, he was "awakened from his dogmatic slumber" by David Hume's radical empiricism. Soon he realized that because the mind has native capacities to determine form, knowledge begins with experience thus countering the idea of innate ideas. In this phase, he concluded that morality, since it could not be based on empiricism, was to be grounded in reason. Third, in this critical period he synthesized the first two stages, naming it "critical philosophy." Kant was himself a rationalist before reading David Hume who made him an agnostic. Kant found the failings of physics because it had a dependence upon mathematics resulting in deductions. The Newtonian method seemed to emphasize both observation and experimentation. The result was Kant's conclusion detailing the differences between a pure synthetic nature of mathematics and the analytics associated with the philosophy of nature.

The Kantian Synthesis

The mind begins with sense experience to create a synthetic a priori judgment—either the predicate belongs to the subject—an analytic judgment—or else the predicate is outside the content of the subject, even though it is still associated with it—a synthetic judgment. The mind is also able to

make a posteriori synthetic judgments as well. These judgments are a result of generalizations based upon previous observations (for example, all crows are black even though there may appear an unlikely brown one). The synthetic a priori judgments like ‘All persons have weight’ or “ $3 + 6 = 9$ ” are a priori synthetic judgments where new knowledge is based on a priori subjects that are universal, necessary, and absolutely certain. Synthetic a priori propositions are where the predicate is not found in the subject. In other words, Kant did not believe though that there are any synthetic a priori propositions associated with morality or metaphysics. The question for Kant is, how can these mathematical and physical judgments be applied to metaphysics? Kant’s meaning of a priori is that of something that is known in advance of experience rather than what is known inductively from experience and presumed to be valid in the future as well. A universal however is something that is held without exceptions. Kant agrees with the empiricists that content of knowledge comes from the senses. But the form of knowledge is determined by those a priori categories of the mind and forms of the senses. In brief, the mind without the senses is empty, but the senses without the mind are blind. Knowledge begins in the senses, but it is completed by the mind. Only in the marriage of the two does man have knowledge. The idea of space is as an infinite perceived magnitude all on its own. Space is not composed of smaller ‘spaces’ to form a single larger perceived space. This space is extending in three directions following the principles of Euclidean geometry which shows that it cannot be derived from some general experience.

Time, also associated with perception, on the other hand, is an infinite magnitude in one direction. The idea of change can only be conceived through the idea of time. This space and time are empirical reality, i.e., humans really experience space and time. Kant labels his philosophy ‘empirical realism’ or ‘transcendental idealism’—things are subjective and ideal, not applicable to the things in themselves (the *noumena*). We sense only the *phenomena* (the thing to me), not the noumena (the thing in itself). The mind cannot know reality but only appearance.

Next, Kant strives to understand the ‘transcendental analytic’ faculty of understanding. He begins by creating a table of twelve types of judgments (found in *Analytic of Concepts*) derived from formal logic illustrating the different ways in which the process of abstract thought is conducted by the understanding (apart from sensibility). These show the basic means and method of understanding devoid of experience. The twelve categories are dictated, according to Kant, by the very structure of the mind’s ability to understand—the a priori conditions that determine logical judgment. These categories were prepared based on certain accepted views about judgment originating from logic during his time. (Later, his successors revised the list.) Similar to Aristotle’s list of categories, Kant arranged them in a systematic fashion. He states that there are other categories but these fit into the classification of ‘predictables.’ Judgments must be placed into categories and organized so that they work towards a proper relation of cause and effect. This process of understanding following these categories coincide with the process of perception due to sensibility—both present in experience, both unable to exist in isolation. Kant justifies these categories by arguing for their a priori condition to all experience.

The Resultant Agnosticism

Kant’s ‘transcendental dialectic’ is associated with his notion of pure reason—the mind innately employing form and category devoid of sensual input. These cannot use the categories when considering the *noumena*. Kant posits that there is a world beyond what the physical sciences show, but we cannot know it. When we attempt to apply the categories of the mind to the real (noumenal) world, we end in contradictions or antinomies. That is, there can be no proper science of metaphysics.

(transcendent knowledge) about the *noumenal*. This brilliant synthesis turned out to be disastrous. For it left us with no way to know reality (the *noumena*) since there is, no way to know what it was before the mind formed it. We know it only after the mind forms it. We cannot know the thing-in-itself (the *noumena*). But we cannot know the thing-to-me (the *phenomena*). We know appearance but not reality. Further evidence that we must remain agnostic about the real world is that when we applied the categories of reason to it, antinomies of logical contradictions follow.

The four main classes of the antinomies based on the four classes of the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The thesis of each is expressed in the perspective of rationalism in the interest of morality. The anti-thesis is expressed as the viewpoint of empiricism according to a standard of scientific rigors. An antinomy is a logical contradiction where each of two contradictory propositions is apparently demonstrated because of the refutation of the other.

The Antinomy about Time

The Thesis: The material world must have had a beginning in time and limited in space and is independent of experience or else an infinite number of moments passed by now where there is no limits in space and no beginning of time. If the world did have a beginning then it must have been preceded by a time prior to it beginning, a sort of empty time in an empty space. This empty space would have to extend infinitely in all directions and there would have been nothing to create a world.

The Antithesis: But the world could not begin in time or else there was time before time began. So, contradiction results from applying the a priori form of time to the world. However, if the world had no beginning in time and no limits in space then eternity must have elapsed in the past as well as in the now. Space too must have existed infinitely in every direction possible. But this (eternal time and infinite space) is absurd.

If one accepts Kant's philosophy, then time and space are only according to man's perception, and then they are not as independent existences in the world. Apart from human experience, there is no grounds for supposing that time and space exist.

Antinomies about Causality

The Thesis: Not every cause has a cause or else the series would never begin. So, there is a beginning of the world. Hence, a first cause must exist.

The Antithesis: But the series cannot have a beginning, since everything has a cause, including the first cause and so on. If every event has a cause, then there must be an infinite series of these prior causes *ad infinitum*. Hence, a contradiction results. So, clearly the mind cannot know reality since when mind is applied to reality, contradictions inevitably emerge.

For Kant, the world is viewed from man's perspective and is constructed according to man's understanding. It is possible that there was some freedom involved in creation but when considering the *Critique of Practical Reason*, this is shown not to be true.

The Antinomy of Matter

The Thesis: It would seem impossible to have matter for any existing particle in the world is infinitely divisible or is composed of simple unextended parts. All matter it would seem must have sides and an inside as well as an outside. All matter must be a composite of some sort and be infinitely divisible.

The Antithesis: However, if a particle was infinitely divisible it would have to be composed of an infinite number of parts.

But it is impossible to think of a particle made of these infinite quantities.

If Kant's philosophy is accepted, then the perception of division *ad infinitum* can continue as long as it is considered in the understanding.

The Antinomy of a Necessary Being

The Thesis: There must exist a being who is absolutely necessary (God) that is in some way associated with the world, either in full or in part. For a contingent world cannot exist on its own.

The Antithesis: Nowhere does such a being exist. For whatever actually exists could not exist. All existence in our experience is contingent.

Kant utilizes these antinomies to illustrate that: 1) metaphysical reasoning is futile and 2) we cannot know the noumenal world. Rationalism errs when it applies appearances to noumenal principles and empiricism errs when it applies appearances to the world of things-in-themselves. Kant's solution is to keep a separation between the noumenal and the phenomenal and limit knowledge to only the world of appearances.

Kant makes the declaration, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge* [italics, his], in order to make room for faith" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, preface to second ed., xxx). In this, he means that he denies the ability to bring reality into the scope of knowledge in a strict sense. But he does not consider this to be a bad thing because, by showing the limitations of reason, he believes that he has made room for faith.

Kant's View of God

No Proofs for God are Possible

For Kant all alleged proofs for God are invalid. The cosmological and teleological arguments are based on the ontological argument which is invalid. This is because, while they begin in experience, they leave experience and soar into the realm of pure ideas. Further, a *noumenal* (real)

cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal (appearance) effect. Experience cannot provide a way to distinguish between possibility and actuality because judgments can only be made through finite connectedness shown to us in experience. The only way to arrive at an absolutely perfect or Necessary Being is by the ontological argument, but it is invalid.

The Ontological Argument is Invalid

The ontological argument of Anselm was revived in modern times by Descartes and defended by Spinoza, Leibniz and others as well. It is primarily an a priori argument. This argument shows by definition that God is an absolutely perfect and necessary Being. However, these attributes of omnipotence and omniscience follow logically via analytic assessment which means they are implied in the definition. For Kant there are several reasons why the ontological argument is invalid. First of all, in so far as it speaks of a necessary being it does not follow for several reasons. First one, Necessary Being is not self-clarifying concept. For another, necessity is a logical construct. It does not apply to existence but only to thought. There is no necessary *being*; there are only necessary *thoughts* (like “all triangles have three sides”). Further, it is logically possible that nothing ever existed. Hence, it is not logically necessary that God exists. If God exists, He must be a necessary Being, but it is possible that no God ever existed. Likewise, if a triangle exists, it must have three sides, but it is possible that no triangle actually exists outside of our minds.

Further, in so far as God is thought of as a perfect Being the ontological argument does not work because existence is not a perfection. According to Kant, existence adds nothing to the essence of a thing. The dollar in my mind has the same characteristics as the dollar in my pocket. The only difference is that I have an instance (concrete example) of one in my wallet.

Likewise, God can be conceived as a perfect Being in all characteristics without existing. There is no empirical data that can verify God’s existence as a necessary Being.

The Cosmological Argument is Invalid

Kant argues that it is an illegitimate leap to assert that just because a human being exists that there also exists a God is a perfect and necessary Being. What is more, the cosmological argument is an argument from effect to cause. However, as shown above, we cannot derive a noumenal (real) cause from a phenomenal effect. Indeed, when we attempt to apply the principle of causality to the real world, it ends in antinomies and contradictions, as shown above.

Physico-Theological (From experienced Design to a Cause) Argument is Invalid:

The third argument Kant considers “the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A. 623: B 651) provides a transition to the realm of practical reason. This argument begins with data gained from experience and proceeds by calling attention to design, order, and the impressive purposefulness shown in nature. However, the most these can illustrate is the suggestion of the possibility of the presence of a great architect working on materials. These observations do not enforce the idea of a God who is unlimited or necessary in his being. Only the ontological argument can make this move, and it is invalid. The best the teleological argument can do is only suggests the probable existence of a finite cause.

God is a Necessary Postulate of Practical Reason

What we cannot *prove* by pure reason, we must nevertheless *postulate* by practical reason. For the moral law (the categorical imperative) demands that we postulate a Moral Law Giver in order to make sense of our moral experience. To accomplish this, man must abandon the landscape of

strict knowledge. Even though there are limitations to these above arguments, they can prepare the mind for theological (practical) knowledge and point it in the natural direction even if they cannot provide an absolute foundation for a natural theology. So, while Kant was not a rational theist, neither was he an atheist. He was a fideistic Deist. While God cannot be proven by theoretical reason, nonetheless, he is necessary postulate of practical reason. For our perfection demanded by our ethical duty cannot be achieved without God and the life to come. Hence, it is necessary to *live as if* God and immortality exists in order to fulfill our moral duty (see below) in this life, even though we cannot *know* by pure reason that He exists.

Kant' View of Miracles

Kant was not a theist; he was a Deist. He believed that God exists, but miracles do not occur. His argument against miracles went as follows: 1) We cannot know the real world (world-in-itself) by theoretical reason. 2) But everything in our experience (world-to-us) must be determined by practical reason. 3) But practical reason operates by universal laws. 4) And miracles are exceptions to a universal law. 5) Therefore, miracles do not occur.

Or, to put it another way, if miracles occurred, they would have to occur regularly, seldom, or never. But what occurs regularly is not a miracle. And what occurs seldom is not determined by any law. So, it is rationally necessary to conclude that miracles never occur.

Kant's Ethics

Kant says in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* that “[i]t is impossible to conceive of anything in the world, or indeed out of it, which can be called good without qualification save only a good will.” This was not new news—this truth should be evident in ordinary moral knowledge. The knowledge regarding moral issues is the knowledge of *what ought to be*, it too being a priori because of its necessity and universality, versus the knowledge of *what is*. Kant divides moral philosophy (ethics) into metaphysics of morals—not to be confused with speculative metaphysics—and applied ethics (practical anthropology). He points out that there is an overlap in these two divisions. Moral law must be grounded in reason by finding the ultimate source of the moral law principles. (Kant parts company with those moral philosophers who attempt to find the basis of moral law in human nature or human society.) Moral laws are principles that ought to govern the will regardless of the consequences.

The nature of ethics was deontological, not teleological. That is, it was duty centered, not destiny centered. One keeps the rules and lets the results take care of themselves. Our moral obligations are also universal. There are no exceptions. In this regard Kant argued that one should never lie, even to save a life. We always have a duty to tell the truth; others are responsible for what they do with that truth. Kant’s notion of moral worth is based on the idea of duty—moral actions must be performed. Kant believes that in all cases one must act in accordance with duty. If pleasure is placed before duty, the preference for pleasure is wrong. It is this principle that Kant thinks is representative and is held by everyone. Every person who is virtuous is worthy of happiness. However, happiness does not automatically follow duty in this life. To connect these two, Kant adds a further postulate—a Judge (God). The Just Judge will ultimately reward the virtuous and punish the evil doers—all with their just desserts. Goodwill is acting for the sake of duty in reverence for law. Law, according to Kant, is universal—as physical laws are universal so are moral laws as well.

Further, ethics are categorical, not hypothetical. Kant posited the Categorical Imperative which demands that we always act so as to treat others as ends, not means. And we should Act only

by norms you we will to be universal. Lying can't be willed as a universal law since if everyone lied there would be no more truth to lie about. Murder cannot be willed as a universal law, else there would be no more people to kill. Moral conflicts are apparent but not real.

Kant provides a formulation that is related to the categorical imperative. 1) Act in such a way that if the act became a universal law others would also act this way as well. 2) Treat persons such that the act is an 'end' in itself and not the 'means' to an end. 3) All should act as if they were a part of an ideal community where all persons would be at the same time be sovereign and subject to one another. Kant expresses desired government to come as close to his ideals as possible, and in so doing, he calls this a republican form of government where the peoples are ruled by officials elected by the people. His essay *Eternal Peace* anticipates the aspirations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Peace will come to world governments if they act in the spirit of Kant.

Kant's Influence on His Successors

Kant not only best synthesized his predecessors, but he most influenced his successors of almost any philosopher in modern times. The rationalists before became Idealist after Kant since they found truth only in the realm of the ideal since we cannot know the real (*noumenal*) world. Also, most phenomenologists after Kant began with the phenomena, not the real world. And the Existentialist claimed not to know reality but to will it or make a leap of faith to it. Likewise, the Empiricism became Positivists since they too could not know the real, but only the world of their senses. The Positivism turned into Logical Positivists which totally eliminated metaphysics and Linguistic Analysis which was content to analyze language locked, as they were, inside of their own linguistic bubble.

Meanwhile the Idealist Johann Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Georg Hegel developed their idealistic philosophies out of their ideas (phenomena). Fichte was a *subjective* Idealist, Schelling—an *objective* Idealist, and Hegel was a *developmental* Idealist.

An Evaluation of Kant's Philosophy

There are many positive features within the Kantian philosophy. A few will be noted.

Some Positive Features of Kant's Thought

First, the synthesis between Empiricism and Rationalism is a stroke of genius. Both the content provided by the senses and the categories provided by the mind are necessary for knowledge. In short, there are both *a priori* and *a posteriori* element in knowledge.

Second, Kant was correct in noting (via the influence of David Hume) that we are not born with innate ideas. Nonetheless, there are innate categories in the mind which are necessary for knowledge. As he said, the mind without the senses is empty, and the senses without the mind are blind.

Third, Kant held strongly to a deontological ethics with universal principles in opposition to a teleological ethic wherein the ends justify the means. His sense of moral duty to universal principles was commendable, particularly for a philosopher of his stature.

Fourth, although Kant never formulated a moral argument for God's existence, nonetheless, he laid the groundwork in two ways. First, he agreed to universal moral prescriptions. Second, believed that it was a necessary postulate of practical reason to believe in a Moral Law Giver.

Fifth, Kant developed the elements of a transcendental argument which can be put to use in

building a rational theism. For if it is rationally necessary to posit the necessary conditions for certain realities, then why is it not necessary to posit a transcendent Mind as the basis for all thought, then this is a kind of transcendental argument for God's existence.

Some Negative Critiques of Kant's Philosophy

There are, however, some serious drawbacks to Kant's thinking in both epistemology and metaphysics. Some of the more notable ones may be mentioned briefly:

First, Kant's philosophical agnosticism is self-defeating. It amounts to saying "I know that one cannot know anything about ultimate reality (the *noumena*). For that is a statement about reality, claiming that no such statements can be made about reality. It appears that it is impossible to deny metaphysics without making metaphysical statements.

Second, Kant's claim that "no necessarily true statements can be made about reality" is itself a claim to be a necessarily true statement about reality. One cannot limit necessary statements about reality without making one himself.

Third, Kant's so-called contradictions (used to disprove we can know the real world) are false antinomies. For example, the antinomy about causality is a false statement of the principle of causality. Contrary to Kant, causality does not claim that "Everything has a cause," but only that "Everything that begins (or is finite) has a cause." Once the principle of causality is properly stated the antinomy vanishes. The same is true of the other so-called antinomies. There was no time before time was created (which would be contradictory). The theist does not hold to a creation in time; rather, it was a creation of time. Once this is understood, the antinomy vanishes.

Fourth, Kant Deism is without foundation. For if God engaged in the supernatural act of creating the world, as Deists believe, then not only are miracles possible, but the biggest miracle of all has already occurred. Hence, there's nothing hindering other miracles from occurring too.

Fifth, given the possibility (and actuality of the miraculous), then Kant's de-supernaturalized view of Christ does not follow. Christianity cannot be reduced to a moral code. Jesus was not a Kantian moralist.

The Renaissance period (14th to 17th centuries) illustrated an advancement in the methods of inquiry. The rationalists and empiricists developed systems of thought in order to strategically place the ideals of God, man, and nature in their appropriate places. It was during this Enlightenment era (18th century onward), also sometimes called the Age of Reason (including perhaps some of the 17th century as well), that there arose a greater concern for Epistemology. Historically, this branch of study generally began with Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* (1690) and closed with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). During the eighteenth century, the public received their 'enlightenment' less through the direct contact with philosophical works and more through what was called the "popularizers"—journals, men of letters, and salon talkers, known as *philosophes*, a term taken from the French.

However, the Enlightenment period is credited for striving towards political independence, economic freedom, religious toleration, and the liberties regarding thought and published writings motivated by a belief in 'human' progress. The worldview of the Enlightenment can be categorized by three ideas: reason—common sense sharpened by logic and science; nature—the conception of the good (based on ethical and aesthetic standards) and the beautiful, however, discrediting anything supernatural; and progress—making the present better than the past. This positive side of the Enlightenment took strides to understand the world in terms of human beings themselves, especially in his psychological, moral, and social life.

The negative side of this era was marked with destructive criticism, primarily against the Catholic Church and religion in general. These criticisms were a significant change compared to the thinkers of the medieval period where these intelligent men broke away from superstitions of various kinds. Excluding Rousseau (1712—1778), one of the best-known thinkers of this time was known by his pen-name Voltaire (1694—1778). His literary works never tired of denouncing the Catholic Church which he considered as an enemy to reason and full of intolerance. It was Voltaire who declared that "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him."

The anti-religious movement of this era went from deism to atheism and materialism. In fact, most contemporary worldviews that reject Christianity and trade it for various forms of 'faith' in secularism, whether it be positivism, materialism, Marxism, rationalism, humanism, and others, not excluding atheism, have their roots in the Enlightenment period. The eighteenth century also saw a shift away from Christianity to Deism and Unitarianism which carried with it some marginal theological beliefs.

Even though the attitude of much of Christianity at this time was distrustful of reason, Christians were not entirely passive when challenged by the doctrines of the Enlightenment. The eighteenth century witnessed a rise in Protestantism. In Britain and Colonial America, there was the Methodist movement, there was also Pietism in Germany, and Jansenism, a form of Catholic Puritanism, in France. These were evangelical, politically and socially conservative movements which reached out to the working class that was neglected by the Enlightenment.

As will be shown below, there were many who influenced the thinking in this period in history. Unfortunately, space does not allow a complete understanding of these influential thinkers. Besides the development of thought through Berkeley and Hume, Locke's writings also played a significant role during this time because of his empirical method. These new thinkers addressed

ethics, human morality, and reason, thus encouraging many to abandon religious beliefs.

The British Moralists

The third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671—1713) was the first great moralist of the eighteenth century. He took Locke's empiricism and applied it to ethics. Humans intrinsically had 'self affections' compelling him to look out for his own interests. They also had 'natural affections' which prompted him to goodness. Their 'unnatural affections' led them to acts of hostility to himself and others.

Francis Hutcheson (1694—1747), professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, viewed morality from an aesthetic perspective. He affirmed that morality is like good taste in art, immorality is ugly. Following Shaftesbury, Hutcheson writes in *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit*, that morality is basically an aesthetic moral feeling based on some rational sense.

Joseph Butler (1692—1752) bases morality by appealing to reason because the conscience is implanted in man by God. As a keen thinker and bishop in the English church, he attempted to base his position on the divine command but, because of the cultural climate, he had to support his claims by appealing to human reason and experience.

Adam Smith (1723—1790) was an intimate friend of David Hume. Smith also taught at the same university as Hutcheson. Smith in *Theory of the Moral Sensitivity* focused upon the sympathy of man guided by conscience as a driving force behind man's actions. Smith coupled the influence of Butler and empiricism to form the foundation associated with sociology. He also would help lay the building blocks for classical political economy in his classic, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*.

Richard Price (1723—1791) refused to base morality on anything subjective, such as psychology, based his doctrine on moral law on a rational, immutable, and the eternal because he believed that the intellect knows these notions intuitively. These principles are self-evident to the common sense of any plain man.

Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832) was the English philosopher who devoted his life to and advocated Unitarianism. His concept of utility covered a broader gamut and was more thorough than what Hume proposed. Bentham made this idea more practical in its application—the fact associated with utility. The natural man, who is selfish, seeks pleasure and avoids pain. Through physical, political, moral, and religious controls, man gravitates towards the common good. The measurement to determine the significance associated with these actions was by a means called by Bentham “the hedonistic calculus” which meant doing the greatest good for the greatest number or people. This he conceived in a quantitative sense of physical pleasure over pain in contrast to John Stuart Mill (see below) who understood the calculus in a qualitative sense. Bentham is known for his work titled *Principles of Morals and Legislation*.

Early Deism

The rejection of orthodox Christianity and replaced by a *natural* religion—were constructed by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583—1648). Even though deism agreed to the idea of the existence of God—and of Him there is to be worship—man is to turn from sin, be virtuous, and is subjected to reward and/or punishment in the future life. However, they rejected these principles based on revelation. Their *natural* religion stemmed from rationalism and just as the name states—‘naturally’ held by all men. Nevertheless, Joseph Butler did compose a work that was considered a refutation of

deism in his *Analogy*. It was Locke, insisting that Christianity must be reasonable, who opened the gate allowing the revival of natural religion. As a result, the following works were published: John Toland's (1670—1722) *Christianity Not Mystrious*, Anthony Collin's *Discourse of Free Thinking* (1713), Matthew Tindall's *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (1730) and Thomas Chubbs booklets (1715 and 1748). In America Thomas Jefferson (1743-1846) and Benjamin Franklin (1706—1790) were deistic in beliefs and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was a strong deist as reflected in his book, *The Age of Reason*.

Materialism and the Mind

John Locke made a passing comment that all matter has the power of thinking. Again, this remark by him opened a floodgate (though not promoted by Locke himself) showing that the mind is a function of the brains activity. This notion was also promoted by John Toland but it was David Hartley (1705—1757), a physician, who holds a significant place in psychology. He posited that the simple thoughts forming complex ideas were analogous to the composition of hydrogen and oxygen in water. Ideas in the brain were simple vibrations creating a physiological basis for mental transformation. Not that this was strict materialism but rather he saw a tendency for thoughts to be dependent upon brain processes. It was Joseph Priestley (1733—1804), a Unitarian, who further developed Hartley's theory and wrote *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind* and *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit* where he promoted the idea that the mental and physical processes may only be different manifestations of the same substance.

THE BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT

The political and religious atmosphere in Britain at the time tended to be far hostility. The moralists enjoyed their independence away from theology. The psychologists were making strides in correlating ideas with the process of the brain. These psychologists were content to keep religion on the side lines. Like many English moralists, the French too tried to separate ethics from metaphysics and theology. However, the deists wanted to continue making religion more rational and free from what they considered as ‘superstitions’ yet they too did not have much influence. Hume did not reject Christianity per se, only that it could not be philosophically established.

The first half of the eighteenth century experienced a calm unemotional ‘religious’ atmosphere which also kept bigotry and intolerance to a minimum. During the middle of the eighteenth century, two brothers, John and Charles Wesley, led Oxford students and graduates to start the great “evangelical revival” that ended up sweeping the country as well as the American colonies. Religion all of a sudden became a personal experience netting benefits to individuals and society at large.

THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT

The French philosophers of the eighteenth century were heavily influenced by English thought. These were straight-out atheists and materialists, especially in the second half of the century. They generally agreed with empiricism (and a kind of positivism) but turned their backs on speculative metaphysics in trade for phenomenalism and the rejection of the ideal deductive method. However, it would be an error to label all of these French thinkers as ‘positivist’ but they did pave the way for this notion in the following century. Several philosophers did reflect upon the connection between man’s physical and psychological attributes resulting in perhaps a crude form of materialism. Overall, and borrowing a phrase from Hume, the French Enlightenment was attempting to develop ‘the science of man.’

One of the most influential writers who cut the path for the Enlightenment was Pierre Bayle (1647—1706). He thought the current theological controversies, the relation between grace and free will, was confused and pointless. Bayle thought human beings were too prone to believe differences when in actuality there were none where these controversies were based on prejudice and a lack of clear understanding. What makes his point noteworthy is his dogmatic views about metaphysics and philosophy or natural theology. He does not posit that religious truths are not incapable of rational proofs, but that they are repugnant to reason. Therefore, there is all the more reason to accept revelation.

Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657—1757) popularized scientific ideas. He was a defender of Cartesian physics and an attacker of Newton’s principle of gravity. In the latter part of his life, notes remaining from his manuscripts showed that he leaned towards empiricism—that ideas are reducible in the end to sensed experienced data. He was also an indirect contributor to skepticism as it pertained to religious truths. He was not an atheist but viewed God as manifesting himself in the law-governed and scientific based system of found in nature. God, however, was not a historical figure of religion.

It was not until Marie Arouet (1694—1778) published his *Lettres philosophiques sur les Anglias*. Marie, better known by his pen-name Voltaire, combined the spirit of Locke’s empiricism, the deism of Toland, and the physics of Newton, spending the remainder of his life disseminating his collaboration of research. Though he had little originality, he expressed his message in style through drama, poem, novels, essays, pamphlets, historical studies and through a philosophical dictionary. One of his favorite works is *Candide* (1759) which bitterly attacks Leibniz’s ‘idealistic’ doctrine of the ‘best of all possible worlds.’ His great literary talent propagated his philosophy world-wide. As a deist, Voltaire believed that matter existed eternally as well as God. Nonetheless, he thought that God’s power was limited. Therefore, God’s limitation then explains why there are natural disasters, further mocking the opponents who claim that ‘this is the best of all possible worlds.’ Voltaire maintained his belief in the existence of God to the end. However, his view on how God related to the world had changed. At first, he shared the optimism of Leibniz and the Pope but later, when considering the disaster at Lisbon in 1755, he became less optimist when considering the problem of evil.

Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues (1715—1747) wrote several works promoting the idea that *passions* are what motivates human beings. In his first work, he focused on the mind where definitions and reflections are founded upon experience. As he discusses the different types of mind, he says that genius depends in part on the passions. As he writes in his second work, he treats the

passions as being founded on pleasure—perfection and pain—imperfection. It is from this idea comes the notion of good and evil. He elaborates on this in his third writing. Because different people find pleasure and pain in different things, ideas of good and evil are therefore different. The conclusion: good must attend to the advantage of society; evil tends towards the ruin of society. This is the foundation of all morality, a mere utilitarian moral interpretation.

Denis Diderot (1713—1784) created an *Encyclopaedia* though it was full of weaknesses, inconsistencies, and had few, if any, new philosophical insights. It did though provide a service in that it did convey information. He cannot be classified as a deist, atheist, or pantheist even though later in life he rejected deism and replaced it with atheism. Later, he too proposed a form of naturalistic pantheism. He did though consider religions such as Judaism and Christianity as mutually exclusive and intolerant. These religions were created from superstition beginning at certain times in history to then disappearing from existence. Diderot seems to have converted to a form of modern existential atheism.

The *Traite de sensations* by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715—1780) was a further development of Locke's empirical psychology but it regarded the higher thought process as transformations of sensations. He placed great stress on the part that language played in the development of the mental life. Ideas are fixed when associated with a sign or word. He was not a materialist, but Condillac apparently believed in the existence of the soul apart from the body. This soul can only be known by its sensations. He did not reduce the soul to a bundle of sensations but believed it was an immaterial center of unity.

Claude Adrien Heletius (1715—1771) took Condillac's theory even further such that he offended both the church and state. He posited that, even though the mind is a blank slate, it develops ideas from experiences of pain and pleasure. The power of human understanding is reduced to sense perception. Based on his reductive psychology, he fabricates a utilitarian theory of morality. He promoted the idea of self-interest as the fundamental motive of conduct. Considering these things, he saw that education was very important and that men develop their character based upon their surroundings.

Julian Offrai de La Mettrie (1709—1751) was an agnostic and was regarded as an atheist. He posits that the senses are man's 'philosophers.' He takes the materialistic avenue even further by stating in *L'homme machine* that there are common physiological principles operating in vegetables, animals, and human organism whereby the functions of each only vary by desire. (He seems to have anticipated the conception of organic evolution.)

Baron Paukl von Holbach (1723—1789) was a materialist and a determinist. Because motion is an essential property of things, the need for God or a supermundane being is ruled out. Natural law is what rules the order and system of things. He states that humans are material beings where the mental processes are nothing but motions in the brain resulting in mechanical events. The soul is the body in relation to its functions. d'Holbach attacked philosophical arguments that posited the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. Not surprising, he rejected the natural religion of the deists. He believed that these beliefs were merely superstitions in order to exploit and control the people.

Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717—1783) studied medicine then furthered his studies in mathematics and science. He had no leanings towards metaphysical principles because he concluded that they led to skepticism—the inability to know and understanding the external world. What can be

said of him is that he was a predecessor of positivism because he thought that science had no need for metaphysics or occult practices.

Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712—1778) ideas did not differ significantly from those of other writers of the Enlightenment period. He makes his mark in this era because of his sympathy for the common people. He did much to change the social philosophy during his time. Rousseau's view on religion resembled Voltaire and the other French Deists. He believed that God's power is limited, thus acquitted God of the responsibility of evil. Rousseau thought that the evils of his time were a result of the fruits of civilization. Man was basically good and a self-preserver who ordered his life well unless the evils of civilization had pressed upon him. Man is generally directed by his will towards the common good. The general will and voice of the people is in fact the voice of God (cf. *Discourse on Political Economy*, 253). His work titled *Social Contract* (1762) ranks along with Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*. The principles of a democratic government can be found in Rousseau's 1762 work. Like Helvetius, he too saw the problem of his time linked to general education. In *Emile* (1762), he outlines the ideal course of education for a single pupil. The great educational reformers, Basedow (1723—1790), Pestalozzi (1746—1827), Herbart (1776—1841), and Froebel (1782—1852), were indebted to Rousseau.

THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Germany's Enlightenment was significantly different than the French. Their motivation was that they wanted to be different from the French. Gottfried Leibniz's doctrine was simplified and elaborated on by the most prominent philosopher in Germany, Christian Wolff. Wolff (1679—1754) thought himself able to explain all things on rational principles. At first he started on the path of theology but changed to philosophy, lecturing on Leipzig and adopting his distinction between truths-of-reason and truths-of-fact. Basically, these opposites cannot be posited without forming a contradiction. Wolff's outlook was quite different as compared to his predecessor Christian Thomasius (1655—1728) who was hostile towards metaphysics. In Wolff's writings there is a renewal of academic philosophy and metaphysics along with an exhaustive rationalism. Though Thomasius was considered a rationalist, he was not anti-religious. His rationalistic philosophy included the metaphysical knowledge of God and natural theology. He is known for his work titled *Rational Thoughts about God, The World, the Soul of Man, and all Things in General*. He was primarily the first philosopher to extensively write in German making philosophical studies available to schools, universities, and the general reader.

Influenced by Spinoza and the empiricism of England and France, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729—1781) believed in divine education that first began with savages and developed further into the religions found in the Orient as well as in Christianity. Along with Lessing, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744—1803) had a philosophy of history. His focused on folklore and the songs found among primitive people. Like Rousseau, he believed in simple feeling instinctive faith as a reliable source rather than rationalism.

Scottish Philosophy

Thomas Reid (1710—1796), Dugald Stewart (1753—1828), and Thomas Brown (1778—1820), all professed empiricism but claimed that Locke was in error is distinguishing as he did between ideas and external objects as they are represented in the mind. These men claimed that the external objects are received directly into the mind, as they actually exist— not as copies or ideas. They were proponents of realism substantiated by means of common sense. Reid takes this a step further and divides common sense into contingent truths and necessary truths. Morality too is intuitive by the conscience. This ethical position is labeled 'Intuitionism.' This common sense philosophy prevailed in Scotland and was popular in churches, freeing ministers from skeptical doubt. Common sense saw a spawned a return to realism in Great Britain and the United States.

The St. Andrews theologian Archibald Campbell (1691—1756) posited that man has an instinctive tendency for self-love—a love that includes self-esteem, esteem of others, and respect. Campbell challenged the Enlightenment's rational religion. In his *The Necessity of Revelation* (1739), he illustrates he criticizes the view that the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and eternal happiness based on one's conduct, can be proven without special revelation. If there is a dependence on revelation, how is it to be identified? He believed that God's existence is only provable for those who want to see it.

THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT

The most brilliant American philosophers of the colonial period were Samuel Johnson (1696—1772) and Jonathan Edwards (1703—1758). Johnson, a disciple of Berkeley and an idealist, modified his view of idealism, claiming that notions not only include the knowledge of ourselves, other spirits, and God, but it also included the universal principles of all kinds. Edwards, was influenced by Locke and Newton. However, his works placed an emphasis on theology, including metaphysical, logical, ethical, and aesthetic subjects as well. He was a theist whose attitude toward the world was illuminated and transformed by his experience with God. Edward's philosophy did not impress his contemporaries as much as his Calvinistic theology—the affirmation of the sovereignty of God, predestination, and total depravity of man.

Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams came under the influence of philosophers while in France. However, Adams retained strong Christian beliefs, while Jefferson deviated more from orthodox Christianity, accepting Christ for his moral teachings. American Revolution, attacks against miracles and prophecies of the Bible, and orthodox Christianity in general, were on the rise. Thomas Paine (1737—1809) and Ethan Allen (1737/38—1789) writing *The Age of Reason* and *Reason the Only Oracle of Man* (1784) respectively, advocated the natural religion of Deism on rational grounds. They believed in God, natural law, man's innate goodness, and the capacity for progress. Since Deism was incapable of organizing churches in America, it only took a generation for it to disappear as a dominant force in society.

The works of Cadwallader Colden (1688—1776), Joseph Buchanan (1785—1812), Joseph Priestley, Thomas Cooper (1759—1840), and Benjamin Rush (1745—1813), showed that these men were men interested in physics and physiology. They attempted to explain mental processes in terms of the nervous system. They discussed the problems of psychology and epistemology. Lastly, John Witherspoon (1723—1794) was a Scot who came to America in 1768 to become President of Princeton University. In just a few years, he was able to silence the advocates of the Berkeleyan idealism at Princeton and to then make it a stronghold of Scottish realism. This ideal lasted for over a century. The last two most famous American proponents of Scottish realism was Noah Porter (1811—1892) and James McCosh (1811—1894). Porter was President of Yale and McCosh was President of Princeton. He was followed by president Charles Hodge (1797—1878) and professor B. B. Warfield (1851—1921).

POST-KANTIAN IDEALISM

The two main streams of philosophy flowing into Kant were Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) and Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz). The former stressed the senses and the later emphasized the mind. Kant was able to synthesize these two movements by claiming that the *content* of our knowledge comes from the senses but the final *form* of knowledge comes from the categories of the mind. Unfortunately, this led to an Agnosticism which concluded that we cannot know reality (the *noumena*) but only appearances (the *phenomena*). Thus the stream of Empiricism turned to Positivism (scientism) which gave up metaphysics for the physical science. And the stream of Rationalism became Idealism which confessed that our ideas did not apprehend reality in itself. Johann Fichte was the first major philosophy in this movement.



Background and Works.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born in a tiny village in Saxony, Germany. He was the oldest son of a humble weaver. Originally, Fichte was schooled by a visiting nobleman who was so impressed with the child's ability at nine years of age to report the substance of a sermon with great accuracy that he decided to provide the boy's education. After the death of this tutor, young Johann struggled on his own with little help from his parents. After he finished his secondary schooling at the Pforta school, he furthered his education at the University at Jena and then to Leipzig for theological training. The highly recognized school at Pforta is where later Friedrich Nietzsche (see below) would be educated. After a while, he himself found jobs as a tutor until he married the brilliant and devoted Johanna Rahn. By this time, Fichte's philosophical interests had been influenced by Spinoza's pantheistic determinism until he came across Kant's *Critiques* via one of his pupils. This was a key factor in his transformation into Idealism.

He served as a tutor in Leipzig and Zurich until he was dismissed because of his overbearing temperament. While at Zurich, he read Kant, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, and gladly accepted the French Revolution. This led to Fichte becoming a convert to Kant. It seemed as though to Fichte that Kant's philosophy was able to shed light on those troubling ideas in Fichte's mind. Eventually, Fichte met Kant in Königsberg but received a cold welcome. When he wrote a monograph called an *Essay Toward a Critique of All Revelation* (pub. 1792) that applied critical philosophy to certain topics associated with religion, Kant became impressed with Fichte's work and took steps to have it published. Unfortunately, the printer of the publication had not included Fichte's name at the top and it was assumed because of its anonymity that this particular work was Kant's alone. Kant quickly gave credit where credit was due and Fichte suddenly became popular. In 1794 at thirty years of age, he was called to a professorship at the university at Jena and found residence in small neighboring city of Weimar where there also resided many great scholars, including Goethe and Schiller. Fichte became known as a great Kantian interpreter.

Later he published a treatise on Idealism called *Basis of the Entire Theory of Science* (1794) which manifested into other works titled *Basis of Natural Right* (1796) and *System of Ethics* (1798). His reputation for hastiness and for various other reasons, including a charge of atheism because of his position of editor in a publication called *Philosophical Journal*, ended in his being dismissed from Jena. The work that led to the accusation of atheism was *On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine World-Order*. This world order proposed by Fichte identified God with a moral-order to be created and sustained by the human will. He wrote other works including lectures called *On the Characteristics of the Present Age* which attacked the Romanists, *The Nature of the Scholar*, *The Way to the Blessed Life or Doctrine of Religion*, and his famous work titled *Addresses to the*

German Nation. In 1810, Fichte was appointed head of philosophy at the University of Berlin. His most noted work that presents his philosophical perspective is covered in *Vocation of Man* (1799). When the typhoid epidemic broke out, both Johann and his wife contracted the disease. Johann nursed his wife back to health but he later died in January of 1814.

Fichte was a deeply conscientious, religious, and moral man having a high regard and duty for the promotion of Kant. He believed every man did indeed have a divine vocation for which purpose he was brought into the world to fulfill. He would, however, present his convictions as though they were the voice of God Himself.

His Philosophy

Fichte was the first to promote Idealism after Kant. This ideal dominated German philosophy during the early nineteenth century. However, Fichte called his doctrine ‘critical idealism’ in order to differentiate it from Kant’s. Fichte took the ‘thing-in-itself’ as the dividing line between dogmatism—accepting the thing-in-itself—and idealism which denies it. The conflict between these two according to Fichte is the striking difference between free determination of one’s will and some standard of truth illustrating a sense of necessity. Kant pushed for an individual a priori in each science and in morality. Fichte strived to show their interconnectedness and interdependence. He initially sided with Kant that religion is derived from ethics but takes this further and posits that God is manifested within the universal moral order. To accomplish this task, he introduces what he calls the “science of sciences” or “science of knowledge.” Here he illustrates an a priori associated with every science positing a universal knowledge associated with this ‘new science.’

Different persons look in different directions depending on what kind of persons they are. The mature self-reliant philosopher recognizes his freedom and will choose Idealism whereas the immature, those who have little consciousness of their independence, will pick dogmatism. However, dogmatism ends in fatalism and materialism whereas idealism safeguards independence of the self and is grounded in nature. This even illustrates that idealism has an advantage over dogmatism. Further, the thing-in-itself is never shown to exist in experience but is only used as an invention to show its necessity.

The Ego and the Pure (Super) Ego

Fichte’s new science (*Wissenschaftslehre*) is briefly outlined as follows. First, he asks the inquirer to examine himself carefully noticing that he should observe himself freely and having both imagination and will. However, there are also external objects that are independent of volition and yet appear as necessary thus being imposed upon me. When something is experienced, two factors result. There is the object itself—the thing-in-itself—and the one observing the object forming the concept—the intelligence-in-itself. The question is, which is ultimate, the object itself or the judgment of the object in the mind? The object is really only seen when the observer is also aware of himself. Therefore, there is really never any awareness of the object-in-itself except only an assumption. (This even extends to the awareness of one’s self—existence is a combination of impressions.) Fichte replaces the intelligence-in-itself with the term ‘I’ or ‘ego.’ What is behind the ego is a pure ego, a transcendent ego which is the first principle of philosophy. When a man reflects on his own self-consciousness, he sees that it also includes a suspicion about the existence of the pure ego as an active force, not being an object itself.

Fichte's Idealism places the consciousness independent of experience. This I-in-itself is free (and spiritual) and takes the external world as its product. His view is dialectical. Creating a thesis, he uses the law of identity to prove his point that the object A must exist in the 'self' or else it could never be perceived in the first place. Through his anti-thesis, he negates the object—not-A—which in turn negates the 'self' making it in opposition to the 'self.' The synthesis is the union of the two in opposition: the 'self' called the ego and the 'not-self' called the 'Super' Ego which is associated with the external world. The external world operated by the Super Ego is the source of the forms of the mind and of the sensed objects themselves. This Larger Ego is the common Mind or Will. This is the essence of Fichte's Idealism.

Fichte is not just concerned with the phenomenology of consciousness; rather he is concerned with developing an idealistic metaphysics. His positing that there is a pure ego insinuates that there is one and only one transcendent ego that actively and infinitely manifests itself in the finite consciousnesses. He even goes as far as to identify it as a spiritual Life who creates all phenomena. He is pressing for both a phenomenology of consciousness and a metaphysics of Idealism.

During Fichte's Jena tenure, he seemed to limit God to an impersonal being. This led to some conservative Christians making the claim of atheism against him. However, during the time he was in Berlin he wrote essays that more specifically described the Super Ego as a being sufficient to fulfill certain purposes. This external world, according to Fichte, was one for the fulfillment of moral purposes. The specific aim for individuals was for them to find their specific duty and vocation. This leads into his ethical idealism.

Fichte's Ethical Idealism

Fichte's moral law is the law of nature where God orders the universe. The material world is apparent to man's senses. The human will is free and his soul is immortal. A person should exercise his freedom without impinging upon the freedom of others. Each person comes into the world with a unique vocation for which he is to perform. However, his duty is never completely fulfilled in this life; hence, the immortality of the soul makes allowance for its completion. Each person is to feel the responsibility to conduct his life in such a way as to work towards his unique calling. Our moral nature shows that he has 'natural' impulses for certain activities only because he wants to do those certain behaviors. On the other hand, humans perform other activities to where he leaves them undone with no regards to an end. This provides evidence for a person's inner moral and ethical nature. Humans are a product of ego, intelligence, and consciousness and as such they strive after freedom and independence through s natural impulses and desires. The natural impulses and desires are from a transcendent point of view, one impulse. Humans are not merely a mechanism. This is especially true for the scholar whose leadership and dominance incite others to work at their unique vocation. The scholar was one who was the clergyman of truth, a guide, a teacher in the human race dedicated to elevating morality, and one who was make known the knowledge of the Divine. This is addresses in *The Nature of the Scholar where* Fichte indicts mankind, stating that most men are slothful and never fulfill their responsibilities.

This individual focused vocation also finds its principle in the nations of the world. Fichte's *morality* focuses in on the individual; his *right* focuses in on the relationships of one human being to another. Both have a common focal point—a person striving for the infinite. The notion of this infinite striving illustrates the pure freedom found in a human being man which is a person's duty making up the essence of the moral law. Each nation too has its own unique vocation in history where it is to

make its contribution in the advancement of mankind. Fichte especially thinks this is true for the Germans above all and addresses this in his *Addresses to the German Nation*. The vocational duty of each person is as Fichte dictum says: “Always fulfill thy vocation . . . act according to thy conscience” (*The Science of Ethics*, II, 12, 13). This pronouncement guides a person to synthesize his needs and wants so that the moral order can be actualized. The state’s purpose is to provide restraints for the common will joined in a civil pact. To act this out, each individual is to surrender his or her freedom to the state. The state is there only to harness non-ethical interests. Eventually, the need for the state will disappear but for the time being, the state is indispensable and carries with it great moral responsibility.

Above all, mankind is to strive for his ultimate destiny—the union with God in perfect love. This is his philosophy of religion and is presented in Fichte’s *The Way to the Blessed Life*.

Fichte on Faith and Religion

In his essay titled *On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Providence* (1798), Fichte illustrates his notion of the idea of God and the world. He accomplishes this *not* through ordinary consciousness or transcendental idealism of the Pure Ego, but rather through the notion of morality. Here, the ego is a part of the super-sensible moral order—God, the divine moral orderer. The Fichtean God is the moral orderer and actualizes Himself through nature and morality—not just a reconciler of them. Immortality can even be understood now as a reality while the infinite Self strives (as was illustrated in his notion regarding vocation). Freedom is the realization of the internal subjective nature that allows obedience to moral imperatives. Since man is a member of the sensible world and the eternal world, he is obligated to the moral law within the material realm. His loyalty is based on rational faith in the true source of life. It is through the activity of religion that the will dies to self and attaches to the law of duty. However, this duty is accomplished through an attitude of love based upon religious meditations where one takes on the characteristics of God’s intelligence, will and power. Therefore, man is left to choose between a love for God or a love for this phenomenal world. This is the basis of true faith. To speak of God as substance, or as personal, or benevolent, is nonsense according to Fichte. However, belief in the divine moral order posits that moral actions result in the good and evil actions never result in the good. Here again, this is where the charge of atheism was levied against him because his readers thought he reduced God to some moral ideal.

The focal point of religion is in the obedience to the moral law. Faith is faith in the ontological moral order. It can be seen that this dynamic panentheistic idealism is based on faith and not based on knowledge. In order to fulfill the moral vocations there is the requirement of faith in a living and active moral order, the infinite Reason and Will. However, Fichte in *The Way to the Blessed Life* concerns himself with edifying the uplifting his hearers and reassuring them that his philosophy is not at odds with the Christian religion.



The Life and Works of Schelling

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling is the connecting link between Johann Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. Friedrich Schelling was born in 1775 in Wurttemberg. His father was a learned Pastor and teacher to which Friedrich received most of his secondary education at home. At fifteen, he was sent to the Tübingen theological foundation where Hegel and Hölderlin were his classmates. Schelling's early educational training was theological rather than scientific. At age seventeen, he wrote a dissertation on the third chapter of Genesis and in 1793 he published an essay titled *On Myths*. While at Tübingen, he mastered Kant, Plato, and Leibniz and expounded on Fichte's teachings. He was a brilliant young man at the age of eighteen and began to publish philosophical papers. However, subsequent publications revealed variations in his perspective. He did advance beyond Fichte. He became known as the "second founder of the theory of science." He later died in 1854.

He taught at the University of Jena in 1798. Schelling's earliest writings were done while he was at Jena where he first studied under Fichte. Starting around 1801, Hegel arrived at the University of Jena and for the next two years he and Schelling engaged in a collaborative effort to defend the "System of Identity." These two would also co-write the entire contents of the new *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. Needless to say, it was during this time that division occurred between Schelling and Fichte. In addition, it would not be too much longer until the ties with Hegel would be compromised. After marrying, Schelling left Jena and went to Würzburg in Munich. Initially, he argued that man's knowledge can only lie in the Ego. With this, he attempted to deduce nature from the essence of the Ego. Eventually, he viewed various organic life forms as successive stages in which the production of matter takes place. It is convincing to Schelling that scientific research presupposes that Nature is intelligible whereby the experiment itself involves questions that Nature is forced to answer.

He believed that Nature's self-reflection as it knows itself and is illustrated through man where the lower is explained by the higher. In this is where Schelling shows the influence of Aristotle's Absolute and the real order of things (*Works*, I, p. 708.) Schelling was attempting to present an argument that there is an a priori succession of ascending stages of evolution. He argued this without any sufficient scientific background to prove that latter species were derived from lower ones. Later Darwin would attempt to give a scientific basis for this in natural selection. The different stages of evolution are represented in the development of the observing mind. During the time of this transfer, he was introduced to Jacob Boehme (C. ~ 1575—1624, German Christian mystic and theologian). Boehme had some very interesting insights on evil, freedom, and the dualism of forces in God and nature. Later in his career around 1802, under the influence of Spinoza, he posits that mind and matter at its lowest point are identical. Schelling, as well as Spinoza had attempted, was unable

to show how the Absolute could be related to a world of diversity. His every changing philosophy led him to take on Hegel's philosophy. It would be during the years of 1800 to 1804 that Schelling focused in on the philosophy of art or aesthetic. Around 1805 to 1808, Schelling focused his interests on religious concerns and had a particular interest in the Gnostic tradition, most especially, the theosophical writings of Jacob Boehme. By the time his last work in 1809 had appeared, his philosophy started to be criticized and his theory on God was challenged. These critics said that Schelling's theory on God led to pantheism and anthropomorphism. He continued to lecture and provide an underground center that resisted against the reigning idealism of that time. After the death of his wife Carolina in 1809, Schelling's activities as a philosopher virtually came to an end being replaced by more conservative social and religious elements.

In 1827, he returned to Munich as a professor of philosophy. In 1841, he relocated to Berlin and took the appointed chair of Professor of Philosophy. He was given the job to stamp out the "dragon seed of Hegelianism." As well, he developed his new philosophy of revelation and methodology. He called this his 'new philosophy' that was counter the 'old philosophy' of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, including his own philosophy that he had earlier promoted while at Jena.

Schelling wrote the following works: *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795), *Ideas toward a Philosophy of Nature* (1797), *On the World Soul* (1798), co-edited the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* with Hegel, and a *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), *Exposition of My System of Philosophy* (1801), *Bruno or On the Divine and Natural Principles of Things* (1802), *Philosophy of Religion* (1804), and *Philosophical Inquires into the Nature of Human Freedom* (1809), and *The Ages of the World* (composed 1811), and the two final works done posthumously, *Philosophy of Revelation* and *Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*. [Collins]

The Philosophy of Schelling

It was in 1796 (when Schelling was twenty-one) that he drafted his system of philosophy proceeding from the idea of the 'ego' or 'I' as an absolutely free being through the proposition of the non-ego to the arena of speculative physics thus ultimately ending in the area of the human spirit. The prerequisite to this would be form a foundation in regards to the moral world, the notion of God, and of freedom associated with all spiritual beings. Add to this the importance of beauty and the aesthetic value of reason coupling to a new mythology tying together philosophy and religion.

Schelling branched out on new ideas, commenting on the works of others in such as way as to make it difficult for historians to determine his general position. So, the following rough summary of his stages can be misleading. During his first years, Schelling was influenced by Fichte which aided him in making his general theory of science. Following after this there was the second phase where he focused in on the reality of nature or the non-ego, which ended up contradicting Fichte's doctrine. The third stage had shown the evidence of Spinoza's influence which eventually led to the emergence of dualism from the identity of the absolute. It was during his Spinozian era that Schelling attempted to take Fichte's 'lifeless' conception of nature and replace it with one modeled after Spinoza's *natura naturans* without overstepping the boundaries of transcendental idealism. This aided him in creating his own 'philosophy of nature.' Eventually Schelling would revise his position on the transcendental idealism which he called "aesthetic idealism." He eventually harmonized the philosophy of nature and the transcendental idealism and construct what he called the "System of Identity" or "Absolute Idealism." Stage four included the influence of Jacob Boehme writings. Schelling relied heavily on the sources of theosophical doctrines—those teachings promoting the mystical insights into the nature

of God and the soul. The years at the close of his career was occupied with the interpretations of myths and the historical forms of religious belief. These apparent shifts of his philosophy illustrated his hold on the dialectic and the problems that came along with them. This fallout is associated with the major question of Schelling's speculations: "Why is there anything at all? Why not nothing?" (*Philosophy of Revelation*, I, 1.)

Overall, throughout his career he did more philosophizing than developing a completed philosophical system. Schelling brings his views full circle via his philosophy of art, joining the transcendental with his philosophy of nature illustrating the infinite through the finite. Foreshadowing Schopenhauer, he makes use of the Romantic notion of the *genius*. Man has the power through the imagination to synthesize extremes. Schelling's writings can be characterized as a 'philosophy of speculative salvation' in that he attempted to restore harmony in philosophy. His aim was to have philosophy be able to solve the problems of the existence of the world which was different than Fichte's philosophy: "explaining the origin of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity." In short, his view could be called I the title of one of his books, a "System of Transcendental Idealism." Here again, Idealism, because of Kant, is locked out of knowing the real world, the thing-in-itself. One can only posit transcendently what he cannot know cognitively.



The Life and Works of Hegel

Georg Wilhelm Hegel was born in 1770 just a few years before the American Revolution in 1776. His father was a government official at Wurtemberg, and his family was Lutheran. He was bored by his dull teachers and cut classes. He later taught at the university with the dubious honor of having Karl Marx as a student.

As the greatest of the German idealists, Hegel was one of the most outstanding western philosophers after Kant. What he gave the world was a more thorough comprehensive system of Idealism. Born August 27, 1770, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was the son of a civil servant and came from an upper-middle class family.

At age eighteen, he enrolled at the University of Tubingen as a student in their Protestant theological foundation. It was at this school that he formed friendships with Schelling and Holderlin where they studied Rousseau together. With these friends, Georg also read Plato and Kant. Enthusiastic about the Greek way of life, they also supported the French Revolution. Georg was not an exceptional student. When he left the university in 1793, his certificate mentioned that he was of good character, had a fair knowledge of theology and philology, but was inadequate in the area of philosophy. He did however at this time in his life turn his attention to theology and philosophy. After his leaving the institution, he became gainfully employed as a family tutor. During this time, he wrote essays which were first published in 1907 under the title of *Hegel's Early Theological Writings*. His early theological works included the following: *Life of Jesus* (1795), *The Positivity of the Christian Religion* (1795—1796, 1798—1799), *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate* (1800). Though these writings are described as 'theological,' Hegel became a philosopher. His philosophy had a theological bent to it in the sense that it focused on the subject matter of theology—the Absolute, i.e., God and His infinite relationship to the finite.

During his first post at the University of Jena in 1801, Hegel first published his work titled *Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling*. The university at Jena was a house of vigorous philosophical inquiry spear-headed by Reinhold and Fichte who searched for criticisms regarding Kantian philosophy. The result of Hegel's responding to Schelling and Fichte seemed to be concerned with understanding the world as it is, thus explaining everything logically. Showing his divergence from Schelling, he published a major work called *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (or of *Mind*) in 1807. After the University of Jena closed, he was left to take a position editing a newspaper at Bamberg for two years. He married in 1811 and became rector of the Gymnasium until 1816 promoting classical studies, instructing philosophical principles, and undertaking personal studies. It was during this time that he produced one of his main works, the *Science of Logic* (1812—1816).

He later received invitations to fill chairs of philosophy and accepted one at Heidelberg. In 1817, he published the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* illustrating his concepts associated with ‘speculative’ philosophy: logic, philosophy of Nature, and philosophy of Spirit. In 1818, he accepted the philosophical chair at Berlin carrying his career until his death in 1831. During this time in his life his credibility as a philosopher grew. At Berlin, he published his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (1821), new additions to the *Encyclopedia* (1827 and 1830), and a revision to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1830) just prior to the time of his death. After his death, many of his devoted students published their notes of his courses in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of history.

His main writings (in their English translations) included *Philosophy of History* (1857), *Encyclopedia* (1873), *Philosophy of Religion* (1895), his major tome, *Phenomena of Spirit* (1910), and *Philosophy of Aesthetics* (1920)

The Philosophical Influences

Hegel firmly believed in the unity of form and content. Hegel was a driving force behind the study of philosophy from a historical approach. He displayed a keen interest in his predecessors and had the ability to capture the tradition and focus of their mindset. Philosophy for Hegel is the overcoming of oppositions and divisions found in the mind’s experience to eventually takes these and find compatibility and synthesis thus resolving the issues between the finite and the infinite. Philosophy then is to construct the life of the Absolute, its dynamic rational nature.

He was fascinated with Greek thought. Aristotle’s notions of man’s inner thought in relation to the Prime Mover intrigued him. The Greek influence on Hegel and the shaping of his thinking at the university both helped form his attitude towards Christianity. The Christianity he was exposed to was that of ideas associated with the Enlightenment—rationalistic theism infused by biblical supernaturalism. He concluded that Christianity was a Bible religion that was out of sync with the German individual. Though he was indebted especially to Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, he also saw the need to critique their positions in order to take their subjective dialectic to a state of completion.

Many philosophical predecessors helped mold Hegel’s thought beginning with Plato’s Idea that humans find their meaning in the State and that philosophy is highest expression of reality. Plotinus had a massive influence on him with his pantheistic belief that the world and consciousness is an unfolding manifestation of the Absolute. Kant bequeathed to Hegel his transcendental method which began with the phenomena of experience. Another important influence on Hegel was the Judeo-Christian linear view of history. Of course all these were united into Hegel’s unique form of developmental Pantheism (Idealism).

As is true of other great philosophers, Hegel not only synthesized his predecessors thought but he influenced his successors. Feuerbach’s atheism springs from Hegel’s view of "God" is man's self-understanding. Marxism adopted the “Hegelian” dialectic of history as (mis)interpreted by Fichte. Even the existentialism of Kierkegaard has traces of Hegel’s belief that the essence of consciousness is liberty, that truth is lived (praxis). That existence is a concrete dynamic process, and his realistic valuation of the individual's predicament in the process of history. Jean Paul Sartre adopted Hegel’s view of consciousness is negativity (absolute freedom), that the self is condemned never to know itself, and that man imposes meaning on things. Edmund Husserl adopted Hegel’s phenomenology method. New Testament critic F. C. Baur saw a so-called “Hegelian” tension between the thesis of Peter, the antithesis of Paul, and the synthesis of John whom he placed in the early 2nd cent.). Also,

David Strauss learned from him that spiritual reality is higher than historical so that Christianity is myth. Finally, the process theology of Alfred North Whitehead finds roots in Hegel's God unfolding in history.

Hegel's Epistemology

There is a strong correlation between Hegel's methodology and his theory of Absolute Spirit. He was impressed in the Romantic theories but saw two shortcomings. First, since there are tensions in life, there must be some purpose or else they might lead to self-deception or lifelessness. Hegel's solution to these tensions in life, and actually the goal of philosophy itself, is to be one with Absolute or Divine Idea. Second, the Romantic perception of logic and the principles of contradiction seemed to be concerned with the entire order of life whereas for Hegel it should only be regulated to empiricism. Logic and the principle of contradiction only have a narrow restricted sphere of understanding and can only serve as a fundamental principle in philosophy. His response then is that philosophy must be dialectic. However, contrary to popular understanding, Hegel did not have a dialecticalism of thesis--antithesis--synthesis. This was Fichte's misinterpretation of Hegel that has somehow stuck to him through time.

The Two Options

Hegel saw two options. He could ignore Kant and return to naive realism, or else he could extend Kant and develop transcendentalism. He chose the latter. Like Kant, he saw the necessity of positing a priori forms to guarantee certainty. But Hegel carried it a step further and argued for the transcendental necessity to posit the content of his philosophy as absolute as well.

It was Kant's ethic and moral teaching that made Hegel attach himself to this philosopher's doctrines. (Hegel's work *Life of Jesus* portrays Jesus as a preacher of Kantian doctrine.) What softened his enthusiasm was Kant's compromise for universal form was elevated above other forms and content. Instead, Hegel promoted concepts of life and love, a sort of synthesis of unifying principles instead of Kant's dualism of sensuous impulses and intelligible will. In this same vein, Hegel disagreed with Kant's theory of knowledge. Kant concluded that pure thought was finite, formal, and regulative entailing a denial of metaphysics as it pertained to super-sensuous reality. He overlooked the duality between sensing and understanding, and the form and matter of knowledge. Hegel countered and considered that the mind through reason is superior over any limits imposed by scientific understanding thus allowing a place for metaphysics. Kant's 'formal' and 'transcendental' logic was added to by Hegel's third and ultimate phase of logical development: the speculative or metaphysical logic. Hegel even went so far as to state in his *Encyclopedia Logic* that "[l]ogic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts" (*EL*, 24).

Transcendental Process of Knowing

The subject matter of Hegel's philosophy is the Absolute—the Totality, the reality as a whole, the universe, a self-reflection of coming to know Itself in and through the human spirit. Because of the structure of the world being harmonious with man's mind, Hegel considered that reason, thought, and the Idea were all knowable by the human mind. The Absolute Idea is Spirit, also known as the World Soul. Through the human consciousness, this Absolute 'spiritually' returns to itself. It is the history of philosophical reasoning where this reality comes to think itself as it unfolds through all history. This reality is a teleological resultant process, not in the notion of a transcendent deity but rather similar to

Aristotle's 'self-thinking Thought drawing the world to its final causality. Like Kant, Hegel begins with knowledge as it appears to us in the phenomena. His basic argument is that partial (relative) knowledge is impossible because it presupposes knowledge of the whole (the absolute). The transcendental necessity of having an Absolute unfolding in time was first posited and then tested then tested it for consistency and coherence. He believed it truth could not persist unless it is based on some higher form of knowledge. But regress cannot be infinite or else we would not know anything. Hence, we must eventually arrive at absolute knowledge (the underpinning of all other (lower knowledge).

Hegel's Metaphysics

God and the World

Philosophy's aim is to lay bare the essence of this Absolute. This Hegel does through logic. Logic is the study of the science of this pure Thought and is concurrent with metaphysics concerning the Absolute in itself, as God is in Himself, the eternal essence before the creation of Nature and of a finite spirit.

Hegel is not referring to a transcendent God like the one associated with Christianity who is the Creator of the universe. His is the Absolute, the Totality, in that 'It' comes to know itself in and through the finite spirit to where it attains a level of 'absolute knowledge'—the Self-Thinking Thought or Spirit. Hegel began with Logic—the Eternal idea. This is emptiest of all notions, devoid of all content. This represents God as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of finite spirit. How Hegel accomplishes the task is to present his position in a clear and consistent manner positing that "the truth is the relation whole to its parts" as found in reality. This theory has come to be known as 'the organic theory of truth and reality.' It is assumed then that the character of each part is determined by the character of the whole. The Absolute—the infinite whole, but not infinite in the sense of existing before time—consists of the finite parts whose 'essences' are determine by the entire 'essence.' This Absolute has come to be complete in and through the consciousness of man.

This is juxtaposed to Nature, creation apart from God. But creation must stand in relation to God. How can these two be reconciled? Hegel's answer is Philosophy of Spirit which overcomes the duality. So there are two poles of duality: God and world which must be merged and give up their separate identities. Point of contact is in man who is the translator between Nature and Spirit. Man has the spirituality of God and the materiality of the world. According to Hegel, Spinoza's "all determination is negation" is necessary in all reasoning. In Hegel's philosophy two opposing realities are united in an elevated synthesis where their contraries are overcome in a higher unity.

The Three Stages

The Absolute Idea is a result of many triads resulting from a dialectic. There are several levels of triads, and triads within triads. This synthesis begins with the most abstract—looking at something apart from anything else—and terminates with the most concrete—compared in its most organic relationship. From one level to the next is purely based on logic—the Absolute Idea internal in itself. In addition, each member of the triad is the Absolute. These categories are not invented by men nor are they innate in man's understanding but are rather a priori realities of divine and human thought and experience.

He begins with man as conscious spirit and then moves to man as corporeal (material). Finally he reaches man as integrated, self-conscious being. He stresses the whole over the parts. All

are part of a greater unity—the human spirit, man as a whole.

In Hegel's philosophy Absolute Idea passes through the many steps of his system made up of triads. Each triad has its own type of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In each thesis, a reality is revealed then contrasted with certain other aspects resulting in a higher synthesis. The triad just below the Absolute Idea is Logic, Nature, and Mind (or Spirit). Each of these is subdivided into another triad giving rise to another synthesis. Logic: Being; Essence; Notion. Nature: Mechanics; Physics; Organics. Mind: Subjective Mind; Objective Mind; Absolute Mind. The pattern is from the most abstract to the concrete, the Absolute Idea.

Absolute Spirit

Hegel argument for the existence of God is more of an ontological proof. It is based on intellectual intuition and rational reflection that is found evident in man. He suggests that the 'idea of God' is found as the basis in the reflective consciousness of man. Therefore, Hegel's ontological argument leads to an Absolute Spirit that is a monistic immanence rather than a God who is transcendent in nature.

In his doctrine of Absolute Spirit, he employs the term *Geist*. Not only does it include the mind and spirit but also the will, passions, and the knowing powers along with the material world as a whole. This also includes a part of man's secular experiences as well as his religious posture with the immaterial. The basis for his argument is the internal evidence found in man—the retained self-identity—even though the mind changes its thinking and willing. It is here that man is a purposeful self-becoming rather than thinking that is attached to Aristotle's Prime Mover. Maturity comes about by painful growth of the inner man. Personality is developed by the knowing good and evil without becoming corrupt or debauched by the experience.

In Absolute spirit the God-man duality is overcome through art which is a limited manifestation (in images) and through religion which is true freedom is when Spirit reveals itself (symbols) the core of which is Christology, the God-man who died. Hence, both God and man died. When he arose neither God nor man rose but Absolute Spirit into which God and man merged. The highest manifestation is in philosophy which realizes Absolute Spirit, the eternal Idea as the epitome, the fullest and most complete of all (concepts). This is only the highest "category" of all thought and existence, not the highest point of achievement. We can never "reach" absolute Spirit, it always vanishes, leaving only the long road of argument leading to it. In brief, while God becomes man (in religion), man becomes God (in philosophy).

The Absolute Mind existing in the external world returns to finite individuals which have their own rational thoughts. The mind is basically in reflective mode where it uses the intuition and dialectic elements within a systematic whole. This 'spiritual' mind can be identified with philosophy itself because the thinking involves all of the sciences thus pointing to some plenary meaning which is ultimately found in philosophy, i.e., Hegelian philosophy. It is in the whole where truth is found represented by a closed circle of wisdom not as a Cartesian chain of truths.

As Berkeley was known as an empirical Idealist theist, Hegel is known as a rationalist pantheist Idealist. Hegel's philosophy can be identified, and as his work illustrates in the title of one of his major works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The conclusion to Hegel's philosophy is that everything is directed to some inevitable conclusion. Finite things, identified only as a phase of the self-developed absolute spirit, are irreducible to thought and spirit rescuing one from realism and positioning man into a state of Idealism.

Hegel anticipated evolutionism by attributing to nature a logical process from lower to higher forms even though he rejected the idea of higher developed animals originating from a lower species. This logical order notion helped pave the way for European evolutionary philosophies of the latter nineteenth century.

The modified forms of Hegelianism, known as either Neo-Hegelianism or Absolute Hegelianism, ventured to Great Britain and America about the middle of the nineteenth century in the views of Francis H. Bradley (1846-1924) in Britain and in Josiah Royce (1855-1916) (see below) in the United States. This teaching dominated in American intellectualism until the second decade of the twentieth century when it was competitively met by the New Realism, Neo-positivism, John Dewey's Instrumentalism, and other rival movements as well.

An Evaluation of Hegel's Philosophy

Hegel is difficult to evaluate because he is difficult to understand. However, there are some central themes which call for evaluation, both positive and negative.

Positive Contributions of Hegel

Linear View of History. Hegel was heavily influenced by a Judeo-Christian linear view of history. Unlike traditional forms of pantheism which had cyclical and reincarnational view, Hegel's view was linear and had an eschaton.

Role of Philosophy. Hegel firmly believed that philosophy played a crucial role in discovering ultimate reality. He did not hesitate to use it in this pursuit.

Validity of Metaphysics. Hegel also held that knowing ultimate reality is a valid pursuit. In fact, he used the Kantian transcendental argument to do so. He was not satisfied to end in antinomies, as Kant had done.

Dynamic Existence. Hegel believed that existence is a concrete dynamic process, and his realistic valuation of the individual's predicament in the process of history. Even the existentialist Søren Kierkegaard (in *Either/Or*), who strongly disagreed with Hegel's both/and thinking agreed with Hegel's description of human existence as a dynamic process.

Negative Critique of Hegel

Hegel's view has come under serious criticisms, particularly from orthodox Christians and traditional theists. Here are some of their points.

Pantheism. Hegel held a developmental form of Pantheism (or Panentheism). There is a central problem with this view, namely, The Hegelian God cannot be ultimate and still undergo the constant change Hegel attributes to him. For what is changing must be measured by what is unchanging. Hence, there would be an unchanging reality beyond God to which he is compared. But by definition this reality would be more ultimate than God.

Progressivism. Hegelianism holds to a form of progressivism in which God is unfolding in higher and better ways. However, it is not possible to know that reality is getting better unless there is a Best to which it is being compared. But, again, this would be something more ultimate and better than God.

Death of God. Hegelianism spawned atheism. It should be no surprise that Hegelianism gave rise to atheism. Two of the great atheists, Feuerbach and Marx, were students of Hegelianism. In fact, Hegel was the first to say "God is dead" ("Revealed Religion" in *Phenomenology of Spirit*). The

fact is that with Hegel the traditional theistic Christian God did die. He was replaced with Hegelian pantheism.

Anti-Supernaturalism. Hegel, like all pantheists, was anti-supernatural which means he was anti-orthodox Christianity. Hegel had to rewrite the life of Christ and his miracles to eliminate the miraculous dimension of historic Christianity.



Introduction

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, most British and American philosophers were reluctant to consent to Positivism, Empiricism, Agnosticism, and Naturalistic Evolutionism. New developments had come about in the natural sciences and fresh perspectives were becoming associated with evolution. There seemed to be a push to seek for an interpretation of the world that seemed more to favor towards man's aspiration for spiritualism. As Thomas Hill Green (1836—1882, English philosopher, British Idealist) asked, “Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature?” In order for man to know anything about nature scientifically, there must exist something higher for the mind to respond to rather than just nature itself. There must be some intelligence behind it; it could not have developed from lifelessness nor from some alien principle that cannot be known. The Idealists at this time in history considered things relating to spiritual values—truth, beauty, goodness, and religion.

Between 1875 and 1900, most professors of philosophy in the United States were Idealists. There were many facets to this Idealism and attempts were made to make spirit more important than matter. There was a major difference between the extreme Absolute Idealist, those who held to monism and pantheism within the all-embracing Mind, the Personal Idealists, and those pluralistic theists. It was Josiah Royce, who was influenced by Hegel, who stands between these two as a more moderate Absolute Idealist where he develops his own absolute Idealism. Royce represents the Anglo-American Idealism. His basic premise is that in order to have a world that is orderly and continuous there needs to be an ‘absolute experience’ where all facts reside and are under a universal law. His philosophy was speculative in that he argued for the one spiritual, self-conscious being—the Absolute—where everything is a participation with the Absolute.

His Life and Works

Josiah Royce parents arrived in America during the gold-rush of 1849 but struggled to make a living. Josiah was born in Grass Valley, California. His mother home-schooled the children. The family eventually moved to San Francisco where Josiah received his secondary education. Later, he attended the University of California. At this time, philosophy was not taught as part of the standard curriculum. He received his B.A. degree from University of California in 1875. He was awarded grant money because of a particular paper he wrote titled *Prometheus Bound*. This grant money allowed him to continue his studies abroad. Furthering his education, he went to Germany to undertake graduate studies under Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817—1881, proclaimed as the greatest thinker of the 19th century after Hegel), Wilhelm Wundt (1832—1920, a voluntaristic idealist that included psycho-physical parallelism), and Wilhelm Windelband (1848—1915, known for his work

on the history of philosophy). It was there that he gained interests in reading the works of Kant and Schopenhauer. Josiah finished his graduate work at John Hopkins University (JHU) and subsequently received his Doctorate degree in 1878. While at JHU, he heard lectures given by William James. These two thinkers would later become acquainted and a friendship soon followed. Royce returned to the University of California in 1878 as an instructor in English. Four years later he was asked to assist at the Harvard department of philosophy helping William James and George Herbert Palmer (1842—1933, American scholar and author, taught natural religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity at Harvard), teaching for them while they were on leave. In 1885, he received a regular appointment as assistant professor. He was a prolific writer and was in demand as a public speaker. In 1914, Royce was awarded the Alford chair of philosophy at Harvard.

In 1885, Royce published *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. In this work, he argues against those who say that it is impossible to find a valid moral ideal. Disproving any universal moral ideal only leads to pessimistic and skepticism. However, when an individual ‘reflects’ upon the existence of moral absolutes, this act itself reveals that there is some consciousness that strives towards harmonious values. When this realization occurs, then man recognizes that he ought to live in a particular way, uniting with other men who likewise live accordingly.

Royce rejects the traditional proofs for God and instead posited an argument in favor of the Absolute through the recognition of error. For truth and falsity only have meaning when there is a relation to a complete system of truth based on absolute thought. In his worked titled *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, he describes the Absolute as the Infinite Thought. Royce held to the coherence theory of truth. In his *The Conception of God* (1897), he posits that there is an Absolute experience that relates to man’s experience. His meaning of the term God is the Divine Being, the Absolute, the One, or the Totality. He tries to develop his theory between the One and the Many which neither reduces the Many to illusion nor makes the One inappropriate.

His other works include the following: *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, *The World and the Individual*, *Philosophy of Loyalty*, *Problem of Christianity* (1913), *Studies of Good and Evil*, *The Conception of Immortality*, *Outline of Psychology*, *Herbert Spencer*, *William James and Other Essays*, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (1919), and *Fugitive Essays* (1920). He also authored an article in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* titled “The Principles of Logic” (1961).

His Philosophy

Royce’s philosophical foundation is a synthesis of the rationalistic metaphysic found in the Western philosophical tradition and an appeal to experience prevalent in America since 1875. His position is representative of Absolute Realism. Royce uniquely argued for a particular belief concerning the will and for its co-working with knowledge. This presentation introduced novel features into the tradition of rationalistic idealism. He labeled his position ‘Absolute Voluntarism.’ His arguments revolve around the issues raised by having a religious view of reality. The basis of his system is that the self is joined in a Universal Community with the Absolute Knower. Royce’s purpose was to prove that all truth is grounded in one totality.

Royce wanted to discover the relationship between the ‘activity of knowing’ and the ‘object associated with that activity.’ He sought to understand how the process of judging and how it relates to the initial sensing process leads to knowledge. Knowledge begins with immediate sense data which at that time is beyond judgment. On the other hand, the entire sense-data input experience involves a reference to something in the past where it can build upon for some future knowledge. In

order for the knowledge to be formulated, there needs to be a principle of transcendence and judgment in order to form this new knowledge.

Royce also wanted to determine what is the nature of God, the world, and man. According to Royce, all of these hinge on the meaning of 'is' and the attributes that are associated with each of these natures. He thinks the only way to find these meanings is through the notion of "ideas." He attempts to differentiate between the internal and external meanings of ideas where the notion of the internal is primary and the notion of the external becomes an expression of the internal.

Royce posited that the theory of Being is possible if one discovers the true relation between man's ideas and the real world. He attempts to explain this by first addressing man's ideas then proceeding to the knowledge of the real world. He attempted to accomplish this through a dialectic argument and by examining the three classical theories of Being—Realism, Mysticism, and Critical Rationalism. From these presuppositions, he believed that Realism emerged. For he reasoned that 'to be' is to be independent of 'being known' where the idea and the object are totally externally connected. Mysticism is defined as 'to be' is to be immediate. Critical rationalism is that 'to be' is to be valid. Royce's rejects the critical rationalist because he does not accept independent objects of either realism or common sense, and further, the rationalist disallows the immediacy of mysticism. Royce defines the real as that which provides warranted validity to ideas. To be real means that an object conforms to a certain universal form or condition that already exists as a precondition to all experiences. Royce thinks this definition brings merit to defining reality in terms of truth (as compared to realism and mysticism).

The Absolute Knower

In order to justify the principle of transcendence, Royce introduces his theory of the Absolute Knower (i.e., the existence of God). The basis of his theory is that error (in judgment) actually exists. Judgments can fail to agree with the fact about the object. Judgments cannot be found to be truth or false until there exists all knowledge about the object itself. Without the involvement of the Infinite Thought, man-made error is either impossible or unintelligible. The Infinite Thought is the beginning of the process; man is at the end of the process.

Royce's argument is similar to the ancient idea of self-knowledge—ideas starting as imperfect fragments of understanding moving forward to reality. All finite individuality is what it is in virtue of its fulfilling the purpose of the Absolute Self. For example, if one posits that a particular act is right or wrong, it cannot be decided as such merely upon one's *own* opinion. Absolute Mind, knowing Absolute Truth, knows if it is right or wrong. However, in order to make any judgment, whether it is in regards to a concrete fact or theoretical principle, there needs to be a standard set by the Absolute Mind who knows truth or else no judgment can be made. If someone were to challenge Royce saying there is no absolute, this statement alone confirms that there is an absolute stating that here is no absolute. Denial implies an appeal to a higher authority.

The relation of God to the world according to Royce is similar to Fichte's Infinite ego and Schopenhauer's "will to live." Royce sees that the "the whole universe, including the physical world also, is essentially one living thing, a mind, one great spirit" (cf. *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 17). This 'great spirit' that he refers to is God, the Logos, the Problem Solver, the Absolute, the World Interpreter, the Beloved Community. Any philosopher who desires to understand Its nature should examine the nature of man and his conscious experiences in concert with man's imagination and memory.

God does not cause events in space and time in the same way that physical causes occur. All of physical nature is the outward appearance of God. Everything in the universe is either alive itself or is part of a larger being. Royce's panpsychism does not posit that every physical object has a mind similar to the human mind. Nature does however have life and is spiritual in its constitution (like looking at the body of a man and realizing that they are also a conscious being). (The 'life' in animals can be observed however, it is much more difficult to see 'life' in plants and inanimate objects.) Each person is their own miniature society where he thinks, reasons, and judges for himself.

Royce's Absolute Idealism

As an absolute idealist, Royce does not look at the world as the materialists who think that the mind was produced as a secondary by-product. Royce considers the world and mind as organically related and inseparable. Mind could not discover the fact of its own existence if it was not outside the realm of materialism (matter made up of atoms and molecules). However, following Kant, it is impossible to know a thing in itself except through ideas. For example, man A sees a table and thinks it is made of oak; man B thinks it is made of pine. The Absolute Mind perceives the 'real' table. Both men's minds and the table need to be present in a sense in the Absolute Mind (but not in a telepathic way). Ultimately, the real desk as the Absolute perceives it will correct any wrong perceptions held by either man.

Royce argues against philosophical agnosticism. He suggests that scientific agnosticism is possible, but it only paves the way for some version of idealism. He objects to the idealism that creates a world that is subjective, unreal, and unsubstantial. His idealism is associated with the Absolute Mind. In this, there can be absolute certainty about Absolute Mind and certain other principles as well, such as metaphysics, logic, and ethics.

Human Experiences in the World

Royce's characteristic doctrine focuses on description and appreciation of the world. What people know and appreciate first hand are things like specific colors, time, space, beauty, love, goodness, and friendship to name a few. These experiences cannot be immediately shared with another. In order to share and describe these appreciations with another they need to be communicated through normative forms utilizing categories of words and symbols. These real descriptions begin with common sense and continue into the world of science resulting in things being classified. However, these scientific descriptions are not ultimate reality. In the Mind of the Absolute, all occurrences happen in the present now—everything is all at once. Humans then gain more of themselves by being involved in community with others. Through these experiences of life with others, it follows that mediation upon life is a law of thought and of reality. This is similar to Hegel's *negativitat* that nothing exists in isolation. The experiences meditated upon by finite man makes him become 'more human.' This is also applicable for God because He is also subjected to the law of meditation where He distinguishes Himself into other selves uniting their experiences into His experiences. This makes God also a Society and a Beloved Community composed of all other conscious selves. Therefore, all of man's fleeting appreciations (in time) are preserved for all eternity.

Human Loyalty

Coinciding with the idea of community, Royce places the basis of ethics in the notion of loyalty (see his *Philosophy of Loyalty*). The principle of being loyal to loyalty is tied to the basic moral law (superior to Kant's categorical imperative and Mill's principle of utility). Loyalty, the

highest virtue, is the freely chosen and practical devotion to a cause or goal. Thus, loyalty does not contribute to dishonesty, deception, racial or social strife, etc. Being loyal to loyalty is the solution to the problem of ethics. Loyalty is a person's willful and practical devotion to a cause. Extreme loyalty is shown in those who are patriots and martyrs and captains of sinking ships. Loyalty is action responding to a cause where the action is not driven by an emotion. Royce promotes the following motto: "Be loyal to loyalty." People are true to their own causes while also needing to be tolerant of other persons who are devoted to their causes. Ultimately, all loyalties will eventually be reconcilable and show its effect in human society. This reconciliation is present in the Mind of the Absolute.

Royce addresses loyalty in light of Christianity in his writing titled *The Problem of Christianity* (1913). It is here where loyalty is defined as love for the community. This is the most important truth that Christianity has shown to the world. Royce points out that salvation is not done in isolation but rather comes about through the loyalty of the Beloved Community (God). This religious community has a special purpose of redeeming man from sin and from the consequences of his self-centered deeds by which man endangers the community through his disloyalty. All Christians are part of a community that is bound together in love and loyalty. Three central ideals of Christianity are linked together. The locus of love is exemplified by the atoning work of Jesus. The church exists to overcome the self-centeredness of the individual. The church also renews the community by being devoted to charity thus reducing the consequences due to evil. Royce sees man's personal immortality having an attachment to the Divine Life. Each person begins life at a particular point in time and continues endlessly. All of his experiences are included in the all-embracing Absolute Mind. This common group mind is the Christian Church. The Beloved Community, or the Absolute Mind (God) is inclusive of all the finite minds in the world.

Royce attempts to rework the neglected doctrine of the Spirit. God now appears as the Spirit or Interpreter, linking together a multiplicity of distinct individual selves in a spiritual unity of love. The religious community, founded on the atoning works of Jesus, becomes the ultimate instrument of the redemptive process.

Freedom and the Problem of Evil

The Absolute cannot be determined by anything outside Itself because It is self-determined and free. All events in nature are ordered by the will of the Absolute. In this context, Royce is a determinist and considers God not only as self-determined but also indetermined in light of His eternal free choices. When it comes to human freedom, Royce is a self-determinist—individual choices are free but yet bound to moral responsibility. Each person has his own measure for God and is uniquely inspired thus making him free. Humans are unique in their worth as an individual where God sympathetically appreciates individuality and becomes less personal.

According to Royce, God has not willed the world and its accompanying evil in vain. The purpose behind evil is to ensure the greater good. In the all present now, the Absolute sees evil as a necessary part of the eternal good. (Royce uses the example of the necessity of Judas's betrayal of Christ or else Jesus' death on the cross might not have occurred.) Everyone should overcome their own personal experiences of evil with good in this life taking comfort that the Logos has willed the best for all.



Introduction

After the death of Hegel in 1871, controversies among the Hegelians arose as to whether the Absolute has self-consciousness apart from the human 'mind' manifestations? Was the incarnated Christ different as compared to the 'Absolute' manifestations of God present in all men? Was this Absolute Mind in men their immortality or did men have personal immortality? The responses were divergent. The conservatives defended the position that Christianity and Hegelian philosophy were essentially in agreement. The radicals however posited that man was a product of nature and sided on atheism and materialism. Feuerbach was influenced by Hegel's view, and he influenced Marx and Engels, as well as Freud. His chief aim: "To change the friends of God into friends of man, believers into thinkers, worshippers into workers, candidates for the other world into students of this world, Christians, who on their own confession are half animal and half angel, into men--whole men."

David Friedrich Strauss (c. A.D. 1808—1874, German theologian and writer, pioneer in the historical investigation of Jesus) followed Hegel and was an initiator of the German 'higher criticism' of the Bible. Strauss is known for his then sensational book titled *The Life of Jesus* which desupernaturalized the Jesus of the Gospels. Ludwig Feuerbach went even further and attempted to trace the psychological origins of religious doctrine, Feuerbach, is as he calls himself the 'natural philosopher in the domain of the mind,' was part of the radical left wing known as the 'Young Hegelians.' It may be said that these Young Hegelians were actually anti-Hegelians. Some like Karl Mark developed dialectical materialism whereas Hegel argued for the Absolute as defined as Spirit. However, these young thinkers (during the mid-1830's) were attempting to put Hegel ideology upright at the same time as transforming it into a new development.

The Life and Works of Feuerbach

Ludwig Feuerbach was born in Bavaria and educated in Berlin under Hegel. He studied Protestant theology at Heidelberg and later went to Berlin and attended Hegel's lectures. It was during this time that Ludwig began to study philosophy. At the age of twenty-four, he became an unpaid lecturer at the University of Erlangen. With no possibility of promotion in sight, he retired to private study and writing.

His chief work is on *The Essence of Christianity* (1841). He also wrote *The Essence of Religion* (1846) and *Lectures on the Essence of Religion* (1851). He also penned *On Philosophy and Christianity* (1839) and *The Essence of Faith in Luther's sense* (1844). There were two additional writings by Feuerbach which had great influence on Marx. These were *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy* and *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*. Earlier in 1833, Feuerbach published a history of modern philosophy from Bacon to Spinoza. Four years later, he

wrote an exposition and criticism of Leibniz's philosophical structure. In 1838 he wrote a book on Bayle and the in the following year an essay devoted to Hegel's philosophy. Feuerbach believed that all talk of God is really talk of humans and their essence. He wrote a publication in 1830 titled *Thoughts Concerning Death and Immortality* which argued that there was no such thing as personal immortality nor was there a transcendent God. There was only the immortality and transcendence of the human spirit in general.

The Basis of Religion is Self-Consciousness.

Hegel started with Being as Idea or Thought, whereas Feuerbach starts with Being as spatio-temporal Nature which deified the natural world. Nature manifests itself to man and imposes itself onto man as some divine being. This divine essence is nothing other than the essence of man especially when freed from his corporeal self. Only man, not animals, is conscious of himself, that is, has self-consciousness. Religion is man's consciousness of himself, although he thinks it is consciousness of God.

The Nature of Religion is Infinite Consciousness.

Consciousness as such is unlimited. So, man must be unlimited. And consciousness is objectification. So, God must be an objectification of man. The idea of God is a projection of human self-consciousness (as found in *The Essence of Christianity*) and a 'feeling' dependence on Nature as the foundation for religion (as found in *The Essence of Religion*). The concept of a personal infinite deity is the projection of man's own existence. However, when man compares the infinite, perfect, eternal, almighty essence of the deity to himself, he is left to a pitiful, wanting, miserable creature, left feeling alienated and in opposition to God. He offers several proofs that God is only a projection of man's consciousness of himself.

First, human nature consists of reason, will, and affection. These all exist for their own sake (i.e. each is for its own sake). But whatever exists for its own sake is God. So, humans are God.

Second, one cannot understand something without having that nature for only like knows like. But human beings understand the divine. Therefore, humans must be divine.

Third, a human can go no farther than his nature since they cannot get outside of themselves. But a human can feel (be aware of) the infinite. So, humans are infinite by nature. The infinite you feel is the infinity of yourself. And what God is to me is to me all that God is.

Fourth, the history of religion reveals that attributes were given to God because they were thought to be divine. They were not considered to be divine because they were given to God.

His genetic-critical method is not like Hume's where he justifies belief from an epistemological perspective. Ludwig's method is traced back to the causal origin of beliefs founded upon experience. It is critical in that it finds the real cause associated with some beliefs. The context of this genetic-critical method is primarily concerned with secondary causes. When it comes to religious belief, beliefs about God do not have their causal origin in God Himself but rather these beliefs have their origin in human nature. In other words, human nature is the correct 'secondary' cause of religious belief. There is also the implication by Feuerbach that God himself is reduced to the essence of the human species—hence God being created in the image of man. As a consequence, man projects God as an independent existing object onto the world. But, at the same time, man believes that God has created him which inverts the hidden causal relationship between God and human beings.

The Necessity of Religion

According to Feuerbach claimed that humans must objectify; it is part of their nature to do so. And God is that objectification. But ignorance of the fact that the object is oneself is essential to religion just as the child must first see himself under the form of another (the father). Otherwise it would be idolatry, namely, the worship of oneself. Furthermore, progress would not be possible for man get a better idea of himself as former deities become idols. Hence, in the course of religion man attributes more to himself and less to God. Humans must anthropomorphize God, since a purely negative God has no religious appeal.

Feuerbach's genetic-critical account of man's concept of God goes back to Xenophanes — man making God in our image (cf. *The Essence of Christianity*). Human beings have as a part of their nature the ability of consciousness and with this consciousness he concocts the notion of infinity. This notion of infinity then is carried over to himself and his nature. Reflecting Cartesian philosophy, the essence of man is such that he has the ability to reason, will, and have affection stemming from man's nature and power to think, love, and act accordingly. It is from this basis that Feuerbach moves to the nature of God. However, his starting point is the wrong starting point. Rather, the foundation should 'What is the nature of God?' then proceeding to 'What is the nature of man?' Feuerbach has inverted the principle and has subsequently asked the wrong question! He has created God in the image of man instead of man being created in the image of God. Feuerbach is attributing a human being's features onto God. From this, Feuerbach concludes that a human's knowledge of God is essentially nothing more than man's knowledge of himself. On particular occasions, he suggests that where God seems to be lacking in some characteristics these must show that these features do not exist in God. It is here where atheism is founded. In the end, Feuerbach's genetic-critical accounting leaves untouched the existence of God.

The attributes of God are really what a human believes about himself. For example, providence is really the desire to believe we are important. Personality is attributed to God as an effort to show our personality is the highest form of being. Prayer and miracles are also anthropocentric. Prayer is really our desire to converse with ourselves. Miracles are the heart of faith, namely, the immediate satisfaction of our wish without tiresome waiting.

The Irony of Religion

The irony of religion is that we develop our own self-consciousness by deprivation of ourselves. This has a systole/diastole action. In the systole action (artery) man projects his best on God and consequently he is left sinful. In the diastole action (vein) man receives his own good back as grace.

Feuerbach's Conclusions

Religion is nothing but a projection of human imagination in the act of self-consciousness. "God" is nothing but the best that man sees in himself (unwittingly). But religion is necessary (as a dialectic of development) so that humans can progress. Religion, then, is an indirect and involuntary means of self-discovery. Feuerbach's philosophy removes God from the center stage of the world and instead places social man in the center as the interpreter. His notions preceded the dialectic materialism and set the stage for Marx and Engels.

An Evaluation of Feuerbach

Positive Features

There are some positive contributions made by Feuerbach. For one, he held that purely negative religious language is useless. For one cannot know something is not-that unless he first knows “that.” For Feuerbach, when one has resorted to purely negative knowledge of God then he has lost all taste for religion.

Further, Feuerbach demonstrates the bankruptcy of man-centered religion. Also, he provides a helpful corrective to excessive other-worldly forms of Christianity. What is more, he provides an appropriate rebuke to idolatrous use of religious language.

Finally, he gives a painfully accurate exposure of narcissism of much religious experience in which God is made in our image. The awareness of man in Christianity even projects over to the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation of the God-human. This God-human illustrates that humanity is an attribute of God. Humanity is now the substance of the truth of Christianity again illustrating that theology is transformed into anthropology. The alleged benefit from this perspective is that when man finds that God is the identification of his own essence he can now rid himself of his self-alienation found in religion due to his now realized transcendent ‘nature.’ A person now has faith in his own powers and in his future. Anthropology has now turned into man’s religion pointing towards atheism making man the highest object and his own end. However, man is not to be egocentric—he is still a social being unified with other men.

Negative Critique

On the other hand, there are some serious faults with Feuerbach’s view of things. He falls far short of his goal to explain away the reality of God.

First of all, his “nothing-but” statements presuppose “more-than” knowledge. How can one know God is nothing but a projection of human imagination unless he has a “more than” knowledge of things? This has been called the “nothing-buttery fallacy.”

Second, he fails to eliminate the possibility that atheism is a projection of his own imagination. In short, his view explains atheism as well, if not better, than it does theism. Maybe theist do not *create* the Father; maybe atheists *kill* the Father (see Paul Vitz, *Faith of the Fatherless*).

Third, he presupposes, but never proves, that human consciousness is infinite. But this is the basis of his disproof of God. So, his basic premise begs the question.

Four, contrary to Feuerbach, we don't have to be God to know one. We only have to be like Him (in His image—Gen. 1:27) to know Him.

Fifth, if ignorance of the fact that we are God is essential to human progress, then once one becomes a Feurbachian, then the gig is up and progress is impossible. So, it would be better for mankind if they did not know the Feuerbaching “truth” of things. In short, knowledge of his view is destruction of his view.



Introduction

Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher was the nineteenth century Protestant systematic theologian who was the “father” of modern liberal theology. He was a theologian, preacher, educator, and political leader, and carried on his philosophical endeavors from these platforms.

The Life and Works of Schleiermacher

Schleiermacher’s time of flourishing was during the era of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. He did not mimic the popular thoughts of the day but rather focused on a critical analysis of religion without needing some philosophical insight. His religious rearing helped form his foundational focus on religious experience. Even though he had strong philosophical concerns, he still maintained his pious upbringing engaging in metaphysics on the one hand and religious awareness on the other.

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in 1768 at Breslau. His parents were of Moravian (pietistic) persuasion and provided him with his education. Although he dismissed some of the fundamental doctrines of the Faith, he enrolled at Halle to study theology. It was those first two years at the university where he purposely acquainted himself with Spinoza and Kant. In 1790, he passed his examinations and then proceeded to take the post of a family tutor. He was a sincerely religious and pious man. From 1794 to the end of 1795, he pastored at Landsberg near Frankfurt to fill the role in an ecclesiastical position in Berlin until 1802. He was ordained and preached in Berlin (1796). Then he taught theology at Halle (1804) and Berlin (1810). By 1804, he was teaching philosophy of ethics, theology, the New Testament, and hermeneutics at Halle. In 1807, after Napoleon shut down the University at Halle, he returned to Berlin and became part of the founding of a new university where in 1810 he was appointed the professor of theology. In 1810, he was lecturing at the University of Berlin as the professor of theology teaching for the rest of his life dogmatic theology. It was his preaching enterprise where he exerted moral influence on the nation. He sought the union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia. In the social arena, he contended for internal social reform as well.

At the age of thirty, he became known for his work titled *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799) and in the following year, he wrote *Soliloquies*, which illustrated his thorough understanding of Romanticism. His two major works are *Discourses on Religion* (1799)—an experiential approach, *Monologues* (1800). His interests in ethical issues became evident in *Outline of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theory* (1803) which occupied much of his mature thinking. This work illustrated the influence of Kant. Plato’s *Republic* also penetrated his thinking. He also translated Plato’s dialogues into German where each part appeared in 1804, 1809, and 1828 respectively. And *The Christian Faith according to the Principles of the Evangelical Church* (1821—1822, revised 1830—1831) which is a doctrinal approach and his *Brief Outline of the Study of*

Theology (1st ed. 1811) coupled with some open letters to a friend show his thoughts regarding Christian doctrine, the organization of theological disciplines, and systematic theology. Many of his sermons and lectures as well are published.

Influences on Schleiermacher

Christianity according to Schleiermacher is a monotheistic faith with teleological underpinnings where all things are related to Jesus of Nazareth, the redeemer of mankind. It is on this basis that he formed all of his other understandings regarding other religions. It was Schleiermacher who originated the Protestant theology of Christocentrism—Christ, the center of the Christian’s inner religious consciousness.

There were other influences on his thought. Pietism (from the Moravians) provided his emphasis on the devotional over the doctrinal. While in Berlin, Schleiermacher was influenced by the Romanists, especially Friedrich Schegel. He still had interest in Spinoza but felt as though he had to rectify his philosophical perspective with religion that he was to teach. Romanticism (from Schlegel) gave him a bend to Pantheism over theism. And Agnosticism (from Kant) bent him toward emphasis on the practical over the theoretical.

Schleiermacher's View of Religion: “Man as a Religious Being”

What constitutes each person as different and distinct is their inward self-consciousness called by Schleiermacher their “feeling.” This “feeling” or awareness is unique to each man and is incapable of being derived from another. It is each man’s thinking, feeling, and doing that make him different from another man. Each man is original and yet a participant in society with other men. (On the other hand, if a man’s self-consciousness remains only in a potential state or imperfectly formed, then he does not become a societal contributor to the common good. He is a person in the formal sense but lacks spiritual life.) It is through the workings of religion where the highest ‘feeling’ of self-consciousness resides. Therefore, human culture is dependent upon the cultivation of the individual religious life as it associate with one another in society.

Simply put, the basis of religion is in experience since we must have before we can utter it. The locus of religion is in the self since the inner is the key to the outer. The object of religion is the All (which many call God). The nature of is a feeling (sense) of absolute dependence. This is a sense of creature-hood. It is an awareness that one is dependent on the All. It could be called as a sense of existential contingency.

Distinguishing Religion from Ethics and Science

<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Science</u>	<u>Religion</u>
way of living	--thinking	--feeling
way of acting	--knowing	--being (sensing)
practical	contemplative	attitudinal
rationalization		intuition
self-control		self-surrender

The Relation of Religious Experience to Doctrine

Man is a religious being, however, religion can be as much of a problem to him as it can be beneficial. Schleiermacher came to realize that religion can at times be confusing to man. In this regard, he considered sin as man's failure to realize when he is to be entirely dependent on God and when he is to be relatively dependent as objects within the world. For Schleiermacher religion is related to doctrine as the inner to the outer. Religion refers to the experience and doctrine to an expression of the experience. Religion is the sound and doctrine is only the echo. It is the feeling and doctrine is only the form. It is the stuff and doctrine is a way of structuring it. Religion is the sensing of it and doctrine is a way of stating it. Doctrine is not essential to religious experience and is scarcely necessary to expressing it.

Universality of Religion

Schleiermacher believed that all men have this religious feeling. That is, all men have a sense of dependence on the All. It is interesting to note that even the atheist Sigmund Freud (see) admitted having this sense. He denied, however, that it was a religious feeling.

The Christian Faith provides a feeling of total dependence on God; it is a consciousness of being in relationship with God. This feeling of dependence provides a feeling of identity that cannot be supplied through any other individual or volitional relationship. This feeling is not expressed as self-deficiency or awe (interpreted as such by Rudolf Otto) but rather is self-consciousness involving thinking and willing as man rationally involves himself with his world. This absolute dependence has no reciprocating presence as compared to the relative absolute which does have a reciprocating nature with society. Hence, according to Schleiermacher, the original meaning for the word "God" was that of a being on whom we have absolute dependence and not as the One who was a perfect Being.

Communication of Religion

Schleiermacher's infinite-life God transcends all human categories, therefore, no human categories (such as thought, personality) applies to Him, and further, God reveals Himself as a necessary being in the world. Religion can be communicated in different ways. The primary way is that religion is better caught than taught. Secondarily, it can be communicated through symbols. But these are really expressions about our feelings, not really descriptions of God. Religion comes from the instantaneous consciousness of "an immediate existence-relationship" not stemming from a foundation of ideas. Doctrines too are only verbal expressions about our religious feelings.

Varieties of Religions

When considering the world and the infinite unity, a problem arises. There must be a correlation between God and the world. It may seem at first that for Schleiermacher that the difference is only a human perspective and that there is no distinction. He does want to avoid reducing this doctrine to the world-to-God or God-to-world. This is where Spinoza's *Natura naturata* in relation to *Natura naturans* comes into play—divine reality transcends man's conception.

God is the object of this self-conscious 'feeling' combined with faith rather than it being based on knowledge. Therefore, religion is neither metaphysical nor is it moral. Theology then is simply symbolic. The varieties of religious expressions are endless. This is due to our personality

differences. Pantheistic expressions fit those who delight in the obscure. On the other hand, theistic expressions fit those who delight in the definite (see William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*). Schleiermacher rejects the idea of a universal natural substituting itself for historical religions.

Religion and Truth

Truth and falsity do not apply to religion as such but only to ideas. This is because religion is an experience and truth involves expressions about that experience. But the truth is not ontological since the true or false statements are not made about God but about our experiences.

He is essentially rejecting theoretical knowledge used as a basis for religion and sides more with the aesthetic consciousness. However, Schleiermacher does connect religion with metaphysics and ethics in a general sense. He says that without religious intuition (or 'religious feeling') of the reality of the infinite, metaphysics would be left hanging in mid air. Ethics combined with religious intuition would provide an empty idea regarding man. This intuition reveals that man is dependent on God, the infinite totality.

Aim of Religion

The aim of religion is the love of the World-Spirit (the All) through loving men. The love of God is not over and above our love for others (as Jesus said—Mt. 22:37). Rather, God (the All) can only be loved through loving other human beings.

Each individual, having his own special gifts and talents, is a particular and unique manifestation of God to the world and his society. It is each individual's distinctiveness that distinguishes him from other men that presupposes human society, and visa versa, both implying the other. Therefore, each person has his own unique vocation in society as a member of the community.

The Result of Religion

Like Plotinus (see), Schleiermacher believed that unity with the One (God) will bring oneness to our life. Devotion to the All will bring all together. Real unity is derived from union with the ultimate Unity.

Influence of Religion

There is no specific influence on one's ethics of any specific religious belief. However, religion in general does produce a wholeness of life. We act *with* religion not *from* it.

One cannot be scientific without piety, that is, without a sense of dependence for it removes presumption to knowledge which is ignorance. The true goal of science can't be realized without a vision arising from religion.

The Test for the Truth of a Doctrine

Religion itself is neither true nor false; it simply and attitude of dependence and piety. However, ideas about religion can be true or false. Their truth value can be tested by scientific criteria of clarity, consistency, coherence, and fit with other doctrines. The can also be tested by ecclesiastical criteria, that is, their value for life of the Church.

Using Schleiermacher's criteria, the doctrine of God's timelessness can be evaluated as false in the following way: 1) Timelessness does not fit well with the Incarnation. How can eternal become temporal? 2) Timelessness conflicts with doctrine of creation. How can Eternal act in time? 3) It conflicts with foreknowledge (even knowledge). Why does the Bible speak of God as foreknowing?

How could a timeless God know anything in time? 4) It conflicts with God's personality. How can God purpose, plan and respond if eternal? 5) It conflicts with God's worshipability. It necessitates God's immutability. Who can worship a God that cannot be moved to change in any way?

In short, for Schleiermacher a being who can change his mind, respond to prayer, and change the content of his knowledge as things change is more worthy of worship than an eternal and immutable one. A timeless God has more liabilities than assets for Christian theology. It is more Platonic than Christian.

Influences of Schleiermacher on Others

He is the Father of modern Liberalism. He influenced most major liberals after him including Albert Ritchie (1822-1889), *Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (1870-1874); Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), *What is Christianity?* (1900); Julius Welhausen (1844-1918), *Introduction to the History of Israel* (1878). He was a promoter of JEPD theory of the authorship of the Pentateuch.

An Evaluation of Schleiermacher

Critique of Schleiermacher's liberal view comes from the other end of the theological spectrum. Orthodox Christians see the following flaws in his philosophy:

First of all, as he admits, there is really no way to test the truth of his basic religious feelings. The sense of absolute dependence is a vague, amorphous, and undefined that easily opens one to all kinds of deception. As Martin Luther put it, "Feelings come and feelings go, and feelings are deceiving. My warrant is the Word of God. Naught else is worth believing."

Second, Schleiermacher makes a false disjunction between religious awareness and thoughts about it. In actuality our thoughts about the awareness and the awareness itself cannot be separated. For we only know them because we have thought about them.

Third, his view of truth is faulty. Truth does rest in the realm of ideas, but it is not simply in ideas about our religious feelings; it is in ideas about reality. Schleiermacher's theological ideas never get beyond ideas about religious feelings to ideas about object (God) of those feelings.

Fourth, he rejects and divinely authoritative and objective revelations from God. For orthodox Christians, doctrine about God is based in the written Word of God. For Liberals the Bible merely contains the Word of God here and there amid all the errors and myths. But there is no objective authoritative way to determine which is and that which is not the Word of God. Hence, we are left with no more than subjective experience to determine what is true and what is right.

Finally, Schleiermacher admits that thinking about our allegedly common religious experience comes to opposite conclusions like pantheism and theism. But since truth rest in the realm of ideas, then his view comes to contradictory ideas. But the undeniable rational Law of Non-contradiction demands that contradictories cannot both be true.



Introduction

The most prominent philosophers of this time period were Schopenhauer and Nietzsche representing the Germans; Comte and Bergson the French; Mill, Spencer, and Alexander the British; and Royce, James, and Dewey the Americans. These all provide interesting and at times original insights as to the cosmos and human beings.

Generally speaking, German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer is best known for his version of Idealism which involves a form of Pessimism. This involves his doctrine of the will, theory of sufficient reason, interpretation of art as it related to Platonic Ideas, ethics, justice, and benevolence. His philosophy is seeking to transition from appearances of objects to the thing-in-itself, including its identification with a cosmic will. He was the German philosopher who placed the 'will' as ultimate in his metaphysical views.

The Life and Works of Schopenhauer

Arthur Schopenhauer was born in 1788. His father, a wealthy banker in Danzig, was wise and desired to provide the best education for his son. After his father had apparently committed suicide in 1809, Schopenhauer continued for two more years in the commercial industry out of respect for his father. His mother, a novelist, provided Arthur with opportunities to meet literary figures such as Goethe. Because of the bitter relationship Arthur had with his mother, they became estranged.

After his father's death, he was privately tutored. Receiving permission from his mother to head into higher education, he first studied in the gymnasium at Gotha and then at Weimer to study the classics. He studied and became proficient in Greek, Latin, and Italian. From 1809 to 1813, he attended the University at Gottingen and Berlin. He began his scholastic endeavors in the study of medicine before changing his interests to philosophy. His philosophical interests focused initially on Plato and Kant. He also became familiar with the ancients and moderns of Europe. He also acquainted himself with the philosophy of India. In Berlin, he listened to lectures by Fichte and Schleiermacher and it was during this period that he developed his extreme dislike towards professors of philosophy. When the Prussians attempted to expel Napoleon from Berlin, he moved to Rudolstadt in order to prepare for his doctoral dissertation.

Though Schopenhauer was a lecturer at the University of Berlin, he was unable to attract many students (as well as gaining much attention for his primary work). As a result of the Cholera epidemic in the city, he went to Frankfurt on the Main.

His personality and character is difficult to analyze. Both parents had some psychological instabilities and he was known himself for sometimes being morbid and neurotic. He made very few friends and was at times ill-mannered, egocentric, and of strong sensual appetite. However, some of

his admirers claimed that he would become distraught at the sight human as well as animal suffering. Some believe that it was the economic hardships in central Europe that made him a pessimist. He lived at Frankfurt on the Main for the remainder of his life. Arthur Schopenhauer later died in 1860.

Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation was titled *The Four-Fold Root of Sufficient Reason* and was originally published in 1813. His primary work is his book called *The World as Will and Idea (Presentation)* which was made public in 1818. This work was against the stream of Hegelian philosophy. (While he was at Berlin, he would foolishly schedule his lectures at the same time as Hegel's. His attempts to compete failed.) Disheartened, he withdrew from academic life carrying with him the firm but errant thought that Hegel was out to ruin him. His latter writings illustrate his petty slams against Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and other philosophers. The other works he published were *On the Will in Nature* (1836), essays under the title of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841), a second edition of *The World as Will and Presentation* (1844), and his last book *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851).

In 1839, he was awarded a prize from the Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway for his essay on the subject of freedom. As he attempted for a reward from the Royal Dutch Academy of the sciences for his essay on ethics, his work led to a refusal of the award because of his disrespectful references to other leading philosophers.

The Law of Sufficient Reason

His basic formulation is as follows: *Nothing is without a reason why it is, rather than is not* (*On the Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, I, 5; II, 19, Hillebrand). He is not saying that everything must have a reason but that everything that is to become an object of knowledge for person must have a sufficient reason for being so. When there is a sufficient reason identified, then divisions of objects can be determined and also show their connectedness.

Schopenhauer, following Berkeley, thought that the only thing that existed was ideas—a world of pure mentalism. Objects of perception are only the a priori formations which the mind inflicts upon sensation. Therefore, he thinks that the common principle is associated with the sufficient reason carrying with it its four-fold root. (See his text *The Four-Fold Root of Sufficient Reason*). They are: 1) the sufficient reason of becoming where cause and effect makes natural science possible, 2) the sufficient reason of knowing where ground and consequent makes judgments and inference possible, 3) the sufficient reason of being where space and time makes mathematics possible, 4) and the sufficient reason of action where motive and action makes acts possible. A human being is a body that occupies space during a time continuum causally responding to sensible stimuli. Therefore, the four-fold root is what makes all knowledge possible. There are four factors to these divisions as well. These correspond to the principles of being, becoming, acting and knowing. The four necessities are: mathematical, physical, moral, and logical. In addition, the principle of sufficient reason does not apply to the world itself but only as an organizer of the things-in-themselves as phenomenal objects.

In Schopenhauer's work the *World as Will and Presentation*, he begins with the following statement: "the world is my presentation" (*WWP*, I, 1). This assertion rests on Kant's theory of knowledge. Schopenhauer claims that the will reveals itself immediately to each man as the "in-itself" as an awareness he has of his phenomenal being. He is saying that man is able to view the

world in two modes: the mental presentation of the world is a phenomenon (it is an object) and noumenally, the world is the thing-in-itself or will. Sensation is just the immediate consciousness of objects changing and are simply subjective. However, sensation assumes some objective empirical perception in order for the object to be understood, which is related to the application of causality, space and time. The perceptual world owes its objective support to the mode of understanding which creates a phenomenal presentation in the mind for the perceived subject. This is close to Kant's theory, however, Schopenhauer differentiates in three ways. First, he identifies this thing-in-itself with the will. Second, he reduces the a priori forms to space, time, and causality. Third, the notion of understanding is expanded to law of causality and to the forms of sensibility. In addition, one underlying factor associated with this *will* is its metaphysical perspective. He states that reason is subservient to the will and is used as its tool. More specifically, the will determines what action is to be accomplished based upon what motives or reasons specified in the mind that are looking to be fulfilled for some bodily need or desire towards some end.

Following Kant, he held that the principle of sufficient reason can only be applied to the phenomenal world and cannot be applied to the noumenal world. Reason is unable to penetrate through the curtain of the phenomena to the underlying reality associated with the noumenon—the thing-in-itself. Therefore, the cosmological argument positing the existence of God can be valid if the argument is used to show an illustration from the world as a whole to God as its cause or as a sufficient reason. But it never really reaches God. Here Schopenhauer follows Kant but not as far as Kant's belief in God as a matter of practical or moral faith.

There is a consequence to Schopenhauer's doctrine—it is an argument for atheism. If the principle of sufficient reason does not apply to the world as he states then there is no foundation for the cosmological argument for God's existence. Second, if all things are based on an a priori condition, then to speak of an absolute reason for reality is a contradiction. And further, the Kantian principle of experience leads to atheism rather than to Kant's agnosticism.

In addition, Schopenhauer posits that the body is a product and instrument of the individual will and as such, ideas only exist for man only. If man has no other existence except for his own consciousness, then he concludes that if this be the case, he would identify this as egoism (or what is usually known as solipsism). However, he does say that this view would be absurd even though a person can become aware of his own will. A person can infer by analogy that other persons as well are intuitively aware of their wills too.

There is an ethical side to the idea of abstraction and reasoning—moral man is guided in his conduct by principles formed by concepts. Knowledge is a servant to the will; knowledge is used to fulfill the needs of the body through reason which enables man to discover solutions fulfilling his needs.

Schopenhauer's Metaphysics

Metaphysics is made possible because of man's intellect. His mind, through the will, is able to direct itself towards objectivity where he becomes a 'disinterested spectator' of contemplation based upon intuition regarding the nature of reality. There is only one thing-in-itself existing via the Will. It is independent of perception whereas the appearance of the reality of the world can exist as a multiplicity seen of the phenomenon in the empirical world. This Will can be identified if man looks within himself through the self-conscious. Not only does man have an innate desire to live, create, and a general striving, there is also a Will seen in nature where it too illustrates many facets of striving

via animal instincts. Overall, there seems to be a metaphysical Will that seems to be characterized with a will to live and function. This Will is in a constant state of finding satisfaction. He does admit that this Will cannot be known in its entirety and that it may have attributes that cannot be known by man, but he does say that it can be known as a representation. In a sense, this metaphysical Will can be known through the phenomenon; however, it is unable to be known specifically as the thing-in-itself.

According to Schopenhauer, the phenomenal world, intuition, and understanding is applied to both humans and higher animals but abstract concepts and reason are only applied to human beings (whereas animals, dogs for example, cannot reflect abstractly about space, time, and causality).

Schopenhauer held that a human being is an 'animal metaphysicum' meaning that he is a creature who cannot avoid marveling at the existence around him. This wonder led him to raise questions regarding its fundamental character and significance. These questions cannot be answered by empirical science because these inquiries are beyond their scope. Religion, however, attempts in its own fashion to answer these questions but only in an allegorical or imaginative way. These explanations are treated as literal truths concerning some higher order but end up having these accounts fall to absurd contradictions. In contrast, philosophy is based on sure thinking aimed at truths in the proper sense without over crossing the boundaries of human knowledge.

The Meaning of Existentialism

The basis thesis of existentialism is that "Existence is prior to essence" in significance, if not in time. It is not a metaphysic, nor is it an epistemology. It is more or a methodology or a way of approaching life. As such it is difficult to define. However, some basic contrasts reveal what is common to much of the overall existential movement can be described. It is an emphasis on living over knowing; on willing over thinking; on the concrete over abstract; the dynamic over static; participator over spectator; love over law; personal over propositional; the individual over social; the subjective over objective; the non-rational over rational; existence before essence; conscious determination over unconscious determination.

Some Major Proponents of Existentialism

An important early existentialist is Wilhelm Dilthey (c. A.D. 1833—1911), German empiricist, influenced the movements of phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutic philosophy, social science, cultural anthropology, and psychology. Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers were both influenced by philosopher Dilthey. He is known primarily for viewpoints on the science of the human mind. Dilthey's epistemology is dualistic in regards to the human experience—it is both internal, the subject's knowledge of itself (cognition, volition, reasoning, decisions, values, goals, mental states) and external, the experience of the outside world in relation to the will. However, the outside world is only known by inference and the knowledge of it in the mind is only a construction. His view is similar to Kant's even though he does not believe in a priori knowledge. Major existentialists include the following:

- 1) Søren Kierkegaard (1813—1855), Danish Lutheran theist.
- 2) Friedrich Nietzsche (1844—1900), German atheist.
- 3) Jean Paul Sartre (1905—1980), French atheist.
- 4) Albert Camus (1913—1960), French atheist.
- 5) Martin Buber (1878—1965), German Jewish theist.
- 6) Edmund Husserl (1859—1938), German phenomenologist who provided a method for some existentialists like Heidegger.
- 7) Martin Heidegger (1889—1976), German pantheist.
- 8) Gabriel Marcel (1889—1964), French Roman Catholic (who had an agnostic father and liberal Jewish/ protestant aunt reared him after mother's death).
- 9) Karl Jaspers (1883—1969) German Greek Orthodox layman. His experiences under pathologists and psychologist gave him the background to publish two great works on psychology. However, he shifted his interests from psychology to philosophy. His philosophical development is more abstract and systematic as compared to the other existentialists.

Existentialism can be divided into two camps: the existential authors and the existential

theologians. Under the category of authors, there is the following: Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Gabriel Marcel, and Karl Heim. The theologians are as follows: The early Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and Rudolf Bultmann.

Some Basic Tenets of Existentialism

Generally speaking, existentialism posits one's being as a human individual existing in the world. Albert Camus viewed the bond of man to the world as an absurd juxtaposition between a blind environment and a being given the responsibility to care for nature. He takes the evolutionary approach and warns that man should not read too much into his benevolent duties and his relationship with the world. His position is counter to the Christian belief that God has ordained man to manage the earth and that it is to be a part in supplying his needs. Each man is endowed with making the world into his own project in order to find its meaning.

Another existential belief is that humans are primarily a choosing animal, as opposed to rational, political, and/or mechanical animal. "He" is not free (man as object). "I" am free (a person as subject). "I" am not "myself." I can put my "self" in a test-tube and describe it, but the "I" behind it cannot be put in the tube; it is utterly free. It is nothing or non-being, that is, sheer existence with no essence.

Also, existentialists stress how one gets from non-existence (the aesthetic) to existence (religious encounter with God) by a "leap of faith" (Kierkegaard). Moving from Being for itself to Being in itself is impossible. The best we can do is to recognize our own inauthenticity. We can never achieve authenticity. All that is left is to have a project in this world (Sartre). We move from Being toward Beyond-Being through Being-there (*Dasein*), viz., humans (Heidegger). For Martin Buber it was a move from an I-it to I-thou relationship.

All existentialists, in one form or another and whether they admit to a religious perspective or not, make some allowance for transcendence or 'a seeking beyond the immanent' of the human social system. Some existentialism seeks epistemological neutrality associated with the method of phenomenology rather than seeking after neither any mathematical certainty nor any logical foundation of the sciences. This neutrality attempts to stifle any tension between realism and idealism in hopes of providing a better approach to defining the distinction between mind and being. One of the ultimate goals is to determine whether there is a synthesis between individual existence and a pure universal essence. Some critics claim that any relationship of these two ultimately would ultimately end in the destruction of both entities.)


Existentialism is not a worldview; it is a certain way to approach the world. There are existentialist from many conflicting world views such as theism (Kierkegaard, Jaspers), atheism (Sartre, Camus), and pantheism (Heidegger).

Major Theological Movement Influenced by Existentialism

Neo-orthodoxy is the main theological movement that emerges from an existential influence. This includes men like Karl Barth (especially his early period) with his stress on personal encounter. Likewise, Emil Brunner was influenced by the existentialism of Martin Buber with his stress on an I-Thou relation and of revelation being personal, not propositional. Rudolph Bultmann adopted a Heideggerian existentialism in his demythology of the New Testament to get at the existential core of truth behind the myths. Likewise, Paul Tillich formulated his concept of seeking the ground of Being in the wake of Heidegger's analysis of Being.

An Existential Family Tree

The existential family tree has several roots and many branches. It can be diagrammed as follows:



An Evaluation of Existentialism

Existentialism has come to be known in some circles as the counter-Enlightenment in philosophical expression. If so, this demonstrates that the Enlightenment's ideology is fragile without concreteness, and to some extent, dangerous. It was perhaps Heidegger who is responsible for this blow to the Enlightenment taking away the meaning of man and placing existing man in a battle of truth.

and untruth. Whereas the existentialists illustrate that if man is to be given meaning, then perhaps it needs to be done here and now! Existentialism attempts to look at the whole nature of the human condition not just as an epistemological subject but also one who has to experience unpleasant things.

Positive Features

Many positive features of existentialism have been noted by observers. Some of the more important ones are listed here. 1) It stresses love as vs. legalism. 2) It emphasizes the practical vs. the theoretical. 3) It focuses on concrete over against the abstract. 4) It exalts the personal over the propositional. 5) It stresses freedom over determinism. 6) It places priority on existence over essence. 7) It calls us to be participators, not mere speculators, in the game of life.

Negative Dimensions

Others point to a down side to existentialism. A few may be listed here. 1) It does not answer what the essence of existence is. 2) It is too subjective and sometimes tends to be mystical. 3) It has a false disjunction between the personal and the propositional. 4) Its view of freedom is often too unbounded and absolute. 5) It sets up a radical disjunction between essence and existence. 6) It often stresses the non-rational to the point of logical contradiction. 7) It is sometimes offers a rational attempt to expound and defend the non-rational. 8) It sometimes sets up a false fact/value dichotomy.



Introduction

While the roots of existentialism are found in Nietzsche, many regard Kierkegaard as the father of the movement. Kant was the forerunner of Positivism and Idealism, but Kierkegaard was the opponent of both.

Kierkegaard was a borderline genius. The power of his intelligence was that it was able to turn everyday experience into a moment of reflection. For him, he realized that this state could be all-devouring and ravaging. Therefore, he knew that his intellect was his cross to bear and that without faith, he could die inside of his mind. As he observed the culture around him, he noticed that everyone everywhere was engaged in making life easier. He believed that someone needed to come along and make life (intellectually) more difficult again. This he thought might be his career and destiny. Kierkegaard's problem was a personal one—he chose to be a Christian, and this choice was the only way. What counts most for him in life are not the various adventures that seem to come up but rather the inner depth of that comes from even those situations that seem banal. (His evaluation of life even played out in his personal life—the breaking off of his engagement with Regina Olsen. Before Kierkegaard was a choice: a life of unbridled sensuality or a life of absolute religiousness.)

The Life of Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard's father was Michael Pederson Kierkegaard, a poor Jutlander who amassed his wealth in Copenhagen selling drapes to then sell his business in 1786 to study theology. Søren was born May 5, 1813, in Copenhagen while his father was fifty-six and his mother was forty-four. He had an extremely religious upbringing by his father—a man who suffered from melancholia and imagined that the curse of God hung over his family. Søren's relation to other children was strained by his malicious wit. He managed to live an outwardly happy life, even though he was reared with severity and in piety by a melancholy old man. His mother, Anne Sorensdatter Lund, and five of his six brothers died while he was young. Søren was of high intellect but was lazy and loved the theatre. He enrolled in the University of Copenhagen to study theology, no doubt to please his father. Paying little attention to the theological studies, he instead devoted his time to philosophy, becoming familiar with Hegel, literature, and history. His studies at Copenhagen could not supply for him what he needed and as recorded in his August 1, 1835 *Journal* entry: “a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die.” Mozart was his favorite composer. Before he was 25 he was used by as a principal character in a novel (by Hans Anderson, *Shoes of Fortune*). Søren was often drunk. He contemplated suicide many times, climaxed with break in his *Journal* (April to June of 1836).

Søren became estranged from his father and mother speaking of the “stuffy atmosphere” of Christianity. His religious disbelief was accompanied by loose moral living. He maintained that Christianity and philosophy were incompatible. He was converted before his twenty-fifth birthday

(1838) and resumed his religious practices. He reconciled to his father by May 1838. His father died soon after in August, 1838. It took from 1831 (eighteen yrs. old) to 1841 to get a Masters Degree in philosophy. He was engaged weeks after graduation to Regina Olsen. His Journal entries were written between 1834 (twenty-one yrs. old) and 1841. His writing career extended from 1838 (*From Papers of One Still Living*) to 1855 (*Attack Upon Christendom*). Other noteworthy factors of his life are that he was politically conservative though inactive. He was blond with blue eyes and had a spine deformity. He loved the country but was active socially. He had one love affair with Regina Olsen but decided not to marry her because: He did not wish to plague her with his wretched, melancholy self (?) Or, he was afraid and backed out (?) Or, His love for God led him to sacrifice what was most precious to him (?).

The Writings of Kierkegaard

His Aesthetic Literature includes: *From the Papers of One Still Living*; *The Concept of Irony*; *Either/Or*; [Two Edifying Discourses]: "The Expectation of Faith"; "Every Good and Perfect Gift is from Above"; *Repetition*; *Fear and Trembling*; [Three Edifying Discourses]: "Love Shall Cover a Multitude of Sins"; "Love Shall Cover a Multitude of Sins"; "Strengthened in the Inner Man"; *Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*; [Four Edifying Discourses]: "The Lord Gave, and the Lord Hath Taken Away"; "Every Good and Perfect Gift is from Above"; "Every Good and Perfect Gift is from Above"; "To Acquire One's Soul in Patience"; [Two Edifying Discourses]: "To Preserve One's Soul in Patience"; "Patience in Expectation"; *Philosophical Fragments*; *The Concept of Dread*; *Prefaces*; [Four Edifying Discourses]; "Man's Need of God Constitutes His Highest Perfection"; "The Thorn in the Flesh"; "Against Cowardice"; "The Righteous Man Strives in Prayer with God and Conquers—in that God Conquers"; *Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life*; [Three Edifying Discourses]: "A Confessional Service"; "On the Occasion of a Wedding"; "At the Side of a Grave"; *Stages on Life's Way*; *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.

The Christian Writings of Kierkegaard include: *On Authority and Revelation: The Book of Adler*; *On the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle*; *A Literary Review*; *The Present Age*; [Three Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits]: *Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing*; *The Lilies of the Field*; *The Gospel of Suffering*; *Works of Love*; *The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethico-Religious Communication*; *Christian Discourses*; *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress*; *The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air*; [Two Ethico-Religious Treatises]: "Has a Man the Right to let Himself be put to Death For the Truth?"; "On the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle"; *The Sickness Unto Death*; *The High Priest-The Publican-The Woman that was a Sinner*; *The Point of View*; *Armed Neutrality*; *The Individual*; *My Activity as a Writer*; *Training in Christianity*; *Reply to Theophilus Nicolaus (Faith and Paradox)*; [An Edifying Discourse]: "The Woman that was a Sinner"; [Two Discourses at the communion on Fridays]; "But to whom little is Forgiven, the Same Loveth Little"; "Love Covers a Multitude of Sins"; "For Self-Examination Commended to This Age"; *Judge for Yourselves*; *Attack Upon "Christendom"*; [Article in The Fatherland]: "This Has to be Said; So Be it Now Said"; *The Instant*; *What Christ's Judgment is about Official Christianity*; *The Unchangeableness of God: A Discourse*.

Some Miscellaneous Writings include: *The Journals of Kierkegaard*; *Newspaper Articles*; *Meditations from Kierkegaard*; *The Prayers of Kierkegaard*. To say the least, Kierkegaard was a prolific and provocative writer. Soren presents the Christian faith from the point of view of an observer through indirect communication rather than from the point of view as an apostle communicating the truth directly. After a religious experience in 1848, he changed his method and

became compelled to take the direct way. This became apparent in his work titled *Anti-Climacus*.

Kierkegaard saw that the Danish State Church scarcely deserved the name Christian. It appeared to him to be little more than just a polite moral humanism complete with a modicum of religious beliefs which were to not offend the susceptibilities of the educated. When he wrote about this condition after the death of the current prelate, it stirred a vigorous controversy. His view can be summarized in what he saw as the Three Stages (see chart):

KIERKEGAARD'S THREE STAGES		
I. AESTHETIC	II. ETHICAL	III. RELIGIOUS
Feeling Self-centered Routines of life Life without choosing Centered in present moment Spectator Personal whims Deliberation Controlled by life Life of intellect Life of immediate interests	Deciding Law-centered Rules for life Choosing life Centered in life-time duty Participant Universal norms Decision In control of life Life of will Life of ultimate concern Respect of moral law The universal (abstract) Propositions about God Objective truth Essential realm	Existing God-centered Revelation to life Choosing God Centered in eternity Response to moral law-giver The individual (concrete) Person of God Subjective truth Existential realm
	RELIGION A	RELIGION B
	Natural Religiosity Rational Immanent Origin in man General need for God	Supernatural Christianity Paradoxical Transcendent Origin in God Specific need for Christ

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The Basic Teachings of Kierkegaard

The climate at the time was very much Hegelian idealism which represented the philosophical

West. However, Kierkegaard believed that this Hegelian thought threatened Christianity more than any anti-Christian philosophy because it led to more confusion and misunderstanding as to what real Christianity was. This led to those who thought they were Christians when in actuality they were not. For Kierkegaard, Christianity was throughout a personal religion. It depended on a historical incarnation and revelation and could not be understood based upon an aspect of eternity—it had to be lived out now.

He saw philosophy as the expression of the individual's existence creating the epitaph, "That individual." According to him, what an individual does not depend on is what he or she understands but rather it is based on what the individual wills. This doctrine of the will is based upon the ultimacy of under-determined choice. Choice is at the core of human existence and is criterionless. If criterion determines what man's choice is, then it is not the individual who makes the choice.

His basic view is summarized in the chart representing the three stages (above). In the first stage, most people are living on the aesthetical level. People are governed by sense, impulse, and emotion, even though they are not to be thought of as grossly sensual in their activity. Here there is a lack of determined religious faith and fixed moral standards. Discrimination is based on aesthetics not obedience. Man in this state loves to experience much sense pleasure and hates all that would limit him in his array of choices. His aesthetic life is a life of freedom. On the aesthetical level one lives by the routines of life. He needs to move to the ethical level whereby one accepts the moral rules for his life. But only by a crisis with the lower levels and "leap of faith" to the religious level will one live a God-centered life. Kierkegaard hoped to provoke them to the ethical and then on to the religious level.

Provoking one from the aesthetical level to the ethical level is stage two. In this ethical stage, man accepts a determinate moral standard and obligation to provide consistency to his life. Here man renounces the satisfaction of his sexual impulses and instead enters into a state of marriage, a type of ethical institution. The example of this stage is found in the purpose of his book *Either/Or* (Feb. 20, 1843) published pseudonymously under the name of Johannes Climacus (John the Climber was a Medieval monk who wrote the Ladder to Heaven). *Either/Or* is a massive two volume love letter to convince Regina he was a scoundrel so she would willingly reject him rather than grieve losing him. Regina knew it was written for her, but she didn't understand it completely. Kierkegaard's purpose was to help the reader to face his own spiritual experience. The theme was a new attack on Hegel's both/and dialectical thinking. Passion, not cognition or mystical intuition, is the culmination of existence. In neither the objective storing of knowledge nor the blissful mystical intuition of it are any values placed upon it. Life is not found in neutral facts nor blissful insights but in responsible choices.

Kierkegaard presents a sophisticated hedonism wherein one's own reflective experience can be the object of pleasure. The refined aesthete isn't morally defiant but is morally indifferent. For the aesthetic existence is an endless possibility, never a present reality. The aesthete despairs of ever becoming a true self and merely tinkers with his environs. His choices are not between good or evil but whether to choose or not to choose. The ultimate for the aesthetic life is commitment to despair which is at least an honest relating of one's self to one's self, though without hope. He has immediate interests but no ultimate concern.

In part two Kierkegaard stresses that to be ethical means to be ruled by the eternal; to be aesthetic, by the temporal. The ethical and aesthetic levels are qualitatively distinct but naturally

related (in that the former is a prior condition to the latter). The ethical means accepting one's responsibilities under the sovereignty of God. Hence, self-realization is not mere self-creation but integration of the eternal and temporal. What some men call ethical is only aesthetic pre-morality. Judge Williams is the spokesman. He was the complete antithesis of the rebellious, self-seeking aesthetes. We must rise above passionate interest to devoted involvement. Marriage illustrates the ethical life as monastic illustrates the aesthetic life which is impoverished compared to the beauty of marriage. This illustrates Kierkegaard's irony of anguish in breaking his engagement to marry (an ethical duty) for religious purposes. Just as marriage is before God, so too man's ethical life must be before God. The basic choice is not good or evil, but good and evil, namely, the choice of the ethical. But if one chooses the ethical he will inevitably (though not automatically) choose good (cf. Augustine's "Love God and do what you will."). The chief danger is the delay of duty. One must obey God; he must deny himself (repent) in order to find himself. Duty does not rob experience of aesthetic beauty. The ethical incorporates and enriches the aesthetic (Dutiful marital love is a most beautiful thing). So the ethical life ends in repentance which is not same as religious faith but is a condition of it. As such the ethical relates one only to the moral law, not to the Law-Giver. Repentance is a long way from a leap of faith; it is the end of the ethical, not the beginning of the religious (it ends self-reliance but is not reliance on God). This is forcefully illustrated in his book *Fear and Trembling* where Abraham is called on to suspend his duty to the ethical ("Thou shalt not kill") by a leap of faith in which he transcends the ethical faith in his religious duty to God and kill his only son Isaac.

Kierkegaard had hope that his pseudonymous *Either/Or* would provoke people to the sense the need for the religious. He published two edifying discourses (May 16, 1843) under his name as an answer to that need. In them he affirms that the world's great needs were not technology and political equality but a spiritual encounter with God. However, people preferred entertainment to edification. In "Expectation of Faith" solace is found only by means of the eternal like a guiding star to a sailor faced with the monotonous repetition of the waves. He attacks boredom by introducing the eternal into the flux of life. He concludes that the tedium of the temporal is overcome only by the tranquility of the transcendent (eternal). Faith is a passion for and response to the Eternal; not for what it bestows, for the Giver not the gift. Doubt, though a cunning passion, can by self-consumption, be an instrument leading to faith. Religious truth cannot be communicated; it can only be awakened.

In "Every Good and Perfect Gift" he faces the problem of moral pathos and affirmed that God can use the moral gloom for our good. Even denial of prayer is not unjust since God compensates with faith and love. The one praying is changed for better even if the answer is for worse. Even tragedies can be triumphs if received with thanksgiving. Every personal tragedy is somehow redeemed by God's sovereignty. He here introduces a theme of his latter works, namely, suffering must be accepted as a gift of God. It is so good because it tends to destroy man's self-will.

Philosophical Fragments (June 13, 1844), as the title suggests, it is a series of artistically designed "scraps" in contrast to Hegel's "system" of philosophy. Christianity is surveyed as to its content (what) as opposed to *Concluding Unscientific Postscripts* which stresses Christianity as an existential way of life (how). The theme is an attack on man-centered philosophy at its best.

He argues that left to himself man views the Christian God as a perplexing Unknown. If communication is to occur, God must initiate it. It raises two questions: Is it possible to base eternal happiness on historical knowledge? And how can the transcendent God communicate to us. It contains a beautiful parable of the Incarnation of Christ: King's love for lowly maiden leads the King becomes a beggar to win her. He argues that one cannot get the eternal out of the purely historical, or

the spiritual out of the rational. Man's basic problem is not ignorance of God's regulation but offense at it. Original sin is the most elemental fact about man (cf. *Concept of Dread*). Original sin is illustrated by man's responsibility to know the truth. Man cannot know the truth without being in it, and he cannot be in it unless God puts him in it. Hence, man needs revelation, i.e., a miraculous self-authenticating disclosure that is not part of a rational system. Nor even an intuitive prophetic insight. The difference between God's revelation and human reason is illustrated thus:

Socrates Wisdom

Backward recollection

Arouse truth within

Truth is immanent

Truth is rational

Truth comes from Wise man

Christ's Revelation

Forward expectation

Give truth from without

Truth is transcendent

Truth is paradoxical

Truth comes from the God-Man

Kierkegaard on the Subject of Truth

For Kierkegaard religion is not a set of intellectual propositions that one assents to because the 'believer' thinks they are true. He was the first person since Aquinas had settled the meaning of truth (in *De Veritate*) and indeed, Kierkegaard may have been the one who changed the course in European philosophy. Religious truth then must penetrate personal experience and be appropriated accordingly. This is objective truth—truth that I *have*—versus subjective truth—the truth that I *am*.

Christian truths are neither analytic (self-evident) nor synthetic (as Kant said), because even if factually correct such statements lack the certainty Christian claims have. According to Kierkegaard, the preferred channel of truth must be brought to man by a teacher who transforms what is not known to what is to be known. However, only God can bring about truth. Therefore, God must become a teacher of man, and more specifically, in the form of a servant. He claims that "truth is subjectivity." They are paradoxical and can be accepted only by a leap of faith. The Christian lives before God *by faith alone*.

There is a real transcendent God whom men gain only by choosing Him in His self-revelation. Christianity originally bears witness of itself from outward representations. God is the Unknown limit to knowing who magnetically draws reason and causes passionate collision with man in the paradox. Reason cannot penetrate God nor can it avoid Him. The very zeal of the positivists (see Comte, Mill, and Spencer below) to eliminate God shows their preoccupation with Him. The supreme paradox of all thought is its attempt to discover something that thought cannot think. Herein thought attempts to commit suicide, that is, to run out of thinking.

God is unknown to us both in Himself and even unknown in Christ. (He always transcends us). God indicates His presence only by "signs" (pointers). The paradoxical revelation of the unknown is not knowable by reason. Man's response must be a leap of faith (given by God but not forced on us; we can accept it or choose to live in rationality). Faith in God cannot be either rationally or empirically grounded (God cannot be either empirically evident or rationally certain). The empirical evidence about Christ tells us only that a strange humble man once lived. Rationally man cannot even comprehend God. Man cannot even imagine how God is like or even unlike himself. The most we can do is to project familiar qualities in the direction of the Transcendent that never reach Him. He cannot argue from the works of Nature to God, for these either assume God (for believers) or lead to doubt God (for unbelievers).

Even if we could prove God's being (in Himself) it would be irrelevant to us. It is God's existence or relatedness (to us) that is of religious significance (Gospel is presented to man only for existential choice, not for rational reflection (cf. *Postscripts*, 485; *Works of Love*, 74). There is no ultimate irrationality in God but a supra-rationality which upholds finite rationality by transcending it and holding it in its place. The real absurdity is in man's situation, viz., he must act as though certain without reason to do so. God is the absolute paradox not merely because of the inability of the mind (as for Plotinus) but because of sin which separates us. This absolute paradox becomes absurd in the Cross and is the "offense" in the Gospel offer. Man's task is not to intellectually comprehend God but to existentially submit to Him in sacrificial love. The paradox is not theoretical but volitional. It is not metaphysical but axiological. God is folly to our mind and an offense to our heart.

As for Biblical Criticism, the problem: How can eternal salvation depend on historical (and thereby uncertain) documents? How can historical give non-historical knowledge of God? The answer: In so far as the Bible gives empirical data it is an insufficient ground for religious belief. Only Spirit-inspired faith finds the eternal God in temporal Christ. Biblical writers are not primarily certifying the historicity of Christ's deity but the deity of Christ in history. Hence, biblical criticism is irrelevant. The important thing is not the historicity of Christ but His contemporaneity as a person who confronts men today by faith in the offense of the Gospel.

The Jesus of history is a necessary presupposition but history does not prove His Messiahship. The only proof of His Messiahship is our discipleship. Kierkegaard also offers a "Note on 'Natural Religiosity.'" He claims it is good but it is not Christian. It lacks transcendent disclosure. It is supplementary to Christianity but it is pathetic without Christianity to fulfill it. It arises by a collision of reason with the Unknown (Cf. Otto's "Numinous") but never goes beyond the collision. The collision produces a diaspora (illustrated by the multitude of mankind's religions). Man the god-maker deifies whatever overwhelms him. But deep in the heart of natural piety lurks a caprice that knows it has produced the deity (i.e., it knows its deity is a fantasy). Hence, natural religion veers to polytheism (which collects all its fantasies) or to pantheism (which is an incongruous merger of them). The conclusion: the nearest reason has brought God is the farthest he ever is.

Kierkegaard offers an observation on comparative religion. He says Buddhism seeks eternal outside of time--by meditation. Socrates sought eternal before time—by recollection. But Christianity seeks eternal in time—by revelation.

An Attack on Christendom

When the Christian moves from the aesthetic to the religious, then he becomes serious about the project of life living under the eye of eternity. However, what Kierkegaard saw in modernity was a drift towards what he called the Law of Large Numbers—society as a collective, externalized crowd disregarding the individual. Where this mass is, there is a collective truth (so the world is led to believe). Even in Christendom, to speak of 'Christian nations' or 'Christian peoples' makes no sense to Kierkegaard. Christianity is what affects the person. This is precisely the argument that he brings upon the complacent 'institutionalized' Christianity in his day and does so in his work titled *The Attack against Christendom* and further yet in *The Present Age*.

An Evaluation of Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard was first and foremost a religious thinker whose idea of Christian religion has exercised a powerfully influence on modern Protestant theology. As such he has prompted both a


positive and negative response.

Positive Contributions

Kierkegaard philosophy has been praised for many things. These include the following: 1) He states his personal beliefs in the basic fundamentals of the Faith, including the Trinity, Deity of Christ, Atonement, Resurrection, and Inspiration of the Bible; 2) He places a stress on the personal encounter with God through repentance and true faith in order to attain authentic Christianity; 3) He emphasizes the importance of individual responsibility in contrast to a behavioral determinism; 4) He offers a helpful corrective to Christian rationalism, noting that true faith is based in God, not in rational or historical evidence; 5) He presents a forceful call to return to New Testament Christianity; 6) He affirms the transcendence of God over against his mere immanence; 7) He emphasizes on God's unchangeability and His grace through the redemption of Christ; 8) He recognizes the fundamental nature of human depravity as the inability to reach God on our own. 8) He contended that Christian truth cannot be attained by unaided human reason. 9) He offers some helpful pre-evangelistic suggestions about bringing people to despair as preparation for salvation; 10) He has creative insights into and illustrations of many biblical truths). 11) He stresses the subjective need to appropriate truth in our lives as opposed to merely knowing it in our minds. 12) He offers a live, biblical critique of "easy believism" in the need for repentance and exercising saving faith.

Others have pointed out some serious problems with Kierkegaard regarding existentialism, particularly from an orthodox Christian perspective. A few can be briefly noted here: 1) He has an unjustifiable bifurcation of fact and value, between the historical and the spiritual. This undermines the need for personal relation with Christ by casting doubt on the objective historical truth about Christ; 2) Likewise he makes a radical and unjustifiable separation of the Eternal and the temporal. Eternity and time meet in the temporal now. The present mirrors the Eternal. There is an analogy between creation and Creator which Kierkegaard not only neglects but rejects; 3) This left Kierkegaard with agnosticism about a "wholly other God." The Kantian gulf is in place in his thought; 4) He has an unwarranted suspension of ethical for the religious (in *Fear and Trembling*) which goes beyond the moral law and against reason; 5) He has a mistaken belief that "truth is subjectivity," rather than subjectivity a condition of receiving the Truth; 6) He has an unjustified rejection of theistic arguments for belief that God exists. Ignoring them does not refute them; 7) He fails to appreciate difference between belief that (which needs evidence) and belief in (which doesn't). So, one can have arguments *that* God exist without rejecting Kierkegaard's assertion that reasons do not bear on belief **in** God; 8) he employs misleading terms like "leap," "absurd," and "paradox" which in the history of thought from Parmenides to Kant and beyond have always meant logical contradictions; 9) He overstates the individual and neglects the need for fellowship and the Christian community; 10) He radically minimizes what is historically necessary to Christianity to the mere presence of God in Jesus. The apostle Paul, by contrast, contends that belief in the historicity of Jesus' resurrection is necessary for salvation (cf. Rom. 10:9; 1 Cor. 15:12f); 11) He makes a radical disjunction of between personal and propositional revelation. Propositional revelation (the Bible) is needed to bring us the truth about the person of Christ in whom we must believe in order to be saved; 12) He encouraged an axiological (value) shift from the historical to the spiritual Christ which led to the demythology of the New Testament (see Bultmann); 13) He denies the needed doctrine of analogy that alone makes talk about

God possible (see Thomas Aquinas), leaving us in agnosticism about the nature of the “wholly other” God. 14) At times he uses the alleged “Hegelian” (see Hegel) method in theology, claiming man is a synthesis between the Eternal and the temporal.



Introduction

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the problem of human existence was focused on him being a stranger to himself to the point that he must discover or rediscover who he is and what his meaning in life was going to be. Kierkegaard suggested that he return to Christianity as it was with the first disciples (as compared to the organized Christendom). Nietzsche, however, suggested an even more ancient return—a replication to the archaic past of the Greeks. He will consider the characteristics and livelihood of the god Dionysus in order to bridge his inner warring divide that plagued his being. He thought that if the Dionysus was revived, this savior-god might rescue the whole of mankind which seemed to him to be in fatigue and decline. However, this god was also known as the “the horned one” or “the bull” to the Greeks, and according to mythology, was torn to pieces by the Titans. The fate of Dionysus overwhelmed Nietzsche who himself was also ravaged by the dark forces leaving him at the age of twenty-five in psychosis—perishing with the god, a solutions of his own devices.

It has been said that Kierkegaard painted Christianity in such stringent terms that it drives some people to atheism, and that Nietzsche painted such a sorrowful view of atheism (a person without God) that it drove some people to Christianity. Yet both came from similar backgrounds, namely, 19th century European Lutheranism. Both experienced an early loss of their father, and both learned to detest the Lutheran Christianity in which they were reared.

The Life and Works of Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche was born 1844 in a little town of Rocken, in Prussian Saxony. His father was a Lutheran pastor in Saxony and later died of insanity (softening of the brain) when Friedrich was young. He was his mother, sister, two aunts, and grandmother dominating his life. They had moved to Naumburg where he attended the gymnasium. He was given a strict religious training, and he lost his faith in college. These women hoped the boy would grow up to be a brilliant preacher like his father and grandfather before him. From age fourteen until twenty, he attended the famous school of Pforta which provided a firm foundation in German literature and the Greek and Latin classics. He later studied under the famous liberal thinker, Friederich Ritschl and focused on philology. In Leipzig, he became acquainted with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, enjoyed music, and made inquiries about Erwin Rohde’s conception of the psyche. He observed the naïve faith of his mother and grandmother and, after reading Schopenhauer, he became an atheist. He served in Prussian medical corps where he contracted dysentery. He recovered but always had a headache and indigestion. Though he was a mild, kind, and gentle man, yet nervous and irritable at times. He idealized his friends until he became acquainted with their faults. He kept the course of that which he believed was right—the overthrow of

modern Christian culture and democratic morality. In its place, he attempted to bring a revival of the ancient Greek aristocratic ideal of life. He increased loneliness and alienation from friends led to final his madness. Living in isolation, he wrote book after book until his mind was gone.

The Works of Nietzsche

Nietzsche wrote *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872) where he spoke of his humanistic ideal as a combination of Dionysus (the Greek god of music) and Apollo (the Greek god of the plastic arts). His obsession against Christianity shows up in several works: *The Wagner Case: The Twilight of the Idols*, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, *The Ant-Christ*, *Ecce Homo* ("Behold the Man"). His ethical position can be identified in *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) and *Toward a Genealogy of Morals* (1887). His *Untimely Considerations* (1873—1876) was against the materialism of the post 1870 Germany. His works *The Dawn* and *The Gay Science*, appearing between 1878 and 1882, discussed the issues regarding Christian morality as life-denying. *Ecce Homo*, an autobiography written near the end of his life (1900). It was published 1908. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is his greatest work whose message is "the death of God" Vol. I-II (1883); III (1884); IV (1885). *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), *Anti-Christ* (1895).

Philosophical Influences on Nietzsche

Like most others in the modern world, Nietzsche was influenced by Immanuel Kant's agnosticism. He was also affected by Schopenhauer's atheism, particularly his stress on the will. F. A. Lange's *History of Materialism* was also an important factor in forming his thought. From the ancient world, Heraclitus's philosophy of becoming was important. And from the modern world Voltaire's anti-Christian, anti-supernatural views contributed to Nietzsche's thinking.

Nietzsche's position on morality and modern culture is a variation Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer. However, Nietzsche deplored the idea of society determining personal conduct, the 'rule of the flock' mentality. This went against his idea that man was still and unfixed animal. He leveled severe criticism against Christianity and states that it is an enemy of life and betrays mankind. His viewpoint is quite atheistic and deterministic where the elite, based upon their physical, intellectual, and social prowess, are the only ones who are able to further man's existence. All men have the power to develop their own norms based on the exclusion of God and any standards associated with good and evil.

Influence of Nietzsche on Others

Like other great thinkers, Nietzsche had a significant influence on many of his successors. Sigmund Freud's profound introspective psychology is an example. The existentialist Martin Buber acknowledges being impressed by *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as a teen ager. Jean Paul Sartre's atheistic existentialism was also affected by Nietzsche. Wittgenstein linguistical mysticism owes a debt to him as well: "One should speak only where one may not remain silent, and speak only of that which one has overcome - everything else is chatter" (Nietzsche –*Human , All Too Human*). Jacques Derrida and Post-modernism find roots in Nietzsche as well.

Nietzsche denied God. The fire for this negation was Schopenhauer's philosophy. Nietzsche resembles Marx by his refusing to put forward arguments for God's existence based on rational review, and in its stead, basing it on broad cultural judgments undermining any belief in God.

An Overview of Nietzsche's Philosophy

Nietzsche's view involves a critique of 19th century culture. He said Europe is sick and

cannot be healed by prosperity or technology. Culture has no unity of outlook, is too eclectic. Man has lost his dignity since he lost faith in God and now has lost faith in himself. Christianity has lost its authority and is merely humanistic. We have lost our stability, and evolution has proven that all is flux. He criticized anti-culturalism of the State which encourages conformism. He opposed democracy and socialism. His view was used by some Nazis to support Nazism, though Nietzsche did not support it. He praised individual heroes. We can improve human nature to become a superman. He opposed Hegel's view of history as a necessary unfolding of the Divine. We must get superhistoric view of man by "Know thyself" and organizing the chaos within. The decline of dogmatic faith at the time it was needed most led to paralysis of culture. So, God is dead, and must be replaced by a voluntaristic metaphysics of becoming.

It is Nietzsche's pathological path that makes his philosophical meaning of atheism understandable as he tried to live it out. Up to this time in history, man was living under the childhood shelter of God (or the gods). Now that the gods were dead, could mankind likewise meet this challenge and too become godless? Nietzsche thought the answer to this timely question was yes; man, as a courageous animal was able to survive even the death of God. Man is to live with no religious or metaphysical safety nets. If mankind was to become godless, Nietzsche was to be its prophet.

Three Central Themes is Nietzsche

The Will to Power

In Zarathustra it is man's basic nature and is found in all living things (*conatus, elan vital*). This is probably not a metaphysical doctrine of unusual significance (as Heidegger interpreted it). Nor is it protofascist as Heidegger agreed. It was a psychological theory that involves: 1) the power of self-control in art and philosophy not so much subjugation of others; 2) The power of the slave to live free of resentment of his master. It is rooted found in Greek contest (*agon*), viz., triumph over others, power over audience, language, and self. In the pinnacle of power one is perfectly self-possessed, self-sufficient man, (Socrates in prison is better than Nero on the roof); but Goethe is better than Socrates-- self-mastery. It is a man of intelligence and passion who passionately mastered his passions and employed them creatively. It is the illuminator of most (if not all) behavior but is not the only motive for human action.

Superman (Overman, *Übermensch*).

Lucian (2nd century) used the word, as did Goethe in Faust. Nietzsche never applied to an individual, except in one ironic self-critical passage ("on poets" in *Zarathustra*). It is always intended as a this-worldly antithesis of God. "A human being (*Mensch*) who has organized the chaos of his passions, has given style to his character, and became creative." Mankind involves mixed types. Nietzsche does not claim to be a superman. One who renounces God and supernatural dignity of man and recognized. There is no meaning in life except the meaning man gives his life.... One who rises above flux of creatures and becomes a creator and ceases being human, all too human. A superman is one who can willingly accept suffering and misery and prove their worth by overcoming them. He is not the one who thinks of himself as superior but who demands more of himself.

Eternal Recurrence

Since there is no God or objective meaning in life, man must will his own meaning. This Nietzsche does in willing the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs. He presupposes absoluteness of time and flux and finite space. Upon destruction, our universe will be reconstructed and repeat previous patterns and events identically (so Nietzsche will be born 1844, etc.). What has been will be innumerable times at immense intervals. This is Greek in origin but struck Nietzsche like a revelation in 1882. He recognized it was a gruesome doctrine unless one can joyfully affirm one's existence and say: "Abide, moment - but if you cannot abide, at least return eternally!" Eternal Recurrence is set against Christian linear doctrine that history is progressive, ending in an eternal Goal. Nietzsche believed that Eternal Recurrence is the most scientific of all hypotheses because finite power quanta in finite space in infinite time will produce only a finite number of configurations that will repeat over and over. However, George Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* (1907, pp. 250) rejected this, claiming that three wheels rotating at different speeds never line up again if one is one-half the speed of the first and another twice the first. Nietzsche did not attempt to prove the doctrine but stressed its ethical and psychological impact, namely a) horror of all-too-human life without it and joy felt by the exceptional person who believes it. Eternal Recurrence is not superior to God, but belief in other world cheapens this world. Eternal Recurrence is the "Religion of religions" (Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, 363-365).

A Comparison of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard

Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard had Lutheran backgrounds. Both were trained in post-Hegelian Germany. Each manifested an introspective psychological methodology with literary genius (poetic philosophy). They both demonstrate the meaninglessness and nothingness of human life apart from God. Both stressed death of God and vital Christianity in Western Society. They also accepted Kantian disjunction of appearance and reality and inability of man to know reality by reason. Further, they acknowledged the need to suffer in the overcoming life. They admitted that all absolute and eternal values must be rooted in a transcendent God. And both men had an implicit Post-Hegelian dialectic in their thinking. They also stressed individual, passionate, and volitional nature of man. They believed truth to be a matter of life not of philosophical thought. Both men held critical view of Christian evidence. Both believed ultimate responsibility goes beyond good and evil. In addition, both stressed the significance of human solitude.

There were, of course, some other important differences. Nietzsche denied God and Kierkegaard affirmed Him. Nietzsche believed that reason is man's only hope and Kierkegaard held that revelation is. While Nietzsche held that the overcomer wills eternal recurrence, Kierkegaard affirmed the eternal God. Nietzsche held that Man is self-sufficient and must deny God, but Kierkegaard insisted that Man is insufficient and must submit to God. For the former, the movement of history is circular, but for Kierkegaard the movement of history is circular. Nietzsche believed the Bible is full of myths, lies, and errors, but Kierkegaard held that it is a record of truth and revelation from God. For Nietzsche, self-denial is a sign of weakness, but Kierkegaard believed it was a sign of spiritual strength. Nietzsche believed man is only finite and fallible, but Kierkegaard affirmed that he is finite and sinful. Nietzsche was not to bring peace to the world, but instead, carried and used the sword to divide, shock, and perplex his audience. His fate though is one of the many lessons that can be learned in man's striving to 'know thyself.' Man cannot be understood from the zoological perspective, but it is Nietzsche who illustrates that man does indeed have a problem in determining his nature. Hence the contrast between these two influences—Kierkegaard loving his native Copenhagen while Nietzsche was in a state of utter homelessness cut off from his community thus

festering in a land of loneliness.

Nietzsche claims that the existence of God and Christianity either stands or falls on the present social order. Nietzsche rejects Christianity because as a total system it must rest on the standards set by Christianity delegating standards of culture and morality to the public—if the culture does not prove it out, then reject it and the existence of God. However, Kierkegaard saw that the problem lay in the confusion between the eternal God and the traditions of men. He also saw a breakdown in the structures that watered-down Christian requirements. Kierkegaard warned that Christianity could not endure unless it detaches itself from “Christendom.”

Nietzsche and Kierkegaard differed in their notions about *being* and *becoming*. Nietzsche believes that it is self-evident that the transcendent and immutable being is incompatible with the world of becoming and that any notions of piety associated with this being must be discarded. Kierkegaard on the other hand suggests that man should forget the idea of themselves as gods. Kierkegaard posits that man does not look for a lasting city here on earth because he is a pilgrim to the Absolute. Nietzsche counters by declaring that the entire world is the lasting city thus denying the existence of the transcendent being.

Nietzsche understood God as well as Kierkegaard. For one who rejects the absolutely binding obligation of God on his life understands God as well as the one who accepts it. Ironically, Kierkegaard drove men to atheism; Nietzsche drove them to theism.

Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Hegel Compared

HEGEL	NIETZSCHE	
Opaque	Clear	
Objective	Subjective	
Optimistic	Pessimistic	
Only a Philosopher	Philosopher and Poet	
Said God is Dead	Believed God Dead	
Reinterpreted Christianity	Rejected Christianity	
Eternal found through time	Eternal recurrence of time	

Nietzsche was misunderstood by many philosophers. Though he was unsystematic in his approach, he did deal with his subject matter, albeit, in a more indirect and dramatic aphoristic prose. He approached his philosophy through the vein of art, never denying the artist within. However, there were those like Heidegger who did think he was a systematic thinker considering him the last metaphysician of the West.

Although he was an atheist, even a theist can agree with some of what he said. For example, when God dies, all value dies too. He provided a profound analysis of post-Christian European culture. He stressed the meaninglessness of life without God. However, Nietzsche's basis for rejecting God was volitional not rational (see Paul Vitz, *Faith of the Fatherless*). His substitution of the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs for God demonstrates that even atheists cannot avoid the Transcendence (i.e., God). Of course, he provided no evidence for eternal recurrence. Further, the negation of all value (called Nihilism) is self-defeating. For it implicitly affirms the value of negating all values. Nietzsche showed the need for God in his poem to the "unknown God" in which he bemoaned his need for God.

As noted, Nietzsche accepted Schopenhauer's pessimistic notion of Christianity—a world denying, asceticism promoting emphasis on a narrow and restricted life. The Christianity that appeals to most twentieth century folks is not this kind. Today, it is seen as manly, self-reliant, and world affirming seeking to have each individual experience a richer and fuller life for himself and others as well. However, the Christian church should take into consideration Nietzsche's severe criticisms and allow it to foster honest self-examination. Even though most would conclude that the church has been mostly right and Nietzsche mostly wrong, the church can learn something even from its most severe critics.



The Life and Works of Barth

Karl Barth was the son of Fritz Barth (1856—1912). Karl was born in Basel in 1886. He later held as an adult professorships at Gottingen, Munster, Bonn, and Basel and impacted the theological world starting in 1921. He was a professor of Theology at Berne. He was a student at Berne, Berlin, Tübingen, and Marburg. He ministered at Geneva from 1901—1911 and was pastor for ten years at Safenwil, Switzerland. In 1921, Barth was appointed to the Chair of Reformed Theology at the University of Göttingen. In 1925, he went to Münster, and in 1929, he went to Bonn where his opposition to Hitler led to his exile. He later became professor of Theology at University of Basel until his retirement in 1962.

Barth wrote his *Commentary on Romans*, 1919 and revised it in 1922. Later, he penned *The Word of God and Theology*, 1924 and *Theology and the Church* was published in 1928. He wrote the *Prolegomena to a Christian Dogmatics* (1927). His *Christian Dogmatics in Outline* came out in 1927 and his magnum opus, multi-volume *Church Dogmatics* was produced between 1932 to 1968.

The Influences on Barth and Barth's Influence of Others

Barth was influenced by the epistemology of Immanuel Kant by way of Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann. He was also influenced by the existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard, though he later disavowed this influence. From Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* he learned of the bankruptcy of man-centered philosophy. The liberal theological method of Wilhelm Herrmann, the atheism of Franz Overbeck, and, the pietism of an early nineteenth century pastor, Jean Blumhardt, were also influences on his thought.

The writing of his *Church Dogmatics* was influenced by Anselm (*Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, 1931). The ontological argument of God's existence does not require a metaphysical construction. Rather the argument self-contains its own rationale—the revealing of the inner form of the Word of God. Dogmatics systematically presents the material orderly, affecting all areas of human life. It is not a deduction from a set of principles.

Barth's critical (rather than constructive) *Der Römerbrief* (*Commentary on Romans*) challenged the human preconceptions concerning God. The notion that religion is under divine judgment and is judged as a human phenomenon rather than a divine one, had a great influence on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's idea of the existence of a "religionless Christianity."

Barth's influence was great because it was biblical without being considered 'fundamental.' He escapes the charge of being irrational by being non-rational. Other, Emil Brunner and Oscar Cullmann, held similar neo-orthodox views. Hendrik Kraemer's applied Barth's thought (in *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (1938), showing that all religions, including

Christianity, are under the judgment of the revelation of Christ.

The Basic Elements of Barth's Thought

The early Barth was a student of the liberalism of his day. Three factors are significant for his later thought. First, he formulated the absolute transcendence of God and sin-dominated realm of mankind in opposition to the tendency of modernism to put man into the place of God. Second, in the wake of Hegel he developed a dialectical theological method which poses truth as a series of paradoxes, for example, the infinite became finite; the absolute transcendence of God, and yet His self-disclosure in Christ. Third, from Kierkegaard learned the idea of the crises, which involved struggling with these paradoxes, to avoid rationalization, and to experience the crises of faith.

The later Barth reacted against modernism and liberalism. As a pastor at Safenwil, Barth became dissatisfied with liberalism in the face of the practical concern of "Christian Preaching." For Barth, truth in religion is based on faith rather than on reasoning or evidence. This is known as fideism. For Barth, transcendental truth cannot be expressed in rational categories, but needs to be made known by the clash of opposites. Theological knowledge is an internal rationality, an inner consistency within the presuppositions of the faith, and is independent of the rules of thought governing other knowledge.

The Word of God: Three Levels

The Word of God manifests itself in three forms: First, there is the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, God's personal Word. This is the ultimate level which is identical with the second Person of the Trinity was incarnated in Jesus Christ.

Second, the inscripturated Word is the whole canon of Scripture as a witness to revelation but not a revelation itself. Revelation is personal but not propositional. The Bible then is a fallible apostolic witness to and testimony of the person Word of God in Christ.

The third level is the proclaimed (preached) Word which depends on the written Word because it is based upon this witness to revelation. The Bible looks back to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The proclaimed word looks forward to the fulfillment of God's Word in the future. Only the revealed Word, the incarnate Christ, has the absolute character of the Word of God. The other two are relative to the first and can only be properly labeled the Word of God to the extent that God freely chooses to use these to confront us.

Barth's Concept of Revelation

Barth is convinced that the Holy Scripture is not itself a revelation but is rather a fallible but reliable human witness of that revelation in Christ. He affirmed that there is a difference between an event and the record and description of that event. Hence, the revelation of God and the human description of it are never identical. The Bible is not the infallible words of God, but a thoroughly human book. The writers of the Bible were men like us, and therefore fallible. These writers were time-bound children possessing a perspective not like ours. Their records are fallible witnesses to the redemptive events in the concepts of their time. As fallible men, they were witnesses to revelation and as sinful men they were capable of errors. Nonetheless, their words were justified and sanctified by God so that they spoke God's Word with their fallible and erring human words.

However, God's Word never coincides with the Book (the Bible) itself. The Word of God is always a free, sovereign act of God. He believed that this removes the words of the Bible from the Word of God so that the Word of God is not subject to the attacks leveled against the words of the

Bible. However, God uses this Bible for His service by taking the fallible human Biblical text and encountering the individual through it and in it. The authority of the Bible and its divine character are not subject to any human demonstration. It is only when God, by the Holy Spirit speaks through the Bible that a person hears the Word of God. The Bible consists of the sixty-six canonical books recognized in the church, not because the church confers on them a special authority, but because they embody the record of those who witnessed (personal) revelation in its original form (Christ).

Barth's View of Divine Inspiration

God's Word is always the Word of God, but it is not at our disposal. The dictum, "the Bible is the Word of God," does not refer to the Bible as such, but to God's working within the Bible. Inspiration does not imply the infallibility of the words of the Bible in their grammatical, historical and theological character, as human words. The wonder is that fallible and erring human words are at the moment used by God as a gateway. For Barth, all likeness between God's Word and the Bible is lacking, and everything stands in opposition and in contradiction with the real Word of God. It may be said that the Bible becomes the Word of God if and when God is pleased to speak through it.

Religious Language

There is no analogy of being (as in Aquinas) or similarity between creatures and their Creator who is "wholly other" and transcendent. There is only an analogy of faith which is based on revelation which spans the gulf between God and us (see Barth, *Anselm*, 1931). Man cannot span this Kantian gulf by any natural theology or theistic arguments for God. Barth holds to the idea that revelation is relational, not propositional. The knowledge of God is given by God, through the grace of God.

Barth on Philosophy

According to Barth, philosophy collides with theology. Philosophical metaphysics, seen as a 'secular thought,' attempts to say something about God as the Absolute. Philosophy, whether it is logic, philosophy of science, or other branches, may be proper in some interpretational inquiries but not in theology unless it is held in strict subordination to the Word of God. Attempts to establish doctrinal truth upon external arguments not associated with the Word of God is both dangerous and irrelevant. Hence, the Christian message is not to be seen as another teaching among rivals. And Further following this conclusion, traditional apologetics is to be ruled out.

An Evaluation of Barth's Views

Positive Evaluation

Barth's view is often commended on several important points. First of all, he provides a definitive rejection of modernism and liberalism. He challenges modernism effort to put man into the place of God. He rejects their efforts to make God totally immanent, and to ignore God's transcendence.

Second, Barth's emphasis on the Bible is significant. He called the Church back to the Bible. He points out that the Scripture does not have authority as a result of a human rational process. Thus, our faith is not ultimately directed to the book, but to God Himself.

Third, Barth upheld several orthodox Christian doctrines including the virgin birth, the Trinity, the deity of Christ, and his bodily resurrection, and the necessity of Christ redemption for our salvation.

Negative Evaluation

However, the conservative theologians have pointed to several shortcomings in Barth's view. First of all, his extreme emphasis on God's transcendence put God out of reach and effectively made God unknowable. In fact, Barth's claims with reference to God's transcendence are self-defeating. For the idea that transcendental truth cannot be expressed in rational categories is to express transcendental truth in rational categories.

Second, Barth's rejection of analogy leaves humans in an unwarranted and unjustified agnosticism. For either our knowledge about God has some similarity with the way He really is or else we are left in agnosticism. If the later, then despite Barth's multi-volume systematic theology, we know absolutely nothing about God. The Bible is like a cracked record through which we can hear the Master's voice, but the record (the Bible) is not perfect.

Third, Barth claimed that truth is a series of paradoxes which raises the question of whether this statement is true, and if so whether it is paradoxical. Barth's theology is fideistic which may be internally consistent (rational), but there is no indication where it touches reality, and so is impossible to distinguish objective truth from falsehood.

Fourth, many critics see serious problems which Barth's view of Scripture. In attempting to preserve God's freedom to speak or not to speak through Scripture, he has undermined the essential nature of Scripture as the authoritative Word of God. His view is contrary to what the Bible affirms of itself. It is not merely a witness to revelation, but a revelation itself. It is the writing (the *grapha*) itself which is God-breathed (2 Tim. 3:16-17). In addition, the men of God who wrote it were carried along by God and spoke from Him and not from themselves (2 Peter 1:20-21). The apostle Paul's even wrote of "words...taught by the Spirit" (1 Cor. 2:13). The formula "What the Bible says, God says" and vice versa (thus, equating the words of God and of Scripture) is supported by many biblical passages (cf. Gen. 12:3 with Gal. 3:8 and Gen. 22:4 and Mt. 19:4-5).

Fifth, the focus of divine revelation according to Scripture is not a self-authenticating word, but an open, public, verifiable historical event. Paul said the evidence for Christ's is evident to all men (Acts 17:31). Luke 1:1-4 claims to be a written showing the historical foundations on which the proclamation of the Gospel rests. In Acts 1:3 Jesus granted many infallible proofs to the disciples. Therefore, it was not a matter of mere faith in a personal encounter but in one based in historical, verifiable, events.

Sixth, Barth retained the unjustifiable bifurcation of fact and value inherited from Immanuel Kant (see). However, events like the virgin birth, Christ's Incarnation, Crucifixion, and resurrection are values that cannot be separated from the historical and physical facts (events) with which they are associated.

Seventh, by separating the Bible from the Word of God and fact from value, Barth causes a serious Christological problem. For there is a strong similarity between the anthropic Person Christ, who combined both divine and human natures without sin and the anthropic book (the Bible) which combines both the divine Word and the human Word in one book without error.

Eighth, even without the similarity between the Christ and the Bible, Barth's view of total depravity so corrupting human culture and language (in which the Bible is expressed) that even the words that came out of Jesus' mouth as a human being would be fallen and sinful. Yet the Bible declares emphatically and repeatedly that Jesus never sinned (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 1 Pet. 3:18; 1 Jn. 3:3), nor was any "guile found in his mouth" (1 Peter 2:22).



The Life and Works of Buber

Martin Buber was born in Vienna in 1878 of Austrian Jewish Parents. He spent his childhood in Lvov, Galicia with his grandfather Solomon Buber who was a well-known business man and rabbinic literature scholar. Martin studied philosophy and art history from 1896 to 1900 at University of Vienna, Leipzig, Zurich and Berlin. He was an active Zionist in his twenties with Herzl and Weizmann. His work was instrumental in the revival of Hasidism (Jewish mysticism).

Martin was involved in several Zionist journals, from editor to becoming the founder of a publishing house. Even though he was a Jew, his culture was altogether Germanic and his progression of thought was anchored in Biblical and Hebraic heritages. His work was impressive because he sought after the roots of man from a biblical perspective. He was a corrective to the more ambitious teachings of Heidegger and Sartre. His most famous contribution is the development of the I-Thou philosophy in 1923 (William James had used the phrase in 1897).

From 1924 to 1933, he was a professor of the philosophy of Jewish religion and ethics at Frankfurt-am-Main University. This was the only chair in Jewish religion at any German University. In 1920, Buber and Franz Rosenzweig founded an institute for adult Jewish education thus devoting his energy to strengthening religious and spiritual resources for the German Jewry in the face of the challenges being mounted by Hitler's coming to power. Buber taught at the University of Frankfurt (1923—1933). In 1938, Buber left for Palestine and took an appointment as professor of sociology of religion at the Hebrew University. Partnering with Y. L. Magnes, they led the Yihud movement which was devoted to Arab-Jewish understanding pointing to the creation of a bi-national state. After a few others lecture venues, he eventually died in 1965. Later, he left Hitler's Germany (1938), and taught at Hebrew University (1938—1951). Buber died in 1965.

The major works of Buber include *I and Thou* in 1923 (English trans in 1957); *Eclipse of God* (1952 Eng. trans.); *Good and Evil* (1953); *The Prophetic Faith* (1960), and *Two Types of Faith* (namely, Jewish and Christian, 1961). Buber's *I and Thou* is also a representative confrontation between God and man where each being confronts the existence of the other in his completeness—one as man, the other as God. It was a matter of continued faith with Job which he maintained through his many responses of emotion towards God. The faith that Job had in God, as well as the faith David had, permitted them to call God to account. Faith at its fullest dares to express anger toward his God.

The Philosophy of Buber

Buber's perceptiveness is an attempt to show that there is a basic difference between relating to a thing (or the observed object) and to the person himself. However, Buber did not think the distinction was that simple. According to Buber, things and persons are both observed as 'It' when

characterized as not genuine relationships between the parties. But the relationship becomes genuine when there is a “I-Thou” relationship between the two parties. There is a primary difference between the way people relate to inanimate objects and how they relate to persons. When a person is seen as an “It,” then I am alone and act as sole observer and judge. When the person (object) becomes the “Thou,” the universe is seen in light of him and he is no longer just another person (object) among many resulting in a different involved “I” carrying with it greater risk.) Buber’s most famous contribution to philosophy was his distinction between an I-It and an I-Thou relationship. The nature and hindrances of an I-Thou relations will be discussed first.

I-Thou versus I-It.

An I-Thou relationship is one that treats others as an end not as a means. We should love people and use things; we should not use people and love things. We should treat others as a subject (an I) not as an object, an It).

Three things hinder I-Thou relations: First, *seeming* rather than being. Second, *speechifying* rather than real dialogue; Third, *imposing* oneself on another rather than unfolding oneself to another. Genuine existential experiences are always person to person. One takes off his mask and speaks as a real person to another real person. Only this is true communication.

The I-Thou relationship is risky because there is no hiding place to buffet any personal need. In addition, the Thou is viewed as one who has full freedom associated with his otherness and has the freedom to act unpredictably. If the responses of the I-Thou relationship becomes one of where the Thou is calculated, then the relation shifts to an I-It relationship. The I-It relationship is not a present relationship but one based upon the past, based upon a previous knowledge of his past. The I-Thou relationship is one truly based on the present because it is in a position of unpreparedness for the expected and unexpected. (This is related to genuine listening to the Thou, where the I does not know what is going to be said as compared to pseudo-listening where the I pretends to listen and assumes what he is going to hear based on some past experience.

A Contrast of Buber with Sartre

Since Jean Paul Sartre (see below) was an atheistic existentialist and Buber a theistic one, it is enlightening to contrast their views. The following chart summarized their differences.

Sartre	Buber
Others are Hell (They are the means of my objectifying myself)	Others are Heaven (They help me discover my true subjectivity in interpersonal relations.)
There is no ultimate meaning	There is ultimate meaning (grounded in God)
Common project	I-Thou Relation

For Sartre, others are hell because they reflect an objectification of me, not the real I that as a subject transcends any objectification. Therefore, there is no ultimate meaning, no real I-Thou relationship. Hence, the best we can do is have common projects with others (e.g., join a group with others who are doing the same thing). At one time Sartre joined the Communist Party to fulfill this. Buber, on the other hand, believes that we could find meaning in an I-thou experience with others grounded in God, the ultimate Thou.

Buber's view of God

In Buber's view, man is in a dialogue with God where each is the other's Thou. Life for man is a constant transition from the Thou to the It back to the Thou. For Buber, there is really only One Thou; it is God and whose nature cannot become an It. Therefore, though man may hate God, he cannot reduce God to the status of a thing and turning God into an It. It is here where Buber claims that traditional theology attempts to turn God into an It. When man transitions from thinking about God to addressing Him, then it is here that man is truly communicating with the living God. This true communication is different than what the philosophers merely do by intellectual assent alone.

For Buber, God is "Wholly other," but He is also "Wholly the same," nearer to me than I am to myself. God cannot even be sought, since there is nowhere He is not to be found. In fact, God is not sought by man; man meets God through grace as God moves to man. All who hallow this life meet the living God as the unfathomable condition of being. To see everything in God is not to renounce the world but to establish it on true basis. We can sense God's presence but can never solve His mysteriousness. God is experienced in and through the world. Nonetheless, He must be met alone. In this union with God we are not absorbed but remain an individual "I" (ontologically different).

Buber's view of Religious Language

Like Plotinus, God is not the Good but the SuperGood. He must be loved in His concealment. For Buber's God does not name Himself (in the "I am that I am"); He simply reveals Himself since this is not a definition but a disclosure of Himself. The idea of God is a masterpiece of man's construction, an image of the Imageless. But, as Buber insisted, "Idols are idols, whether they are metal or mental." Nonetheless, the word "God" should not be given up simply because it is the most heavily laden of all words, for it is thereby the most imperishable and indispensable of all words. The word "religion", however, is vexatious and has undergone the epidemic sickening of our time and should be replaced by "all real human dealings with God."

Philosophy and the Eclipse of God

Philosophy hinders man's relation to God in two ways. First, man makes his own selfhood supreme and thus shuts off light from heaven. The passion peculiar to philosophers is pride in which their system replaces God. Second, objective language (It-language) is a form of verbal idolatry which obscures God. God does not come under the law of contradiction; we speak of Him only dialectically. Buber believed that idols are idols whether they are mental or metal.

Buber's form of existentialism has a significant influence on Neo-orthodoxy. Emil Brunner carried over Buber's existential views into Protestantism.



The Life and Works of Brunner

Emil Brunner was born in [Winterthur](#), near [Zurich, Switzerland](#). He studied at the universities of [Zurich](#) and [Berlin](#). He received his doctorate in theology from Zurich in 1913, with a dissertation on *The Symbolic Element in Religious Knowledge*. Brunner served as pastor from 1916 to 1924 in the Swiss mountain village of [Obstalden](#). He was a professor of theology and taught at Zurich from 1922 to 1953. Later he taught at the International Christian University at Tokyo until 1956. He participated extensively in the work of the World Council of Churches and for a time in the Moral Re-Armament movement. He died in 1966

He wrote *Die Mystik und das Wort* (1924); *The Philosophy of Religion from the Standpoint of Protestant Theology*, Eng. Trans. 1937); *The Mediator*, trans. 1934); *The Divine Imperative*, trans. 1937); *Man in Revolt*, 1939; *Dogmatics*, (1946-60); *Christianity and Civilization* (Gifford Lectures to 1949).

Brunner's earliest theological positions were typical of those represented by Swiss and German Protestantism prior to 1914, accepting the liberal propositions concerning the social and ethical aspects of the gospel. This also included the views associated with the alliance between philosophy and theology. Regarding philosophy, Brunner was quite familiar with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (see below). After World War I, he began his study of liberalism that seemed to convey the notion that he was an ally of Barth. In addition, his work *Die Mystik und das Wort* (Tubingen, 1924) is a disclosure seemingly against Schleiermacher's writings concerning the basis of Christianity found in religious experience through natural theology. Instead, Brunner takes the path of revelation.

He was a contemporary of Karl Barth, but held a more liberal form of Neoorthodoxy. He also held that humans have the capacity to receive revelation from God to which Barth wrote a short but emphatic book titled *Nein* [No]!

Faith and Reason

Brunner begins with Revelation and works outward to Reason and not the other way around. He believed there is a general revelation in creation only because the Bible says there is. Apart from Christ, men inevitably get pagan idea of God. There is no agreement between natural and biblical revelations. Only Christian revelation can see this and set it straight. It does not teach all men have experiential knowledge of God. Man turns what he knows into an illusion. Natural revelation makes man guilty, but it cannot free him. Only supernatural revelation can do that. Man has only a remnant of Imago Dei. He has the faculty of reason, but he does not have the right attitude of reason.

All Revelation is Personal Not Propositional

Brunner uses the word ‘dialectic’ often in regards to his position on revelation. Theology’s use of dialectic, where it is attempting to understand revelation, would end up canceling itself out if considered strictly from a philosophical perspective. A contradiction arises, for example, when considering omnipotent divine goodness and the existence of physical evil. The dialectical theologian would see this as a manifestation of a necessary paradox. The contradiction shows that man’s intellect is inadequate (and that divine revelation is still adequate and true), not that man has failed intellectually. Therefore, when a criteria of consistency is formed then man’s understanding of revelation is hindered. He further alludes to the idea that if revelation is looked at as a series of propositions, then failure to understand it may result. Revelation is the act of God not an orderly or logical line of reasoning of doctrine. It is this reason that philosophy must set limits on its usage.

Brunner declared that truth is personal not propositional. The following contrast illustrates what he means by this:

	Impersonal Truth	Personal Truth
	About Things	About Persons
Objective		Subjective
Abstract		Concrete
It-Truth		I-Truth
Rational		Existential
Truth we Know		Truth we Live
Correspondence		Encounter
Static		Dynamic
I grasp it		He grasps me
(I possess it)		(He possess me)
Declarations		Decision
Communication		Communication
	about God	of God
	(Himself)	

Christ said "I am the Truth." Truth is a personal encounter with Christ who is the Truth. Propositional truth about Christ does not draw one closer to Christ. Truth is found in a subjective encounter with Christ.

The Noetic Effects of Sin

The way sin manifests itself in man is his failure to understand himself as a person. Neither can philosophy in and of itself comprehend a human as a person but only as objects and perceived existences. The secular view in philosophy of human beings is inadequate. Humans seek to be autonomous because their will is rebellious against God. It is however through revelation that man can understand himself as a person and it is through revelation that God as a Person is understood especially when viewing the life of Christ including His death and resurrection.

Sin affects the mind more in some disciplines than others. The closer the subject matter is to our relation to God, the greater the affect of sin on it. The farther the subject matter is from our relation to God, the less influence of sin there is on it. The following chart reveals the influence on

sin on the various disciplines:

Areas Agreement with Unbelievers

MOST RELIGIOUS—	Theology	LEAST
	Morality	
	Psychology/ Sociology	
	Physics	
LEAST RELIGIOUS—	Mathematics	MOST

The Relation of Philosophy and Revelation

The God of whom philosophy speaks is not the God of Christian revelation because: 1) the God of philosophy is inferred, and 2) he is presented as an object. The God of revelation encounters man as a person to the Person. God cannot be discovered except through Biblical revelation. (Brunner was in opposition to Barth's position that humans are so corrupt that they cannot advance one inch toward God through their natural powers.) Brunner believed that humans have a natural capacity that allowed them to, with a minimum of rationality, respond to God versus simply being a puppet on a string.

For Brunner, philosophy and revelation are fundamentally different. Philosophy is a system of thought and revelation is a way of life. Philosophy is not the primary interest of Christian. Revelation includes reason but reason never includes revelation. Christian philosophy is possible and necessary because we can and should think. It is not reason but rationalism which makes philosophy absurd. Both Philosophy and theology are under Christ's lordship. It is not reason that is opposed to revelation, but man's pride (in his rationality in science, philosophy, culture.) Man takes pieces of truth and makes them into an absolute "ism".

An Evaluation of Brunner's View

Despite his positive emphasis on a personal relationship to God, his insight into the effects of depravity on scholarly pursuits, and his more positive attitude toward philosophy (than Barth), and some other matters, Brunner was opposed to orthodox theology. This is evident in many areas.

A Rejection of Orthodox Doctrine

Unlike Karl Barth, Brunner denied many the fundamental Christian beliefs. He did not hold the orthodox view of the Trinity, Deity of Christ, Substitutionary Atonement, or Physical Resurrection. Of the later, he wrote: "Resurrection of the body, yes: resurrection of the flesh, no! The "resurrection of the body" does not mean the identity of the resurrection body with the material (although already transformed) body of flesh; but the resurrection of the body means continuity of the individual personality on this side, and on that, of death." Yet Jesus called his resurrection body "flesh" (Lk. 24:39), as did the apostle Peter (Acts 2:31). Further, Jesus' resurrection body had the crucifixion scars in it, showing that it was the same body that died (Lk. 24:39; Jn. 20:25-29). Indeed, Jesus said he would be raised in the same body in which he died (Jn. 2:18-22).

A Rejection of Propositional Revelation

Brunner made an unnecessary bifurcation of the personal and the propositional. Truth itself is propositional, but it can be applied to persons. The Bible is filled with propositions about God that

are true because they correspond with reality. Further, it contains many other statements that are propositional. To be sure, these are propositional truths about a Person (God) with whom we are to have a personal relationship. But without these propositions we would have no knowledge of the God with whom we have to do.

A Denial of the Validity of General Revelation

For all practical purposes Brunner denied the validity of General Revelation since it is so obscured by sin as to be rendered ineffective. Yet the Bible says it is “clear” (Rom. 1:19) and all people who do not have God’s special revelation will be judged based on it (Rom. 1:20; 2:12-15). Indeed, “the heavens declare the glory of God” (Psa. 19:1) and even among the heathen “God do not leave himself without a witness” (Acts 14:17) and know the one of whom we are “his offspring” (Acts 17:28) and therefore should seek Him (v. 27).

Like most other modern philosophies, phenomenology was developed in the wake of Immanuel Kant who insisted that we cannot know the *noumena* (the real world), but we can only know the *phenomena* (the world that appears to us). This prompted the development of the phenomenological method which insisted that we should bracket the whole question of knowing reality (metaphysics) and concentrate on the preconceptual phenomena of experience as our starting point in philosophy. For some (the realist) like Husserl, they hoped eventually to eventually work their way back to reality. Others (the Idealist), found themselves locked out of Kant's *noumena* (real world). This perspective takes the form of a phenomenological reduction where the normal presuppositions and assumptions are set aside so that things (particularly those of science and beliefs about the external world) can be viewed as they fundamentally appear to the consciousness. The founder of the phenomenological method was Edmund Husserl. It was Sartre who 'radicalized phenomenology' to include a special consideration of reality that could include the theory of being. Sartre, in his early phenomenological studies, makes it clear that there is no distinction between a science of phenomenon and a science of being (*Being and Nothingness*). The method was used by Martin Heidegger (see below) used it to form an existential philosophy. Others, like the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed it into a *Phenomenology of Perception* (Eng. Trans. 1945). Roman Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan put it to the service of Catholicism in his book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957). However, the most famous use of the method is in Georg Wilhelm Hegel's (see above) massive *Phenomena of Spirit* (1910).

Edmund Husserl wanted to return to the method of investigating "things themselves"—the direct presentation of things the way they appear. Others believed that if phenomenology is to be a truly presuppositionless science, a radical approach must be taken in order to bring the truth of an object back to its roots, its beginning of being. Phenomenology is therefore a foundational methodology. For Heidegger, phenomenology means letting the "thing speak for itself" so as to not let the observer be coerced into ready-made and confining ideas. Therefore, he was promoting letting the object be what it is, and carrying this one step further, letting human life reveal itself if there is a willingness to perceive it.



Life and works of Husserl

Edmund Husserl was a German Jew who became Lutheran. He was trained at Leipzig, Berlin, and at Vienna where he received his Ph.D. in mathematics (1881). He attended lectures of Franz Brentano in Vienna (1884—86) and became a philosopher. Wilhelm Wundt had a negative influence on Husserl. He thought Husserl was too analytic and behavioristic in his psychology. The philosopher/psychologist Franz Brentano (d.1917) had a positive influence on Husserl. He liked his synthetic approach and stress on gestalt. Husserl taught in Halle (1887—1901), Gottingen (1901—1916), and Freiburg (1916—1929), where he spent the remainder of his life. It was these last few years that he was exposed to social and political pressures because of his Jewish ancestry.

Husserl works can be divided into three periods. In the first period he wrote: *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) and *Logical Investigations* (1900—1901). In the second period he penned: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology* (1913, Eng., 1931). He also produced the best summary article on "Phenomenology" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th edition, 1929, Vol. XVII, 700-702. In the third period he produced: *Cartesian Meditations* (see English trans. of his 1929 lecture). The development of his thought during these three periods took him from a position that was primarily ontological realism to a distinctive form of idealism.

Husserl's Philosophy: Three Stages

Philosophy was more than an academic study for Husserl—he approached it with utmost seriousness! His aim was to make philosophy an *a priori* autonomous science that would function as the foundation for all other sciences. In this scientific approach, philosophers should seek complete lucidity, take nothing for granted and accept no statement as true without scrutiny and no excogitation without interrogation. This science Husserl called “phenomenology.”

Husserl’s phenomenological method comes in three stages. It is here where he attacks psychologism in order to clear up confusion between psychology and logical order. In his *Logical Investigations* he argued that a careful description of the nature of logic showed that its principles were universal and necessary. Logical truth has an *a priori* basis that is not found in empiricism. Empiricism seems to neglect certain aspects of experience and it is phenomenology that is able to bridge this gap and add stability to experience. However, Husserl does not propose a separate realm of essences because essences are understood through a distinctive act of cognition. The mind *thinks* the object and the properties of phenomenology *bring* the object to fulfillment. The search for the truth associated with the object is when the object is *shown* in the perceptual intuition where the individual holds a seemingly paradoxical position. Phenomenology posits that no assumption should be made about the existential status of an intentional object until a reflective description of the law-governed

relationship between consciousness and the object is achieved.

The First Stage: The Eidetic Reduction

This stage deals with the object of consciousness. It is an attempt to get the idea or essence through activity (*noesis*) of the known object (*noema*). By analyzing an activity one can get at their essential kind, i.e., their essence or idea. In this reduction of acts to idea we have a specific example of a general, that is, a universal meaning particularized in a specific case (i.e., an eidetic reduction). He rejects Kant's disjunction between *phenomena* and *noumena*. For Husserl believed that the *phenomena* manifest the *noumena*; there is a *noetic* intention and *noematic* (content, world) parallel.

The laws of logic do not precede consciousness. However, they are discovered by consciousness intuiting abstract meanings and relationships among them. Then, once discovered the laws of logic are normative for discovering truth. There is a meta-logical basis for all logic which is without content, a "pure logic." No science can justify its own principles; it must begin in pre-scientific consciousness. His concern is not with factual relations but with ideal ones that can be applied to factual ones. By this he founded a phenomenological descriptive of the way things appear in our consciousness. Initially, one cannot say this is the way things really are, though eventually led to the warranted assertion that particular objects were real and not mind-dependent.

The Second Stage: The Phenomenological Reduction

This deals with bracketing of the object (*epoche*) of consciousness where it is a suspension of existential assent. Here Husserl founds a phenomenology based for the implications of his method. He opposes empirical "natural history" approach (of Locke and Hume), insisting that we must study the phenomena itself, unmediated through ideas, the primary "givenness." We must return to the roots of reality, to pure evidence, to an absolute beginning. In this he attempts to break away from all presuppositions by bracketing existence. Descartes' *cogito* (I think) is supplemented by the *epoche* since the *cogito* can be denied, but the phenomena cannot. The *epoche* [bracketing of existence] is neither doubt nor supposition but suspension of judgment about existence. Hence, the earlier eidetic reduction evolves into a phenomenological description.

The Third Stage: The Transcendental Reduction

This stage deals with the Subject (the ego). Husserl argues that a transcendental-phenomenological subject (ego) or "pure consciousness" is present in all my conscious acts; there is an I (ego) in every "I think" or "I do." This transcendental ego gives meaning to the world. This ego is center from which intentionality emanates. All phenomenal reductions are eidetic (since they treat things as objects), but we need a transcendental reduction to view the subject of consciousness.

The problem with this method is how we can we know other subjects? Husserl's answer is that we know it by transcendental subjectivity, i.e., by a representation in my consciousness of the other subject (similar to how Leibnitz's "windowless" monads can know each other by the Super Monad representing them there).

The structure of activity is the structure of the self; we are not natures but "structured processes" which are law-governed as primarily indicated in the intentionality of our consciousness. Only a subject gives meaning to objects and to the world; mere facts in themselves are meaningless in the sense that they are always thought about in a particular way. We have many meanings (intentions) toward objects; these are its subjective meaning. What is left over is "objective" but meaningless. Science is part of the meaning of man, but man gives the world its scientific meaning by the universal

laws that govern intentionality. Science is based on a pre-scientific intentionality of man to use the world and to understand it. Hence, there are no strictly self-interpreting facts; all facts are interpretive facts. This is not to say the objects in the world are experienced in a certain way and according to law-governed relationship with acts of consciousness. Nonetheless, Husserl fails to overcome the problem he creates, namely, that experiencing these objects posits a *neoma* in place of the real object. So, while he rejects a Kantian gulf, in his later writings (subsequent to *Logical Investigations*) he creates a kind of gulf of his own between the knower and the real world.

A Critique of Phenomenology

Many scholars see some serious flaws in phenomenological thinking. Several will be briefly noted here.

First, although it rejects the self-defeating Kantian assumption that there is an unspanable gulf between the phenomena (the thing-to-me) and reality (the thing-in-itself), nonetheless, it creates a kind of gulf of its own by placing the *neoma* in place of the real object.

Second, it begins with the unjustified assumption that bracketing reality is the best way to understand reality. But the assumption that this is a presuppositionless approach is itself a radical presupposition. Unless one begins in reality, he cannot end there. A realist begins with reality, the finite reality of his experience and moves from there to show there must be an infinite reality (God) beyond the world. Without a starting point in reality one cannot avoid the Kantian criticism or conclude the existence of God.

Third, Husserl's view is really a form of transcendental idealism. Its assumption is that there is no meaning in the world not given it by man. How do they know this? If they could know it, it would be self-defeating. Actually, it is a gross anthropomorphism of making reality in our own image. The meaning of facts in the world is the meaning given to it by its Creator.

Fourth, Husserl provides no real way one can know other minds that is consistent with its own methodology. For if one can only know the "I" of his consciousness by a transcendental argument, then there is no way to know another I in this matter. Leibniz's monads don't help since he, unlike the phenomenologists, has an argument for a Super Monad (God) by which the existence of other monads is represented in his consciousness. The phenomenology method as used by Husserl does not offer this possibility.

Husserl also held to some radical views concerning the transcendental ego. He posited that this ego would continue in existence even if after the world was destroyed. This ego would exist as an individual entity. Thus, man has two selves: one familiar empirical one, and the unknown transcendent one. However, this is difficult to defend based on phenomenological data alone.



Introduction

According to Kierkegaard, reason is threatening faith and attempts to bury it. The Western world is at a crossroads. It must choose either to be religious or fall into despair. If man chooses to be religious, he must find firm footing in the historically rooted Christianity and renew his faith. On the flip-side, Nietzsche, entrenched in the era of science and reason and claiming the 'death of God', questions what to do with the primitive instincts and passions found in man. Behind this dualism is the notion that man is alienated from his own being. Heidegger claims the alienation from Being itself is the issue and ends up as his central theme, doing so by taking his own systematic path. He posits the following: Might man's dilemma stem from the fact that he thinks wrongly about the nature of Being itself? However, the philosophy of Heidegger is neither theistic nor atheistic, but describes the world from a non-theistic (somewhat pantheistic) perspective following Plotinus.

The Life and Works of Heidegger

Martin Heidegger was born in Baden, to a Roman Catholic family. He focused early on particular studies with the intention of entering the Catholic priesthood. Keeping his interests in the methods associated with the Scholastics, he changed directions and took avenues that acquainted him with the problems of modern philosophy. He attended lectures of those who were of the Neo-Kantian Baden school of values. Martin was also influenced by the categories of Duns Scotus and particularly from the phenomenological method of Husserl in which he was trained at University of Freiburg. He wrote dissertation on "The Categories and Theory of Meaning in Duns Scotus" at Tübingen 1916. While teaching at Marburg, he presented his primal treatise on *Being and Time* (1927). In 1928, he was called to Freiburg to succeed Husserl as chair of philosophy and continued the professorship until 1945. He was provost at University of Freiburg from 1933—35 under the reign of Hitler. He publicly renounced Husserl and removed the dedication to Hitler from his book *Being and Time*, although he left a footnote acknowledging him. He was influenced by Brentano's dissertation on "Being in Aristotle" and appears unaware of the significant influence of Plotinus on his thought. His basic metaphysical question was also asked by Schelling and Leibniz before him: "Why is there something rather than nothing?"

Heidegger became involved in the political arena because of his rectorship address at Freiburg University. In 1933 in which he called for devotion and support for the newly formed National Socialists. However, as disillusionment arose in the organization, he resigned his position as rector the following year but continued to teach. Because of his political association with Nazism, English speaking countries were hesitant to examine and consider his views.

The major works of Heidegger are *Sein und Zeit* (1927), translated as *Being and Time* (1956), has become a sort of systematic bible of existentialism. The purpose behind *Being and Time*

was to provide an analysis of the temporal human experience and an advancement to the nature of being from the perspective of time. He also wanted to view the phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology—from Kant back through to Aristotle. Some of his other works were *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929, translated in English in 1962); *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929), translated in English as *Existence and Being* (1956); *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1943), translated in English as *On the Essence of Truth*; *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1953) translated in English *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1959); *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955) translated in English as *Question of Being* (1958), and *Was ist das--die Philosophie?* (1956) translated in English *What is Philosophy?* (1958).

In his long essay titled *Forest Trails (Holzwege)*, Heidegger combs through Nietzsche’s corpus looking for evidence that will shed light on Zarathustra’s announcement that “God is dead.” It is here where he also focuses his disillusionment on Western metaphysics. He accuses it of identifying with Platonism’s appeal to the supersensuous world of ideal powers. Nietzsche’s claim was that the supersensuous God and the ideal motives have now lost their hold on the human mind, therefore, metaphysics has come to an end.

The Philosophy of Heidegger

Like many philosophers there were both early and later stages to his thought. The Early Heidegger in *Being and Time* had an anthropomorphic Emphasis; the later Heidegger (*What is Metaphysics?*) stressed hermeneutics.

The Influences of Others on Heidegger

Heidegger was influenced by a number of major thinkers before him. His phenomenological method came from Husserl. Nietzsche provided his nihilistic concerns. From Hegel he learned his historical approach to philosophy. Soren Kierkegaard provided for him the stress on personal subjectivity. Finally, although he gave no recognition to him, Plotinus was a strong influence on his pantheistic mystical metaphysics

The Influence of Heidegger on Others

Heidegger also had a great influence on others. Paul Tillich obtained his basic metaphysics from him. And Rudolph Bultmann is indebted to Heidegger for his *--sitz-im-leben* (setting in life) ground for his demythology of the New Testament. Karl Barth’s “unprotectedness” or openness to voice of Being is Heideggerian. Finally, the so-called “New Hermeneutic” of Hans-Georg Gadamer and followers comes out to the later Heidegger.

A Helpful Comparison

Three great existential thinkers provide an enlightening contrast:

Kierkegaard	Nietzsche	Heidegger
Theistic	Anti-theistic	Non-Theistic (pantheistic?)
God is Dead in Church (ecclesiastically)	God is Dead in Culture (culturally)	God is Dead in Reality (metaphysically)

Authenticity found in eternity	Authenticity found in futility	Authenticity found in temporality
God Beyond Reason	God Against Reason	God Irrelevant to Reason

The Early and Later Heidegger Compared

<u>Early</u>	<u>Later</u>
Anthropological	Hermeneutical
Heavy Style	Freer and Lighter
(<i>Being and Time</i> , 1927)	(<i>Intro to Metaphysics</i> , 1953)
DREAD	JOY
Phenomenological	Mystical

The Unity in Heidegger’s Thought

Despite the shift in emphasis from his earlier to later writings, Heidegger had some common themes that run throughout his career. One was his concern about *Verfallen*, that is, the forfeiture or forgetting Being obvious to him. Man has forgotten about Being and is preoccupied with beings (things). As alluded to above in reference to his *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that metaphysicians are discussing ‘being as such,’ but neglect however the nature of being itself. In addition to this, in English language the word ‘being’ is ambiguous since it is a noun whereas “being” as used by Aquinas is a verb, referring to the act of be-ing. Heidegger’s goal was to clear a ‘new’ pathway for the comprehension of being. Unless philosophers are willing to take steps into the past and go behind what is usually constituted as metaphysics or first philosophy, then they run the chance of being led astray about the nature of being. Hence, from Aristotle forward many have been led astray and as a result, equivocations that have been created. The other common thread is Heidegger’s interest in or quest for Being in overcoming nihilism. These two cords hold together his thought in both periods of his life.

Heidegger regards the God of the Scholastics as merely the highest *Seindes*—the Supreme instance of that-which-is. To call God the first cause in metaphysics is only to understand him as the highest good, the last end, only in comparison to other things-that-are. To apply the categories to him is to implicate God as one among the other beings. However, according to Heidegger, Being is not an empty abstraction. All men understand that they move and live within a preconceived understanding of Being even though they may be in the dark about it. It is his task to bring man’s thinking in regards to being to light through the use of phenomenology—but different than Husserl’s use of it. Heidegger’s phenomenology means ‘let the thing speak for itself.’

The Early Heidegger: An Anthropomorphic Emphasis.

This period is represented by his book *Being and Time*. It is a massive phenomenological analysis of human being (*Dasein*—which in German literally means Being-there, his essence, his self-presence) in quest for Being (*Sein*).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasizes the characteristics associated with man, especially his acts of freedom. Man is not just a substance like those other things in the domain of that-which-is and not just a cognitive subject related to noetic things. Man is truly a human being because he is the center of responsibility for his own person while on his path to maturity. However, it must be noted, that Heidegger is not regarding the world of non-human things as devoid of meaning except only through humanness. His ideal associated with transcendence takes on a new light. Transcendence is not a horizontal vision of man to his world but rather is a vertical path of free man to being. For man to exist he must be in the place of truth of being.

Part One depicts man's inauthentic everyday existence in three fundamental aspects: Facticity, Existentiality, and Forfeiture. Whether man is living in fallen-ness or in a state of risen-ness, he is noticed by three characteristics of his existence in terms of *Dasein*: 1) mood and feeling, 2) understanding, and 3) speech.

Facticity: Man finds himself cast in a world not of his own willing. It is my world; I make it (Man is "Homo Faber" before he is "Homo sapiens"). World is mine to make within the limits of my contingency (World=common sphere of activity and interest; mental world).

Existentiality: It is the act of appropriating or making my world mine. It is an inner personal existence which stones do not have. Man is an anticipation, always reaching beyond himself, though within the bounds of the world. Man projects in, of, and with his world. Existentiality is the anticipation of its world, an understanding of it.

According to Heidegger it is necessary to understanding Being in which human existence is rooted. Therefore, humans exists in the truth (and he also exists in the untruth because of his fallenness). Truth and Being are thus inseparable. Humans, though, does not really see what is really happening around him. Regarding the communication of man with man, it is the function of language that is inherent with man, not only when there is talking, but also when there is silence in the communication. It is when there is silence then we are capable of authentic speech. (Here is where Heidegger looks at the existential background out of which the signs of speech are constructed.) Humans exists 'within language' before even a word is uttered because we exist within a context of understanding, which is nothing more than existing in Being itself.

Forfeiture (Fallen-ness) (*Verfallen*): Through his self-projection and self-transcendence, man understands the world and becomes himself. However, the world is not only the material for our creative energy but also the agent by which we are seduced from our essential drive to understand and to create. That is, we not only shape our world but we forfeit to it. We forget "Being" in our quest for particular beings. We sacrifice "I" for "they". We seek meaning of being human in the anonymous crowd (*das Man*), i.e., in an inauthentic public mode that is alienated from one's own true becoming. According to Heidegger, the existence of man in this 'fallen-ness' means that mankind is living beneath the level of existence up to which it is possible for him to arise.

Conclusion: Humans are determined (put here) yet free to make of the world what he will. But the all essential "I" is hidden most of life by the daily routines in the tension of the historical (e.g., the call of my situation, family, country) and in the unhistorical (passing moods, gossip with neighbor, i.e., flight of the self from itself).

Part Two of *Being and Time* speaks against this scattering inauthenticity, he singles out an authentic being, *Dasein* and develops his concept of existential or historical time which involves three things: dread, conscience, and destiny.

Dread: The fundamental mood of man according to Heidegger is anxiety (*Angst*)—a sense of the here-and-now when associated with difficulties found in man's existence. Anxiety is not fear but is rather the uncanny feeling of being afraid of nothing at all. It is nothingness that makes itself present and is the object of dread. (Fear knows what it is afraid of; dread does not.) These momentary states of mind are the answer to whether we can emerge from forfeiture, i.e., turn back in the flight from ourselves with honesty. Most unique momentary state of mind is dread which recalls man from self-betrayal to self-knowledge. Dread is an objectless fear, a sense of nothingness that grasps me when I face the whole of it as ending in death. Hence, I dread my life as a whole, because it is bounded and grounded in death (nothingness). So, dread reveals that we are a "being-unto-death". It sets us free from the illusion of the "they". So dread brings me to the totality of my authentic being, viz., to my death. Thus, death is the only event in my life that is uniquely mine.

Death ends up being a very personal and intimate possibilities since it is "I" who must suffer—no one can do it in my place. It is when death is viewed from the inevitable that it becomes freeing. This freeing makes one look differently at the petty cares of daily life that engulfs man's existence. Once the petty cares are identified (and discarded), then focus can be placed on the essential projects of life making life significant and personally one's own. Heidegger calls this the condition of "freedom-toward-death."

Conscience: Dread is the mood in which a person is open to the voice of conscience, which expresses itself through dread. It is the voice of the self to itself calling it from forgetfulness to the responsibility of being itself. It is the call from inauthenticity.

We must recognize that we are "thrown" into the world not of our own choosing and yet it is precisely this condition that I must choose. So the conscience bids us to transcend our own facticity and enslavement to freedom. It tells me I ought to face my contingency and make it vitally mine rather than let it inflict itself on me. Therefore, through the conscience I recognize myself in debt to myself, i.e., guilty (*Schuld*).

Destiny: Death is my destiny. Existential time is my time, that is, from birth to death. Time is the ontological ground of what man most truly is. It moves from the future; man is the being-unto-death (future). Our time was given for but not by our own duty. Only by choosing my time and the role into which I have been cast am I properly "historical," that is, have a destiny. Without the concept of time, man would not realize his immortality thus making time devoid of human meaning. Everything in life can be measured by man's temporality. Of the three tenses of time—past, present, and future—Heidegger gives preference to the future. The future is primary because it is the region of time in which man projects and can define his own personal being. It is also the future from which time flows to us, giving us the next moments of our existence.

Conclusion: *Being and Time* pictures the lonely being driven by dread to face the prospect of its own nothingness and in retrospect its own guilt and yet to realize in this the terror of its own freedom.

The Later Heidegger

The later Heidegger shifts to a Hermeneutic Emphasis. It is represented by his book, *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Several themes emerge in this period.

History: Meaning of Being is rooted in the intellectual history of the West. Being, as distinct

from particular things is almost nothing, a haze as Nietzsche said. We have "fallen out of Being" and betrayed our true vocation by running foolishly after this thing and that. So it is the history of our being that we should be forgetful about Being.

For the West, the history of Being begins with the fall of Being. Unlike the biblical view of the fall of the first man, this fall did not occur in Eden but when the Greek thinkers detached the clear and distinct forms from their backgrounds.

The Darkening of the World: We live in a world darkened by our forgetfulness of Being. We are more concerned with beings, from genes to spaceships, than with our true calling which is to be shepherds and watchers of Being. Inventiveness, not understanding, has been our occupation. We are more concerned with proliferation of technical skills than with metaphysical unity. So we have lost Being; it has become haze, an error—nothing.

Greek Philosophy: The Greeks detached being from the vast surrounding ground of Being by shifting the meaning of truth. According to Heidegger, this happened in a single passage in Plato's *Republic*—the allegory of the cave. Truth was defined as that which the intellect truly judges things. From there, the Greeks were able to develop science—the distinguishing characteristic of the West. Philosophy can only be done properly in Greek and German (Latinizing Greek philosophy has been the source of error). In fact, between Parmenides and Aristotle the error began, namely, a dichotomy between Being and Thought. For Parmenides these were one. Even Heraclitus held the unity of Being in the Logos. But by the time of Aristotle Being has broken loose from its first great anchorage and floated out in that tide of nihilism on which we are still adrift. Human beings have become a rational animal who merely has a logos but is not at home in Being. We have lost the Presocratic *aletheia*, the unhiddenness of being, a truth has become a characteristic of propositions (a mere "correspondence" with "facts"). This loosening of truth from Being has led to nihilism.

Poetry and Language: Heidegger wishes to recall us from nihilism to Being through language. It is by language that man stands open to Being. Unlike the pseudo-terminology of science which has lost its hold on Being, the true origin of language is in poetry. For poetry is the primal language of an historical people in which it founds Being. Hence, the great poets are the ones who can restore language to its primal power—as a revealer of Being. Thus language is the foundation and house of being, especially the poetic language of Holderlin (who had a keen tie with classical antiquity). Through him we may hope to get some intimacies of truth, some illumination of Being, of the Holy. We are, as it were, "waiting for god" (cf. "Waiting for Godot")—a god remote from theology or piety—who presides over the long-lost Being of which we are in quest.

Conclusion: There is a formal unity in the quest for Being between early and late works but the emphasis is different. His later works discard Kierkegaard as a mere religious writer, refutes Sartre's Humanistic existentialism and opts more for Nietzsche, Holderlin and Rilke ("pathological poetry"). In early his work, humans speak through language; in later work Being speaks through language. And since Presocratics let Being speak through language, etymology of Greek words is the key to true meaning of words. This is the thesis behind Kittel's *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* and the Bultmannians who helped compose it.

An Evaluation of Heidegger's Thought

Positive Comments

There are several positive aspects of Heidegger's philosophy that have been commended.

First of all, in a post-Kantian anti-metaphysical world, Heidegger's quest for Being is admirable. Further, in a post-Nietzschian world his emphasis on being versus nothingness and nihilism is commendable. Likewise is openness (receptivity) to Being is a positive feature. Also, he rightly allots a stress on the subjective application of truth to one's life. This is how Heidegger would answer Nietzsche: Western man needs to go and bring back Being from its discarded and forgotten state into which he has fallen. Man needs to let Being be instead of making Being provide answers to man's need for power. As for hermeneutics, he believes that language is the key to present reality. In this same vein, like the Bible's authors, Heidegger is aware of the evocative value of poetry and metaphor. Finally, he asks right question: "Why is there something rather than nothing at all?"

Negative Critiques

Others have noted significant problems with Heidegger's position. Heidegger says Being is something that man cannot have as a mental picture or representation but is known only by conceptual reasoning. Thinking is rooted in Being and is at once coupled to remembrance and thanking. Being is this presence that is invisible and all-pervasive. Human beings in their existence are transparent and open to Being. Unfortunately, many believe that Heidegger does not provide the right answer to this basic metaphysical question. For he assumes that this question can be asked of God as well as His creation. But this is a misunderstanding of the law of causality that only demands a cause for finite beings, not for an uncaused and infinite Being. Further, Heidegger has an unfounded assumption that Being is unintelligible in itself. In this regard, he engages in a self-defeating attempt to express the inexpressible. As for the role of language, Heidegger overstates the case by claiming that language establishes being rather than merely expressing it. Further, he wrongly assumes true meaning is found in etymology, rather than in grammatical-historical contest. Also, he engages in a self-defeating rejection of the correspondence view of truth. What is more, while he expresses an openness to Being, he does not see a need to be open to God, who is Ground of Being. Like other post-Kantian thinkers, Heidegger neglects the descriptiveness and cognitivity of language (based in a real analogy between Creator and creature) for a purely evocative dimension. Finally, his eventual Plotinian-like mysticism is open to the same criticism that other purely subjective approaches are.

The problem of God is still a crucial problem for Heidegger. He rejects the views of the philosophers who posit God as the Prime Mover, the First Cause, and the highest in the realm of Being. In his opinion, attributing to God these highest instances of that-which-is is sacrilegious because God is not contained in the order of that-which-is. Heidegger sees a vast difference between the Christian view of God and a metaphysical view of God. However, there cannot be two Ultimates. As Paul Tillich (see) noted, revelation and reason are like two mountain climbers approaching the same peak from different directions. Further, there must be a real similarity between the Cause of being and the being it causes, since it cannot give what it hasn't got.



The Life and Works of Tillich

Paul Tillich, German-American theologian, provides a theological expression of Heidegger's thought. He was born in Prussia (then part of Germany) in 1886 into a Lutheran pastor's family. He attended the [University of Berlin](#), the [University of Tübingen](#), and the [University of Halle](#) in 1905-07. He received a theological and philosophical education and was subsequently ordained in 1912 into the Evangelical Lutheran Church. After serving as a military Chaplain in World War I, he taught theology and philosophy at Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, and Frankfurt. He received his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the [University of Breslau](#). He is best known for his more popular books *The Courage to Be* (1952) and *Dynamics of Faith* (1957). He also produced a three-volume work *Systematic Theology* (1951—1963) and a work titled *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (1955) which defends the idea that ontological speculation has relevance to biblical religion. His *Theology of Culture* (1959) discusses the relevance of theology and various aspects of culture.

Tillich taught at the Universities of Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt (1924-25) where he came in conflict with the Nazi movement which eventually led to his dismissal. He then moved to Union Theological Seminary in New York and became professor of systematic theology and philosophy (1933—1956), Columbia University, Harvard Divinity School (1955), and the University of Chicago (1962). He died in 1965 and is buried in New Harmony, Indiana.

His Philosophy

Tillich has had a tremendous impact especially in the English speaking countries. He was influenced heavily by existentialism and believed, as Kierkegaard did, that religious questions are related to the problems found in the human situation. Thus, Tillich posits that Christian doctrine can resolve of practical problems. Working from a Heideggerian existential philosophical background, he spoke of God as the Ground of Being or the Power of Being. He argued that if God is the source of all Being, then God cannot be Being, as the Medieval philosophers mistakenly thought. Rather, God or the Ultimate is beyond Being, as Plotinus held.

The Starting Point of His Philosophy

Like Heidegger, Tillich has an existential starting point. He first analyzes that human's have a personal anxiety about death, meaninglessness, and guilt, that is, the threat of non-being that calls for God. The solution to man's anxiety is participating in the infinite power of God in order to find the courage to exist in the face of his anxieties. Historical ambiguities, perplexity, and despair all call for the kingdom of God to counter this. Human beings ask the question about being which is provided in their own self-awareness. Human structure is dipolar with a tension between individuation and participation; dynamics and form; freedom and destiny.

Ultimate Concerns

Every person has an ultimate concern, a way of organizing his life around a personal center. It is an unconditional surrender akin to Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence. It is an infinite passion for fulfillment. It alone makes life worth living. It is characterized by an objectivity, namely, its ability to avoid idolatry (i.e., the identification of a symbol with reality) and subjectivity, that is, by its openness to "grace" or the provision of ultimate Being.

God: the Object of Ultimate Concern

God is the object of ultimate concern, or what Tillich conceives of as faith, that is, he is Being itself, the Ground of Being or the Beyond Being (if Being is viewed as finite). Faith, according to Tillich, is a recognition and complete surrender to 'something' as an absolute authority. Religious faith is validated when its object is focused on what is metaphysically Ultimate. This faith provides an expectation that in some way there will be some receiving of fulfillment through this encounter. Everything in one's life is somehow related to this supreme authority who is holy causing one to react in awe. In his *Systematic Theology*, he states that man is ". . . that being in whom all levels of being are united and approachable" and that man is the ". . . being who asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found." Not all objects of ultimate concern are ultimate (e.g., country, persons, and things). Only what is really ultimate is ultimately real. God is not personal. Monotheism must be demythologized. Providence is not a theory about God's activity by a symbol of human courage in spite of and even unto death. Miracles are only unusual natural events that point to the Ultimate. They are not a suspension of natural laws which would be a demonic destroying of creation by God in order to provide salvation.

Tillich defined a religious experience as an "ultimate commitment." He believed everyone, even atheists, have an ultimate commitment to something. Of course, not all ultimate commitments are to what is really ultimate. Idolatry is possible. Only an ultimate commitment to what is Ultimate is an adequate religious experience.

God-talk

Tillich argues that religious life can be validated by reference to a reality outside of one's self. Religion is not the accumulation of human feeling, attitudes, or validation founded upon metaphorical proofs. He also did not adhere to doctrine that pointed to the existence of a personal God or deity. Literal (univocal) talk about God is idolatrous. With the exception of the word "Being," all language describing God is symbolic. But a symbol differs from a mere sign. Signs merely point to something beyond them, but a symbol also participates in the reality to which it points. For example, the American flag is not a mere sign; it participates in the reality of the country it represents. Thus, symbols, like a flag or cross, should be treated with respect.

Reinterpreting Christian Symbols

Christian symbols need to be reinterpreted, not replaced. These symbols manifest the Ultimate and are used to point to the Ultimate whereby they person participates in the Ultimate. For example: "God" should be viewed as the object of our ultimate concern. "Sin" is alienation or estrangement from God. It is not a violation of some absolute moral law for which one is morally guilty and in need of redemption. "Salvation" is the realization of our acceptance by the "grace" or goodness of Being (God). It is the point at which we accept our acceptance. All religions are the same in that they express and ultimate concern. However Christianity is the most adequate symbolic representation of

ultimate concern. Individual salvation is an abandonment of the world to anti-religious movements. “Christ” is the decisive point of the intimate and uninterrupted relation between God and Man. He was more than a prophet. He was the decisive center of history. He was “sinless” in the sense that nothing separated him from God. He was not good in himself (as he said), but he achieved a scar-less union with God. He was unique and unrepeatable. All saints after him achieve relation to God as a consequence of the earlier Christ-event.

The “Bible” is not an infallible revelation from God. It is a fallible book of myths and symbols of “God.” Nonetheless, its mythologized language must be preserved, even though it provides no metaphysical knowledge of God. For it does convey a core of existential truth behind the symbols.

Faith and Reason

The relation between philosophy and theology is contrasted as follows:

	<u>Philosophy</u>	<u>Theology</u>
<u>Approach:</u>	Detached Objective Empirical	Involved Subjective Faith
<u>Source:</u>	Universal Logos (in rationality)	Incarnate Logos (in history)
<u>Content:</u>	Viewed Cosmologically	Viewed Soteriologically

Both the philosopher and theologian are climbing the same mountain toward the same peak (the Ultimate), but they approach the summit from different sides and in different ways; one by faith and the other by reason. However, every philosopher as an individual has an ultimate concern, and every theologian must use reason to clarify and systematize his theological thoughts. So neither conflict nor synthesis is possible since as methods they have no common ground.



The Life and Works of Bultmann

Rudolf Bultmann was born in Wiefelsted, Oldenburg, Germany. He studied at Marburg, Tübingen, and Berlin. He first taught at Marburg and later became professor of New Testament studies at Marburg in 1921. He remained there in a teaching position until 1951. He became a noted professor at Breslau in 1916 and at Giessen in 1921.

The major works of Bultmann include: *Jesus and the World* (1934); *Kerygma and Myth* (1941); *Theology of the New Testament* (1952—1955); *Essays: Philosophical and Theological* (1955); *History and Eschatology* (1957); *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (1958), and *Existence and Faith* (1961). He and his students were the major force behind the massive *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*.

Bultmann's Demythological Naturalism

Bultmann saw a void between the thought forms of the New Testament and twentieth century man. Modern man does not see his world consisting of a conflict between the demonic supernatural powers and the Supernatural God who intervenes in mankind securing his salvation. Our scientific world is a purely naturalistic one and does not allow for miracles. Hence, the crucial question: Is it required for modern man to commit himself to both twentieth-century science and first-century pre-scientific speculation? To Bultmann, these two worlds are incompatible. In addition, it profits none to view Christianity as a strictly and objectively 'historical religion' where its foundation is based on the recorded events of the life of Jesus. Even though the historical evidence is substantial enough to illustrate that Jesus did indeed live, making a huge impact on certain contemporaries, the resurrection was a purely spiritual event, not the literal raising of a physical body.

Bultmann assigned a large part of the New Testament to the category of mythology, not objective history. Therefore, its interpretation can be used to indirectly describe the possibilities of human existence. The Christian is to "incorporate" the essentials of the New Testament record into his present thought and activity. It is through the historical accounts that God makes available man's free-mode of 'authentic' existence (a term he borrowed from Heidegger). This 'authentic' life is only available to man by virtue of divine grace through the appropriation of the Word revealed in Christ.

The New Testament contains the myth of a three-storied universe with heaven above, earth in the center, a underworld beneath. But miracles are incredible to modern man, for he is convinced that the mythical view of the world is obsolete. If the New Testament embodies truth independent of its mythical setting, theology must undertake the task of stripping the mythical framework, that is, "demythologizing" it. No person can choose his own view of the world; it is already determined for him by his place in history. All our thinking to-day is shaped by modern science, so a blind

acceptance of the New Testament mythology would be irrational.

The Impossibility of the Miraculous

Following Spinoza and Hume before him, Bultmann believed that modern science has made it impossible for anyone to hold the New Testament view of the world. Now that the forces and the laws of nature have been discovered, we can no longer believe in spirits, whether good or evil. The only relevant assumption is the view of the world which has been molded by modern science and the modern conception of human nature as a self-subsistent unity immune from the interference of supernatural powers. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus as means an event whereby a supernatural power is released; to the biologist such language is meaningless.

The Real Purpose of Myth

The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should not be interpreted cosmologically, but anthropologically, but existentially. Unlike some, Bultmann did not wish to eliminate myth, but to reinterpret them. Christ was a concrete, historical figure, but the miracles and resurrection are not historical but supra-historical events. Jesus arose in the hearts and minds of the early disciples.

For Bultmann miracles are supra-historical events. The resurrection is not an event of past history since a historical fact which involves a reanimation of the dead is utterly inconceivable. It is clear that the New Testament is interested in the resurrection of Christ simply and solely because it is the eschatological event par excellence. The historical problem is scarcely relevant to Christian belief in the Resurrection. It is an event of subjective history, an event of faith in the hearts of the early disciples

In summation, myths are by nature more than objective truths; they are transcendent truths of faith. But what is not objective cannot be part of a verifiable space-time world. Therefore, miracles (myths) are not part of the objective space-time world.

An Evaluation of Bultmann's Demythological Naturalism

Bultmann is to be commended for several things. First, he did not deny the historicity of Jesus. Further, he stressed the need to know Greek and to understand the New Testament in the context of its own culture. What is more, he realized the transcendent dimension of religious language. Furthermore, like other existentialist, Bultmann believed that we should have a personal encounter with God through Christ.

However, some have pointed to serious flaws in his thinking. One of these flaws is his lack of precise definition and meaning to words such as myth, mythology, and analogy. Hence, his articulations provide a weak foundation to his theology. Neither are his varied methods of discussion defined thoroughly enough leaving uncertainty in regards to test for claims made about God. Instead, his mythology takes center stage in aiding the understanding of God leaving one wondering if God-talk is even possible. For one, he denied many of the great fundamentals of the Christian faith, including the trinity, the virgin birth, the deity of Christ, and the physical resurrection of Christ.

Second, he denied the supernatural nature of the resurrection and other miracles. In this he yields to naturalistic science. This rejects from his rejection of theism. For if a theistic God exist, then miracles are possible. But once one rejects a supernatural Being (God) beyond the natural world, then it follows that there will be no supernatural intervention in the natural world.

Third, it does not follow that because an event is more than objective and historical it must be less than historical. Events that are more than purely objective may be at least space-time events. Simply because an event is not of this world does not mean it cannot take place in this world. Something of Supernatural origin can happen in the Natural realm. By occurring in space-time, miracles can be objective and verifiable. In Bultmann's theology, authentic existence tends to be more heavily weighted on the individual. This makes it difficult to determine an accurate accounting of what Christian discipleship and love are according to Bultmann.

Fourth, in claiming that miracles such as the Resurrection cannot happen in space-time history, Bultmann is revealing his unjustified, dogmatic, naturalistic bias. It is something he holds "no matter how many witnesses are cited." The dogmatism of his language is revealing. Miracles are "incredible," "irrational," "no longer possible," "meaningless," "utterly inconceivable," "simply impossible," and "intolerable."

Fifth, if miracles are not objective historical events, then they are unverifiable or unfalsifiable. If this is so, then they have no evidential or apologetic value. But this is contrary to the claims of the New Testament (John 20:31; Acts 1:3; 1 Cor. 15:1-8).



The life and Works of Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris. He was the only child of Jean-Baptiste Sartre, who was an officer in the French navy, and Anne-Marie Schweitzer, who was a first cousin to Albert Schweitzer. Jean-Paul's parents were nominal Christians (a Catholic-Protestant mix).] When the child was only one year of age, his father died. This resulted in the child and his mother moving back into the home of her parents. He was then raised by his mother and maternal grandfather who was a professor of German. Jean-Paul was taught mathematics and was introduced to classical literature by this grandfather. His mother remarried when he was twelve years of age. The family then moved to La Rochelle.

When Jean-Paul was a teenager, he became interested in philosophy after reading a work by Henri Bergson (1859—1941), an influential 20th century French philosopher who promoted intuition over rationalism and science for understanding reality. He studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) from 1924 through 1928, earning a doctorate in philosophy. ENS was an institution known for turning out many French intellectuals. After 1929, he taught several students between the ninth and twelfth grades in Paris and elsewhere. From 1933 to 1935, he was a research student at the Institut Français in Berlin and at the University of Freiburg. His first work of notoriety was *La Nausea* (*Nausea*). From 1936 on, he published a philosophical novel called *La Nausea* (1938) and a collection of stories called *The Wall* (1939, English trans.), in addition to several philosophical studies. Sartre was influenced by several Western philosophers including Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl (where he learned the phenomenological method), Heidegger (where he learned metaphysics), and Nietzsche (where he learned about atheism). One of the biggest influence on Sartre came from Alexandre Kojève (1904—1968) Russian born French philosopher who integrated Hegelian concepts into continental philosophy. Moreover, Sartre does not seem to have any regards for empiricism, positivism, or materialism. The primary focus that runs through his work is his passionate interest in human beings—understanding them and viewing the other Christian, Cartesian, and Hegelian theories of human beings. Though he rejected these theories, he did see a common thread of some sort of human aspiration that ran through these ideas. Sartre's philosophy can be seen as a focus on the mode of being human, rejecting all forms of rationalism, theistic or otherwise. It was through his writings and plays that he attempted to show his philosophical views.

While at ENS, Sartre met Simone de Beauvoir who later became a well-known philosopher, writer, and feminist. The two formed a life-long relationship. At the outbreak of the war in 1939, Sartre was called to duty by the French army. He was later captured by the German opposition. After his release, he returned to Paris to teach philosophy until 1944. After the war effort, he wrote a number of novels and plays which ultimately made him famous.

The early period of his career was dominated by phenomenological psychology under the influence of Husserl. Here he produces *Transcendence of the Ego* (1936 French, 1937 English), *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory* (1939, 1948), and *The Psychology of Imaginations* (1940, 1948). The middle period focused on ontology of human existence with influence from Heidegger. It was during this time that he produced *Being and Nothingness* (1943, 1956) and *Existentialism and Humanism* (1946, 1948). In a latter period, his concerns turned toward Marxism. He wrote *Questions de methode* (1960) and *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960).

His Initiation into Atheism

Sartre wrote in his autobiography titled *The Words*, the following in regards to his religious upbringing: “I was taught . . . the Gospel, and catechism without being given the means for believing” (*The Words*, 249). He later added the following concerning his family and the influence of the Christian culture. “My family had been affected by the slow movement of dechristianization that started among the Voltairian upper bourgeoisie and took a century to spread to all levels. . . . Good Society believed in God in order to speak of Him. How tolerant religion seemed! How comfortable it was” (Ibid., 97, 98). He saw in his grandparents showed traits of mysticism and indifference, leaving him with further aversions to things religious. Though he outwardly showed that he believed in God, inwardly he became continued to dismiss thought of God (Ibid., 100–101). Sartre wrote of his atheism: “Only once did I have the feeling that He existed. I had been playing with the matches and burned a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt his gaze inside my head and on my hand. . . . I flew into a rage against so crude an indiscretion, I blasphemed. . . . He never looked at me again” (Ibid., 102).

Sartre’s conversion to atheism was confirmed one day when he was twelve years of age. He made an attempt to think of God, but could not. From then on, he considered the matter settled, however, the notion of things relating to God was not completely abandoned. He writes, “Never have I had the slightest temptation to bring Him back to life. But the other One remained, the Invisible One, the Holy Ghost. . . . I had all the more difficulty getting rid of Him in that he had installed himself at the back of my head. . . . I collared the Holy Ghost in the cellar and threw him out; atheism is a cruel and long-range affair: I think I’ve carried it through. I see clearly, I’ve lost my illusions” (Ibid., 252–53).

Sartre’s Atheistic View of God and Man

Sartre believed God’s existence was impossible. God, by his very nature, is a self-caused being. However, one would have to be ontologically prior to himself in order to cause himself. This is impossible. In Sartre’s terms, the “being-for-itself” can never become the “being-in-itself” (*Being and Nothingness*, 755–68). In other words, the contingent cannot become the necessary. Nothing cannot produce something. Therefore, God, a self-caused being, cannot exist.

Sartre viewed humanity as an empty bubble on the sea of nothingness. The basic plan for the human being is to become God. But it is impossible for the contingent to become a necessary being, for the subjective to become objective, or for freedom to become determined. The human being is a conscious being, one who can ask questions and one who can receive negative answers. This idea of negation is more than just a logical function of some judgment. To Sartre, this opportunity of negation through negative judgments requires some counter ontological status considered nonbeing. Now, the question is, What is the source of this nonbeing? Being, that is human consciousness, is in contrast with everything else in the physical world. This nonmaterial being (consciousness) is self-detaching

and surrounds negation (nonbeing). Consciousness projects being-in-itself against the background of nonbeing. It also bridges the gap between the actual and the possible to thus determine which of these two are to be realized. This makes human consciousness free because it can think of itself other than itself. According to Sartre, this is demonstrated by anguish.

Human beings then can adopt one of two fundamental attitudes: responsible freedom or psychological determinism. Determinism, justified by a variety of devices, is a way to conceal freedom from one's self. The antithesis is the acceptance of one's personal freedom and that they are responsible for their own acts. Though there may seem to be some internal duality, it is this reasoning pointing towards determinism that is certainly doomed for failure. Therefore, the individual person is a free agent who defines the moral world. The individual is, in fact, condemned to freedom. If one were to attempt to escape his destiny, he would still be freely fleeing it. Even suicide is an act of freedom by which one would vainly attempt to eliminate his freedom. So the human "essence" is absolute freedom, but absolute freedom has no objective or definable nature. The "I" (subject) always transcends the "me" or "it" (object).

The World and Man's Destiny

According to Sartre, the world is real but is contingent—it is simply there. The world, like human life, is a given. Philosophically, the world is uncaused and is the field where subjective choices are performed. The world really has no objective meaning whereby each person creates personal meaning. The fact that several people may choose the same subjective projects (like Marxism for Sartre) makes no difference whatsoever. Each person is still objectively the one who is making personal choices. For example, Sartre said, "I am my books." Yet each person transcends the world that has been personally created. However, the 'author' is more than mere words. He or she is the "Nothing" (freedom) out of which it was created.

Sartre's View of Ethics

Sartre thought that there were no absolute or objective moral prescriptions. He writes, "No sooner had you [Zeus] created me than I ceased to be yours." He continues, "I was like a man who's lost his shadow. And there was nothing left in heaven, no right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders. . . . For I, Zeus, am a man, and every man must find out his own way" (*No Exit*, 121–123).

Not only are there no divine imperatives or moral prescriptions, but there neither are objective values. In the last lines of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre wrote, "it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations." For all human activities are equivalent. We must, in fact, repudiate this "spirit of seriousness" which assumes there are absolute or objective values and accept the basic absurdity and subjectivity of life (see S. de Beauvoir, 10, 16–18, 156).

What then should one do? Literally, he should do "his own thing." Since there are no ultimate and objective values, man must create them. A person can act for personal good or for the good of all humanity. But there is no ethical obligation to think about others. In the final analysis, each is responsible only for the use of personal, unavoidable freedom.

An Evaluation of Sartre

Rather than addressing the typical arguments posed by the atheist, there is a part of Sartre's atheism that is peculiar to him that should be discussed. Critics have noted the following:

First of all, God is not a self-caused Being. Self-causation is impossible. God is the only uncaused Being in existence. When Sartre concocted a false meaning of God's initiation (coming into

being), he was able to then dismiss the existence of God. Thus, he set up a straw man—a wrong view of God—to subsequently knock it down attempting to prove his point.


Second, Sartre proposes that God is a contradiction to human freedom and creativity. But God is the Supreme Creator and man is the sub- or co-creator of good and value. God is the Prime Cause and human freedom is the secondary cause. In addition, human free will and determinism are not logically contradictory since God can pre-determine that human beings are to be free actors.

Third, Sartre makes an unjustified bifurcation between subjectivity and objectivity, between fact and value. However, in the human being, this disjunction is without a real difference. I (the subject) am me (the object). An attack upon the body is an attack upon the person. Therefore, a person's subjectivity and objectivity are not separable.

Fourth, if there are no objective values and each person is fully responsible only for themselves, then there is no meaningfully ethical sense in which one ought to choose responsibly for others. This leads to there being no moral obligation to do anything. Atheistic existentialists do what they do only because *they* choose to do it. Atheistic existentialism reduces to antinomianism—freedom from all laws of God.

Closing Comments: Back to God

Despite Sartre's autobiographical comments against the existence of God, he was unable to completely dismiss God. Before his death in 1980 at the age of seventy-five, he turned back to the God. It was reported in a French magazine that Sartre embraced Christian theism before he died. In his own words (Spring 1980): "I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured. In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here; and this idea of a creating hand refers to God." Sartre's mistress, Simone de Beauvoir, reacted to Sartre's apparent recantation, complaining, "How should one explain this senile act of a turncoat?" She adds, "All my friends, all the Sartrians, and the editorial team of *Les Temps Modernes* supported me in my consternation" (cited in *National Review*, 677). (See also other confessions below in **The Failure of Post-modernism**). In view of Sartre's conversion, it might not be surprising that his existential colleagues reacted as they did to his comments. It seems to be a tacit self-condemnation of Sartrian Humanism by Sartre himself. Two men, Alain Larrey and Michael Viguier, who lived in Paris in 1980, reported that two months before Sartre's death, he complained to his Catholic doctor that he "regretted the impact his writings had on youth," that so many had "taken them so seriously."



The life and Works of Marx

Karl Marx was born in Treves in the Rhineland [Germany]. His family was Jewish but had converted to Lutheranism when he was a child. He later studied law in Bonn and philosophy and history in Berlin. During his undergraduate studies, he identified himself with the left wing of the Hegelians. He was known as a militant atheist forming the credo: “Criticism of religion is the foundation of all criticism.” He received his doctorate in Jena in 1841 for his thesis on the materialistic philosophies of the Greek philosophers Epicurus and Democritus. This added support for Darwin’s evolutionary origins of human life as a product of a material world. In Paris, he became friends with Friedrich Engels (1820—1895), social scientist, political theorist, co-authored *The Communist Manifesto* with Marx, co-father of Marxist Theory. Marx was a German revolutionary socialist and was one of the most influential of all modern atheists adopting the atheism of fellow student, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804—1872).

Though Marx is mostly known for his economic theory studies, philosophy did play a part in his economic synthesis. By virtue of his influence, Marx could be included with other great social thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Hegel.

Marx eventually lived later part of his life in London being supported financially by Engels and is buried there. Marx lived a life of poverty not holding down permanent employment. He had a chronic illness and was saddened by the death of his three children. He spent a great deal of time in the British Museum gathering material for his great work on his analysis of capitalism. He was only able to publish one volume of *Das Kapital* in 1867. Engels constructed two other volumes from posthumous papers.

Marx’s numerous works include: *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* which is about French socialism, English economics, and German philosophy. The *Communist Manifesto* (1848) was co-authored with Friedrich Engels along with *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (ed. 1959) and the *Holy Family* (1956). He also penned *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (trans. 1956).

Marx was the source of historical materialism but it was Engels who developed the dialectical materialism as a metaphysics or the theory of reality. Marx, like many Germans in his day, remained under the influence of Hegel. However, as time went on, Marx adhered to more to historical and economic knowledge rather than any metaphysical or moral critique associated with capitalism. He sought after the factual and scientific aspects.

The Philosophy of Marx

His View on God

Marx strongly rejected religion concluding that it was harmful, calling it “the opium of the people.” He thought that because men believed in the supernatural afterlife that this provided an excuse for the exploitations found in this life because they did not concern themselves with the cares of this world based upon the better world to come. Marx thought they should be concerned with the affairs of this life. He also thought that economic and material forces dominated this present world.

Marx drew three principles from his atheist friend Ludwig Feuerbach. First, “man is the highest essence for man” (*Marx and Engels on Religion*, 50). This means there is a categorical imperative to overthrow anything—especially religion—which debases humanity. Secondly, “Man makes religion; religion does not make man” (*Marx and Engels on Religion*, 41). Religion is the self-consciousness of the human being who feels lost without some identification with a “God.” Third, religion is “the fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces” (*Marx and Engels on Religion*, 147). In short, God is a projection of human imagination.

The Marxist evolutionary concept of the universe is that there is no room for a Creator or a Ruler. Deism’s Supreme Being is according to Marx a contradiction in terms. The only function that God serves is to make atheism a compulsory article of faith and prohibit religion generally (*Marx and Engels on Religion*, 143). Marx even went so far as to reject agnosticism: “What, indeed, is agnosticism but, to use an expressive Lancashire term, ‘shamefaced’ materialism? The agnostic conception of nature is materialistic throughout” (*Marx and Engels on Religion*, 295). In the end, religion will die and eventually be replaced by socialism.

His View on Man

Though he supported the materialism of Darwinian thought, Marx did not deny the concept of the mind altogether. However, he believed that even the mind was determined by material conditions. He states that “For us, mind is a mode of energy, a function of brain; all we know is that the material world is governed by immutable laws, and so forth” (Marx, *Marx and Engels on Religion*, 298). This view fits well with those philosophers who are aligned with call epiphenomenalism; consciousness is nonmaterial but is dependent on material things for its existence.

His View of Society

Marx was more interested in the social being of man. When it came to the obvious physical needs of man, he believed that what was true for man in the present social arena was also true for all men at all times in all places. He held to the concept of the working man but he did not believe in the concept of private property. When men own their own property, they have a tendency to become alienated from the rest of society. To cure man’s leaning and personal desire finding fulfillment in personal ownership, Marx proposed a future communist society where man would work for the good of the whole and thus find his personal fulfillment in this venue. In such a society it would be each according to his need, not each according to his ability.

His View of Ethics

It follows that the Marxist ethic is relativism, utilitarianism, and collectivism. His relativism points to no moral absolutes (following Nietzsche) because there is no external (or inner) set of rules dictated by an ‘eternal realm.’ The notions of good and evil are then determined by the socio-economic structure—the struggles of the ‘class’ determine ethics. The utilitarian concept in the communist society promotes the ultimate good for the society. Therefore, the utilitarian end justifies

the means to getting there. And finally, the collectivism of Marxist thought believed that the perfect life is only possible when the individual is integrated into the whole of society under corporate and universal law.

His View of History

According to Marx history primarily moved by economic laws that are inexorable as physical laws. At the heart of this movement is the Marxist dialectic which operates when the *thesis* of capitalism is opposed by the *ant-thesis* of socialism and eventuates in the *synthesis* of communism. Thus, his ultimate goal of a Communist Utopia was the end toward which he made his ultimate commitment.

Brief Evaluation of Marx

Critics of Marx, while admiring his social goals, have been strong in insisting his means of attaining it were seriously lacking. Several significant points have been made. First, his atheism are subject to the same criticism as those of his mentor, Ludwig Feuerbach (see). Second, Marx social consciousness was derived, not from his atheism of materialism but from is Judeo-Christian training and culture. Third, his linear view of history—that it was moving toward and ultimate Goal—was also borrowed from Christianity. Fourth, Marx's ultimate commitment to this communist utopia is a religious one (as Tillich noted). Indeed, it is an illusory paradise, not supported by the reality of those who have attempted it (e.g., Russia and China). Fifth, his attempt to overcome the gap of the rich-getting-richer and the poor-becoming-poorer is not the only solution to the problem. In the ancient Jewish economy, this division was checked by the year of Jubilee (one year every half century) when acquisitions were returned to their original owners. Sixth, his deterministic view and anticipations for the future had not worked out as he had planned. His assumption that economic influences would work like physical laws was incorrect. Seventh, his materialistic/evolutionary ideals ignores the spiritual and religious aspects of humans made in the divine image. It also ignores the immaterial aspects of human being and, coupled to his anti-supernaturalism, rules out the possible of an active God. Eighth, his moral relativism is self-destructive.

Some Sources on Karl Marx

There are some select sources that are helpful in understanding and evaluating Marxism. These include: K. Blockmuehl, *The Challenge of Marxism*; N. L. Geisler, *Is Man the Measure?* (chap. 5); R. N. C. Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*; D. Lyon, *Karl Marx: A Christian Assessment of His Life & Thought*; K. Marx, *Das Kapital*; *Marx and Engel on Religion* and *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*. Ronald Nash, *Social Justice and the Christian Church*. Fred Swartz and David Noebel, *You Can Still Trust the Communist to be Communists*.

The term “positivism” was first introduced by Saint Simon to designate a particular scientific method and its projection into philosophical inquiry. Its roots can be traced back to Francis Bacon, English Empiricists, and the philosophers associated with the Enlightenment. Auguste Comte (see below) adopted the term which eventually became a major philosophical movement. This movement became very powerful in the Western world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’s. Positivism strived for a universal principles based on scientific knowledge that would penetrate politics, ethics and even ‘positive’ religion.

Generally speaking, positivism’s major thrusts are as follows: valid knowledge is only obtained through science; facts is the only basis of knowledge; philosophical methodology is not any different than scientific inquiry; philosophy’s task is to find general principles associated with all sciences guiding human conduct and forming the basis for all social systems. However, positivism does deny the existence of powers that are beyond facts and laws established by scientific conclusions. It follows then that it is also opposed to metaphysics.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, French philosophers realized that they could not follow the reckless and brazen men of the Enlightenment who thought that after the bondage to the state and church had been released that mankind would once again be wise, good, just and able to govern themselves rationally. It became clear that those well-meaning philosophers who brought on the Revolution made some serious errors; now future philosophers had to undo these wrongs. Some, such as Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821), thought that Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the leaders associated with the Enlightenment were wrong. The natural sciences were of great value for particular purposes but these sciences could not reveal ultimate truth, and further, they did not have any bearing on religion or sociology. The authority on these two areas lies with the Pope and the directives mandated by the Catholic Church.

Recall that it was Condillac (mentioned above in “The French Enlightenment”) who was a dominant figure during the Revolution. During this time, it was the psychological school that stressed all mental processes resulted from a combination of sensations. One of its members, a physician who attempted to combine physiology and psychology via a philosophical investigation, was Pierre George Cabanis (1757-1808) who claimed that sensibility cannot be explained and that it must lie beyond the powers of investigation.

Just prior to Comte was Maine de Biran (1766-1824) who posited that the formation of knowledge was not external perception but rather was the immediate consciousness of one’s self-activity where it was a combination of external stimuli and impulses. Later, he was in favor of a “life of the spirit” that supported religious mysticism. A new social reform was proposed by Comte de Saint Simon (1760-1825) who ventured to create a new Encyclopedia. He also stressed that a new Christianity needed to be formed that focused not on the future life but rather with the physical and moral improvement of those classes in society that were of humble means. Simon continued his efforts and influenced many of his students in the Polytechnical school, one who was Auguste Comte (see below). It can be noted that Comte’s idea came from Saint Simon, but in an undeveloped form.

Comte, unlike Nietzsche and Marx who accepted cultural verdicts, was not satisfied to passively watch the world lose its faith in God. He recognized that this resultant vacuum needed to be filled with some other ‘overbearing’ faith. The choice was either to return to a thoroughgoing theistic

and supernatural foundation for intellectual and moral life or reformulate a society focused on a positivist faith in humanity. His proposal would end up being an anti-theistic program—a sort of atheistic relativism. He was to replace the *Credo in unum Deum* with a new slogan: *All is relative—here is the only absolute principle*. This is the basis of the faith of Positivism. It will be his three-stage program that will illustrate Comte’s principle of all is relative.

Positivism is the movement in modern philosophy that stresses that all true knowledge is derived from science. Positivism banishes metaphysics and considers it useless when it seeks to determine causes and essences. It is scientific thinking and the betterment of humankind that is at the heart of positivist philosophy. Hence, it is sometimes called scientism. The positivists are heirs of the Empiricists like John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, and especially David Hume (see above) who stressed that all knowledge comes through the senses. After Kant’s agnosticism, the empiricists became positivist since no knowledge of the real world was thought to be possible. Auguste Comte began this positivist movement, followed by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer whom Charles Darwin called “our great philosopher.”

Forms of Positivism

Although it is widely known as a scientific view, there are various kinds of positivism. Writers in other fields applied it to their discipline. Auguste Comte himself applied it to society and coined the term “sociology.”

Social Positivism

Saint-Simon and other socialistic writers introduced social positivism into France. Saint-Simon’s influence also stretched to those in Italy (Cattaneo and Ferrari) as well as in Germany (Laas, Jodl, and Duhring). Unitarians Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (father of John Stuart Mill, see below) introduced it in England. It sought to promote a more just social organization emphasizing scientific progress while deemphasizing theological and metaphysical doctrines eliminating the foundations built during the Middle Ages. The new spiritual powers were the scientists and the industrialists.

Evolutionary Positivism

Evolutionary positivism is based on nature as it relates to physics and biology. Its predecessor was Charles Lyell and his doctrine of biological evolution as found in his work titled *Principles of Geology* (1833). Charles Darwin (see below) took this a step further in his *On the Origin of Species* providing adequate proofs for biological evolution. Both posited natural and necessary progress with origins starting at the cosmic nebula and developing uninterrupted to the human history of the world. Herbert Spencer defended the progress of “evolution” from the simple to the complex in the chemical and biological developments. He viewed religion as the interpreter of the mystery of the world (*First Principles*, London, 1862). However, all religions fail in providing the explanation reminding man of the mystery of the world’s origin.

Others associated with evolutionary positivism were Ernst Haeckel and his monism, Cesare Lombroso and his determinism, and Wilhelm Wundt and his psychophysical parallelism. There were others who were influenced in this vein as well, such as William James, John Dewey, and A. N. Whitehead, and others.

Critical Positivism

In the later part of the nineteenth century, critical positivism took on another name in Germany

and Austria: empirio-criticism. This was done through the work of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. They promoted the idea of stable groups of sensations that were dependent on and connected to one another. They posited that science was an economic endeavor as compared to it only being contemplative or theoretical. Its “economy” sought for the principle of the least action required for a ‘thing’ in the progress of adaptation to its environment.

Logical Positivism

Logical positivism (see also Verification Principle and A. J. Ayer below) was [Edwards] a general approach to problems of language and meaning [Routledge] and was given its name in 1931 by A. E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl. It is also known as “consistent empiricism,” “logical empiricism,” “scientific empiricism,” and “logical neo-positivism.” Generally speaking, positivists rejected transcendental metaphysics because they thought its assertions were meaningless—there was no method of validation. This reiterates Hume’s conclusion that metaphysics was “sophistry and illusion.” Therefore, Mach attempted to remove all metaphysics from science. The positivist also argued that statements concerning the external world were meaningless when it discussed the Absolute or things-in-themselves because there was no possible method to verify that “it” existed (or did not exist) independent of man’s experience. These positivists even went so far as to state that the epistemological theses of realism and idealism were meaningless as well. Philosophy too was considered as “cognitively meaningless.”

Critique of Positivism

Positivism eventually led to Logical Positivism of A. J. Ayer (see below) and the Vienna Circle who eliminated all meaningful statements about metaphysical reality by way of the Principle of Empirical Verifiability which demanded that the only meaningful kinds of statement are those of the mere relation of ideas or else those of matters of fact which can be known only through one of more of one’s five senses.

The main thrust behind positivism is its reliance upon the verifiability principle. However, the condition of the principle was unclear because “the meaning of the principle is the method of its verification.” The table turned. The positivists set out to destroy metaphysics but now the metaphysician could now refuse their recommendations. This difficulty in the positivists circles led Carnap to posit that the verifiability principle was an “explication” of concepts associated with metaphysics, science, and meaning. The logical positivists feared that their verifiability principle threatened to destroy metaphysics and now it was possibly going to destroy science as well by ruling out as meaningless all scientific laws.

Additionally, it was questioned as to what would be considered as “verifiers” or “confirmers.” There was also the question as to the verification of content versus structure—is the content of one man’s experience the same as another man experiencing the same experience. This verification was uncertain. However, science is only interested in what is experienced *and* what is agreed upon. It seems as though the ultimate content of science lies beyond public observation. But, there is dissatisfaction to the idea that ultimate scientific truth is private. As a result, logical positivism disintegrated and died even though it had left behind a legacy.

AUGUSTE COMTE (A.D. 1798 - 1857)



The Life and Works of Comte

Auguste Comte was born at Montpellier in 1798. He came from a French rationalist Catholic family. He studied science and was secretary of Saint-Simone at Ecole Polytechnique. He said he "naturally ceased believing in God" at age fourteen. He is the father of philosophical positivism. He also coined the term "sociology" and founded that discipline. He developed a mystical (non-theistic) humanistic religious cult (see below). The major works of Comte are *Course, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (1830—1842, trans, 1853) and *The Cathechism of Positive Religion* (1852, trans. 1858).

Auguste was the oldest son of a revenue office clerk. His mother, who was twelve years older than his father, clutched to Auguste. His father and sister seemed to always be of ill health. Passing all of the competitive exams for entrance into the Polytechnical school, he was admitted at the age of sixteen. It was there that he studied mathematics, physics, and chemistry. From 1814 to 1816, he attended the Poly-Technical school in Paris but was subsequently dismissed because of rebellious behavior against an unpopular instructor. For six years Comte was a disciple of Saint Simon's teaching of social philosophy. After a disagreement regarding an essay that Simon wrote, the two parted company. While in Paris around 1816, he studied the idealist thoughts of Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis and the writings of Hume and Condorcet. When he was denied a professorship at the Polytechnical school, Comte supported himself through odd jobs such as a tutor, a coach and examiner for the school, private instructor, and through lecturing. After his departure from school, he became a mathematics tutor and also served as secretary to the French utopian socialist Saint-Simon learning about industrialization, banking, politics, and philosophy's involvement in the French revolution. This background provided a foundation from which he created his three states of mind: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. These events occurred between 1817 and 1824. In 1826, Comte started his public lectures on the positivist philosophy.

Comte fell in love with the orphaned Caroline Massin who supported herself as a seamstress. After her and Comte were married, she supported his scholarly endeavors. When finances became meager, she sought relations with other men in order to supplement their income. Comte disagreed with this procedure and the two eventually separated even though she continued to offer her support for his work. He later had an attack of insanity brought on by a rigorous workload and his regrettable marriage to Caroline, leading to a suicide attempt. After his recovery, he continued lecturing and his *Course of Positive Philosophy* was later issued (1830—1842). His *Discourse on the Positivist Spirit* was issued in 1844 emphasizing the importance of his science of sociology. He also wrote *Discourse on the Positivist Outlook* in 1848 which emphasized the development of the positivism in human society and in the following year he developed the *Positivist Calendar*.

Comte would later fall in love and become devoted to Madame Clotilde de Vaux in 1844, however, they would not marry. After her death, Comte's philosophical views drastically changed. Now he believed that a new religion needed to be developed that would conserve the values of Catholicism without its doctrines. We should serve Humanity as a substitute for serving God.

In order for the followers of positivism to be properly rooted, he wrote a *Positivist Catechism* instructing the adherers on the history of humanity and as a thesis for the future development. He also wrote a four-volume *System of Positive Polity* (1851—1854) which combined the speculative with the practical and the scientific with the religious aspects of his ideology forming his religion of humanity. At the time of his death in 1857, he was in the process of writing the *Subjective Synthesis* beginning with volume one in 1856. Its premise was to accomplish unity of all the sciences. Auguste Comte died in 1857 worn out from his efforts and finishing out his life in isolation and wretchedness.

The Philosophy of Comte

Comte wanted to be able to view society in such a way that it would benefit all classes of people and ultimately insuring universal peace to all societies, including the economic situation. His philosophy was basically one of social reform. Comte's philosophy would emerge from his historical study of the progress of the Western European human mind, that is, the sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology. He only considered mathematics as a logical tool and not a science like the others. Comte gave the meaning to 'positive philosophy' similar to Aristotle's idea of philosophy—the general system of human concepts. The notion behind the 'positive' is the idea of theories having the focal point centered on the coordination of the observed facts. In other words, 'positive philosophy' aligns the observed facts—positive knowledge—and synthesizes them with the sciences. Thus, the mind only knows subjective impressions, those that are 'appearing to us.' It is Hume's skepticism that seems foreign to Comte, except when it has to do with theological beliefs and metaphysics as it transcends from the phenomenal world. To Comte, philosophy was an extension of the natural ideas or common sense. His epistemological starting point was Kant's anti-Metaphysic and Hegel's historical development.

Three Stages of Society

It was his study of the 'scientific mind' that prompted Comte to notice that the history of the sciences goes through three stages. He claimed that the progress of these three stages are inevitable and irreversible. In his Law of Growth Comte delineated three stages of human development:

The Theological Stage (child)—which characterized ancient philosophy. In the theological stage, like a child, man views everything as given life by some will(s) and life-form(s) [from animism to polytheism to theism, see below] similar to his own.

The Metaphysical (transitional) Stage (youth)—which was depicted in medieval thought. Comte thought most men in this stage thought mostly in metaphysical terms overemphasizing egoism and individual rights. This second stage could easily be misunderstood. What Comte means by the metaphysical stage is the transformation of personal deities (or God) into metaphysical abstractions—the concept of a personal god is followed by the concept of an all-inclusive Nature like force, attraction, and repulsion. This of course easily leads into the next stage of Comte's scientific outlook or mentality.

The Positivistic Stage (manhood)—which he initiated in the modern world. In this last stage,

scientists concentrated on observation and the laws of phenomena with no consideration of the 'unseen or unknowable spirit forces.' In order for the transition to the final stage to take place, there may need to be a moderately short and progressive dictatorship to guide public thought towards the right direction. This is part of the social science—moving society out of the theological and metaphysical stages.

The following chart summarizes Comte's view on these three stages of human thought:

THEOLOGICAL	METAPHYSICAL	POSITIVISTIC
Primitive	Greek	Modern
Gods	Principle (logos)	Methodological unity in science
Personal	Impersonal Law	Objective Method
How and Why are the same	How and Why differ	How only
Mythical (mythos) Theories	Philosophical (logos) Theories	Scientific Theories
Supernatural Beings	Natural Forces	Phenomenal (empirical)
Animating Spirit	Impersonal Powers	Natural Laws
Spiritual Causes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fetishistic/Animistic (physical is alive) ● to Polytheistic (personified into gods) ● to Monotheistic (consolidated into a godhead) 	Rational Causes	Natural Causes
Anthropomorphize Nature	Deify Ideas	Describe and relate phenomena
Military Organization	(transition)	Industrial success and peace

Comte thought that the current society was in a state of confusion—men were at times thinking in terms of one of the stages and at other times thinking in another stage. This occurrence was taking place not only in the natural sciences but also in the social subjects as well. To resolve this problem, men need to all be brought into the last stage, the Positive Stage. The final goal of Positivism according to Comte is to find a general law by which all phenomena are related. What Comte attempted via a mass of detail to demonstrate that each science was dependent on the previous science—there is no physics before astronomy, no biology before chemistry. He arranged the sciences in a hierarchal order: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and lastly, sociology. Psychology, the one science not mentioned, is according to Comte falls partly under sociology and mostly under biology. Neither his philosophy nor metaphysics is a part of the list because these apparently are not based upon facts or what is real.

Comte viewed historical philosophy as an earlier stage characterized with men in constant

doubt and dispute with one another. Here is where he differed in methodology as compared to Descartes. Descartes determined that there was one right method for conducting reason—the geometric method. Comte saw that logic was revealed in through the history of scientific inquiry. In his view, the mind can only be explained by looking back into the past in order to see how it has evolved through the sciences. The difference is that the mind cannot be explained in an a priori method.

It should be noted that Comte rejected materialism on the basis that it is impossible to reduce the phenomena of life to chemistry because the phenomena of each science is governed by the laws of the previous science. Men are not mere products of nature as the materialists claim. Sociology, being the most unstable science, is the last in the progression. Such a law, he believed, would be the ideal result of positivistic philosophy. However, he was realistic enough to believe that the best likely result is a unity in scientific method. To date scientists still search for the one universal law which will explain all physical forces in the universe which Albert Einstein called the Unified Field Theory.

The Science of Sociology

According to Comte, Sociology is the final science, the science of society, the last one to enter the positivistic stage. He considered himself as the founder of Sociology as a positive science. It was not until the advent of sociology that the struggle between the theologico- metaphysical mentality holding to a general explanation of reality and the positivist mentality suffering from overspecialization could be resolved. Comte attempted to combine the universality of form and the reality of the content in a new single science—sociology.

According to Comte, sociology is intertwined with and includes economics, political science, ethics, social psychology, and the philosophy of history. Comte acknowledges Montesquieu and Condorcet as his predecessors in this science of man. However, it was Comte alone who brought this new science of sociology into the final stage. Social progress is dialectical. The science of sociology can be drawn from an analogy in geometry—the principles of statics, the mathematical side, and dynamics, the mechanics side. Social statics makes inquiry into the changeless aspects of society where it focuses on societal order in comparison to the social dynamics investigates society's development and observes its progress. Sociology studies both the static and dynamic formations and society needs both as well. It moved from Feudalism to the French Revolution (the 'metaphysical' transition of his day) to Positivism. Freedom of thought is as out of place in society as it is in physics. True freedom lies in rational subjection to scientific laws. One law is that society must develop in a positivistic direction.

Three States of Social Change Illustrated

In brief, in the Middle Age society shared common religious ideas (the theological stage). In the French Revolution society had common political ideal (the metaphysical stage). In Modern times, society must share same scientific method (the positivistic stage). The Catholic priesthood must be replaced by scientific-industrial elite. Religious dogma should be replaced by the dogma is based on science and proclaimed by this elite. Karl Marx denied reading Comte until 1886 but a Comptian friend (E.S. Beesley) chaired the 1864 meeting of the Marxist International Workingmen's Association.

Comte's Religious Views

Comte's religious doctrine is inherent to his philosophy and follows from his suppositions concerning the social order. To devise his religious dogma, he borrowed from the French traditionalists notions concerning Medieval Catholicism (and perhaps from the influences of his parents as well). And of course, he positioned himself as its high priest. He admired these institutions but yet divorced their doctrinal foundations. Because the goal of social progress is to reverse the animality and egoism of the past replacing it with a move towards an exalted altruism—all are to live for others—Comte proposes that this be accomplished through the positivist subjective synthesis. This places the criteria of human welfare at a higher level. Therefore, when dealing with man's beliefs, appetites, and impulses there needs to be some form of a positivist religion of humanity. It is here where Comte wants to replace the theological religious values with an anti-theistic humanism. Whereas religion was once God-centered in worship, it is now to be man centered, servicing the Great Being, humanity—an absolutivism-for-us. The triune-god of humanity was composed of three members: humanity, the earth, and apace. Notwithstanding, the Christian calendar, which illustrated the sacred holidays, was replaced with the Positivists Calendar. This illustrated thirteen months each named after a great man. Whatever great work they accomplished was to then be celebrated.

To understand Comte's religious belief, he is to be interpreted as one who maintains that as humans progress they shed their belief in God. The spread of atheism is a characteristic of man's advance into maturity. (This is a natural way of interpreting his three stages.) The more man sees scientific proofs the less man needs supernatural explanations. However, Comte did not assert dogmatically that there was no God. In fact, he did defend positivism against the charge of atheism. Rather, he adopted the notion that the idea of God became an unverified hypothesis as humans furthered their scientific explanations.

Comte disliked Protestantism because it was negative and productive of intellectual anarchy. In place of both he developed a Humanistic (non-theistic) religion in which Comte was the high priest of this Cult of Humanity. Comte's mistress (Mme. Clothilde Vaux) was the high priestess. He developed a Humanistic Religious Calendar (with Saints, such as Frederick the Great, Dante, and Shakespeare).

Some Criticisms of Comte

There is truth to the progress of science thesis. Science has eliminated many superstitions and promoted progress in understanding our world. Further, metaphysical presuppositions can hinder the progressive understanding of our world. All the modern conveniences and technology we enjoy has been made possible by the scientific method. Further, the study of sociology has increased our understanding of human actions in the social setting. For all of these, we can thank Comte and the other positivists.

However, positivism (scientism) has some serious flaws. First of all, its basic premise is errant. The scientific method is not the source of all truth about our world. There is no scientific basis for making such a claim. So, it fails on its own test.

Second, even granting Comte's thesis of the maturing of society with the advancement of stages, Comte offers no proof that his third stage is final. It is always possible that something could supersede that stage.


Third, Comte does not succeed in eliminating the possibility that a theistic God exists. And if God exists, then miracles are possible. And this would be a refutation of Comte's naturalistic presupposition.

Fourth, If God exists, then there could be another source of truth than science, namely, divine revelation. The only way Comte can eliminate this possibility, is to prove that it is impossible for God to exist. But he offers no such proof. And if God exists, then supernatural events and supernatural revelation is possible.

Fifth, Comte feeble attempt at establishing a non-theistic secular religion show the incurability of the need to worship. It reveals what Pascal saw as a God-sized vacuum in the human heart—one that it best filled by God Himself.

Sixth, Comte's anti-Protestantism view as "anti-scientific," and his pro-Catholicism view are not supported by the facts. Comte certainly was aware of the Catholic Church's treatment of Galileo and of the fact that the founders of many areas of modern science were not Catholics. Likewise, his defense of the Crusades, saying, "All great expeditions common to the Catholic nations were in fact of a defensive character" is not supported by the historical facts. Indeed, this is granted even by many Catholic scholars.

HERBERT SPENCER (A.D. 1820 - 1903)



The Life and Works of Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer was born in Derby, England in 1820 and died as an eccentric old bachelor in 1903. His father George was a liberal who rejected all forms of religious authority. His father, a schoolmaster, and his uncle, a clergyman, provided Herbert with an excellent primary and secondary private education. Herbert's greatest intellectual gift was in mathematics and the natural sciences. He lost his faith as a teenager and became a Deist.

Since the university education at that time was principally associated with the classical education model, Herbert refused to go to college. Instead, he involved himself in engineering and journalistic endeavors. He became a civil engineer for the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway until the project was completed. In part, some of his financial support came from the selling of his books (of which J. S. Mill was among a supporter). He never married and in 1855 he was struck with sickness and suffered with additional health problems. He overcame most of his difficulties with an incredible memory and an extraordinary logical mind.

He developed an all-embracing conception of evolution the progressive development of the physical world, biological organisms, the human mind, and human culture and society. During his lifetime, he achieved tremendous authority, mainly in English-speaking academia. In 1902 he was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature. He is best known for coining the concept "survival of the fittest," which he did in *Principles of Biology* (1864) after reading Darwin.

The Influences on the Life of Spencer

Spencer was influenced by Laplace's nebular hypothesis—the planets are a result of primitive gases; Charles Lyell's (1797—1875), a geologist and lawyer who influenced Charles Darwin, who wrote *Principle of Geology*. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's (1744—1829), a French naturalist, proposed that evolution occurs by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Spencer held that plants and animals share a common ancestry and the use and disuse modifies organic structures for which the modifications are inherited. Spencer used Karl Ernst von Baer's (1792—1876), Russian naturalist, embryonic development view in his development of his universal evolutionary principles. Spencer became a supporter of Charles Darwin theory of evolution. As a result, in 1860 Spencer announced his outline for a Synthetic Philosophy of evolution. He was also influenced by Comte and Mill in that man is at present passing from an evolution from militancy to industrialism. Spencer aimed to demonstrate that the principle of evolution applied in biology, psychology, sociology and morality. Darwin called him "our great philosopher." He derived his idea of cosmic evolution from watching the waves produced by a pebble thrown into a pond one Sunday morning. In 1848, he became a sub-editor of the *Economist* and became acquainted with G. H. Lewes, Huxley, Tyndall, and George

Elliot. He discussed the theory of evolution in detail with Lewes. However, compared to Mill, Spencer is little read these days. Nonetheless, he is credited as being first modern thinker to develop a philosophical framework for evolutionary thought. Indeed, Charles Darwin called him “our great Philosopher.”

His Works

In 1851, Spencer published *Social Statistics* and then in 1855 the *Philosophy of Psychology*. In France, he met Auguste Comte. In 1858, he outlined his *System of Synthetic Philosophy* which was distributed in 1860. *First Principles* (1862), *The Principles of Biology* (1864—1867), *Principles of Sociology* (1876—1896), *Data of Ethics* (1879), *The Principles of Ethics* (1892 and 1893), *Justice* (1891). Some additional works were *Education* (1861), *The Man Versus the State* (1884), *The Nature and Reality of Religion* and the posthumous *Autobiography* (1904). He was not a man to be in the lime light as seen by his many refusals to be honored.

Spencer's Philosophy

His central thought was one of comic evolution of all things. He was a deist and Positivist. He believed in the ultimate perfection of mankind. His philosophy was based on the First Law of Thermodynamics often stated as “Energy can neither be created nor destroyed.” He believed Natural laws were the statutes of a well governed universe that had been decreed by the Creator with the intention of promoting human happiness. Like Comte, he was committed to the universality of natural law to everything in creation both material and non-material.

The second objective of his Synthetic Philosophy was to show that these same laws led to inexorable progress. He sought the unification of scientific knowledge in the form of the reduction of all natural to laws to one fundamental law—the law of evolution. In this respect, he followed the model of Robert Chambers in his anonymous [*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*](#) (1844). The first clear articulation of Spencer's evolutionary perspective occurred in his essay, 'Progress: Its Law and Cause,' published in Chapman's [*Westminster Review*](#) in 1857, and which later formed the basis of the *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy* (1862). After reading Darwin's work he coined the phrase '[survival of the fittest](#)' for Darwin's view and incorporated it into his own system, but the primary mechanism of species transformation that he recognized was [Lamarckian](#) (acquired traits can be inherited). The end point of the evolutionary process would be the creation of “the perfect man in the perfect society” with human beings becoming completely adapted to social life.

Spencer's *First Principles* conveniently outlines his general philosophy, including his metaphysics and his laws of evolution. It begins with what he calls the Unknowable: the ultimate nature of reality. He speaks of two types of knowledge. First, ordinary knowledge is based on observation and common sense. All that humans can observe are things and events however, no absolute knowledge can be gained about them. This is what he calls the relativity of human knowledge. Second, there is the scientific knowledge which is not completely united, therefore, it is the job of philosophy to organize these loose ends of the sciences into some sort of unified knowledge. It is Spencer's evolution formula that is a kind of unification which he thinks is supported by philosophy.

What science is able to explain according to Spencer is matter, motion, space, time, substance, and causation. Moreover, he thinks that their characteristics are independent of observation. When one experiences these irreducible phenomena, Spencer thinks that these are to be viewed psychologically in terms of *Force*. What this Force really is no one can know except that it

abides by the general laws of evolution. However, Spencer does concede that if an inquiry is made into the ultimate cause (or causes) of sense experience, inevitably, this leads to the hypothesis of First Cause. This leads to the idea of both an infinite and an absolute. However, nothing intelligible (to us) can be said about this First Cause leaving the notion only of a mysterious Power. It is here where philosophy stops concluding that Force is the ultimate of ultimates. (Spencer does not follow Kant in that he attributed these to forms and categories imposed by the mind through the act of sensation. However, he does seem to follow Spinoza's metaphysics of the double aspect theory.) Though science deals with what can be known, it is the duty of religion to deal with the unknowns. As time progresses forward, what is known by science continues to broaden whereas what is relegated to religion shrinks. Therefore, the metaphenomenal lies outside the grasps of science and philosophy.

In his eventual agnosticism he came to believe that the "most certain of all facts that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." He called this awareness of "the Unknowable" and he presented worship of the Unknowable as capable of being a positive faith which could substitute for conventional religion. Indeed, he thought that the Unknowable represented the ultimate stage in the evolution of religion, the final elimination of its last anthropomorphic vestiges.

Spencer's Evolution

Spencer's formula of cosmic and biological evolution is that it is a sequential integration of matter where matter passes from indefiniteness transforming into some homogeneous definite thing in a state of equilibrium. However, he assumes that this homogeneous state is en-route to some heterogeneity finality. This formula is determined deductively as a consequence of Force. It is also established through induction.

Spencer created a formulation to describe his law of evolution. It is a process of coherence and integration of matter and motion in the system. When evolution occurs in this sequential form, elements combine together that were once scattered. According to the nebular (cloud-like) hypothesis, the solar system was once a diffused nebula. Each planet was subjected to a successive stage—from a gaseous to a liquid to a solidified sphere—where planetary matter became more consolidated. Geology has revealed that the Earth, once a molten mass, cooled. The outer crust continues to grow thicker to the point where it is so rigid that it is only occasionally disturbed by earthquakes. Biology demonstrates that animal growth too integrates itself from elements previously scattered on the Earth into some other form of coherence. The heart, originally a long pulsating blood vessel, formed itself into chambers. Bile cells too located in the wall of the intestine consolidate and formed an organ. Boney frameworks create a skull and appendages form from the vertebrae center. Organic evolution (Phylogeny) also reveals that worms evolve into crustaceans (aquatic creatures) transforming into crabs and spiders. In the vertebrates, progression integrates into birds and mammals and apes and man. What follows is the relationship of similar species: hunting in packs, sentinels, and then government. In sociology, uncivilized societies become nomadic forming tribes where the weak submit to the strong. Eventually, permanent societies are formed, then counties, then ultimately into a world federation. In the societies, language of the lower kinds use only nouns and verbs where the higher kinds use inflections and other parts of speech. The higher languages, like English, inflections give way to newer words of expression. Words and phrase change over time, such as 'God be with you' converts to 'Good-bye.' Music too progresses from savage cadences to modern melody or oratorio and the implementation of instruments.

Spencer's crown jewel of his evolutionary hypothesis was his ethical system. His utilitarian

ethics is focused on what attains pleasure in the long run where too universal happiness is the ultimate goal for society where acts are adjusted to meet this end. He establishes his ethic on the theory of evolution which abandonees any previous emphasis on a supernatural authority. This religious belief system is replaced by a morality based upon a scientific foundation. Moral conduct proceeds in the scale of evolution to where evidence shows that purposeful actions are directed to the good of the individual or the species. Good acts (pleasurable), that is those that are better adapted to the ends, are more evolved whereas bad acts (un-pleasurable) represent a lesser evolved life. However, there is also the teleological effect that illustrates the struggle of one creature at the expense of another (i.e., the survival of the fittest over the weaker). His form of justice carries the premise that each man has the right to do as he please as long as it does not infringe upon another man's freedom.

Spencer is sometimes credited for the [Social Darwinist](#) model that applied the law of the survival of the fittest to society, but [Princeton University](#) Economist Tim Leonard's *Origins of the Myth of Social Darwinism* disagrees. Actually, Darwin himself (see below) applied it to society when he opposed vaccinations because they keep the weak and poor in existence rather than eliminating them (*The Descent of Man*).

An Evaluation of Spencer's Philosophy

Positive Evaluation

Spencer's *First Principles* begins with his agnostic position concerning the unknowable. However, he devotes a significant portion regarding the *Knowable*. In this treatment he shows himself to be a constructive thinker resembling more of a positivist than a skeptic. Further, Spencer was a comprehensive thinker. He saw the need for a philosophy behind his theory which made it part of a cosmic whole. Indeed, evolution was a philosophical theory before it was a science. What is more, Spencer could not avoid God, even though He was concealed behind the term "Force." It was clear that this transcendent Power was capable of achieving goals and progress that only a Cosmic Mind could do. Indeed, Spencer presented worship of the Unknowable as capable of being a positive faith which could substitute for conventional religion.

Negative Critique

First of all, Spencer, like many others, misstated the First Law of Thermodynamics to support his own naturalistic views: "Energy can neither be created nor destroyed" is not a scientific observation. Rather, it is a philosophical dogma. Actually, it means "The amount of actual energy in the universe remains constant." It says nothing about the origin of the universe or its duration. The Second Law does: "In a closed system [such as the whole universe is for the naturalist], the amount of useable energy is decreasing." Given this principle the universe must have had a beginning. And by logical inference, there must have been a Beginner (God).

Second, Spencer's agnosticism has been evaluated elsewhere (see Kant above). It is a self-defeating position which claims to know that it cannot know anything about the Ultimate.

Third, Spencer's biological evolution is critiqued along with Darwin (see Darwin below). It fails to demonstrate the grand scheme from microbe to Man.

Fourth, Spencer's cosmic evolution is a gigantic category fallacy. Even if evolution were established in the field of biology, this would not justify applying it to everything in the cosmos including biology, psychology, sociology and morality.

Fifth, the scientific method as such cannot deal with ethics. The distinction between the 'imperfect' and 'perfect' in the Spencer evolutionary morality opens the door for moral relativism.

Absolute ethics is based upon an ideal code of conduct; relative morality is based upon an adaptation of shifting ethics in an evolutionary society. To assume it can be, entails the is/ought fallacy. One cannot logically go from what *is* to what *ought* to be. In addition, Spencer takes the scientifically based utilitarian ethics model and posits that the ultimate end of life is happiness of the fittest (according to the societal standards when this perfect society is reached). In the past, societies based their ethical codes on some authority, including some divined imposed sanctions, in order to provide regulation. The trend associated with the evolutionary model is towards a utilitarian development, again fostering a relativistic morality.

Sixth, the only scientific evidence is for micro-evolution (minor changes within basic types). To apply this to macro-evolution involves a leap that goes well beyond the evidence.

Seventh, as a positivist, Spencer wrongly assumed that the scientific method was the only source for truth. This is an unjustified elimination of both metaphysics and special revelation.


Eighth, Spencer has an unjustified optimism that one can ultimately obtain the perfection of the human race by use of the scientific method. The ugly facts stand against such optimism.

Ninth, Spencer's evolution illustrates a progress from incoherence to integration, and from homogeneity to heterogeneity. However, there is an underlying assumption that allows this evolution to occur. This evolution must contain some form of determinism that drives the order, from the indefinite to the definite, all based on some finite phenomena. There was a beginning and there will be an end both in space and time. Couple this to the principle of dissolution where things wear out and return to the pre-evolution state. Spencer's reply is that while our universe evolves others are dissolving—evolution and dissolution simply go on forever.

Despite the fact that Darwin called him "our great philosopher," currently, Spencer is not considered an authority on any subject. His evolutionary philosophy was so wide spanned, covering so much that it ended up being abstract and empty. And not to mention that evolution has little place in mathematics, logic, physics, and chemistry and little relevance in sociology and ethics. It was John Fiske (1842—1901).

American philosopher and historian, one of Spencer's famous disciples in the United States, attempted to develop his *Cosmic Philosophy* in four popular essays (*The Descent of Man*, *The Idea of God*, *Through Nature to God*, and *Life Everlasting*). Fiske's work is a modification of Spencer's general philosophy, providing a theistic interpretation of evolution. Without this divine aid from the outside, Spencer cosmic evolution was a mere castle in the sky. As we shall see with Darwin, even with it, macro-evolution falls far short of its scientific goals.

CHARLES DARWIN (A.D. 1809 - 1882)



The Life and Works of Darwin

Charles Robert Darwin was born in Shrewsbury, England, the son of a physician in 1809. He attended the universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge. Near the end of his undergraduate studies, he developed a relationship with J. T. Henslow, professor of botany at Cambridge. This relationship as well as reading the works of Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt (1769—1859), German naturalist and explorer, writer of *Kosmos* (1845) and Herschel created in him a strong desire to contribute to the scientific study of Natural Science. To facilitate this, Henslow provided for him the post of naturalist aboard the H. M. S. Beagle.

Darwin's Early Religious Training

Although christened an Anglican, Darwin was sent to a Unitarian school. He later entered the University of Cambridge in 1828 "where his father had decided that he should prepare for the ministry" (see *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*). Even at this early date he did not believe in "all the doctrines of the Church" (ibid.). Yet he was deeply impressed with William Paley's books, *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794), and *Natural Theology* (1802).

Darwin's Original Theistic Beliefs

Even as an adult, he accepted Paley's watchmaker design argument. But before 1835 he still clung to a deistic God who created the world but let it operate by "fixed natural laws." While on the Beagle (1836) voyage, he spoke of "the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backward and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity." As late as 1859, he said, "when reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist." Probably the word Deist would have been more descriptive, since Darwin gave no evidence of believing in God's continued supernatural intervention in the universe. He added that "This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the *Origin of Species*; and it is since that time that it has very gradually become weaker" (*Autobiography*, p. 92-93).

He sailed the Beagle where he observed the differences in finches. He wrote *On The Origin of Species* (1859) where he concluded: "whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed [by the Creator] into a few forms or into one...from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful

have been, and are being, evolved." The bracketed phrase was not added until the 2nd edition and repeated in almost all editions thereafter. He later regretted "having truckeled to public opinion" by adding this phrase about a "Creator" since he eventually became an agnostic.

Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* was a key turning point in modern thought because, in the minds of many, he had given the first plausible explanation of just how evolution could have occurred by applying the principle of natural selection to variations in populations. He argued that over long periods of time small changes added up to large ones and accounted for the origin of new species without the direct intervention of God. Later in *The Descent of Man* (1871) he affirmed that humans had also evolved. Charles Darwin's evidence, though categorized as circumstantial, drew such conclusions that shortly after he wrote most scientists would become convinced that all plants and animals have a common origin. The notion of the unchangeableness of species and their immediate creation would soon be rejected. This caused a revolution in the sciences, the reverberations of which are still being felt. His theory of organic evolution revolutionized science, philosophy and theology and he would be regarded as one of the greatest biologists of the nineteenth century. His teachings would reach much further than Copernicus before him, establishing for many (through his own observed circumstantial evidence) that all living things, including man, had developed from a few simple forms, even perhaps from one form.

The Evolution of Darwin's View of God

Darwin began his life as a Christian theist, being baptized in the Church of England and later, despite his rejection of Christianity, he was buried in Westminster Abbey! Darwin's life is a microcosm of the late 19th century.

Darwin's Rejection of Christianity

However, Darwin had become an evolutionist sometime between 1835 and 1837 (Mayr, x). As late as 1841, Darwin reread William Paley's *Evidences* and was yet impressed by his "good" arguments. But "By 1844, his views [on evolution] had reached considerable maturity, as shown by his manuscript 'Essay'..." (ibid.). Charles Darwin's son and biographer, Sir Francis Darwin, said that "Although Darwin had nearly all the key ideas of the Origin in mind as early as 1838, he deliberated for twenty years before committing himself publicly to evolution" (F. Darwin, 3.18). Only a decade later (1848), Darwin was fully convinced of evolution, defiantly declaring to J.D. Hooker: "I don't care what you say, my species theory is all gospel" (cited by Moore, p. 211).

Darwin's faith in the Old Testament declined first, before 1848. (Moore, 212). He said, "I had gradually come, by this time to see that the Old Testament from its manifestly false history of the world, with its Tower of Babel, the rainbow as a sign, etc., etc., and from its attribution to God the feelings of a revengeful tyrant, was no more to be trusted than the sacred books of the Hindus, or the beliefs of any barbarian" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, p. 85).

The Acceptance of Anti-supernaturalism added to his descent. Both Benedict Spinoza in 1670 and David Hume (d. 1776) almost a century later had attacked the basis of supernatural intervention in the world. Darwin noted, "By further reflection that the clearest evidence would be requisite to make any sane man believe in miracles by which Christianity is supported that the more we know of the fixed laws of nature the more incredible do miracles become, that the men of that time were ignorant and credulous to a degree almost incomprehensible by us, that the Gospels cannot be

proved to have been written simultaneously with the events, that they differ in many important details, far too important as it seemed to me to be admitted as the usual inaccuracies of eyewitnesses; by such reflections as these. . . . I gradually came to disbelieve in Christianity as a divine revelation" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 86). Yet, Darwin added, "I was very unwilling to give up my belief. . . thus disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last complete. The rate was so slow that I felt no distress, and have never since doubted even for a single second that my conclusion was correct" (Ibid., 87).

The "Damnable Doctrine" of Hell

Darwin had a strong aversion to the orthodox doctrine of Hell. He wrote, "I can indeed hardly see how anyone ought to wish Christianity to be true; for if so plain language of the text seems to show that the men who do not believe, and this would include my Father, Brother and almost all my best friends, will be everlastingly punished. And this is a damnable doctrine" (Ibid., 87).

The Death of Darwin's Daughter

Darwin's increased skepticism was culminated in the death of his beloved daughter, Anne in 1851 (Moore, 220-223). Moore notes that "Two strong emotions, anger and grief, in the *Autobiography* mark off the years from 1848 to 1851 as the period when Darwin finally renounced his faith" (Moore, 209). This, of course, was just after his view in evolution had solidified (1844-1848) and before he wrote his famous *Origins* (1859). Connected to the doctrine of eternal punishment, Darwin could see no reconciliation between a perfect child and a vengeful God (Ibid., 220).

Twice in one month (in 1856) Darwin put himself outside the pale of Christianity. Referring to himself as a "horrid wretch" (one of the condemned), in May (1856) he warned a young entomologist: "I have heard Unitarianism called a feather-bed to catch a falling Christian; and I think you are now on just such a feather bed, but I believe you will fall much lower & lower" (cited by Moore, 221). A month later, Darwin referred to himself as "the Devil's Chaplain," a satirical figure of speech of a confirmed unbeliever (Moore, 222).

Darwin's Descent to Deism

Darwin gradually discarded Theism for Deism, leaving the single act of divine intervention for the creation of the first form or forms of life. Even at the time of *Origins* (1859) where, in the second edition he spoke of "life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one. . . from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved" (emphasis added).

Paley's Design Argument Rejected.

Gradually he came to reject even the cogency of Paley's design argument. He said he was "driven" to the conclusion that "the old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection had been discovered. . . There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws" (*Autobiography*, 87). The only design involved was that a Creator set up these fixed natural laws. Darwin wrote: "There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings

and in the action of natural science than in the source which the wind blows. . . . I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance" (F. Darwin. 1.279; 2. 105).

Darwin even ventured so far as natural selection as "my deity." For to believe in miraculous creations or in the "continued intervention of creative power," said Darwin, "is to make 'my deity' 'Natural Selection' superfluous' and to hold *the* Deity if such there be accountable for phenomena which are rightly attribute onto to his magnificent laws" (cited by Moore, 322). Hereby Darwin not only stated his Deism but signaled his growing agnosticism by the phrase "if such there be."

Darwin seemed in the later stages of his Deism to flirt with a Finite God that John Stuart Mill (see above) had embraced. As early as 1871 in the *Descent* Darwin denied a widely accepted basis for belief in an infinitely powerful God, he wrote: "Belief in God Religion . . . There is no evidence that man was originally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence of an Omnipotent God" (Darwin, *Descent*, 302).

By 1879, Darwin was an agnostic, writing: "I think that generally (and more and more as I grow older), but not always, that an Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind" (cited by Moore, 204). Eventually, he wrote: "The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 84).

Darwin denies ever being an atheist, though Karl Marx, who gave Darwin a gold embossed copy of *Das Capital*, affirmed that agnosticism is nothing but a "shamefaced materialism." Darwin claimed that "In my most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in denying the existence of God...." (cited by Moore, 204). Likewise, most reputable scholars reject the stories of Darwin's death-bed conversion as apocryphal. Indeed, as late as 1879, many years after the *Descent* (1871), Darwin declared, "It seems to me absurd to doubt that a man may be an ardent Theist and an evolutionist" (Letter 7 May, 1879), though Darwin himself was content to remain an agnostic.

An Evaluation of Darwin's Views

Darwin himself offers some of the best evaluation of his views. The following admissions by Darwin are revealing:

Both Sides of the Issue should be Considered.

In the "Introduction" to *Origin* Darwin stated: "For I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to conclusions directly opposite to those at which I have arrived." He adds, "A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing the facts and arguments on both sides of each question; and this is here impossible." This seems to support a two-model theory which many creationists suggest for public schools but was rejected by the Supreme Court (*Edwards* June 19, 1987), even though it was what evolutionists pled for in the 1925 Scopes Trial.

Recognition of the Importance of "Missing Links"

Darwin was well aware of the fact that the actual evidence for (or against) evolution was in the fossil record and that there were gaping holes in it. He wrote: "Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic change, and this is perhaps the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory [of evolution]" (Darwin, *Origin*, 152, emphasis added). In point of fact, Darwin confessed that we do not find "an infinite number of those fine transitional forms

which, on our theory, have connected all the past and present species of the same group into one long and branching chain of life" (Darwin, *Origin*, 161).

Leaps are Evidence of Creation.

In view of the great jumps and leaps in the fossil record, Darwin's own statements are self-incriminating. He said, "he who believes that some ancient form was transformed suddenly . . . enter[s] into the realms of miracles, and leave[s] those of science" (cited by Denton, 59). Even as a student, Darwin, commenting on *Sumner's Evidences of Christianity*, said that "when one sees a religion sets up, that has no existing prototype . . . it gives great probability to its divine origin." As Howard Gruber put it, "Nature makes no jumps, but God does. Therefore, if we want to know whether something that interests us is of natural or supernatural [origin], we must ask: Did it arise gradually out of that which came before, or suddenly without any evident natural cause?" (cited by Denton, 59). But clearly by Darwin's own premises, then, macroevolution does not follow, for he admits that there are great jumps in the fossil record, which are a sign of creation, not evolution.

Darwin's False Analogy

Much of the persuasiveness of Darwin's view came from the apparently plausible argument that if artificial selection can make significant small changes in a short time, then surely natural selection can make large changes in a long period of time. But as E.S. Russell noted, "the *action of man in selective breeding is not analogous to the action of "natural selection"*, but *almost its direct opposite*. . . ." For "Man has an aim or an end in view; "natural selection" can have none. Man picks out the individuals he wishes to cross, choosing them by the characteristics he seeks to perpetuate or enhance." Rather, "He protects them and their issue by all means in his power, guarding them thus from the operation of natural selection, which would speedily eliminate many freaks; he continues his active and purposeful selection from generation to generation until he reaches, if possible, his goal." But "Nothing of this kind happens, or can happen, through the blind process of differential elimination and differential survival which we miscall "natural selection" (E.S. Russell, 124). Thus, a central pillar of Darwin's theory is based on a false analogy.

Darwin Admitted "Many Serious Objections" to Evolution

He even dedicated a whole chapter to what he called "a crowd of difficulties" (Darwin *Origin*, 80). For example, "Can we believe that natural selection could produce . . . an organ so wonderful as the eye" (ibid.). How could organisms that need eyes to survive live without them for thousands or millions of years while they were evolving? Indeed, most complex organs and organisms must have all of their parts functioning together at once from the beginning. Any gradual acquiring of them would be fatal to their functioning. Further, "can instincts be acquired and modified through natural selection?" (ibid.). Especially those so wonderfully and mathematically complex as in a bee. Darwin admits of the difficulties with evolution that "some of them are so serious that to this day I can hardly reflect on them without being in some degree staggered" (ibid.).

Evidence Reveals Separate, not Common Ancestor

Interestingly, Darwin himself acknowledged the misleading nature of analogy which, admittedly, his view was based on. Elaborating of his oft quoted last words of the *Origin* that God created "one" or a "few" forms of life, Darwin admits two revealing things. First, he acknowledged

some eight to ten created forms. He said, "I believe that animals are descended from at most four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number" (Darwin, *Origin*, 241). Beyond this, he admitted that one can only argue by analogy, adding: "Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide" (Ibid., emphasis added). This is a very revealing admission in view of the demonstrably false analogy used between artificial and natural selection.

Darwin's Theory was not Derived from Nature

Even some evolutionists admit that Darwin did not derive his theory from the study of nature but from a naturalistic world-view. George Grinnell wrote: "I have done a great deal of work on Darwin and can say with some assurance that Darwin also did not derive his theory from nature but rather superimposed a certain philosophical world-view on nature and then spent twenty years trying to gather facts to make it stick" (Grinnell, 44).

Concluding Thoughts: No Need for God

Although Darwin, and many Darwinists, stoutly deny that Darwin's view is in principle atheistic, the charge has been laid very seriously at his door. The Princeton scholar, Charles Hodge, in a penetrating analysis, asked and answered his own question: "What is Darwinism? It is Atheism. This does not mean that Mr. Darwin himself and all who adopt his views are atheists; but it means that his theory is atheistic, that the exclusion of design from nature is...tantamount to atheism" (Hodge, 177). Hodge's logic is challenging. Evolution excludes design, and if there is no design in nature, then there is no need for a Designer of nature. So, protests to the contrary notwithstanding, evolution is in principle an atheistic theory, since it excludes the need for an intelligent Creator.

Even many evolutionists acknowledge that Darwin's scenario of a "warm little pond" in which first life spontaneously generated excludes God entirely from the realm of biology. He wrote: "It is often said that all the conditions for the first production of a living organism are now present which could ever have been present." Thus, spontaneous generation would be possible if "we could conceive in some warm little pond with all sorts of ammonia and phosphoric salts, light, heat, electricity present that a protein was formed ready to undergo still more complex changes..." (cited by F. Darwin, 3.18).

Francis Darwin admitted that "Darwin never claimed his theory could explain the origin of life, but the implication was there. Thus, not only was God banished from the creation of species but from the entire realm of biology" (ibid.). What, then, is the need for a Creator? All one need do is posit, what many long believed, that the material universe was eternal and there appears to be no place for a First Cause, for God. There is, of course, mounting evidence against both the creation of the universe (see Robert Jastrow, *God and the Astronomers*) and the spontaneous generation (see Stephen Meyer, *Signature in the Cell*). Hence, there is need for God, Darwinism notwithstanding.

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The Life and Works of A. J. Ayer

Alfred Jules Ayer was born in St. John's Wood in London in 1910. His family contained wealthy Europeans. His mother had Dutch-Jewish roots and his father was a Swiss Calvinist financier who worked for the Rothschild's that formed the European banking and financial houses in the late eighteenth century. Alfred's primary education was at the Ascham St. Vincent's Preparatory school and at the British Eton school for boys.

After graduating in 1932, he attended the University of Vienna where he became familiar with the notion of logical positivism through the Vienna Circle. In 1933, he went to Christ's Church in Oxford as a lecturer in philosophy and later in 1935 became a research fellow at the college. As part of the army personnel of World War II, he was kept from philosophical endeavors until 1945 where he returned to university teaching as fellow and dean of Wadham College, again in Oxford. In the following year, he became professor of philosophy of mind and logic at University College in London. He returned once more to Oxford in 1958.

In 1936, Ayer's first book *Language, Truth and Logic* was published and became one of the most influential philosophical books of the century. In it, he states that he 'critically' advocates the views of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein of the modern philosophers and the views of the empiricists' Berkeley and Hume, even though he posits his own view as well. These he said had much in common with logical positivism. He states that his principle of verification requires that an empirical statement be made observable, and it is then that it can be considered meaningful. Therefore, metaphysical statements, since they neither purpose to make logical or empirical truths, must be considered meaningless. Even theological metaphysical statements too are without sense (though not necessarily considered false). Add to this, Ayer considers that a priori statements of logic and mathematics are empty as well because they lack content.

The positivists movement, represented by Ayer's book *Language, Truth, and Logic*, grew into a movement called the Vienna Circle. This group included those like F. Waismann, O. Neurath, F. Zilsel, H. Feigl, R. Carnap, V. Kraft, H. Hahn, and K. Godel. They gathered to discuss philosophic problems, founded journals, held meetings, and produced results that were wide spread and difficult to ignore.

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940) focuses on the problem of perception and the problem of language in regards to sense data. *Thinking and Meaning* (1947) is an application of Ockham's Razor as it applies to thinking, objects, words, and meaning. *Philosophical Essays* (1954) is a collection of his papers dealing with philosophical logic, the theory of knowledge, and moral philosophy. In 1956, *The Problems of Knowledge* was published dealing with the problems of a

variety of problems associated with philosophical skepticism. *The Concept of a Person* (1963) discusses the problems of the body, mind, and personal identity and their inter-relatedness.

The Philosophy of the “Early” Ayer: Logical Positivism

At the core of the verification principle is that empirical science is the only method by which one can have knowledge concerning the world. This definition eliminates metaphysical statements and some of the statements found in traditional philosophy. This principle is a direct descendent from the empiricism of Hume, Mill, and Ernst Mach. (This is different than the pragmatism of Pierce, James, and Dewey which allows the meaning of a sentence relative to particular human interests and purposes and their related behaviors. It is also different when compared to operationalism held by Bridgman which allows meanings of terms when they are associated with a set of operations that must be performed in a given instance.)

Logical positivism and analytic philosophy are not the same thing even though they may share a common ancestry and have some similarities. The positivists were influenced by Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein (see below) but yet the positivists set out in their own radical direction. It may be said that positivism is a sub-set of analytic philosophy, but the reverse cannot be claimed. Logical positivists are analysts but not all analysts are logical positivists. One commonality when comparing it to the analytics is that they too take strides to eliminate all metaphysical statements because of the accusation that it asserts nothing at all being neither true nor false.

A sentence's cognitive meaning or its meaningfulness is determined by a reference to the verifiability (or falsifiability) of the statement expressed in the sentence. Therefore, the verifiability principle cannot be a criterion to determine if a sentence is meaningful. What the positivists did was replace the Hume's psychological analysis and passion for formalized language with logical rigors, both though focusing on eliminating metaphysics. Recall that Hume stated that if any volume of metaphysics or divinity does not contain abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, or any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact, then commit it to the flames. Ayer, like Hume before him, determined that there were basically only three types of statements. Analytic statements were propositions that were true by definition, necessarily true (tautologies), or obviously true. Synthetic statements are true by some relationship to an experience. Lastly, there are those statements that are meaningless that have no inherent literal significance and are emotive at best.

Prior to Ayer, Kant rejected all metaphysics by attempting to illustrate that metaphysics does not have any knowledge associated with sensory input or content. Kant posited that the mind cannot go beyond the phenomena of the physical world into the metaphysical world. However, Ayer found that the mind has to go beyond the phenomena world into the metaphysical world because in order to posit that it cannot go there it must recognize that there is a 'there' it can go to. Hence, Kant entered into a metaphysics without realizing it. However, even though Ayer recognized that there needs to be a metaphysic based upon the requirement for empirical justification, its statements were nonetheless meaningless. To this end, metaphysics has meaning in the meaning of language.

The Verification Principle

The purpose of the verification principle is to find some rule or principle that applies to statements that cannot be proven, such as "Saturn is made from green cheese." or "God is everywhere." How can statements like these be verified? Analytic statements, such as $3 + 3 = 6$, having no empirical content itself, are easily shown to be true by formal methods and set standards. A problem occurs when philosophy adopts the verification principle. It means that there needs to be a

scientific basis for all statements which then leads to all metaphysical statements being ruled out. Statements were to have in some way an empirical content, but how was this to be accomplished.

Ayer formulated two distinctions that could be made within the verification principle. First, there was the practical verification which meant that verification was available. Second, there was the principle verification that involved the propositions were the means to verify are not available at this time but when they become available then they can be used. (For example: “There is no life on Mars.” is not principally verified at this time but in the future it may very well be verified after technology progresses to that extent.)

To coincide with the two distinctions above, Ayer created further qualifications to the verification principle. These verifications can be in varying degrees: weak or strong verification. The strong verification supply certitude that is beyond any shadow of doubt providing conclusive proof. The weak verifications are those based on experience that can be subjected to change or correction. These are more probable in their conclusions.

Further refinement was required. Ayer decided that there needed to be further qualifications to the verification principle process. First, he determined that no proposition could be conclusively proven to be false merely by experience any more than could a proposition be verified by experience alone even though the experience may seem emotively significant to the experience. Therefore, and secondly, analytic propositions can be neither verified nor falsified by and through experience alone, even though there is some relation to sense experience. Thirdly, that means that these propositions do not have to be directly verified to be meaningful. In Ayer’s 1946 revised edition of *Language, Truth, and Logic*, he found it necessary to make even further refinements. He acknowledged that the definitional propositions, even those applied to the verification principle itself, were meaningful without the aid of factuality. In addition, he concluded that some empirical statements could be conclusively verified based upon just one single sense experience. (It should be noted that especially the first qualification led to the downfall of the principle itself.)

The Application of the Verification Principle to Metaphysics and Theology

The ramification to Ayer’s verification principle was costly—all metaphysical statements are meaningless, all genuine philosophy is analytical, metaphysics is an accident of language. No meaningful statements can be made regarding God or the transcendence. This does not mean however that atheism and agnosticism are true—they too comprise statements regarding God. Rather, statements about God are, according to Ayer, non-cognitivism, meaning that the very question regarding God’s existence is itself meaningless.

There is another area where the application of the verification principle plays out—ethics. It is no surprise that Ayer also determined that ethical statements too are neither factual nor formal. Ethical statements are emotive. These statements are expressed by the speaker according to some feeling and are an attempt to persuade others to feel the same way they do regarding some ethical principle. Take the command, “You ought not to steal” means that there is a dislike for stealing and that I want you to feel the same way about it as I do. So, ethical statements are not statements *about* one’s feelings but rather they are statements *of* one’s feelings. The command (*of*) is subjective and not a factual declaration and hence are unverifiable. Statements that are *about* can be verified, such as “I am bored” is verified by a sigh that is associated with boredom.

The Philosophy of the “Later” Ayer

The philosophy of the “later” Ayer begins with the demise of the Verification Principle. Basically, it suffered death by qualification. So, we begin with an evaluation of the verification principle. In *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936) Ayer tried to eliminate metaphysics via the verifiability principle. *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940) dealt with problems of private language and other minds. In the 1946, he later revised *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1946) Ayer found it necessary to make further revisions to the verifiability principle. He reluctantly acknowledged that some definitional propositions, for example the verification principle itself, are meaningful without being either factual or purely arbitrary. Also, some empirical statements can be conclusively verified, for example a single sense experience. These qualifications, especially the first one, were to be the downfall of logical positivism. In his *Philosophical Essays* (1954), there were articles treating the problems raised by his first two books. By 1956 Ayer wrote *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956), which reflects moderate anti-skeptical realism. He accepts that some statements may be true even if they cannot be justified in principle. Then he had a near-death experience in the 1980s convincing Ayer of the possibility of immortality, though he continued to reject the existence of God.

An Evaluation of the Verification Principle

It is not surprising that the verification principle is diametrically opposed and disastrous to evangelical Christianity because no statement about the existence or nature of God could be meaningful. What follows from this is that the Bible would not contain any reasonable propositional statements about God therefore making the Word of God invalid. In addition, there would be no basis for any ethical prescriptions, let alone any absolute moral principles. Second, statements regarding God's existence do not need to be reduced to empirical statements or tautologies (statements that are necessarily true). There is no need for a trans-empirical (supernatural) being to be subjected to empirical verification. Metaphysical statements are meaningful within the metaphysical context when abiding by metaphysical criteria.

The death blow to Ayer's verification principle came from its own self-destruction. The principle itself is not empirically verifiable itself! According to its own criteria of verifiability, where all meaningful statements must either be true by definition or empirically tested, it cannot stand on its own structure. Therefore, the verifiability principle is itself meaningless.

Throughout the course of history the verification principle has loosened its 'qualification' standard by broadening its requirements and allowing for some metaphysical and theological statements. In the past, logical positivism attempted to *legislate* someone's statement by what they meant instead of *listening* to what they meant. In the previous example, "You ought not to steal" does not mean that one does not like the action but rather means "You should not/ought not steal." It is fallacious to reduce the *ought* to *is*, the *prescriptive* to the *descriptive*. It is also fallacious to reduce "You ought" to "I feel it is wrong."

Ayer's Qualified Realism

The "later" Ayer's view is reflected in his book, *The Problem of Knowledge* (1963) which deals with the problems of a variety of problems associated with philosophical skepticism. He developed a modified form of Realism. About this time there was a turning point in the Logical Positivism movement in general. Herbert Feigl wrote a definitive article titled "Logical Positivism after 35 Years" (*Philosophy Today*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1964) which narrates the movement's demise.

Its Major Doctrine and Thrust

One of the most significant movement in ethics was at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Great Britain was led by the Utilitarians, or also known as the Philosophical Radicals. These radicals were the offspring of the Enlightenment, empiricists and enthusiastic supporters in the practicability of the social progress maneuvered by scientific knowledge. They promoted the notion that every man was the best judge of his own interests; man should be free to act as he pleases as long as others are not provoked by his efforts. Following ancient Hedonism, they held that the ultimate good was pleasure. Hence maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain for the greatest number of people in the long run was their ethical goal.

There are various forms of utilitarianism: those that focus on *rules* and those that focus on *actions* (John Stuart Mill). Egoistic utilitarianism focus on the good of the individual (G. E. Moore); others stress the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Hedonistic utilitarianism stress on pleasure (Jeremy Bentham), and normative utilitarianism positing normative ethics about how one ought to think and live appropriately.

The utilitarian doctrine states that happiness is the desirable end; all other things are a means to an end. Therefore, whatever afforded this universal good must have utility; hence, the name of this school became known as Utilitarian. The school promoted the universal good of the masses. Hume's ethic was a transition between the moral sense theories and the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (see below). It was Jeremy Bentham who furthered Hume's ideal and devoted his life to the Utilitarian movement. Bentham was a universalistic hedonistic act utilitarian.

The precursor to Bentham's utilitarianism was that of the teachings of Aristippus of Cyrene and Epicurus positing emphasis on egoism. There was also Abraham Tucker (1705—1774, English philosopher). There was also the influence of French philosopher Claude Adreïn Helvetius (1715—1771) and William Godwin (1756—1836) the political philosopher. Normative utilitarianism, however, is attributed to Henry Sidgwick (1838—1900). Lastly, G. E. Moore (1873—1958), thought that the principles of ethics could be objects of intellectual intuition.

Some utilitarians, such as John Stuart Mill, offer a subjective theory for the good, such as pleasure or happiness, as being the only intrinsic and valuable good in and of itself. However, those like G. E. Moore, see an objective theory of the good, such as knowledge and friendship, whether or not it makes a man happy or not. In Moore's theory, once one knew what goodness was then one could go on to address what sort of things actually possessed this property of good. Against the hedonistic Utilitarianism of Mill, Moore's seemed to stress a broader pluralistic alternative.

Common to the modern utilitarian movement was the utilitarian calculus: the right thing to do is what will bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people in the long run. Since this was not always possible to calculate, the "fund of experience" based on past trial and error experience was utilized for determining what is generally the right thing to do.



History and Works of Moore

George Edward Moore was born into an affluent family in Upper Norwood, a suburb of London. His father came from a line of medical practitioners and his mother from Quaker merchants and philanthropists. At the age of eight, young George went to the Dulwich College boarding school. Around the age of twelve, he was converted to the ideals of ultra-evangelism which compelled him to preach the gospel and distribute religious tracts. However, he found this activity rather detestable which may have contributed to his later adoption of agnosticism—no evidence for the support for the existence of God and no evidence for the denial of God's existence.

In 1922, George started attending Trinity College as a classics student. After completing most of the academics, he changed his concentration to philosophy. He was elected a fellow after his completion of his dissertation focusing on Kant's ethic. Between 1898 and 1904, George carried on many conversations with Bertrand Russell. His fellowship terminated in 1904. He was able to continue his philosophical studies because of an inheritance,. During World War II, he came to America and lectured. He regularly lectured at Cambridge from 1911 to 1925. He topics initially focused on philosophical psychology and then to metaphysics. In 1939, when he was able to officially retire, he continued his writing until his death in 1958 at the age of eighty-five.

Within the ten-year period at Dulwich, he acquired a thorough mastery of the classics. He tended to take the world as it was presented by science. He was not troubled by the problems that annoyed Soren Kierkegaard before him. However, what did cause him pause was what philosophers had claimed about the world and the sciences—time is unreal and scientific knowledge is not actually (true) knowledge. In 1903, he published his work titled *Principia Ethica* and in 1922 he published *Philosophical Studies*. His final works published were *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Papers* in 1953 and posthumously the *Commonplace Book* published in 1959.

Moore was a unique thinker, although he and Bertrand Russell (see below) defended the traditional correspondence theory of truth. Moore was independent and direct in his presentations and strongly pursued exact precision so as not be misunderstood. His unquenchable search for truth and clarity is what marked his different from his peers. He was not a flamboyant speaker, but his non-systematic approach to philosophy was original. His most noteworthy works pertaining to metaphysics can be divided into two categories. According to Bertrand Russell, it was G. E. Moore who guided the rebellion against Idealism which was expressed in his *Principia Ethica* where he writes an essay titled "The Refutation of Idealism" (1902). In this, he presented the theory that there is a relation between sense data and material things. In his early works, he criticized the arguments made for idealism. He attempted to show that these proponents spun a web of confusion by making incomplete thoughts and unjustified claims. He specifically targets Berkeley's principle of *esse is percipi*. Later, his second metaphysical aim was to address what he labeled the "Common Sense

View of the World.”

Moore's philosophy follows a prioritized method. First, it seeks to provide a metaphysical inventory of the universe which includes those things which are not entirely and commonly known. Second, there is emphasis placed on classifying the ways in which one can know things. Finally, he investigates the area of ethics. According to Moore, the primary function of philosophy was to analyze common sense propositions which in turn only elaborates upon what is common sensibly known.

Moore's Metaphysics

Moore held that metaphysics deals with non-natural objects or qualities. These objects were components of the universe and were not to be considered as temporal events. He also considered metaphysics as those inquiries that were concerned with the over-all establishment of the universe and which fall in two categories. There are those things which are *found* in the universe and there are those things that simply *are* but are not specifically found as such. (Moore also includes the category of those 'things' that do not exist and are simply imaginary, such as chimeras.) Things that *are* possess the property of being and can be named. Moore qualifies being in that it is something that has endured through segments time and is an object of sense perception. Within the category of being, he states that there are three kinds of objects. First, there are the five types of particulars, such as material things, sense data, acts of consciousness, volumes of space, intervals of time). Second, there is truth or facts made up of mathematical equations and references that are associated with indicative statements. Lastly, there are universals which comprise of relations, relational properties, and those of neither the first nor the second.

His "Common Sense" Philosophy

One of the problems that surfaces in philosophical inquiry is the question as to what it is that one really perceives from material objects and are these objects real. Can the world outside of ourselves be believed? Even philosophers believed material objects were outside of themselves, but when they began to philosophize about them, it was difficult to find out what they *really* believed as true. Moore gave himself the task to find out what philosophers meant by what they said and was there supporting reasons for their belief. Moore held to the idea that all men shared some reservoir of knowledge of things that were simply known to be true. Any doubt of these truths was simply wayward thinking. Moore was one philosopher who seriously considered those common-sense beliefs that are of certainty.

Moore employs in his "Defense of Common Sense" (1925) a strategy focusing on what he calls 'truisms' and thus divides them into three categories. First, is the commonplace proposition dealing with his existence (as well as the existence any human being). He exists, has a body, and resides and lives on earth (which itself has existed for many years) like many other human beings. Second, he experiences life as an existing being and observes many things. Other human beings experience life as well. This includes facts about the present, recollections of thing in the past, feelings, beliefs, and expectations. Third, and related to the first two, are propositions that describe the truth corresponding to the first two categories. But why did Moore gone to such lengths to promote was seems to be painfully obvious? According to Moore, the cause of all philosophical problems is the confusion associated with their terminology. The solution to this is the clarification of terms. The disagreements between philosophers stems from either clouded conscious thinking or from terminology that is unclear. Moore insists that many philosophers in the past have made assertions that

have conflicted or been contrary to the notion of common sense. This include philosophers such as F. H. Bradley (1846—1924) and J. E. McTaggart (1866-1925) who's metaphysical views were at odds with the fundamental beliefs of common sense and the views of modern science. They held, as well as a few others, that material objects and space and time were unreal. What Moore was attempting to do was constrain these philosophers metaphysical views when they clearly created conflicts against what is commonly and sensibly known as certainly true to everyone. In this, Moore provided indication that metaphysicians had strayed too far. He dogmatically states that he does not care how good of a metaphysical argument can be made, if it conflicts with common sense then it should be rejected. For any conclusion contrary to common sense certainly false.

Moore did not attempt to prove his common sense theory. He respectfully climaxes his presentation on common sense by raising his right hand and stating, "This is my right hand." This proposition he considered to be wholly true, was in no way able to be doubted, and perfectly clear. Shortly thereafter, he gestures with his left hand and states, "This is my left hand." His point? There *are* things outside of us, including our minds, that we can say with common sense certainty that they exist. This illustrates Moore's notion that there are those things that are straightforwardly and non-problematically known to all men as certain thus rejecting anything that would run counter to his theory. However, if no resolution could be made, then Moore would default to what he termed as weighted certainties—one proposition can greater certainty that another proposition. Moore argued that beliefs men were generally inclined to adhere to were supported by the principle of weighted certainties.

Moore respected his opposers. He not claim that these other philosophers were stupid or ridiculous in their conclusions, but rather would state that they simply had lost their way down the metaphysical path and their position taken regarding real life which therefore led them to draw inaccurate conclusion.

The Idea of Good

One of Moore's targets was John Stuart Mill who posited a theory of good and a theory of right. The utilitarian approach places 'the right' as a precursor to 'the good,' simply put, right actions are those that produce good consequences. Mill takes a subjective approach to the theory of good, such as pleasure and happiness. However, Moore, responding to Mill's apparent meta-ethical theory, takes a more objective perspective, such as the example of friendship or knowledge as having intrinsic good in and of itself, whether or not the consequence of these brings happiness or pleasure. Moore's foundational consideration was to accurately understand first what sort of things are considered good or understand what the nature of good is. He was looking for the nature of the word or object, the phenomenology rather than the linguistical analysis. To know what the good *is* then leads to what is right. However, Moore was careful not create a fallacy in his attempt to understand the nature of good. He did not want to define the nature of good in terms of some other property. Moore's conclusion was that the property of goodness is a simple, un-definable, non-natural object of thought. In this sense, there is some other property that good things possess (like red is a property known (seen) by its acquaintance with some other thing, like a ball). Moore believed that one can recognize what things possess the quality of being good but we cannot define the quality of good itself. Following this through to its end, the property of goodness is something that is purely intellectual (as compared to perceptual like red). Since good is not definable and is not perceivable, then it must have a non-natural property. What Moore needs to do is connect the link between this notion of good and a system of ethics. The task of moral philosophy was to determine those things

which possess the quality of goodness and what things possess it in higher degrees compared to others.

Knowing Truth and Falsity

According to Moore, the substance of truth and falsity are found in what he calls propositions. When something is heard or read in a proposition, the act of apprehending is the same in all cases. However, it is the *what* in the apprehension that is different in various propositions bearing the truth or falsity of the statement. Moore stressed that these propositions can either be sound or conclusive. The conclusive propositions contain premises that are known to be true whereas a sound proposition may contain premises that may or may not be true as such. The truth of a proposition is identified in the proposition itself where it shows the relationship between the inherent concepts. However, what determines the kind of relationship making it true (or false) cannot be defined. It is the relationship of the propositions to something else outside of itself. True propositions must then be identical with the reality which it corresponds to—a thing is what it is.

Moore set a dividing line between a true and a false belief. When a belief is true, that which is believed is a fact; when a belief is false, that which is believed is not a fact. Hence, the relationship between belief and fact is one of correspondence where belief consists in a relationship between a person and a fact.

Moore's System of Ethics

The science of ethics attempts to establish what the pre-eminent goods are that can be obtained by men. It is impossible to determine the quality of good analytically because that method can only determine degrees and amounts through some perception. Since the good does not rest on some external evidence, its perception is “intuitional.” Likewise, attempting to determine the ‘whole good’ of something is difficult because good is not a sum of ‘good parts.’ Add to this the further difficulty that not all people “intuit” the same content in the good or the right. And besides this, criticism can be brought against “intuition” because of a claim towards vagueness and lack of clarity.

Moore's advice was that one should simply follow the rules of common sense: respect human life and property, keep promises, be industrious and temperate. The common sense approach has shown itself beyond all reasonable doubt to provide the personal and social stability required for a free pursuit of the good. This pursuit of the common sense good should define morality rather than those dictates found in conventional morality.

A Critique of Moore's Views

There are some difficulties associated with intuition when relating it to the science of ethics. First of all, not every person “intuits” the same meaning of the term right. Often intuition is colored by culture and environment. If “intuition” is used as the grounds for ethical beliefs, then the *source* of the belief and the *substantiation* of the ethical belief can be confused. One could derive a belief from any number of sources he chooses but it is another question altogether why one holds to one belief over another. In that case, justification would not be intuition, but rather some self-evident act of the principle that was intuited.

Further, to say that one knows by “intuition” what is the ethical right thing to do does nothing to let the person know epistemologically what that is and how it related to the issue at hand or how that is to motivate the person to do the good and right. For Moore and other intuitionist, morality was objective in the sense that these values were found independent of subjective experience.

By his own confession, Moore agreed that he did not adequately answer the philosophical questions. He did not always tie together loose ends and admitted that sometimes he held to two views that were incompatible with each other.

JEREMY BENTHAM (A.D. 1748 - 1832)



The Life and Works of Bentham

Jeremy Bentham was born in 1748 in Houndsditch, in London. Bentham was born twenty-eight years before the death of David Hume. Hume, the greater philosopher of the two, was interested in understanding morality; Bentham, the better implementer of social reform, was interested in being able to judge moral ideas. He was also influenced by French Enlightenment, especially by the writings of Helvetius who pioneered the utilitarian moral theory and its application in order to reform society.

Jeremy was a precocious child. At the age of twelve, he entered the Queen's College, Oxford, and graduated in 1763 (around the age of fifteen). Just after graduation and following his father's profession by entering the Lincoln's Inn to study law. His major occupation was law and he was called to the bar in 1767 but he never practiced law. Instead, he spent his time dedicated to creating a system of jurisprudence and reform of the civil and penal law.

His venture was motivated by his witness and subsequent dissatisfaction with the courts while a student. His primary interests were in the area of legal reform. His most important books were titled *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford, 1789) and *The Book of Fallacies* (London, 1824).

Bentham's influence was felt in England and attracted men like James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill (see below). After his death, the Bentham movement had become strong and included the publication called the *Westminster Review* which he started in 1824. The movement succeeded in starting a university, the University College, London, where John Austin, one of Bentham's most notable disciples, became the first professor of jurisprudence.

Bentham is chiefly remembered for his radical philosophy of utilitarianism. His idea of utility was primarily set as a guide for legislators. However, Bentham is most noted for his "hedonistic calculus" which contributed to his utilitarian theory. He is chiefly concerned with the greater happiness of the common human community.

The Concept of Utility

This idea of social utility occurred to him as he was reading Joseph Priestley's *Essay on Government* (see Joseph Priestly above). He developed the concept of Utility in a broader and more thorough manner than did Hume before him creating a greater practicality to the movement. This practicality was based on the premise, according to Bentham, that man is naturally selfish in that he tends towards bringing the most pleasure and shunning pain. The notion of man by nature seeking after the greatest pleasure (and avoiding pain) had been propounded in the ancient world by Epicurus and was defended in eighteenth century by Helvetius in France and Hartley and Tucker in England. He did

this through four sanctions. In brief, physical sanctions are related to industry and moderation that effect his environment and health. Political sanctions, especially the fear of punishment, restrain him for activities that are contrary to societal interests. Moral and social sanctions point him in the direction of behaviors conducive to societal approvals. Religious sanctions encourage good behavior or else there runs the risk of divine punishment. The ultimate goal is universal happiness (pleasure). Legislation through the four sanctions should ultimately induce men to act with kindness and goodness. The methodology to gauge the worth of the actions associated with the sanctions was through what he called the “hedonistic calculus.”

The “hedonic calculus” is described as follows. When there are two alternative courses of action, one must consider the consequences of each in terms of pleasure and pain of all the people who might be affected by each course of action. The overriding moral principle is that one should tend towards the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The problem with this was an indisputable fact of human nature that people do not seek after their *own* pleasure. So, why bother considering the pleasure (or pain) of someone else? Bentham concluded that men have a ‘psychological’ desire to seek after their own gratification, thus, when alternatives are present, they choose the one which brings about the most pleasure. However, unlike John Stewart Mill (see below) who held to a *qualitative* utilitarianism, Bentham understood the hedonistic calculus in a *quantitative* sense. That is, the right action is the one that is anticipated to bring the greatest quantity of please and the least amount of pain.

JAMES MILL (A.D. 1773 - 1836)



The Life of James Mill: A Brief Overview

James Mill was Bentham's leading disciple. James entered the University of Edinburgh in 1790 and was licensed to preach in 1798. However, he never received a call from the Presbyterian Church. In 1802, he went to England in hopes of earning a living by writing and doing editorial work. After marrying in 1805, he began his work on his history of British India, appearing in three volumes. In 1819, he began working for the East India Company which eventually provided him a significant salary.

James Mill's primary contribution to Utilitarianism was in the field of psychology where he attempted to explain all mental phenomena by association thus reducing all forms of association to that of adjacency. His *Analysis of the Human Mind* was considered by the Utilitarian movement to provide scientific justification to Helvetius teaching that social education has unlimited possibilities. If the right association of ideas is developed in everyone, then societal progress is assured. In 1808, James Mill met Jeremy Bentham. It was at this time James became an agnostic. After completing several written works, he died on June 23rd, 1836. According to his son (see John Stuart Mill below), James upheld an Epicurean ethic (Bentham and hedonism) and personally combined Stoic qualities and a Cynic's disregard for pleasure. He tried to show how an altruistic conduct of the pleasure-seeking person is possible in that the idea of pleasure and pain of another is really the idea associated with his own.

JOHN STUART MILL (A.D. 1806 - 1873)



The Life of Mill

John Stuart Mill was born in London the year Immanuel Kant died. His father, James Mill, was a British empiricist and utilitarian thinker. He began his studies of Latin at age eight and by the age of twelve, he was introduced to Aristotelian and Hobbesian logic. He was a child prodigy who was homeschooled in Greek at age three and read Aesop's Fables, Herodotus, Plato, and Euclid by the age of eight.

Under the advice of Jeremy Bentham, Mill's father planned his education and taught him personally. Young John had to do more than memorize his lessons; he had to teach them to his younger siblings as well. His recreation was walks with his father and further selected readings history, fiction, and poetry. As stated in his autobiography, he does not recall any religious instruction when he was a youth but there is evidence from other sources that his father took him to church and that he read the Bible.

After a brief stay in France (1820—1821) with Samuel Bentham, brother of the famed Jeremy Bentham, John partook in some readings about Roman law with John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, who was the founder of utilitarianism. For many years, John Mill held in high esteem the principles of utility, even considering it as a religious creed. John's father left out any religious training thus directing him towards agnosticism. In 1826, John underwent an intellectual and moral crisis. Even if his father's teaching was right it still left him in a state of unhappiness. This changed his focus from becoming just a reasoning machine to cultivating feelings and understanding beauty. He also read Locke, Helvetius, Hartley, Condillac, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown.

In 1823, after giving up his study of law, John worked for the East India Company under his Father. Retiring in 1858, his pension allowed him to study and be involved in political activities. It was during this time that he read the works of Saint Simon around 1829 to 1830 and Auguste Comte.

John married the widow Harriet Taylor in 1851. She was a woman of high moral and intellectual excellence and influenced him in the area of women's suffrage and social reform. After her death in 1858, he later served as a member of Parliament from 1865 through 1868. After his death in 1873, his daughter-in-law published his *Three Essays on Religion* which revealed his mind on a subject he was reluctant to discuss.

Mill became a personal friend of Auguste Comte and was godfather for Bertrand Russell. He carried on the legacy Kant and Comte by developing the scientific method. Mill was a strong proponent of utilitarianism which he derived from Jeremy Bentham who was a friend of the family. He married Harriet Taylor after a twenty-one year intimate friendship. He was a liberal member of Parliament who spoke out for women's rights. He was a pioneer in modern inductive scientific

thinking.

The Writing of Mill

His philosophical works include *Three Essays on Religion: Nature, Utility of Religion, and Theism [TE]*; *Utilitarianism[U]* (1863); *System of Logic [SL]* (1843). In 1844, he wrote *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy* and completed the *Principles of Political Economy* in 1848. He also wrote *Considerations on Representative Government* in 1861. He also wrote *On Liberty* (1859) and other political treatises.

His Views on Logic

Mill was a pioneer in modern positivism, also known as scientism. Mill's philosophy can best be viewed from his work titled *A System of Logic*. Mill's major purpose was moral and political reform. He believed that this could only be accomplished if it is based upon the logical method found in the natural sciences. Scientific knowledge, only acquired through a correct investigative inductive methodology, had the capability of social and political reform. Mill's use of logic was geared more towards generalizing and synthesizing the boundaries for evaluating evidence by using known truths and correlating it inductively to the unknowns. Logic is a philosophy of evidence and is used as a method of reasoning for discovering truth.

Mill, who was an empiricist, carried on the traditions of Bacon, Locke, and Hume and takes the principles of empirical logic further than it had been taken previously. He was inclined towards positivism; the only ultimate source of knowledge is sensation via phenomena. All reasoning must progress from one fact to the next and is ultimately inductive. He does not believe that any truths are a priori but rather knowledge comprises ultimately of inductions coming from experience. This is a doctrine of induction confined to explanations of a subjective state of belief in the uniformity of nature suited to Humean epistemology. He elaborated the canons of inductive logic stated earlier by Francis Bacon.

Mill's Five Basic Principles

FIRST CANON. If two or more simple instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one thing in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon. This is sometimes known as the 'method of agreement.'

SECOND CANON. If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common except, and that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect or the cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon. This is sometimes known as the 'method of difference.'

THIRD CANON. If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

FOURTH CANON. Deduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

To these four canons may be added a fifth, the 'method of concomitant variations.' Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.

His View of God

Mill neither accepted positive religious belief nor agnosticism and was not an atheist. His attitude towards God is stated in his *Three Essays on Religion* (see below). Mill believed in a Finite God. He rejected Paley's traditional teleological argument because he thought it was based on the weak analogy that similarity in effect implies similarity in cause (which he believed is weak because the dissimilarities are great). He claimed watches imply watchmakers only because, by previous experiences, we know that watches are made by watchmakers, not by anything intrinsic in the watch. Likewise, footprints imply humans and dung implies animals only because previous experience informs us that this is so.

Mill offered what he considered to be a stronger argument built on his inductive "method of agreement." He reasoned that: 1) There is an amazing concurrence of many diverse elements in a human eye; 2) It is not probable that random selection brought these elements together; 3) The method of agreement argues for a common cause of the eye; 4) The cause was a final (purposing) cause, not an efficient (producing) cause; 5) But Mill admitted that evolution, if true, diminishes the strength of even this stronger form of the teleological argument.

Mill believed that much of what appears to be design is accounted for in evolution by the survival of the fittest (TE, 177-84). His reasoning, however, led him only to posit a Finite God: "A Being of great but limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjecture; of great, and perhaps unlimited intelligence, but perhaps, also, more narrowly limited than his power: who desires, and pays some regard to, the happiness of his creatures, but who seems to have other motives of action which he cares more for, and who can hardly be supposed to have created the universe for that purpose alone" (TE, 194).

We can infer from nature that God has benevolent feelings toward His creatures, "But to jump from this to the inference that his sole or chief purposes are those of benevolence, and that the single end and aim of Creation was the happiness of his creatures, is not only not justified by any evidence but is a conclusion in opposition to such evidence as we have" (TE, 192). About the only legitimate inference we can draw from nature about God "is that he does not wish his work to perish as soon as created" (Ibid., 190).

So God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, but is an intelligence superior to humans. In fact, the very fact the Creator used contrivance—the adaptation of means to ends—indicates His limits. (TE, 77). There could be other finite creators, but Mill favored there being only one since there seem to be universal natural laws that make science possible (Ibid., 133). The limitations of God are due either to the nature of the materials with which he is working or internally to his own nature (Ibid., 186).

Mill's View of Religion

His *Three Essays on Religion* was published after his death. The first essay titled "Nature" posits the notion that nature as it currently exists apart from human intervention could not have been created by a, all-powerful and all-good God who did such providing a model for man to imitate His conduct. Nature seems to exhibit things killing itself, in the least, causing each thing to suffer—starving, freezing, burning—at the hands of others. There is cruelty beyond belief.

His essay on the "Utility of Religion" shows that religion did play a part in the past where the

principles of morality were learned. However, Mill thought that there was a very real evil in ascribing a supernatural origin to these dictums of morality, especially those found in the Gospels. Since those details can no longer be visited, *a belief in the supernatural is no longer necessary* for man to know the difference between right and wrong, let alone providing motivation for its adherences. However, there does seem to be some beckoning within human nature for some type of religion. Comte's Religion of Humanity has two advantages in answering this call? It does have two advantages: 1) it appeals to a neutral motivation as compared to some extended happiness in another world, and 2) it leaves behind the idea of an all powerful and good God creating a world of imperfection and evil.) Yet, the supernatural religions can provide some sort of hope of a life-after-death, though Mill tries to minimize this motivation.

The last essay on "Theism" dismisses the rational arguments posed by Descartes and Kant for the existence of God. Mill is impressed by the design found in nature—though it does not justify a hypothesis for God's existence—but does not side with the Darwinian theory of chance selection. Mill agrees with Hume and Kant that the only persuasive argument for God's existence is the argument from design. Against Paley's watchmaker argument Mill sees the design and function of the eye as an illustration of an intelligent and willful maker. Mill's primary reason against God's existence is the presence of evil and imperfection in the world.

Mill's View of Creation

Like Plato, Mill held that the universe was not created out of nothing (TE, 243). So matter and energy are eternal and "out of these materials [*ex materia*] he had to construct a world in which his designs should be carried into effect through given properties of Matter and Force, working together and fitting into one another" (Ibid., 178).

His View of Nature and Miracles

Since all things take place in a regular and uniform way we can speak of the "Laws of Nature" (TE, 6), such as Newton's law of gravitation. Thus, the operations of nature are uniform, "the progress of science mainly consists in ascertaining those conditions" (Ibid., 6). Although God is the author of nature's laws and could by His will intervene, there is no evidence that He does. Mill agrees that David Hume's argument against miracles leaves the impression "that the testimony of experience against miracles is undeviating and indubitable" (Ibid., 221). He believed that "A new physical discovery even if it consists in the defeating of a well established law of nature, is but the discovery of another law previously unknown" (TE, 221).

So whatever new phenomenon is discovered "is found still to depend on law; it is always exactly reproduced when the same circumstances are repeated" (Ibid., 222). But a miracle claims to supersede all natural laws, not just one natural law by another. Why a natural explanation for all--the absence of all experience of a supernatural cause and the very frequent experience of natural causes (Ibid., 229, 230). So "there is, in short, nothing to exclude the supposition that every alleged miracle was due to natural causes" (Ibid., 231). So there is "a vast preponderance of probability against a miracle...." Further, "that miracles have no claim whatever to the character of historical facts and are wholly invalid as evidences of any revelation" (Ibid., 239).

His View of Evil

One of the most convincing evidences of God's finiteness to Mill was the presence of evil in

the world. For "If the maker of the world can [do] all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion" (TE, 37). "In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow-creatures." (Ibid., 29, 30).

His View of Ethics

Mill carried on the utilitarian tradition in ethics started by Jeremy Bentham. They believe that our ethical duty is to do the greatest good for the greatest number of persons in the long run. However, Mill transformed Bentham's quantitative utilitarianism (of the greatest quantify of pleasure over pain) to a qualitative utilitarianism wherein we should seek the greatest quality of pleasure over pain. Thus, he believed it was better to be an unhappy man (with the possibility of higher intellectual pleasures) than a happy pig.

In view of nature's gross evil, Mill held that "the doctrine that man ought to follow nature, or in other words, ought to make the spontaneous course of things the model of his voluntary actions, is equally irrational and immoral" (TE, 64). Our duty, then, is not to imitate nature but to strive to amend it. And even though some aspects of nature are good, "It has never been settled by any accredited doctrine, what particular departments of the order of nature shall be reputed to be designed for our moral instruction and guidance" (TE, 42). Thus "it is impossible to decide that certain of the Creator's works are more truly expressions of his character than the rest" (Ibid., 43).

Since Mill rejected the supernatural, he could not turn to revelation as a source of ethics. In fact, he believed "there is a very real evil consequence on ascribing a supernatural origin to the received maxims of morality" (Ibid., 99). It has the effect of consecrating imperfect rules and protecting them from all criticism. Having rejected absolutes, Mill devised the utilitarian calculus by which one is obligated to do what he believes will bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people in the long run.

Mill had great respect for Jesus and felt his moral life was exemplar (Ibid., 253, 254). However, when it came to spelling out what the Christian Golden Rule meant Mill believed that utilitarianism was the answer. There are no absolute ethical norms. Even telling the truth is not an absolute. For "that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions is acknowledged by all moralists" (ibid.). The best we can do is to build up from the fund experience general rules which can guide us in deciding on the likely course to attain the end of the greatest good. But "the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better" (ibid.).

His View of Human Destiny

For Mill man is not simply material. He has a mind or soul. In fact, "There is, therefore, in science, no evidence against the immortality of the soul" (TE, 201). However, there is no real scientific evidence for immortality either. It is based merely on hope (Ibid., 208-210). He was confident, however, is that if there is life after death, it will not be one of rewards and punishments (Ibid., 210, 211). It will simply be a continuation of the life we have on earth. To assume a radical break at death in the change of the mode of our existence is contrary to all analogies drawn from this

life. Despite the lack of evidence for immortality, life here and now is worth living. And "The gain obtained in the increased inducement to cultivate the improvement of character up to the end of life, is obvious without being specified" (Ibid., 250).

There is also ground for optimism about the future of the human race: "The conditions of human existence are highly favorable to the growth of such a feeling inasmuch as a battle is constantly going on, in which the humblest human creature is not incapable of taking some part, between the powers of good and those of evil, and in which every even the smallest help to the right side has its value in promoting the very slow and often almost insensible progress by which good is gradually gaining ground from evil, yet gaining it so visibly at considerable intervals as to promise the very distant but not uncertain final victory of Good" (Ibid., 256).

Not only did Mill express optimism about the final victory of mankind over evil, but he believed that humanistic efforts in this direction was sure to become the new religion of mankind. For "To do something during life, on even the humblest scale if nothing more is within reach, towards bringing this consummation ever so little nearer, is the most animating and invigorating thought which can inspire a human creature; and that it is destined, with or without supernatural sanctions, to be the religion of the Future I cannot entertain a doubt" (Ibid., 257). Mill flatly denied the existence of Hell, claiming it is incompatible with his idea of a good God (see below).

An Evaluation of Mill's Views

There are many positive aspects of Mill's views. First, he added considerably to Bacon's description of the scientific method of induction and experimentation. Further, he acknowledged the use of analogy in showing that it is reasonable to posit a creator of this world. Third, he also focused the need to confront the reality of evil in this world. Fourth, he left room for a future life after this one. Fifth, in the realm of ethics he showed the need to take future results into consideration in ethical decisions.

Despite the positive features of Mills thinking, his view has been criticized for many inconsistencies and fallacies. First, positing a finite god is a violation of the law of causality that demands that every finite being needs a cause. Hence, no finite being can be God. Second, his positing an imperfect God demands an Ultimate standard of perfection by which we know God is imperfect (i.e., not perfect). If so, then this Ultimate standard of perfection would be God, and Mills imperfect, finite god would be no more than a creatures. Third, rejecting an infinitely perfect God, as he does, Mill has no way to justify his charge that this world is not perfect. Fourth, a finite god gives him no grounds for Mills optimism that good will ultimately triumph over evil. Fifth, how can he know the world is getting better when he has no standard of Best by which he can measure this. Sixth, blaming God with moral imperfections because of suffering and death overlooks the fact that it is man, not God, who brought these into the world (Gen. 3; Rom. 5, 8). Seventh, it is a serious categorical mistake to assert that it wrong for God to take the life of one of his creatures. It is wrong from creatures to take an innocent life because they did not creature life. But God the Creator made it and, hence, he has the right to take it (Job 1:21; Deut. 32:39).

Finally, in his book, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Mill boldly declared: "I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures, and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." Of course, as former atheist C. S. Lewis pointed out, we would not even be able to know an in-justice unless there was ultimate standard of justice by which we knew an event t be not-just (*Mere*

Christianity, 45-46). So, despite its emotional appeal, Mill's argument is groundless unless there is a just God.

Mill did realize that the first moral principle is not derived from science. The sciences cannot determine ends; they can only make observations of the now. Science cannot provide the standard for morality. Therefore, neither Mill nor Bentham claims that they can prove the principle of utility directly although they deny that the end is arbitrary. They claim that their position is based on a *de facto*—men ordain their actions toward a particular end. Hence, this is the aim of moral philosophy that illustrates a pointing towards the greatest happiness principle. However, one of the decisive points to moral philosophy is an appeal to honesty.

Mill's defense of utilitarianism is that men desire nothing else than happiness, and that this is the sole criteria and foundation of morality. The opposition to this runs in consequence with common experience. He states that any means of happiness can become associated with some primary end where this happiness becomes an ingredient to a desired end. The basic moral problem arises when attempting to determine where man's *real* interests lie and what constitutes genuine happiness. This could mean many things to many people.

Further, Mill rejected free-choice, claiming that human nature is subject to the laws of causation found in a person's education and environment, both physical and social. He thought that believing in necessity that is applicable to all human conduct is not to accept fatalism. Mill sees freedom in a deterministic philosophy where he makes room for causal determinism that leads to a certain feeling of responsibility for self-improvement.

The Rejection of Idealism

At the closing of the last century, most American and British philosophers were unwilling to accept positivism, empiricism, agnosticism, and naturalistic evolution. Rather they looked to the advances in the natural sciences and the new concepts relating to evolution. However, the notion of evolution does not tell the whole story. In order for man to state the laws of nature, there must be a higher nature to which humans responds. The human mind could not have evolved from a lifeless or unintelligible universe or from anything unknowable or unknown. Therefore, the philosophers of this era were Idealists. They found a point of departure from the Kantian and German notions enabling them to find some new discoveries in science. This included a slot of spiritual values that included beauty, goodness, truth and religion.

These British Idealists rejected hedonism in favor of perfect welfare similar to the ideas found in Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. In their political philosophy, they averted socialism and placed greater emphasis on personal liberty. Their value system went beyond the Utilitarian pleasure. They also make room metaphysics in religion. There was a new current of thought on the horizon and it was G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein who were at the forefront of this new wave.

In the United States, the Idealistic doctrine swept through the American Universities and colleges. Between 1875 and 1900, and even for the next two decades, almost every philosophy professor was an Idealist. There were two version of Idealism. There was the Absolute Idealists who were more monistic and pantheistic and considered all reality enveloped by an all-encompassing Mind. There was also the Personal Idealists who were for the most part theistic but also stressed the individual person. Both groups allowed for the spirit-over-matter ideals in reality as compared to Spencer and Mill.

The reaction to Idealism came from analytic philosophy and was birthed by G. E. Moore (1878—1958), British moralist philosopher and idealist becoming an advocate of common sense reality) and along with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Gottlob Frege. This new perspective was more concerned with the analysis of particular concepts and notions rather than the descriptions of these ideas. These analytics attempted to understand *the discussions pertaining to the world* and determine if this talk was philosophic or scientific. Thus, it became obvious and inevitable that analytic philosophy would be preoccupied itself with language.

The Linguistic Turn

Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were reputed leaders in the analytic movement. Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote *Principia Mathematica*, showing how all math could be reduced to logic. Russell favored a more atomic and mathematical approach to solving philosophical problems which involved an ideal language. Moore, along with Ludwig Wittgenstein believed that ordinary language could handle the problems. Hence, linguistic analysis branched off at this point. Other early ordinary language philosophers included J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle. Of course, the later Wittgenstein (in his *Philosophical Investigations*) became a prime influence in the movement. However, the earlier logical positivists were occupied with empirical verification of the meaning of sentences.

The Logical Positivism Sidetrack

Logical positivism was given its name in 1931 by Albert E. Blumberg (1906-1997), American philosopher and political activist and Herbert Feigl (1902-1988), Austrian philosopher, put forward a set of philosophical notions to the Vienna Circle. Their intension was to continue the nineteenth century Viennese empirical tradition which was scientifically oriented and has abandoned metaphysic. Ludwig Wittgenstein (see below) and Karl Popper (1902-1994), Austro-British philosopher, and philosopher of science, though not members of the Circle, had numerous conversations with its members. It was Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* that had a profound influence on discussions within the group. The Circle assigned to Wittgenstein the "verification principles" where the meaning of a proposition is identical with the method for its verification. It was a proposition that had a set of experiences which together are equivalent to the truth of the proposition. However, the positivist did not yield his ideal regarding tautologies. In 1928, the Ernst Mach Society (named after Verein Ernst Mach) was established by the Circle in order to propagate scientific inquiry that would create the intellectual means of modern empiricism. In the following year, a manifesto called "The Scientific World View: The Vienna Circle" was established. It traced the teachings of the Circle back to positivists, such as David Hume and Mach, the scientific methodologists of Helmholtz, Poincare, Duhem, and Einstein. It recognized logicians from Leibniz to Bertrand Russell (see below) and the utilitarian moralists from Epicurus to Mill. It even included the socialists such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, and Karl Menger.

The international affiliates were expanding into America (C. W. Morris), Great Britain (Stebbing, Wisdom, Ryle, Ayer), France (Rougier, Vouillemin), Scandinavia (Kaila, Naess, Petzall, Jorgensen), Poland, (Tarski), and Germany (Scholz).

The Sequential Development of Analytical Philosophy

Stage One: Pioneered by Moore and Russell, focuses on realism and analysis. This stage sought clear and simple answers that could be derived from questioned that were posed very precisely. This may require reformulating and clarification of the question and answer in order to achieve some plain and simple understanding.

Stage Two: Russell worked on this stage where he constructed formal language which carried the label "logical atomism." Basically, logical atomism was to reflect the configuration of the world to a grammatical structure that could precisely put world to what was observed. In this stage there was the development of symbolic logic that had a relation to mathematics. It was Aristotle who focused on the *what* logic which deals with reality. It is symbolic logic that deals with the *how* logic (see Veatch, *Two Logics*), the relationship of propositions. Even though this stage provided a small window allowing metaphysical consideration, it was the third stage that that made attempts to abandon this notion.

Stage Three: Logical Positivism is concerned with formal languages and its association with the sciences, which in turn, strives for the elimination of metaphysics. This stage is seen in those like Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap and the early Ayer and Feigl. Gross Positivism, also known as Scientism, states that existence adds nothing to the essence of a thing. It was Auguste Comte that concluded that there were three stages to history. The first phase began with the belief in a theistic personal God. However, this led to a metaphysical impersonal being. The last stage to be developed was that of the Positivists who looked at the practical scientific world of sense input. Later, there was the influence of John Stewart Mill, who with Spencer, developed Utilitarianism. It was Spencer who

said that God was unknowable based upon his evolutionaism.

Stage Four: Gilbert Ryle (1900—1976, British philosopher who focused on ordinary language as it related to philosophical issues) and Wittgenstein (see below) analyzed language and sought to find those linguistic traps that philosophers fell into. This stage was related to the previous two stages. There were others as well who were on board with analysis of language, such as Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, John Wisdom, who stated that the meaning of a word is discovered by its usage.

Stage Five: John L. Austin (1911—1960, British philosopher of language) distinguished the nuances associated with language reveals that there are different function of speech acts. He spoke of the difference between locution (what is said), illocution (why it is said), and perlocution (what is brought about in saying it).

Anthony Flew's falsifiability principle posited that what is falsifiable can only be considered meaningful and shown in his *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* which used the early Wittgenstein (*Tractatus*, 1921) as a support for his position.

Today, most universities in English speaking countries are dominated by some form of analytic philosophy. Symbolic logic is required along with truth tables. The traditional Aristotelian What logic has been replaced by a How logic. That is, the new logic is no longer capable of speaking of the "substance" of reality, but of a relation between propositions. As it is broadened to cover more issue, it has become more general and less focused. It is more of a general tool to clarify ideas than it is a means of discovering truth about reality.

An Evaluation of Analytic Philosophy

There are some positive aspects to analytic philosophy. The use of language and rules associated with the sentence structure is a key to understanding the meaning of words. Context help us discover the meaning of words. When clarification is required then confusion is avoided. There is validity to testing the meaning of words in order to establish a truth statement. There is also the benefit of using qualified and established models in order to determine religious language.

The negative side to Analytic Philosophy is that while it stresses clarification, it neglects the need for comprehension and justification. While it stressing meaning, it often neglects the quest for truth. In its preoccupation with methodology overshadows the need to do metaphysics. When verification of truth is sought it lays an overemphasis on scientific justification and neglects metaphysical insight. There also must be some reasonable justification in areas that cannot be scientifically checked. This provides an opening for the rationality of beliefs, including belief of God. Like a good surgeon, analytic philosophers have the cleanest hands and the sharpest tools, but they either have no metaphysical body of truth on which to operate—or if they do, they neglect it. To carry the analogy a step further, even the logical tools used by analytic philosophers (a How logic) are incapable operating on metaphysical truth (which only a What logic can do).

Closing Remarks


Rooted, as it is, in a post-Kantian look-out from reality (the *noumena*) or the thin in itself, analytic logic attempts in vain to overcome its anti-metaphysical hangover. Its heritage in David Hume's distinction between two—and only two—kinds of propositions (relation of ideas and matters of empirical fact) has had a lasting and negative effect. Those who wish to study being as being and not merely empirical reality are better served by a different methodology. As Etienne Gilson so masterfully demonstrated (in his book, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*), the history of

philosophy is littered with the wreckage of frustrated philosophical approaches which vainly attempted to do metaphysics with a methodology wholly alien with its subject matter. The truth of the matter is that the study of being must begin with being—and the basic principles of being. Like an expensive meat grinder, no matter how finely the boloney is ground by an analytic grinder, it is still boloney! The wrong methodology will yield the wrong ontology.

A Note on Faith and Philosophy

A Christian has a specific interest in and responsibility to study philosophy. Philosophy will both challenge and contribute to the understanding of his faith. Some Christians are suspicious of philosophy because they have heard stories of others who have lost their faith through the study of philosophy. They have been advised to avoid philosophy like the plague. Upon serious reflection it is clear that this is not wise advice. Christianity *can* stand up to the intellectual challenge mounted against it. The result of such a challenge should not be the loss of faith, but the priceless possession of a well-reasoned and mature faith. Furthermore, there are serious consequences of a failure to be aware of contemporary thought patterns. Rather than being exempt from their influence, one becomes their *unwitting* prey. Unfortunately, too many Christians hold beliefs that are inimical to the Christian faith, and are unaware of that fact.

Since all truth is God's truth, and since philosophy is a quest for truth, then philosophy will contribute to our understanding of God and His world. Furthermore, history shows that philosophical arguments and concepts have played a large and important role in the development of Christian theology. While not all theologians agree on the value or appropriateness of these arguments, all admit that some knowledge of philosophical roots is necessary to the understanding of Christian theology" (Geisler, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 21).



The Life and Works of Russell

Bertrand Arthur William Russell was born in 1872 to Lord and Lady Amberely who passed on while he was a young child. He was subsequently reared in the house of his grand-father, Lord John Russell. By the time he was fourteen, he began questioning the immortality of the soul. At age eighteen, he abandoned his belief in God, influenced by Mill's *Autobiography*. Also at this age, he attended Cambridge to study mathematics. In his fourth year Russell changed his focus to philosophy. It was there at Cambridge where the influence of J. E. McTaggart who steered him away from 'crude' British empiricism and to look instead to the Hegelian tradition. So from 1894 to 1898, he continued his thinking towards the idea that metaphysics was capable of proving beliefs about the universe. He also later taught at Trinity College, lectured in the United States. In 1950, he was awarded a Nobel Prize for literature for championing freedom of thought.

In 1894, Russell acted as an attaché at the British Embassy in Paris. That following year he devoted his studies to economics and German social democracy in Berlin. It was during this time that he wrote the publication of *German Social Democracy* in 1896. At this time he also wrote and published a paper titled *Mind*. In the following year and as an elaboration of his fellowship at Trinity College, he wrote *An Essay on the Foundations' of Geometry*. Based primarily on his friendship with G. E. Moore, Russell reacted strongly against Idealism and together, the two adhered to and promoted the common sense approach—"whatever is real is real."

One of Russell's most notable works was a reaction to Leibniz's doctrine called *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* in 1900. Russell's works are voluminous, ranging from co-authoring the weighty *Principia Mathematica* (1910) co-authored with Alfred North Whitehead to his more popular *Why I Am Not a Christian* (based on a 1927 series of lectures). Other writings include *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900), "Free Man's Worship" (1903), "The Essence of Religion" (1912), *Religion and Science* (1935), "The Existence of God Debate" with Father Copleston (1948), "What Is An Agnostic?" (1953 interview), and "Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?" (based on 1954 articles). His primary philosophical works express linguistic atomism. He was also a mentor to Ludwig Wittgenstein and wrote the introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. He acknowledged Wittgenstein's influence upon his own logical atomism.

Russell's Philosophy

Russell differed from G. E. Moore (see above) in his background and approach. Russell was an accomplished mathematician, however, his mathematics work co-authored with Whitehead had an influence upon his metaphysics. He opposed absolute idealism promoted primarily by Hegel, Bradley, and their followers, because he was suspicious of those who held such a position calling

them “paradox peddlers” who seemed more interested in convincing others of the unreality of the world rather than attempting to understand the world as it was. Whereas Moore’s criticism were aimed at propositions and arguments, Russell’s focus was more systematic and zeroed in on the logic of their presentations. It was this effort that played a major role in constructing a new agreement within philosophy and mathematics in the twentieth century concerning the discipline of logic.

Logical Constructivism

As previous noted, Russell rejected idealism. His metaphysical views also changed considerably during his life. He eventually settled on what he called ‘logical constructivism’ and when applied to metaphysics, it is these logical constructions that can replace inferred perceptions. This was in response to modern philosophers who believed that physical objects are not directly perceived. In addition to this, man is only aware of his own inner experience of perception rather than the object of perception. Thus, the experienced perception and the object itself is not the same. Therefore, it is possible to have a perception of some object even though the object may not be present (which does indeed occur in dreams or during hallucinations). In principle, there are no checks and balances. Russell responded to this problem with the application of logical constructivism having effects upon metaphysics as well as epistemology.

In Russell’s *Our Knowledge of the External World*, he states that logical constructions are made from the actual immediate physical sensed data of common sense. However, if the world of common sensed objects and of science is considered as logical construction, then it may be easy to see how solipsism could result. Logical constructivism would ultimately show that all propositions concerning physical objects can be analyzed in terms of propositions. If successful, the philosophical problem surrounding propositions describing physical objects and sense data as logically independent. However, where he adopted this technique in *The Analysis of Mind*, he began to abandon it in *The Analysis of Matter*. In his analysis of the mind, he embraced neutral monism for some, a metaphysical view holding that both minds and physical objects are constructions out of immediate experience. This replaced the non-idealist and non-materialist form of monism. Later he rejected monism for pluralism making a sharp, distinction between the object itself and the act of awareness. Yet he still remained uncommitted to either form. William James also promoted his theory of neutral monism. However, in the future philosophers would uncover problems with a major component of the neutral monism view—phenomenalism.

Russell on Truth

From 1906 through 1909, Russell wrote four essays (found in *Philosophical Essays, Inquiry, Human Knowledge*, and *My Philosophical Development*) discussing the subject of truth, especially as it relates to pragmatism. He defended a correspondence view of truth and rejected the idealist interpretation of truth as coherence because he felt that it blurred the differentiation between truth and falsehood. He also rejects the pragmatic theory of truth. He was ridiculed when he paraphrased William James’s assertion that the truth of a statement is only when ‘it pays to believe.’ Russell objects to any muddiness between knowledge and truth—if something can be known then it must be true. He did make allowance for those statements that are indeed true even though one might not be able to *know* that it is true. Therefore, what seemed to be left was the correspondence theory of truth. When the truth of a statement is based on some relation to more or more facts, these facts are called by Russell ‘verifiers.’ (The exceptions to this are analytical or logical propositions and pure mathematics. However the application of these types can be said to represent some common sense

position.)

Russell's Ethics

There is another side of Russell for which the general public is more aware—his thoughts regarding ethics, morals, and religion. In his *Philosophical Essays*, he wrote “The Elements of Ethics” where he claims that ethics is a science contrived of propositions about virtuous and vicious conduct. When discovering why certain actions should be taken, these basic propositions cannot themselves be proven. When determining the motivation behind these actions, generally there is a relationship to the actions consequences. If an action is right because it produces good results, then the action must be good in itself. However, not all actions can be good and if they were, there could not be discernment between right and wrong.

According to Russell, all human actions are a result of impulse and desire where, under the influence of psycho-analytic theory, “all primitive desire is unconscious” (*The Analysis of the Mind*). If natural impulse alone dictates, then man is in bondage to it. However, it is the mind; the impersonal objective thought that provides the critical function allowing him to decide which impulses to release and which ones to suppress. Good and bad are derived from these desires. It is through the social media of language where one learns to apply the word ‘good’ to those things that are desired by the social group at large. There is a kind of utilitarian approach: good is what is desired; bad is what is averted. Hence, his ethic was based on a sense of taste, not founded in any objective truth. However, upon his own admission, his own ethical theory does not completely satisfy him. Neither does his theory match to what ordinary people think when they make judgments regarding good and bad, right and wrong.

Russell's View on Religion

As was noted earlier, Russell had abandoned a belief in God at a young age. Up to the age of fourteen, he may be considered as a theist then turning to deism from fourteen to eighteen. At age eighteen, he became a non-theist and then at thirty-one embracing a kind of fatalistic Stoic naturalism. By forty, he became a type of experiential pantheist. Later he became even more anti-theist and anti-Christian calling himself an agnostic suspending judgment, but not an atheist. He evidently thought that the evil and suffering in the world establishes reason for disbelief in a God who is thought to be infinitely good and omnipotent as well. However, he does not claim that the non-existence of God can be proven.

The Existence of God

Russell debunks all the traditional arguments given for God's existence neither does the arguments forwarded by modern scientists or evolutionary hypotheses that may point to a divine purpose have any worth. Russell's attack is primarily focused against the Christian religious bodies who, he thinks, has done more harm than good (*Why I Am Not a Christian*). He is also against theology because he blames it for having invoked religious wars and fueled the idea of persecution and has stifled moral progress in the world. Religion, especially organized religion, is based on fear. Taking this one-step further, not only did Russell reject absolute authority, replacing it with a collective wisdom of man and yet denying 'faith in reason alone,' but he likewise rejected the Bible as an authoritative source. He considered the Bible on the same plane as other legendary works such as Homer.

Russell rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God, especially the cosmological argument for First Cause. This springs from an impoverish imagination that cannot envision an eternal universe. Further, even if one grants the first cause principle just for conversation sake, the argument still does not stand because of the following dilemma:

1. Either all things are caused or else they are not.
2. If all beings are caused, then so is God since he is a being.
3. If all things are not caused, then neither is the world since it is something.
4. So either God is caused by another (and is not the First Cause) or else the world is not caused by any God (and no God exists).
5. In either event, there is no First Cause (because God needs to be caused).

An Evaluation

However, his argument fails because he wrongly categorizes God (an uncreated material Being) with the world (a created material substance). God is the only Uncaused Cause. Hence, Russell has created a categorical mistake. Second, there are philosophical and scientific arguments strongly submitting that the world did have a beginning. Russell's question as to Who caused God? is a misapplication of the meaning of causality. Only those 'things' that begin, are contingent, dependent, and/or finite require a cause. God, who is eternal, independent, not contingent, and necessary, does not need a cause.

Though Russell did not believe in God, he once wrote that "[e]ven when one feels nearest to other people, *something in one seems obstinately to belong to God, and to refuse to enter into any earthly communion*—at least that is how I should express it if I thought there was a God. It is odd, isn't it? I care passionately for this world and many things and people in it, and yet . . . what is it all? *There must be something more important, one feels*, though I don't believe there is" (*Autobiography*, 125–126, emphasis added).

Russell was a hard-core agnostic claiming that it is impossible to know that there is a God. He claimed: "An agnostic thinks it is impossible to know the truth in matters such as God and the future life with which Christianity and other religions are concerned." After making this strong statement, he then adds a caveat: "if not impossible, at least impossible at the present time" ("What Is an Agnostic?" 577). However, this does not lessen his position; it is still self-defeating to claim that

one can know for sure that one cannot be known for sure whether or not there is a God.

The Historicity of Jesus Christ

Russell doubted that Christ had ever existed at all. If he did live, however, there is no nothing that can be known about him (as stated in *Why I Am Not A Christian*). Some agnostics do admire the man Jesus, if he did actually exist, but put him on the same level as Buddha and Socrates. However, Russell argues that, if Jesus did truly live, he was an unwise, unmerciful, inhumane, and cruel person. “There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that he believed in hell. I do not myself feel that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in everlasting punishment” (*Why I Am Not a Christian*, 12).

An Evaluation

In response, it must be noted that Russell overlooks the many evidences of Christ impeccable moral character listed in the New Testament (John 8:46; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15). Second, Russell’s negative accusations fall short of being actual proofs. For example, Russell claimed that Jesus lacked wisdom, therefore, if any wise man (Jesus) said something and was wrong in what he said, he (Jesus) must not be wise. In order to substantiate this claim, Russell sites the following illustration. Jesus promised that he would return immediately to earth after his death to restore the kingdom. However, Russell wrongly assumes that Jesus claimed he would return within the life-time of his disciples. The evidence is to the contrary. Jesus only said that he would *return immanently* which is not necessarily immediately (cf. Mat. 24:36; Acts 1:7)

Further, according to Russell, no human person could possibly believe in such a torturous place as hell. In addition, how could someone who is vindictive against his enemies have no moral flaws? However, belief in hell does not make one inhumane. If the Holocaust was a fact of history, then to believe that it was a fact of history does not make one inhumane. It is a question of truth, not a question of humanity. Second, there is no evidence claiming that Jesus was vindictive. (This is reading into the text something that is not there.) In fact, Jesus even forgave the people who crucified him (Luke 23:34). And warnings people against a destructive lifestyle is merciful act. Would it not be a merciful act to warn someone that the building was on fire? It is in fact the moral character of Jesus *not* to promote vindictiveness but rather doing acts of compassion, love and mercy.

Life after Death

Russell believed that when he dies that his body will just rot. The ego simply stops existing. For him there is no good reason to consider there being any afterlife, whether there is a heaven or a hell. There is no connection between the mental life and any kind of after-life. Even though Russell was not completely settled on the existence of an after-life in general, he posited that if there is a hell, “Belief in hell is bound up with the belief that the vindictive punishment of sin is a good thing. . . . There might conceivably someday be evidence of its [heaven’s] existence through spiritualism, but most Agnostics do not think there is such evidence, and therefore do not believe in heaven” (“What Is an Agnostic?” 580–581). Collectively looking at these views, it is not surprising that he does not fear God along with denying the existence of Zeus, Odin, and Brahma. And “[i]f there were a God, I think it is very unlikely that He would have such an uneasy vanity as to be offended by those who doubt his existence” (“What Is an Agnostic?” 581).

The Denial of Miracles

Agnostics, like he was, deny the supernatural, hence, there is no possibility of miracles because they if they did occur they would be contrary to natural law. When an anomaly does happen, it is not a miracle. Coinciding with his view on the Bible, if there was a recorded miracle in the Bible having been performed by God, this falls on the same grounds as those miraculous evidences performed by the Greek gods in Homer (“What Is an Agnostic?” 581). The virgin birth of Christ is similar to the virgin birth stories of Zoroaster and Ishtar, the Babylonian goddess. Of course, if there is a God, the miracles are possible. Hence, the only way to disprove the possibility of miracles is to disprove the possibility of God’s existence.

An Evaluation: Looking at Natural Law and the Nature of Design

Russell offers the following argument against natural law. 1. If God created law, then it was either for a reason or not for a reason. 2. It could not have been for a reason, since in that case God would be subject to it and not ultimate. 3. It could not have been for no reason, for in that case a rational God would not have done it. For God has a reason for everything. 4. Therefore, God could not have created law (i.e., there is no need for a Creator of law).

However, the natural and regular patterns of the world need some sort of Orderer. The anthropic principle, that the world since its inception seems to have been fitted for human existence, has challenged many modern agnostics and atheist, causing them to have second thoughts. Likewise, the only known cause for the language –like specified complexity found in the DNA is an intelligent being. Second, Russell creates a false dilemma about whether God had a reason for creating law. What God does, He does for His reason for He is the Ultimate Rational Being of the universe.

Following David Hume and Charles Darwin, Russell rejects design in nature that point towards a Designer. He argued that: 1) Either living things are adapted to their environment because of design or because of evolution. 2) Science has demonstrated via natural selection that they are adapted to their environs because of evolution. 3) Hence, they were not designed by a Designer.

However, Russell’s logic is fallacious. It affirms (rather than denies) one of the alternatives in a disjunctive syllogism. This overlooks the possibility that adaptation might result from both intelligent design and evolution. Further, he ignores evidence. He concludes that adaptation of from either design or evolution and further concludes that it must be from evolution. However, God could have created humankind with the ability to adapt to different circumstances

Some Sources on Russell’s Philosophy

For further reading on Russell, see: N. L. Geisler, *When Critics Ask*; B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*; “Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?” and “The Essence of Religion”; “The Existence of God Debate” with Father Copleston, BBC radio broadcasts, 1948; “Free Man’s Worship”; *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*; *Religion and Science*; “What I Believe”; “What Is an Agnostic?” in *Look* magazine (1953); *Why I Am Not a Christian*; A. D. Weigel, “A Critique of Bertrand Russell’s Religious Position,” *Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society* 8.4 (Autumn 1965); H. G. Woods, *Why Mr. Bertrand Russell Is Not Christian*.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN (A.D. 1889 - 1951)



His Life and Works

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was the youngest of eight children and was born in Vienna. Each child was endowed with intellectual and artistic abilities. One of the Wittgenstein sons became a distinguished pianist. The father of this clan became the head of a steel company after he himself had rebelled against a classical education and ran away to America when he was seventeen, to then return to Vienna to later become a draftsman and manager prior to his leadership position. He was a Jew who embraced Protestantism. Mrs. Wittgenstein was the daughter of a Vienna banker. She was devoted to music and made this a central focus of her life. Because she was a Roman Catholic, Ludwig was baptized into the Catholic Church.

Ludwig was educated at home until he was fourteen years of age. His parents sent him to Linz in upper Austria to study mathematics and the physical sciences rather than the classical education. Three years later, he began studying engineering for the next two years at Technische Hochschule at Charlottenburg, Berlin. In 1908 he went to England and in the following year he registered as a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester where he was involved in aeronautical research for three years. His inventions include a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. His interests shifted to mathematics and philosophical foundations of mathematics.

After reading Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, his focus moved away from engineering and studied with Russell at Cambridge in 1911 where he made progress and applied himself to logical studies. In 1912, Wittgenstein did his first extensive reading in philosophy and noticed that the philosophers whom he "worshipped in ignorance" were after all "stupid and dishonest and made disgusting mistakes." This encouraged him to work furiously on his logical ideas. Based on his new understanding of philosophy, he corresponded with Russell and decided that since the two of them had different "ideals" they were no longer suited for one another as friends. It was after his father's death in 1913; Ludwig received a large inheritance from which he gave most of it away, including to two of his sisters. His preference was rather to live a simple and frugal life.

When the war broke out, he served in the artillery group and later ordered to attend officers training. During these years, he continued working on his book *Tractatus* (1921) and completed it in August 1918. While Wittgenstein was on the eastern front, he bought a copy of Tolstoy's *The Gospel in Brief* which made a deep impression on him. While in the prison camp, he obtained a copy of the Gospels and after reading it became disturbed by what he had found. This caused him to question its authenticity due to perhaps the differences found as compared to Tolstoy's. During his prison captivity, he wrote to Russell and decided to have his manuscript delivered to him by courier.

Wittgenstein thought his work *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (The Tractatus)* would

resolve the differences between himself and Russell. Russell wrote the introduction to the book but Wittgenstein could not allow its contents to be included. The publisher rejected the work and did not publish it. Finally, it was published in 1921 as a part of another work. It was later published in London the following year and then again in English in 1962. Upon Wittgenstein's request, most of the notes were to be destroyed. However, those notes from 1914 through 1916 were accidentally preserved and were subsequently published in 1961 titled the *Notebooks* along with a parallel English translation.

Returning to civilian life, he became a school teacher. In 1920, he began teaching classes to children ages nine and ten in Lower Austria until 1926. During his years of being a teacher, he did not give much thought to philosophy. Later when Frank P. Ramsey (1903—1930), British mathematician, assistant translator of the *Tractatus*), the two engaged in exciting dialogue though Wittgenstein told Ramsey that he would do no further philosophical work because his mind was “no longer flexible.” However, in 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge and again devoted himself to philosophy. He would later submit the *Tractatus* in hopes of having it meet the requirements for a Ph.D. It was Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore who were appointed to give him his oral examinations. Later Trinity College granted him a research fellowship and it was during this time that he published his second philosophical work titled “Some Remarks on Logical Form.” From 1927 to 1929, he met at various times with members of the Vienna Circle and his writings had great influence of them, though he was not a member of the group.

In 1929 he returning to Cambridge after a fifteen year absence and resumed his philosophical research. The *Philosophical Investigations* was later published in 1953 in two parts; Part I was written from 1936 to 1945 and Part II was written between 1947 and 1949. He began lecturing in 1930 and remained at Cambridge until the summer of 1936 when he took a brief leave. He returned to Cambridge in 1937 and in two years, he succeeded G. E. Moore in the chair of philosophy.

In World War II, he once again got involved in the military. This time is was in the capacity of a porter at Guy's Hospital in London then in the laboratory at the Royal Infirmary in Newcastle. After the war effort, he returned to Cambridge to resume his lecturing. However, he increasingly disliked academic life, the universities, and saw that students had only half-understanding. He choose to live alone and spend him time working on the *Investigations*. After resigning the chair, he sought a life of seclusion. After several trips and seeing friends, it was discovered that he had cancer. He spent his last days in a doctor's home. He died April 29, 1951.

Besides Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky was also an influence on his personal lifestyle. There were three other influences who stand out among several who shaped his philosophical thinking: Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schoppenauer, and Bertrand Russell. His favorite religious thinkers were Augustine and Søren Kierkegaard.

The works of Wittgenstein include the *Prototractatus* from 1914 to 1916. The English translation was released in 1961; *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief* (1930—1938) published in English in 1966. The English version of *The Blue and Brown Books* (1933—1935) was published in 1958. After writing the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1937—1944), it was released in English in two years earlier. The last two works, *Zettel I* (1945—1948), English version publication, 1966 and *On Certainty* (written around 1949 and published in English in 1969).

The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein is an icon of the Linguistic philosophical tradition. Both the early and later periods of his life produced works that are practically venerated by this school of thought.

The Influence of the Vienna Circle

The area of agreement between the *Tractatus* and the logical positivists, introduced by Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, was the exclusion of metaphysical statements. In the context of logical positivism, to say that metaphysical statements are meaningless is to say that these statements are different as compared to their scientific propositions. Not all metaphysic statements conform to just one pattern. Wittgenstein promoted an alignment of propositions with empiricism; the positivists promoted alignment with verification via sense-experience. Though the positivist eased up slightly regarding their position of metaphysical statement, where it could provide an emotive-evocative significance (however nonsensical), Wittgenstein basically considered any metaphysical statement as an attempt to say what cannot be said.

In his attempt to understand language, he found that it has many functions in the course of human life. He argued that 'meaning' had certain functions that were no longer identical with what was being 'pictured' through language—language portraying the way things really are. If Wittgenstein's idea of language is applied to logical positivism, then there arises a dethroning of language and an abandonment of the positivists criterion. On the other hand, Wittgenstein did not want to bring life back to the philosopher as one who was able to extend knowledge based on philosophical reflection (since he already excluded this in the *Tractatus*). Ultimately, what he was trying to do was to reform language and disallow any philosophical interference (as promoted in his *Philosophical Investigations*, see below) but only describe it. What he opposes is philosophy attempting to unveil hidden meanings and essences found in ordinary language. Wittgenstein's goal is to bring out the real logic of ordinary language.

The Early Period

Wittgenstein influenced Russell to view the propositions of logic and pure mathematics as tautologies. A proposition is a representation of particular expressions of occasions in the world. In the *Tractatus*, he identifies propositions with propositions of natural science and adding the restriction that within this category philosophical statement are not to be included. Wittgenstein goes so far as to say that there are in fact not philosophical propositions and philosophy has no business of interfering. However, the role of philosophy can be to clarify scientific propositions and clear up any logical confusion. Russell had posited that ordinary grammatical form often hides logical form leading to misrepresentations. The task of the philosopher is to clear up the confusion so that the logical form is correctly stated.

Wittgenstein did not say that metaphysical statements were necessarily *false*, rather, they were *meaningless*. When philosophers attempted to write metaphysical things in reference to the ethical, aesthetic, or religious, they succeeded in producing nonsense. In this he thought he had answered the most important questions of philosophy. The implementation of Wittgenstein's program could then be felt in other areas of language as well, such as the language of morals and religious consciousness and other aesthetic types.

Wittgenstein himself said that the point of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is ethical. The project of the *Tractatus* is Kantian, viz., setting the limits of thought. In the preface he says: "Thus the aim of [this] book is to set a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set, a limit thinkable (i.e., we should have to be able to think what

cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be set, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense." And to this he adds, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." His method can be identified as Logical Atomism. In it there is the assumption that there is an isomorphic relationship between language and the world where language mirrors the world. Therefore, all language expressions are propositions of natural science. This leads to the conclusion that any transcendental expressions about ethics, aesthetics, of God cannot be uttered.

The Later Period

Wittgenstein suggests that language presupposes a "language game" even though the game is only a small segment of the whole of language. The function of language is to state facts where words have meaning are referential. (Like a bricklayer calling to his helper to bring, in their language, a particular item. The helper in turn brings the correct material for the item to be built.) This gives illustration that the words of the 'language game' are complete in themselves. In the *Tractatus*, there is the assumption of a universal form of language and the assumption that the elements of language are names that designate simple objects. However, in the *Investigations*, this assumption is rejected. There is nothing common to the various forms of language that makes them language. Here too it is argued that words that are simple or complex have no absolute meaning; words require further clarification. The result is a dissatisfaction when ordinary words are used for perfect exactness. Language does not seem to be as clear-cut as what it needs to be.

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein rejects the concept of a "private language" as incoherent. For all languages have rules shared by a community in which they operate. Wittgenstein also attempts to refute the statements made by Augustine where he posits that the "picture theory of meaning" is the essence of human language. He regards this as an oversimplification of the ideas that the function of language is to state facts and that all words are names, referring to something. He strikes down Augustine's idea that meaning is taught by examples in definition. He suggests that example definitions can be variously interpreted (*Tractatus*, 1.1:28). The statement that Augustine makes regarding the meaning of a name is the object that the name denotes is regarded as absurd.

Wittgenstein also rejected the ideas that meaning is a matter of producing mental images where one clarifies propositions by analyzing them where words have a determinate sense. He rejected both univocal and analogical language. On a more positive note, Wittgenstein was a strong proponent of conventionalism (see below) which affirms that all meaning is culturally relative.

When it comes to religious language, he affirms that prayer and theology are meaningful linguistic activities. He mentions prayer in particular as a language game. Since stating facts is only one of many linguistic activities, there is no *a priori* exclusion against the meaningfulness of religious language. Since language games have intrinsic criteria of meaning, and religious language is a language game, it must be judged by its own standards and not by standards imposed upon it. However, this ends up being a form of fideism, and fideism is untenable. For if one takes Wittgenstein's writings as a rational justification of the non-rational, then they are self-defeating explanation. If he offers no rational justification for his beliefs, they are simply unproven propositions that no reasonable person should accept.

Further, if religious language belongs to the realm of the inexpressible because there is an unbridgeable gulf between fact and value and all "God-talk" is nonsense. That does not mean that the person cannot feel or know anything about God. It is clear from *Notebooks* that there is a feeling of

dependence and a belief in God because “the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.” But what such things are outside the limits of language, and ultimately of thought.

Final Thoughts

Wittgenstein did not join the Vienna Circle in affirming empirical verifiability. They insisted that only empty tautologies, which are true by definition or statements known through the senses, could be meaningful. Wittgenstein rejected this form of logical positivism, realizing that meaning should be listened to, not legislated.

Wittgenstein believed that we are locked up inside a language that says nothing about the realm of value beyond language itself. But this conclusion is self-defeating. Any attempt to forbid statements about the mystical realm beyond language transgresses that prohibition. Like Kant’s agnosticism, one cannot know that he cannot know, and he cannot say that he cannot say. In claiming that the mystical cannot be spoken, one speaks about it. He also follows Kant into a false dichotomy between fact and value. They both saw the two in totally separate domains. However, this is not the case. Human beings combine both. One cannot attack human facticity (the physical presence of the body) without attacking the value of life and personhood. One cannot separate rape or genocide from the value of the object that is at the center of those actions. In theology, the fact of the death of Christ cannot be separated from its redemptive value.


In his *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein portrays religious language as a language game with only cognitive or factual meaning. Religious language is fine as a language game, but it tells us nothing about God or ultimate reality. It is clear that he remains an ‘agnostic’ rejecting any cognitive knowledge in religious language. For example, it is legitimate to utter a belief regarding the event of the last judgment. But no one could say whether that belief is possibly true or false because such beliefs are purely a matter of blind faith providing no evidence for them. He would not, however, ridicule those who claim to base their beliefs on evidence, for example, historical apologetics. He states: “It has been said that Christianity rests on an historical basis. It has been said a thousand times by intelligent people that indubitability is not enough in this case, even if there is as much evidence as for Napoleon. Because the indubitability wouldn’t be enough to make me change my whole life” (*Tractatus*, 57).

Wittgenstein did not embrace atheism; rather he could be considered a fideistic theist. Wittgenstein read both the New Testament and Søren Kierkegaard. He acknowledged the validity of prayer and belief in last things and recognized that religious language had some value. Though religious language was not descriptive to him, it did aid the religious life in a practical way. In brief, God-talk is possible, but it is not really talk about God, not in any descriptive way. God-talk is non-cognitive. Hence, Wittgenstein could be called an agnostic when it came to God. In traditional terms, God talk is equivocal. It is evocative and commissive (they orient our lives) but not descriptive of God.

A Critique of Wittgenstein’s Conventionalism

Among the legacies that Wittgenstein leaves behind, none is more deadly than the conventionalist view of meaning. For *All meaning cannot be relative*. If it were, then the statement “All meaning is relative.” would be meaningless. Like other attempts to deny objective meaning, Wittgenstein had to assume the objective meaning of his statements. Further, since all true statements must be meaningful, then all truth would be relative too. But the claim that all truth is relative is not itself a relative truth claim. So, it too is self-defeating. Further comments are found under

Conventionalism (below).



Background and Emphasis

John Langshaw Austin was born March 29, 1911 in Lancaster. His father, Geoffrey Langshaw Austin was an architect and his mother was Mary Bowes-Wilson. In 1922, the family moved to Scotland where Geoffrey became the secretary of St. Leonard's School in St. Andrews. John was educated at Shrewsbury School and Balliol College, Oxford and later became a Fellow of All Souls College in 1933. In 1935, he moved to Magdalen College where he taught until he was elected chair of to the chair of moral philosophy at Oxford from 1952 until his death in 1960. In the years prior to the war, he spent much time in philosophical inquiry and scholarship. He made himself a Leibniz expert and did work in the field of Greek philosophy, most specifically, Aristotle's works. During World War II, he served in the British Intelligence Corps and attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel and was made an officer of the Legion of Merit.

J. L. Austin was the British philosopher of language who affirmed that the nuances associated with language reveals that there are different ways to say the same thing, the same meaning. He is recognized for his primary work titled *Are There a Priori Concepts?* Austin's work may be classified as "ordinary language philosophy" enabling it to cover a broad spectrum associated with philosophy. He sees the application in philosophy as bringing to the forefront the distinctions found in language itself. He stresses that it is important to be precise in the various ways meanings are related to different concepts over and beyond just finding different ways of discussing the same concept.

Austin delineates different speech acts. In so doing he illustrates how ordinary language is more complex and subtle than one might first realize. What they may have called 'linguistic analysis' in the past might now be better described as 'conceptual analysis.'

For Austin language analysis was one way of doing philosophy. In his "Plea for Excuses," he says this about language: ". . . there are also reason why it is an attractive subject methodologically, at least if we are to proceed from 'ordinary language', that is, by examining *what we should say when*, and so why and what we should mean by it. . . . this . . . philosophical method, sparsely requires justification at present—too evidently, there is gold in them thar hills: more opportune would be a warning about the care and thoroughness needed if it is not to fall into disrepute. . . ." (p. 129-130). He continues and reminds his readers that words are tools, and clean they should be in their proper use in meaning because words themselves are not facts or things. Certain chosen words are sometimes inadequate and arbitrary when they are used to make connections. What is the reason for close scrutiny? It is to keep one from the traps that language sometimes sets and to ward off misunderstandings when applied to linguistic or analytic philosophy (cf. *ibid.*) It was the lack of thoroughness and insufficient research leading to generalizations, made either grammarians or philosophers, that Austin found deplorable. He was hoping that his 'new' method would emerge.

His Philosophy of Language

Austin was not unique in his philosophical aims or theory. He was unique in his technique. Austin conceived as the central task that opposed ordinary philosophical language was the clarification of ordinary language that was characteristic from Socrates to G. E. Moore. His work was not necessarily novel. The first step for anyone embarking on a philosophical investigation was to investigate those resources of terminology already at one's disposal. Ordinary language was the begin-all and end-all of philosophical inquiry. He was not against the philosopher's technical terminology, but rather some of these terms had been introduced inappropriately and uncritically. Second, language itself was worth close study. He didn't view language as something that was to be kept sacred, but he wanted to ensure that what was being used was clear and tried prior to use. Third, he saw the many subtle distinctions within ordinary language.

Three kinds of Speech Acts: the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary.

Locutionary acts are uttered words (e.g., saying "Hello"); the illocutionary act is what we do in saying something (e.g., give a greeting, command, or promise); the perlocutionary act is what we bring about (e.g, persuading, surprising, etc.). This doctrine was presented in *How To Do Things With Words*. The real meaning is found not in the simple locution but in the illocution, namely, what the author meant by those words and what he wanted to accomplish by those words.

Austin's views are an attack on two philosophical perspectives: talk, either saying or acting, describes the word and the requirement of logical positivists for empirical verification. He calls those statements that are a correct description of reality, either it being true or false, 'constative' as compared to statements that do not describe reality and are neither true nor false (such as bequeathing, christening, or begetting). These have as their goal some 'performative' action. A constative statement must have some relevance associated with it and some object of reference. The performative however, have a descriptive element associated with them and can have truth values associated with them. Austin nonetheless finds a breakdown with these two types of statements and develops a new theory of speech acts. He breaks these down into three different types. There are great number of utterances, even those in the indicative mood—a statement of an objective fact—was such that it was impossible for these utterances to be characterized as either true or false. For example, "I will promise to meet you at three o'clock." This statement only makes the promise but does not report on the promise that will happen. Or, "I promise that these brown chicken eggs are newly laid by my prominent hen." This statement provides a guarantee but reports nothing about the guarantee. Statements like these are classified by Austin as "performance" statements that indicate that some performance of a particular act but do not report on the performance itself. It was this characteristic associated with utterances that drove Austin to formulate his theory of illocutionary forces. From this, he created a technical term called "constative" which refer to those statements that are naturally called true or false but yet when philosophers applied them he thought they were used in a too narrow sense.

Criticism of Traditional Philosophy

In *How To Do Things With Words* Austin provided what is needed for clarification in language as it relates to the traditional problems of philosophy. In his work *Sense and Sensibilia*, he focuses on the central problems associated with epistemology. He posits that one never directly perceives material things but rather only sense data (the idea or the content of the sense data) based upon the doctrine of illusion. Referring to Ayer, for example, he posits that illusions are actually

confused with the meaning of delusions, a belief that one sees things that are in fact not there. For example, the stick that seems to be bent in the water is not an illusion at all. The discussion hinges on the complexity and differences in the use of the word “looks,” “appears,” and “seems.” In further discussions, he focuses on the traditional usage of the word “reality” and contrasts it with other words, such as “fake,” “bogus,” “toy,” etc.

Perhaps more important is Austin’s discussion regarding the avoidance of over- simplification and hasty generalizations as it pertains to linguistic and nonlinguistic facts. He suggests that during some perceptions that curious things may come about due to a defect in sense abilities or there may be a peculiarity associated with the medium involved or a wrong assumption applied. The point that Austin makes is that philosophers’ uses of words cannot be ignored. They tend to use technical words for which they use a particular meaning for their purposes.

In his work *Sense and Sensibilia*, he is interested in addressing the fact posed by others that a person does not directly perceive material objects (promoted by the likes of Ayer, Price, Berkeley, and Moore) but rather only perceive the sense data or sense perceptions. Austin believes that those who hold to their views are simply obsessed with a few words or facts which have not been carefully studied, understood, or described. He thinks that ‘sense datum theorists’ creates a hindrance for sense data in that one perceives ‘material objects.’ Austin disagrees because he does not think that one ordinarily uses the term ‘material object’ but instead names the object itself. Here the theorist limits the meaning of what can be perceived. They also suggest that if one perceives something that may not be there that deception has just entered the picture. (One sees a rainbow for example but the material object is not there.) They suggest that the ordinary person needs proof for every single case. Add to this, the sense data theorist suggests that there is never any absolute certainty in what is seen, only perception. Last, even the sense data cannot be trusted. It was Moore who stated that one is never *directly* acquainted with material objects.) Austin is therefore arguing that the sense data theorist claims that there can be no certainty concerning the external world thus undermining belief it.

Concluding Comments

Austin had a linguistics background as compared to a scientific one like his Cambridge contemporaries. Where Wittgenstein was interested in gross category mistakes related to language, Austin was interested in the finer details of language and words. He saw his position as part of the solutions to the traditional problems associated with philosophy. The outcome of Austin’s work, developed by his student John Searle, was that it laid a new foundation for the standard theory of speech acts as it pertains to individual sentences. There are overarching principles that govern all conversations so that the speaker conveys the right understanding to an audience and the audience understands properly what the speaker is attempting to convey. All of this is accomplished in as much and as little words as possible in order to briefly and clearly state what is necessary and in an unambiguous manner. Misunderstanding occurs when these maxims are not followed, either intentionally or mistakenly. This simple observation of language that helped solve many of the traditional philosophical problems associated with epistemology, semantics, and ethics. Of course, its primary value lay in clarification of meaning, not in verification of truth. Its value was methodological but not metaphysical.

Introduction: The Roots of Conventionalism

Conventionalism and the Theory of Meaning

Conventionalism is the theory that holds to the idea that meaning is relative. However, if truth claims provide meaningful statements, then it follows that truth is relative. (This conclusion is opposed to the Platonic view that absolute truth exists—truths that are true at all times, in all place, and for all people.) Conventionalists contend that meaning changes in order to fit each unique situation. This would mean that language would have no essence of itself. Some of the modern proponents of linguistic conventionalism philosophy are Ferdinand Saussure (1857—1913), considered as one of the fathers of 20th century linguistics), Gottlob Fregge (b. 1925), German mathematician, logician, and philosopher, and Ludwig Wittgenstein (see above).

Symbols and Meaning

Conventionalists state that there is a significant difference between symbols and meaning. Other than natural symbols (smoke indicating fire) and onomatopoeic terms (like “crash,” “bang,” “boom”) where the sound is the meaning, virtually all linguists acknowledge that symbols are conventionally relative. For example, the word ‘down’ has no intrinsic meaning. ‘Down’ can refer to ducks’ feathers, a lower position, a psychological state, a type of mountain landscape, a southern direction, or an attempt of a football player carrying the ball. In addition, the same or similar group of sounds may have a far different meaning in another language(s). This scenario is true for most words. Words that convey meaning are relative; it is not implying that the meaning of a sentence is culturally relative. Individual symbols are relative but not the significance of combining symbols in a sentence. Therefore, the basic idea of Conventionalism is that language (meaning) has no form or essence. Linguistic meaning is derived from the changing and relative experience on which language is based. Ludwig Wittgenstein is a clear example of a conventionalist view of meaning.

Conventionalism Evaluated

However, conventionalism has serious flaws if it is to be used as a theory of meaning. The following is a summary of these flaws and shortcomings.

1. It is a self-falsifying. If the theory were correct and had meaning, then the statement “All linguistic meaning is conventional” would be relative and ultimately meaningless. Conventionalist who makes such statements assumes that their sentences have objective meaning. He is in effect making a meaningful statements arguing that there are no objectively meaningful statements
2. If conventionalism was correct, then universal statements would not be able to be translated into other languages as universal statements. However, this is not the case. “All triangles have three sides.” is understood to be universally true in everywhere and at all times to all people. The same is true of the universal trans-cultural statement: “All wives are married women.”
3. If conventionalism were true, one would not know any truth prior to knowing the context of that truth in that language. There would not be any universal truths in any language.
4. Conventionalism confuses the *source* of meaning with its ultimate *ground*. If conventionalism were true, then one would not know any truth prior to knowing the conventions of that truth in that language. The source of a person’s knowledge is not social but logical and represents a first principle of logic in that the predicate is reducible to the subject. It is true by definition, not acculturation.
5. Fifth, if conventionalism were correct, no meaning would be possible. If all meaning is based on changing experience, which in turn gets meaning from changing experience, there is no basis for meaning.
6. Conventionalism has only an internal criterion for meaning. However, internal criteria do not help adjudicate meaning conflicts of the same statement from different worldview vantage points. For example, either a theist or a pantheist can make the statement “God is a Necessary Being.” The words in themselves, without objective definitions behind them to fall back to, lack any sort of relation to truth. The theist and pantheist can argue and leave one another with the impression that they believe the same things about God. By being able to unpack firm meanings for *God* and *Necessary Being*, the conversants can discuss the differences in their worldviews. It is easy to see that no truly descriptive knowledge of God is possible for a conventionalist. If language is strictly based in

experience, then it tells only what God *seems to be to us in our experience*. It cannot tell us what he *really is in himself*.

7. Conventionalism rests on a circular justification. It does not justify its claims, but only merely asserts them. A conventionalist asked for the basis of this belief that all meaning is conventional cannot give a nonconventional basis.

8. Conventionalists often distinguish between surface and depth grammar that ends up avoiding some of their dilemmas. However, such a distinction assumes that they have a vantage point independent of language and experience. Conventionalism, by its very nature, does not allow such a vantage point outside one's culture.

The conventionalists' theory of meaning is a form of semantic relativism. Like other forms of relativism, conventionalism is self-defeating. The very theory that all meaning is relative is itself a nonrelative concept. It is a meaningful statement intended to apply to all meaningful statements. It is a nonconventional statement claiming that all statements are conventional.

Sources on Conventionalism

A conventionalist theory of meaning is rooted in G. Fregge, *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* ("On Sense and Reference") in P. Geach, ed. and trans., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Fregge* and F. Saussure, *Cours de Linguistique Generale* (1916); *Course in General Linguistics*. It was expounded by opposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. It was opposed by Plato in *Cratylus* in the ancient world and by St. Augustine (*Against the Academics*) and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1.84–85 in medieval times. Modern proponents against it include E. Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy* and J. Harris, *Against Relativism*.

Introduction

The pragmatic movement is for the most part an American phenomenon even though there were traces of it in German and English philosophies. It was the most influential philosophy and movement in America during the first quarter of the twentieth century. As a movement, it rejected much of the traditional academic philosophy out of concern to establish certain positive goals. Pragmatism emphasizes interpreting truth through consequences. It was first used by Charles Peirce in the 1870's and later further refined by William James as a theory of truth. It expanded further and was propagated by John Dewey (see below) and F. C. S. Schiller. However, because pragmatism is an evolving philosophical movement, it is treated here as a group of theoretical ideas and attitudes that have developed over time in Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey (see below), to have had several shifts in its direction and formulation. Even though there is still an interest in the philosophies of those just mentioned, pragmatism as a movement has faded in recent times. However, it has helped shaped the modern conception of philosophy; it provided a method for investigation and helped in clarifying communication.

Pragmatism is associated with a particular view of the nature of truth: "a statement is true in so far as it works for me." Pierce distinguished several kinds of truth. Transcendental truth has to do with the real character of things—they have them whether they are realized or not. Complex truth, either ethical or veracity, is the truth of propositions aligned with belief. Logical truth is the truth of a proposition as it relates to reality. When it comes to the truth or falsity of a proposition, the determining factor is the experience associated with it. If experience cannot provide a refutation, then the proposition is true; a proposition is false if it can be backed by an accompanying experience. However, it should be noted that Charles Sanders Pierce (1839—1914) does not claim that truth and empirical verification are the same thing. He is saying that a statement is true if it cannot be empirically falsified, if such a test was available. Pierce considers pragmatism to be a method of reflection that assists in making ideas clear. His pragmatism is a rejection of nominalism—where universals are mere names—and the acceptance of realism.

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864—1937) was of German decent, educated in England, and was an instructor at Cornell University in America. Schiller was less inclined as compared to William James (see below) to indulge in metaphysical speculations. Schiller did have an anthropocentric (human-centered) outlook to the world where it demanded that man should view the world as a changing modification that man can mold. He attributes the aesthetic to metaphysics rather than some value of truth. His conclusion was no doubt fostered by his empirical verification standpoint. Schiller's main contribution was in the area of logic and contains more detail than James.

WILLIAM JAMES (A. D. 1842 - 1910)



Introduction

William James was one of the most popular philosophers in American history, though he had no disciples and very few followers. He promoted a “radical empiricism” which also had few subscribers. Most of his students became what was coined as the “new realists” which did follow certain thoughts of James but instead drew different conclusion. As a self-proclaimed radical empiricist, he was in principle opposed to traditional metaphysics in general and stood in opposition to absolute realism in particular. However, he did have a great respect for religion and sought to justify it on pragmatic grounds without compromising his pro-science worldview. James was inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce and attempted to expand the principles of pragmatism and apply them to the difficulties associated with philosophy in an attempt to revolutionize philosophical thought. Peirce initiated the use of ‘pragmatism,’ however it was James who revived it in 1889, though giving full credit for the term to Peirce. However, the manner in which James used it was renounced by Peirce.

The Life of William James

William James was born in New York in 1842. His mother was Mary Robertson Walsh James and his father was Henry James, Sr., an eccentric theologian who followed the mystical doctrines of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688—1772). William’s paternal grandfather was an Irish Presbyterian and a very successful businessman who amassed a large fortune. When James Sr. was left with a large sum of money from his father’s inheritance, he decided on a life of leisure and the writing on subjects of theology and philosophy. James Sr. had associations with Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Young William James paternal grandfather was Irish and a Calvinist.

The James household did not adhere to any strict forms of religion. The family had many spirited philosophical conversations on a wide variety of topics. William was among three brothers, one of which was to become a novelist, and one sister. From 1855 to 1860, James primary education was received in schools in England, France, Switzerland, and Germany. James’ interests were divided between the natural sciences and the painting arts. In 1860, James decided to focus on becoming a painter much to his father’s dislike. After he realized that he could only become a mediocre artist, he redirected his interests. In 1861, he attended the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard and began studying chemistry. He later studied anatomy, physiology and evolution. In 1864, he transferred to the medical school. While attending school in 1865/66, he accompanied an expedition to Brazil where he contracted smallpox. In 1867, illness and the desire to further his education in experimental physiology, he went to Germany. In the following year, he received his medical degree at Cambridge. He later began teaching anatomy and philosophy at Harvard in 1873, psychology in 1875, and philosophy again in 1879. In 1878 at the age of thirty-six, he married Alice Howe Gibbens.

James had suffered an emotional ‘philosophical’ crisis in 1870. He suffered from the realization that he lacked moral strength leaving him feeling weak. James was a religious man like his father. He struggled between the concepts of a scientific worldview that excluded the freedom of the will and the religious worldview that included it along with the belief in God. His belief in the freedom of the will was aided by the writings of French philosopher Charles Renouvier (1815—1903). His thought for a cure was his philosophical justification in believing in the freedom of the will of man. It was this idea about the freedom of the will that moved his philosophy to maturity, leading to a defense of free will, moralism, and belief. He continued to teach until his resignation with Harvard in 1907.

The Works of William James

One of James’ prominent writing is the *Principles of Psychology* (1890) which is both a literary and scientific work. James writing in psychology is a standard text and authority on psychology. The following is a list of other works by William James: *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (1897), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), *Pragmatism* (1907), *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), *The Meaning of Truth* (1909). The works published posthumously were *Memories and Studies* (1911), *Human Immortality, Some Problems of Philosophy* (1911), and *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912). His *Varieties of Religious Experience* is considered a classic in the field.

In the preface of *The Will to Believe*, he states his philosophical position as that of ‘radical empiricism.’ He states that the meaning behind this is that the conclusions concerning matters of fact are hypotheses that are liable for future modification. In his work *Some Problems of Philosophy*, empiricism is contrasted with rationalism. Rationalists are the men of principles whereas the empiricists are men of facts. Second, the rationalist moves from the whole to the parts, from universal to the particular, and makes truth claims based on deduction. The empiricist however begins with particulars and moves to the whole through induction.

His Philosophy

The manner in which pragmatism is generally used is credited to James. His pragmatic method for testing truth (different from the pragmatic theory of the *nature* of truth) is initiated by first determining what an idea really means based upon the facts. He was a pragmatist in his theory of truth and ethics holding to the simple view: “Does it work?” In James’ own words, “what concrete difference will its being true make in one’s actual life?” Truth is not inherent in an idea. “Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is *made* true by events.” These facts must be confirmed by some kind of observation or experiment. If there is substantiation, then the associated idea must be considered true; if there is a positive result from a test, then the idea is devoid of truth. Truth, then, is not inherent in an idea. “Truth happens in an idea. It becomes true, is made true, by events.” The worldview that works best is true (*Essays in Pragmatism*, 160–61; all citations in this article are from the writings of James. His pragmatic method does not commit to any particular philosophy. James did not hold to an a priori metaphysics especially seen in his *Principles of Psychology* where he means by metaphysics as “scholastic rational psychology” or “philosophical psychology.” However, he did side with a posteriori metaphysics which is similar to science in that it is descriptive and theoretical. In regard to science, further experimentation via scientific methods is used for confirmation. In regards to moral beliefs, consequences are observed. If an action is right, then the greatest amount of good will be gained in the long run. (James is evidently a Unitarian—right

and wrong are determined by consequences.) In all other cases, such as belief in God, if a person feels happier, is more useful to other, has greater confidence and courage, then that person has a right to accept and believe in the existence of God. If religious belief can be justified and based more than just on a single occurrence, it must also continue to be justified.

The appeal to experience is not new to philosophy. James was following in the traditions of empiricism. In British empiricism, there was the focus on epistemology—what can be known—but James opens up the borders and rules nothing out. His empiricism is more cosmological allowing a broader framework associated with experience. However, James's meaning behind this 'experience' remains somewhat imprecise.

James was influenced by the Darwinian theory of evolution. Feelings that evolve somehow say something about the world. However, religious experience is not justified by evolution (and neither is anything else particularly) but it is not discarded either. Religion and irreligion however have equal footing. To James, it was religious experience that mattered, not religious doctrine. When religion is void of experience, then it becomes "fossil conventionalism" (*The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James*, 1885).

Religious truth can only be confirmed when it makes some concrete and specific prediction about the world's future. These religious hypotheses are either supported or refuted according to James' pragmatism or his theory of belief which is presented in his essay "The Will to Believe." This essay argues for the right to believe, primarily in regards to moral actions, and provides some direction regarding religious interpretation.

His View of God

Religious experience is acceptable if there is warrant to believe as such since it does suggest that perhaps there is a "higher part of the universe" that is beyond the immediate experiences of the senses. However, James' supernaturalism has its limits—it cannot be the infinite and omnipotent God of traditional theism. James' god is finite (and perhaps even a combination of multiple gods) and works to some ultimate good. This god avoided being "the hallow unreal God of scholastic theology [theism], or the unintelligible pantheistic monster" (*Pluralistic Universe*, 316). The theistic God is so transcendentally distinct from his creatures that mankind and God have nothing in common (*Ibid.*, 26), and this pantheistic God swallows all people in the absolute unity of its consciousness. James position fits neatly with his finite godism where he accepts a "superhuman consciousness" who was not all-embracing but was rather finite in power and/or knowledge (*Ibid.*, 311). "All the evidence we [as people] have seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious" (*Ibid.*, 309). The focal point to this is that he posits some greater power that is friendly to humankind and human ideals. Such a power "should be both other and larger than our conscious selves" (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, 396).

James was careful not to claim too much about God which would border on over-belief. He speculated very little about his own over-beliefs. He concluded his classic *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?" (391). What was certain to him was that there is something "more" out there with which human beings can feel connected to as "a subconscious continuation of our conscious life." Shying away from the idea of over-belief and replacing it with what is common and generic, there is some sort of 'saving

experience' that comes from a positive content associated with religious experience. This 'experience' at least, James confessed, is literally and objectively true (Ibid., 386, 388).

Even though there are particular differences in the various worldviews in how they express ideals about God, James observed that all religious experiences had one thing in common: "they all agree that the 'more' really exists; though some of them hold it to exist in the shape of a personal god or gods, while others are satisfied to conceive it as a stream of ideal tendency embedded in the eternal structure of the world." He also found that there were generic agreements among religions when considering the god(s) acts—it is beneficial to give one's life to him/them. James noticed the difference in these religions was how they explained what was meant by the union of man with the divine that comes with religious experience (Ibid., 385). Anything beyond this was speculative over-belief. Christian theism, for example, would define the 'more' as Yahweh God and the union with God based on the righteousness of Christ. Such beliefs according to James were mere speculation.

The Nature of the Universe

Taking a pluralistic position, James says that these two see the history of the world the same. The theist hypothesizes and says that God put the world in motion whereas the materialist says that matter got it going. From the pragmatic perspective, no future details are available, therefore the discussion stalls. However, if the dilemma is looked at prospectively (rather than retrospectively), in regards to what future promises are made by both camps, then theism seems to win because of its prediction of an ideal order. Somehow God would not allow *total* destruction of his work. However, the materialist can only hope for improved human ideals and achievements. Weighing in all things, theism seems to win out based upon the inner personal continuous conscious experiences. However, at the same time, James looks at the suffering and evil in the world and draws the conclusion towards finite godism—God is limited in what he can do.

James was opposed to both pantheism and materialism/atheism. He claimed that the world was not reducible to matter, nor was it pure mind or spirit. Instead, James took a pluralistic view of the universe—it contained many diverse things. Nevertheless, the universe is not truly distinct from God. He states that "[t]he theistic conception [of the world], picturing God and his creation as entities distinct from each other, still leaves the human subject outside of the deepest reality in the universe" (*Pluralistic Universe*, 25). James's distinctive views identify him as close in thought to what would later be called "panentheism"—God animates the world the way a soul does a body.

His View of Miracles

James labels the Christian miracle-working God as "grotesque" in conforming nature to human wants. He states that "[t]he God whom science recognizes must be a God of universal laws exclusively, a God who does a wholesale, not a retail business" (*Varieties*, 372–74). James's God is organically connected with the world. He continues: "The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champions of which in alternation, different men may all find worthy missions. Each attitude being a syllable in human nature's total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely" (Ibid., 368).

Even though James's view carries a naturalistic tone, he did consider the supernatural. He surmised that Christianity surrendered to naturalism too easily by taking its precepts regarding the physical sciences at face value. Naturalism, by contrast, is "...the curdling cold and gloom and absence of all permanent meaning..." Which "is in a position similar to that of a set of people living on a frozen lake, surrounded by cliffs over which there is no escape" (Ibid., 122). Like Kant, James

believed theistic supernaturalism was unnecessarily confining itself to sentiments about life as a whole, which theism views too optimistically. In this over-optimistic, universalistic way of looking at the ideal world, practicality disappears (ibid.). James' further "refined" supernaturalism admits "providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real world together by interpolating influences from the ideal religion among the forces that causally determine the real world's details" (Ibid., 392).

James did hold to a worldview of reality that was broader than the one accepted by science. "The God whom science recognizes must be a God of universal laws exclusively, a God who does a wholesale, not a retail business" (James, *Varieties*, 372-374). He spoke of his "own inability to accept either popular Christianity or scholastic theism.." (Ibid., 393) because he believed it surrendered too easily to naturalism. Although he was willing to use the term *supernatural*, he did not mean it in the theistic sense. He would not accept the idea of "miraculous healings," which was a prevalent thought in the late nineteenth century. He objected to any supernatural interruption of a natural process where these phenomena must be dismissed by the scientist as figments of the imagination. With almost prophetic awareness of the next century, James added, "No one can foresee just how far this legitimization of occultist phenomena under newly found scientist titles may proceed—even 'prophecy,' even 'levitation,' might creep into the pale" (Ibid., 378).

However, there was another sort of everyday miraculous activity that was more gladly received—God's subtle, even subliminal influences on man through the natural world. If "there be a wider world of being than that of our everyday consciousness, if in it there be forces whose effects on us are intermittent, if one facilitating condition of the effects be the openness of the 'subliminal' door, we have the elements of a theory to which the phenomena of religious life lend plausibility." James was so impressed by the importance of these "transmundane energies" that he believed they influenced the natural world (Ibid., 394).

Based on his denial of the miraculous, except within stringent naturalistic guidelines, James also denied any life-changing conversion experience. James skeptically claimed that "converted men as a class are indistinguishable from natural men; some natural men even excel some converted men in their fruits." He continues and states that even "[t]he believers in the non-natural character of sudden conversion have had practically to admit that there is no unmistakable class-mark distinctive of all true converts" (Ibid., 192).

His View on the Nature of Truth

James' pragmatic method is a test of truth wherein a hypothesis is verified by its consequence. Though this is a form of empiricism, it also relates to realism. If there is something that 'ought' to be believed, then this 'ought' must be explained in concrete terms. Truth is something of which we must be fully aware, if we are to not perish. For in the long run we cannot live with what is false because reality compels us to live in truth. There may be some raw obsession that may account for the existence of authoritative truth. Men create truth as a result of their activity. This view of human activity in the world is called 'humanism.' Truth and falsity apply to the ideas that are focused on objects. These ideas are mutable in the sense that they can be modified or used to replace one idea for another. Ideas then are judged as better or worse falling between some ideal limits called truth and falsity. In James' views truth is associated with the good—truth is an invention rather than a discovery. And again, he is arguing that these truths are ideas that 'work' which leads to some sort of satisfaction and success.

According to James, the nature of truth is not a direct disclosure of or correspondence with a certain reality but rather is a relationship between human ideas and the rest of human experience. The traditional theory of truth is that *which agrees with reality*. James responds by asking, in what sense do true ideas agree with reality? Do these ideas copy it? Ideas agree with reality only in the sense that acting upon the idea leads to a satisfactory consequence. Truth for him is a certain property of beliefs, not of things. Realities *are* and beliefs associated with them are true. Truth and falsity are predicated on propositions not on ‘things’ or ‘facts.’ Truth according to James is a relation between one part of experience and another. The truth of an idea is found in the process of its verification or validation. He also allows for those truths that can or could be verified in the future—these being truths in process.

Truths are the normal functions of ideas that are a part of life. Truths frequently change especially those scientific truths that change from time to time. Truth is associated with actions that take place in the future. Sometimes the past changes as well like, for example, the reasons why the United States has entered wars. Truth is what works at the time in light of that present situation.

James goes into further detail regarding circumstances. There are three kinds of realities in which a judgment must conform to some truth. First, there are those concrete facts of sense. Second, there are abstracts, such as math and logic. Third, there are other existing truths that affect the truth that is being sought.

James should not be misunderstood as claiming that just because a falsehood works that it can be labeled true if it worked or was beneficial to believe in it. When a truth works for James, it has to mediate between all other previous truth and possible future experiences. When a truth works, there is a measure of satisfaction associated with it. In addition, James is not promoting the belief in *any* proposition but rather believing in a proposition that is *right to believe in*. True then is defined as something that follows logically to a verification or towards a likely verification in the future, a case being potentially true. According to James, there is the human element of belief and knowledge. This human element finds a certain amount of satisfactoriness of opinion in distinguishing between truth from falsity. This methodology is based on standards within the experience and not outside the experience. The humanist regards truth as changing *with* experience whereas James, the pragmatist, views the world as an unfinished, changing, and growing experience.

His View of Human Beings

Human beings have two dimensions—spiritual as well as a material property. Evolution has formed the lower forms of life. Now humankind has reached a point of immortality. James rejects the naturalist’s assumption that the mind cannot survive death (see immortality below) because the ‘thinking’ is merely a function of the brain. He states that “[d]ependence on the brain for this natural life would in no wise make mortal life impossible—it might be quite compatible with supernatural life behind the veil hereafter” (see *Human Immortality*, 24, 38–39). Science can prove only the *concomitance* in the functioning of mind and brain; the *dependence* of the mind on the brain has not thereby been proven (Ibid., 42–43).

View of Good and Evil and Freedom of the Will

James did not find the answer to these questions either from Spencer’s mechanical evolution or Royce’s absolute idealism. Rather, as a pragmatist is concerned to know whether or not people make a difference in the world. As James considers his psychology background and considers what is carried to the next generation through heredity, influences made from environment, and our past

habits, there is still the issue of human choice. James positions himself as an indeterminist in that he thinks that humans can direct his own attentions, create new habits and break down old ones, and thus become to a certain extent masters of their own futures. These free choices enable a future world to be improved. The world is a mixture of both good and evil. Coupled to James' doctrine of chance is the idea that looking back into history some things seems to have been determined things.

James did believe that "saintliness" flowed from religious experience thus rejecting Nietzsche's view that the saint is a weak individual. James pointed to such strong figures as Joan of Arc and Oliver Cromwell as counter-examples. James praised the holy life, saying that it gave religion its "towering place in history" even when other aspects of faith did not stand up to practical common sense and empirical testing. He goes on and says, "Let us be saints, then, if we can, whether or not we succeed visibly and temporarily" (*Varieties*, 290).

As a relativist, he believed that "there is no such thing as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance" (*Essays*, 65). Thus, he did not believe in any absolute standard for the saintly life of good. Each person must find what works best for them. James offers only the general guideline that man should avoid "pure naturalism" on the one hand, because of its ineptness, and "pure salvationism" on the other, because of its other-worldliness (*Varieties*, 140). The human race as a whole helps in this process to determine the content of ethical philosophy as contributors to the race's moral life.

Despite his relativistic morality and tendency toward pantheism, James sharply parted with most pantheists in that he believed that evil is real, rather than just an illusion. He thought that both pantheism and theism were too radical of a break between concepts of absolute and relative morality. In effect, he sought to give quasi-absolute force to a set of universally accepted moral guidelines, even though they could not be called "absolutes." While the system may seem to hold together by weak threads, the connecting tie is pragmatism: "'The true,' to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving" (*Essays*, 170).

Human Destiny

James was opposed to both the optimistic and pessimistic views of human destiny. He could not agree with those who believed the world could not be salvaged. Optimism thinks the world's salvation inevitable. Midway between these two teachings was the doctrine of *meliorism*—teaching that while the world is not absolutely good nor absolutely bad, improvement is possible—which treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible. As a pragmatist, James felt compelled to accept change-for-the-better in the world as probable but not inevitable. James goes on to say that "[p]ragmatism has to postpone a dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in the long run" (*Pragmatism and Other Essays*, 125, 132).

James's realism led him to reject universalism's belief that all must be saved. "When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind forever, but the possibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept" (*Ibid.*, 130). To justify his position, he provides the following scenario:

Suppose that the world's author put the case to you before creation, saying: "I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each does its own 'level best.' I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through [sic]. It is a social scheme of co-

operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?” (Ibid., 127)

James believed that most people would take the adventurous risk in favor of non-existence. This he sees as the current condition of the world.

An Evaluation of William James

James said many things with which even an orthodox Christian could agree. For example, he rejected that man is only a material being and accepts the possibility of immortality. He acknowledges the reality of evil and that humanity was more than just matter. He also rejected pantheism and avoided atheism. Even though he was not a theist, he did believe in some sort of god and his (its) work in the created order. Indeed, James was not even a Universalist since he accepted the possibility of some sort of ultimate loss for the reprobate. If man wanted to believe in God, he had the right to do so. James saw value of belief in man's life and commended holy and righteous living.

However, James' notion of finite godism is contrary to orthodox theism because it posited limitations on God. This particular view left him without any full assurance of a final victory over evil—a finite God does not have the power to assure final triumph. He also rejected supernaturalism because it seemed to be illogical to him. However, he did admire the impact of believers, those who believed in the supernatural, on the world, like those of Cromwell, and Stonewell Jackson, and the advancements in educational and social institutions, hospitals, the Red Cross, abolition of slavery, and rescue missions.

Lastly, his pragmatism in the end does not work. The only way it can is if man had infinite knowledge of all possible consequences to every possible action. Neither does James' denial of absolutes work. For James, the only right way to live was by the expedient as the truth was the expedient in the way of knowing. It was one of his Harvard colleagues, Josiah Royce, who penetrated James' pragmatism when he asked if he would take the witness stand in a courtroom and swear “to tell the expedient, the whole expedient, and nothing but the expedient, so help him future experience!”

James' Influence on the “New Realism”

William James is considered by some to be the forerunner of what was labeled the “New Realism.” This doctrine was promoted by the following scholars: Edwin Bissell Holt, Walter Taylor Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter Boughton Pitkin, and Edward Gleason Spaulding. This doctrine's focal point is the rejection of John Locke's epistemological dualism. Some of James's doctrines can lead to this conclusion. However, for James' consciousness is teleological—human freedom can make a difference in world events by assisting God in the carrying out these events. The following is a list of those ideals that lead to this conclusion.

1. James did not regard the mind as creative but rather selective. Regarding moral conduct, all thoughts are selective when viewing from available option presented before it, i.e., the mind does not *produce* the options but rather chooses from among the best options.
2. Consciousness is not its own distinct existence. Instead, consciousness is a *grouping*—choosing from selection of objects picked out by the organism (mind).
3. Pure experience is a neutral thing. Consciousness is a collection of pure experiences that are practical and functional.

The new realists implied that knowledge is an external thing. This view then posits the

impossibility of an a priori world. Man normally thinks of objects in the world existing independent of knowing but the new realists say that there is no substantial difference between mind and matter. They attempted to do this by eliminating consciousness and explaining awareness of an object simply as a response by an organism—a motion of particles. Cognition belongs to the same world as the world of objects, thus rejecting representationalism—no object image. This becomes a sticking point is when the inquiry is made concerning memory's recall of past events. The answer calls for brain states sustained by extra-organic causes (Montague, *The New Realism*).

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JOHN DEWEY (A. D. 1859 - 1952)



Introduction

Probably the most eminent American philosophers that has appeared in the twentieth century are Josiah Royce, William James, and John Dewey, resulting in nearly every philosopher and educator being influenced by one of these great thinkers. Royce set his emphasis in the old and cultured America finding his refuge in the Absolute. James lived in the upper Northeast and finding much disorder in the world, he sought to analyze the psychological and religious approaches to these problems. Dewey however, seemed to understand America better than the other two, at least according to his followers. Dewey has been called the father of the modern American education because of his immense influence in this area. He signed the *Humanist Manifesto* (1933) and was a leader in the movement to turn education toward secular humanism. As a philosopher and writer he is closely identified with the philosophy of instrumentalism, also known as progressivism or pragmatic humanism.

John Dewey was the leader in the pragmatic movement in social and political philosophy. He thought the role of social philosophy was to help men solve social problems by supplying men the theories used in projects of reform. He also rallied for increased democratization of American life in order to equalize wealth and seek the elimination of the privilege class. Therefore, the task of philosophy was to clear out the obstacles so that these goals could be met. His social experiment was to allow all to flourish. In order to accomplish this on an individual basis, he advocated the “application of intelligence—free and open discussion of many participants—to solving problems.”

His Life and Works

John Dewey was born and native to Burlington, Vermont. After three years of high school education, he went under the private tutelage of Henry Augustus Pearson Torrey (1837—1902, considered an Intuitionist) who was then professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont. Under Torrey’s guidance, Dewey studied the history of philosophy and philosophical German in the native language. After studying at the University of Vermont, he became a high school teacher. It was his essay on the metaphysical assumptions of materialism that in part led him to enter John Hopkins University (JHU) where he later completed his graduate (1884) and received his doctorate degree from George Sylvester Morris (1840—1889) who studied philosophy and theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York, was an educator and philosophical writer and authored *Philosophy and Christianity*). While at JHU, he studied C.S. Pierce first pragmatists, G.S. Hall, the first American experimental psychologist, G. S. Morris a neo-Hegelian, and T. H. Huxley, through whom he became interested in philosophy. His dissertation was on the psychology of Kant. It was Morris who taught Dewey about Kant and Hegel which sparked in him an interest for other British Neo-Hegelians. Dewey then followed Morris to the University of Michigan (UOM). Dewey became

dissatisfied with the pure speculation of philosophy and rather sought ways to make philosophy more relevant to the practical dealings of men. In 1904, Dewey became professor of philosophy at Columbia University where he was professor emeritus in 1929. While at Columbia University, he defended his foe, Bertrand Russell. He later held a full professorship at the University of Minnesota before succeeding Morris (d. 1889) at the UOM.

Some believe that Dewey's most significant years were spent at the University of Chicago between 1894 and 1904. This opportunity gave him a chance to work out his diverse interests, especially those of social and urban life mixing with workers, union organizers, and political radicals. It was here that he launched out of his Neo-Hegelianism and began his Instrumentalism, also called Operationalism. He found that the mid-westerners were a practical folk where this carried over to their educational system as well. The students seemed to want an education that would benefit their future vocations. He saw that the student body was diverse and represented many nationalities. His conclusion: anybody was as good as anybody else and there really were no 'native' instincts providing any consequence to the human race. All that man does is a result of habits that can be modified through education and, equal opportunities for such should be open to *all* men. Since the political, economic, and social structure of the mid-westerners was quickly changing, Dewey believed that education was needed in order to prepare for a better democracy. *Nothing should stand in the way of social reconstruction.* It was Dewey who sought to be a reformer in order to make everything socialized without becoming socialistic. He believed that education should be available on equal terms to children and adults of all races, religions, and social classes.

The Writings of John Dewey

In 1904, Dewey went to Columbia University in New York City to teach in the philosophy department until his retirement in 1929. John Dewey wrote a variety of works on a several topics. His more technical writings include: *Experience and Nature*, *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), and *Logic*. He also wrote *Essays in Experimental Logic*. His more popular works are *School and Society*, *How We Think*, *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), *The Public and Its Problems*, *Freedom and Culture*, *A Common Faith* (1934), *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus* (1894), *Democracy and Education* (1916), and *Characters and Events*. He also wrote *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought* (1910). Dewey also wrote many articles that appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy*. His *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920) was probably his most popular work. In his *The Quest for Certainty* (1929), he proposed an 'experimental theory of knowing' that was to improve upon empiricism and rationalism and epistemology of Kant. Dewey wrote many books and numerous articles on topics ranging from education and democracy (*Democracy and Education*, 1916), to psychology (*Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1930), logic (*Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, 1938), and even art (*Art as Experience*, 1934). His view of God and religion is best expressed in *A Common Faith* (1934).

Dewey's View on Society and Philosophy

Dewey blames the improper divisions of society into conflicting groups on the dualisms associated with general and educational philosophy. Society had been divided into classes where there were those in the cultural education and those in the humble vocational group. Aristocrats, such as Plato and Aristotle, looked down on skilled worker and put too much stock in the intellectual speculation without the practical. Descartes and his successors placed too much emphasis on the nature-mind dualism. Hobbes and Bentham looked at life from an egocentric perspective. Dewey

however sees some merit is studying the history of philosophy, however done very carefully and critically. Dewey thought that philosophy should rise out of problems found in social life. Philosophy is *thinking*—seeing unsolved problems, viewing difficulties, then suggesting solutions. Philosophers are likely to offer these solutions inspired by their own social class. This is where the connection is to be made between philosophy and education. Education evaluates rival philosophical alternatives. It has in a sense a two-fold agenda: first, criticize existing objectives against existing science; second, separate the obsolete from those objectives that can be reconstructed to meet the intensions of the current social situation. It is education then that is the laboratory where these new philosophical doctrines can be tested. This is Dewey's instrumentalism.

The key to his instrumentalism is experience. In his early days, he held to the Hegelian ideals associated with the nineteenth-century idealists—experience was a single, dynamic, unified whole where everything is interrelated. There are no disconnects in experience and nature. However, he came to believe some critical issues with this line of thinking. First, he realized the idealists distorted the character of experience because of a lack of reflective thinking. Modern philosophy was too concerned with epistemological issues that they mistakenly thought that *all* experience was some form of knowing. Man is an acting being and he experiences things that are also non-reflective as well. Second, Dewey insists that man experiences are overlapping and interpenetrating providing each with its own unity. Here is where he rejects the idealist's notion of a single unified whole where *everything* is interrelated. Third, the idealists, he claims, did not have a grasp on the organic nature of experience. This resulted in their overgeneralizations. As the human sciences were growing in their understanding of the anthropological-biological situation, the organic character of experience began to emerge. This 'later Dewey' was on the cutting edge of comprehending the meaning of experience, which combined Greek naturalism with the reflection of experience.

All that can be known comes through experience, not just man's conscious and unconscious realizations, but also the contents of nature—earth, plants, animals, man, the outer universe, history, and the present—can be experienced. Therefore, all experience because it is continuing in time is subject to change. Man is involved in a continuing interaction with nature and through this effort he can come to understand its essential character. Science monitors changes and catalogues them under laws. Other experiences fall under myths, magic, politics, and the aesthetic. Philosophy too needs to change along with these changing experiences. It is here where philosophy has a two-fold task: criticize existing objectives in regards the present, and second, determine which objectives have become obsolete and reconstruct new ones. What the scientists and philosophers should do is reconstruct and reorganize the earlier experiences into new reinterpretations. It is here where Dewey draws the following conclusion: there are no absolutes and no unchangeable truths because there is a continuum of change and experience. [Wright] Dewey criticizes the old epistemological model of the absolute certainty of truth where it claimed that there are self-evident truths known by rational thought, or obtained by the senses, where a construct can be made for the remainder of knowledge. Dewey claims that the model is confused and misguided. He claims there are no first-truths that can be known with certainty because knowledge is self-corrective where it becomes vindicated with time and experience. When change and uncertainty arise, man learns from the past resulting in an alteration for the future. Mind and matter change as experience changes. It is here where Dewey is a meliorist—the world can be made better through human effort.

Dewey's "Societal" Philosophy: Instrumentalism

Dewey is known for his instrumentalism—his version of pragmatism. He describes it as

empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism. He was primarily interested in viewing the problems of value and human conduct, and observing society and education. The connecting thread through these interests is in reflective thinking. Thought to Dewey was the active relationship between a living organism and its environment. It was not an ultimate or an absolute, or a process that creates an objective reality in a metaphysical sense. Neither is it something in humans that represents a non-natural element. Thought is just one among many other natural activities. Thought is a highly developed form of the relation between the stimulus and the response to that stimulus on a purely biological level. Thought then, when stimulated by a problem, seeks to change its environment. Thought then becomes part of the process and yet it interrupts the process through recognition of the problem. Thought then ranges from common sense to scientific inquiry—both addressing and attempting to solve some problematic situation.

Reflective thinking consists of successive ideas leading towards future judgments that support one another. This combination is a movement that works towards particular ends—new solutions to old problems. Reflective thinking follows a five-step process. Step one is to consider vague alternatives to a particular problem. Step two intellectualizes the problem weighing pros and cons. Step three considers appropriate hypotheses. Step four uses deduction in light of previous experience(s). And lastly, step five tests these hypotheses inductively through experimentation.

Not only does Dewey state the environmental nuances associated with the world of change but he also considers cultural nuances as affecting the thought process. Here it can be observed that Dewey holds to a ‘naturalism’ where thought develops from a relationship between an organism and his environment. Dewey’s notion of thought can be described as a kind of empiricism—starting at experience which leads back to experience. It starts with a problematic situation and ends when the environment is changed. Dewey places emphasis on *doing* as a focal point in the process of knowing where the knower is an active participant in the knowing process. This includes the active participation of the knower in concert with sensed data. Dewey posits that knower’s select data instead of just be given the data. Dewey, along with James and Lewis, agree that knowledge requires this active interpretation.

Dewey’s Philosophy of Religion in the Age of Science

As a secular humanist, Dewey rejected a belief in a theistic God because modern science that made such a belief untenable. In his work titled *A Common Faith*, he states that “The impact of astronomy eliminated the older religious creation stories.” And “geological discoveries have displaced creation myths which once bulked large.” In addition, “biology has revolutionized conceptions of soul and mind . . . and this science has made a profound impression upon ideas of sin, redemption, and immortality.” Further, “anthropology, history and literary criticism have furnished a radically different version of the historic events and personages upon which Christian religions have built.” Psychology “is already opening to us natural explanations of phenomena so extraordinary that once their supernatural origin was, so to say, the natural explanation” (*A Common Faith*, 31).

Dewey believed that science had made even agnosticism too mild of a reaction to traditional theism. “‘Agnosticism’ is a shadow cast by the eclipse of the supernatural” (Ibid., 86). And “generalized agnosticism is only a halfway elimination of the supernatural.” As an antitheist or atheist, he rejected any attempt to support the existence of God. “The cause of the dissatisfaction is perhaps not so much (1) the arguments that Kant used to show the insufficiency of these alleged proofs, as it is the growing feeling (2) that they are too formal to offer any support to religion in

action” (Ibid., 11). Since there is no Creator, human beings were not created. For Dewey modern men and women think in scientific and secular terms, thus, they must now take a naturalistic view of origins. Humanity is a result of naturalistic evolutionary processes, not the special creation by any kind of God. Dewey believed that secularism had caused a “diffusion of the supernatural through secular life” (Ibid., 65). Secular interests had grown independent of organized religion and had “crowded the social importance of organized religions into a corner and the area of this corner is decreasing” (Ibid., 83).

Dewey on the Value of Right and Wrong

Some of the Greek philosophers (e.g., Plato), as well as several moderns, have recognized absolute and eternal values prescribing right from wrong. In addition, Christian theologians have affirmed the existence of absolute values too and have attributed these to God’s reason and will. As we have seen, Dewey rejects the existence of any type of absolute value in any way. Values undergo modification and reconstruction through the course of reflective thinking being evidenced in social change and scientific knowledge. It is here where his instrumentalism plays out in the area of ethics. It is also here where Dewey seems to side with Unitarianism applied to ethics looking at the consequences associated with actions. (However, he does not side with hedonism) It is not surprising that Dewey does not hold to any hard-and-fast set of values because it would bring a ball and chain to progress. Therefore, moral growth is an outcome from one age to another.

Dewey on the Relative Nature of Truth

Dewey is also opposed to any homage in religion that pays respect to the supernatural. “The claim on the part of religions to possess a monopoly of ideas and of the supernatural means by which alone, it is alleged, they can be furthered, stands in the way of the realization of distinctively religious values inherent in natural experience” (Ibid., 27–28). Science and its advances call into question the very notion of the supernatural and it continues to explain the phenomenon of nature. Belief in the supernatural, according to Dewey, is based on ignorance and “[i]t stifles the growth of the social intelligence by means of which the direction of social change could be taken out of the region of accident, as accident is defined” (Ibid., 78). Religion attempts to attach importance to *their* intellectual beliefs which include the cognitive adherence to some unseen power that controls human destiny. This allegiance requires some form of obedience, reverence, and worship (Ibid., 7). In addition, there appears to be a vast difference between the religions and no common denominator of meaning. Again, this shows the inadequacies of religion.

However, though Dewey rejects the supernatural he does not consider himself irreligious. He embraces the need for and preservation of religion. It is here where he is attempting to break new ground where he says the following. “I shall develop another conception of the nature of the religious phase of experience, one that separates it from the supernatural and the things that have grown up about it.” And “I shall try to show that these derivations are encumbrances and that what is genuinely religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them; that then, for the first time, the religious aspect of experience will be free to develop freely on its own account” (Ibid., 2). The old idea of the supernatural can be replaced by man’s experience and the application of his inner ‘universal’ religiousness. Since people are *religious* rather than have a religion, there is much to be gained by rejecting religion and applying their religiousness. As Dewey said, “I believe that many persons are so repelled from what exists as a religion by its intellectual and moral implications, that they are not even aware of attitudes in themselves that if they came to fruition would be genuinely

religious” (Ibid., 9).

The Elimination of Supernatural Religions

Dewey believed that religious belief in the supernatural hindered social progress. He says that “Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing. Dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor” (Ibid., 46). He thinks that the problem is religion’s sacred-secular split. “The conception that ‘religious’ signifies a certain attitude and outlook, independent of the supernatural, necessitates no such division.” For “It does not shut religious values up within a particular compartment, nor assume that a particular form of association bears a unique relation to it. Upon the social side the future of the religious function seems preeminently bound up with its emancipation from religions and a particular religion” (Ibid., 66, 67).

Not only does he think that social progress is hindered but also social values are deprecated by belief in the supernatural. “The contention of an increasing number of persons is that depreciation of natural social values has resulted, both in principle and in actual fact, from reference of their origin and significance to supernatural sources” (Ibid., 71). He further adds, “I have suggested that the religious element in life has been hampered by conceptions of the supernatural that were imbedded in those cultures wherein man had little control over outer nature and little in the way of sure method of inquiry and test” (Ibid., 56).

A New Religious System of Secular Humanism

Dewey was not proposing that a new natural religion replace the supernatural religion. Instead, he wanted to liberate certain elements and outlooks that might be called religious (Ibid., 8) from religion. The difference between a religion and the religious is that a religion “always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight.” By contrast, “the adjective ‘religious’ denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of beliefs.” Rather, “it denotes an attitude that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal” (Ibid., 9, 10). (This follows suit with his doctrine of change and Instrumentalism, and applied to religion, he wants to replace ‘traditional religion’ with a ‘religious attitude’ that reorients life.) Dewey defines “religious” as “any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality” (Ibid., 27), albeit, and attitude verse an act. Therefore, the belief in the supernatural must be overthrown and replaced by a more scientific approach to the road of truth. The old method hampered the development of the universal religiousness element of life towards the good life. The supernatural religion created a gulf between the sacred and the secular where its assumptions were based upon ignorance of the causes and operations of nature. (Even agnosticism provided a shadow of the supernatural.) Further, the old religion involved assent to doctrines that were not open for public review but rather became limiting and private. Hence, the new religiousness carves a path for adaptations and modifications to a changing world.

Dewey aligns himself with Friedrich Schleiermacher. He claimed that religious experience involves a feeling of dependence. He insisted that it must be a dependence without traditional doctrines or fear (Ibid., 25). Religious experience helps to develop a sense of unity impossible without it. In a religious experience, “the self is always directed toward something beyond itself and

so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe” (Ibid., 19).

Such experiences occur in different ways in different people. “It is sometimes brought about by devotion to a cause; sometimes by a passage of poetry that opens a new perspective; sometimes as was the case with Spinoza . . . through philosophical reflection.” Religious experiences appear not to be necessarily unique species of their own. Rather, “they occur frequently in connection with many significant moments of living” (Ibid., 14). Religious experience is a kind of unifying ideal of other experiences in life.

Dewey’s View of God

Dewey used the term “God” not in the sense of a supernatural Being instead as “ the ideal ends that at a given time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take on unity” (Ibid., 42). God to him represents a unification of one’s own essential values pointing towards progress and achievement of ideal values.

He believed that it is essential that all persons have such religious ideas. “Neither observation, thought, nor practical activity can attain that complete unification of the self which is called a whole. The *whole* self is an ideal, an imaginative projection” (Ibid., 19). Thus, self-unification can be achieved only through a religious commitment to “God” (that is, to ideal-values). Says Dewey, “I should describe this faith as the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (Ibid., 33).

Dewey’s religious form of pragmatic humanism was world-wide in scope as promoted in his “common faith.” He states his plan by clearly: “Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant” (Ibid., 87). He saw the doctrine of ‘the brotherhood’ as having the greatest religious significance. “Whether or not we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite” (Ibid., 84). The traditional view was too severe which castrated the vital nerve of religion. Rather, it is the social welfare of mankind that is the supreme good shown in religion.

This faith in science has according to Dewey advantages over traditional religion. Science provides a means for human progress because it is a method, not a set of fixed beliefs. Science is a way to change thinking via tested inquiry. Not only is science superior to religion, but it opposes religious dogma. Falling in line with his doctrine of experience and progressive philosophy, he states that “[f]or scientific method is adverse not only to dogma but to doctrine as well, provided we take ‘doctrine’ in its usual meaning—a body of definite beliefs that need only to be taught and learned as true.” However, “This negative attitude of science to doctrine does not indicate indifference to truth. It signifies supreme loyalty to the method by which truth is attained. The scientific-religious conflict ultimately is a conflict between allegiance to this method and allegiance to even an irreducible minimum of belief so fixed in advance that it can never be modified” (Ibid., 38, 39). In other words, science and traditional religion based on the supernatural are irreconcilable. But religiousness dedicated to science is essential if humanity is to progress.

Faith and Social Reform

Dewey's faith was in science. Science is critical intelligence, and it was this intelligence that is more religious than faith in any revelation from the supernatural God of traditional religion. However, he did see the need for a doctrinal foundation of some sort. He says that "[s]ome fixed doctrinal apparatus is necessary for a religion. But faith in the possibilities of continued and rigorous inquiry does not limit access to truth to any channel or scheme of things." This faith reveres intelligence as a force (Ibid., 26).

Coinciding with his social reform, he saw that absolute was found in the democratic progress. Recall that he opposed the traditional supernatural religion because it stifled social progress. He said "the assumption that only supernatural agencies can give control is a sure method of retarding this effort [of social betterment]" (Ibid., 76).

He proposed a solution for social development. "In the first stage, human relationships were thought to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as to require redemption from external and supernatural sources." This previously instilled doctrine from the traditional religions must be rejected. "In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is found to be akin to values esteemed distinctively religious." This too must be surpassed. "The third stage would realize that in fact the values prized in those religions that have ideal elements are idealizations of things characteristic of natural association which have been projected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction. . . . Unless there is a movement into what I have called the third stage, fundamental dualism and a division in life continue" (Ibid., 73). The solution therefore is up to humankind to achieve the social progress that is needed if progress is to be had. The only method to achieve this end is found in science. Dewey states the solution to future success: "There is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experimental record and controlled reflection" (Ibid., 32). For "were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth that conveyed by the word 'scientific' in its most general and generous sense—no discovery in any branch of knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious" (Ibid., 33).

An Evaluating John Dewey's Views

Of course, there were some positive features in Dewey's thought. Children do learn by doing. There should be a practical element to learning. We do need to be good citizens. Democracy does depend on educated voters. Religion has been guilty of institutionalizing itself. We should not eliminate the religious aspect of education. Progress in education and society is desirable, and so on.

However, Dewey's rejection of the traditional Judeo-Christian values on which our society was founded for a humanistic, naturalistic, and relativistic one is unfounded and disastrous. There are many reasons for rejecting his overall humanistic religious enterprise for our schools and society.

First of all, his rejection of traditional theistic beliefs, such as America was founded on, is unjustified rationally, constitutionally, and socially. Our founding document spoke of our "Creator," "creation" and God-given "inalienable" rights based on "Nature's Laws" that come from Nature's "God." Our Founding fathers warned that our system would collapse if the Judeo-Christian principles were taken away (see George Washington's First Inaugural Address).

Second, Dewey's overall educational philosophy has been tried and it has not worked. Perhaps the most damaging criticism that can be given to a pragmatic philosophy is that it does not

work. After generations of trial and error in Dewey's educational philosophy, we rank lower than most industrial nations and never first, second, or third in most of the categories.

Third, his anti-supernaturalism was unfounded. It is based in his rejection of theism for which he provided no rational arguments. His reasoning was sociological and political, not rational and philosophical.

Fourth, Dewey's relativism in truth and ethics is self-defeating. One cannot deny objective truth without making an objective truth claim.

Fifth, his relativistic ethic is also unjustified. Whatever works is necessarily right. All that success proves is that a given course of action *works*; it does not prove the course of action is *right*. Some things that work very well are simply evil. Ethical questions are not settled by obtaining desired results. No pragmatist would appreciate someone misrepresenting his view simply because it worked accomplished its task. The truth is that to show that *all* is relative, one must have a non-relative vantage point from which to view all of truth or else their claim is self-contradictory.

Sixth, Dewey's idea of social progress is meaningless without an unchanging moral standard by which it is measure. We can't know things are getting better, unless we know what is Best. It must be asked: By what standard is progress to be measured against? If the standard is within society, then we cannot be sure we are *progressing*. Maybe we are only *changing*. If the standard is outside the race, this is a transcendent norm, a divine imperative, which Dewey rejects. Second, there is no fixed point of reference for measurement. If there is no fixed point, then change is evaluated on an indeterminate sliding scale. In practice, progressivism is grounded on the wishes of those with the power to set the schedule.

Seventh, why social or democratic progressivism? After all, a society can progress toward ever-better dictatorships. Why not better monarchies? Or, better Aristocracies? Or, better forms of Communism? Why democracy? Emerging Muslim democracies resulting from free elections wish to impose *sharia* law on their people—something which would surely be repugnant to Dewey's whole philosophy. The truth is that Dewey's definition of "achievement" or "progress" in social and democratic terms was arbitrary and philosophically unjustified

Eighth, Dewey placed great emphasis on experience and science as the means for human achievement and progress. But human progress has not occurred in the century in which science progressed the most—the twentieth. And experience has shown that human have not made moral progress along with their great achievements in technology. They have only provided more technical and more efficient ways to pass on their corruption to others.

Finally, Dewey's definition of God is inept. He defines *God* as the ideal, a unifying goal for human progress is his own realm. But a mere idea lacks the appeal for a truly fulfilling religious commitment. Paul Tillich (see) defined religion as an ultimate commitment and noted than anything less than an ultimate commitment to the Ultimate will not be ultimately satisfying. Likewise, anything ultimately that less than Personal will not be ultimately satisfying to persons.

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His Life and Works

Sigmund Freud was born in Freiberg, Moravia (now part of the Czech Republic). When he was at the age of three, the family moved to Vienna where he later entered the university around seventeen years of age. While studying medicine, he focused on neurology and made significant contributions in laboratory research. Freud was influenced by Jean-Martin Charcot (1825—1893, French neurologist, professor of anatomical pathology, founder of modern neurology) and Josef Breuer (1842—1925), Austrian physician who laid foundation of psychoanalysis.

Freud turned his attention to psychological aspects of neurology. He later became known as the founder of psychoanalysis. He also was one of the most influential atheists in modern times providing a widely known explanation for disbelief in God. It was not until 1908 when psychoanalysis became not only a therapy but a movement. Freud's originality brought him into both conflicts and isolation. The later years of his life were met with international recognition. Freud was exiled to London, but his sisters remained in occupied Austria and were murdered by the Nazis.

Freud had married in 1886 to Martha Bernays and together they had six children. In cooperation with Breuer he wrote a work titled *Studies in Hysteria* (1895). Late in 1899, he wrote *The Interpretation of Dreams*. He made theoretical innovations in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, *The Ego and the Id*, and *Group Psychology and Analysis*. Many of his works were met with disagreement however, his friendships with colleagues remained. At his time of death, he left an unfinished work called *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. In addition to his works on psychology, Freud was preoccupied with religion. He wrote *Totem and Taboo* and *Moses and Monotheism*, but his most influential in undermining belief in God was the 1927 work, *The Future of an Illusion*.

Freud's Basic Concepts

Freud thought that neurotic behavior had a particular objective and purpose. When these purposes are understood in the adult, there is, according to Freud, some sort of reenactment of childhood happenings. These can be expressions of essentially childish fears and anxieties. Childhood trauma was thought to be repressed memory until some adult situation triggered or reawakened it from its unconscious complexity tied to memory and emotion. Freud was committed to the opinion that there is an empirical correlation between the occurrence of certain types of events from early childhood and the exhibition of particular traits showing up in adult life. These empirical correlations were associated with what Freud called repression—those things too painful to hold onto, sublimation—rechanneled drives that cannot find an outlet, and the unconscious self—a theoretical entity without which there would not be an intelligible connection between early childhood experiences and the adult life. Repression threatens the ego (the personality itself), so, it becomes defensive against disruptions. The ego's function is to reconcile the instinctual, the

biological demands of the id, and superego—the parental controlled unconscious mind.

His Methodology in Therapy

The purpose of psychoanalysis according to Freud is for the patient to become aware of his unconscious self. This will help the person to recover his lost memories connected to his unconscious motives. The goal is to return the patient to the point at which the conflict (or weakness) became embedded in his character that produced the inabilities and his subsequent neurosis.

Freud on Religion

According to Freud, religion is a product of wishful thinking wherein the idea of a monotheist omnipotent heavenly Father replaces the fallible human father figure. With this perspective, the position of a child can be retained into adult life. Thus, infantile behavior of guilt and forgiveness is perpetuated in religious experience. He also thought that religion was damaging to species because to him religion was illusory. Religion is based on wish fulfillment for it has no scientific evidence that provided distinguishing elements between reality and desire.

Freud admitted that his anti-religion position may be unjustified, even though he held strongly to it. He rejected the authoritarian aspect of religion. This too he thought was based on the illusory desire for wishful thinking and fulfillment. In psychoanalytic terms, it is the childhood security blanket that adults have not outgrown, a desire, in a sense, for a heavenly security blanket. Overall, the following is what he believed to be harmful when it came to religion: 1) Religion arises from the desire or wish for a Cosmic Comforter. 2) It originated during a primitive (ignorant) period of human development. 3) It drains energy from the drive to solve the world's problems. 4) It is selfish and impatient, wanting immediate, immortal reward upon death. 5) It may contribute to the passionate, irrational nature of man because of early religion indoctrination and the repression of sexual development. 6) It keeps people in a perpetual state of childhood immaturity. 7) Its adherents are closed-minded and they do not willingly give it up under any circumstances. 8) Religion is not needed because humanity now has science to control the world and, with resignation, can live with the rest. 9) Throughout thousands of years of effort, it has not brought personal and social satisfaction. 10) Religion has a specious and inauthentic basis: It is alleged to be true since: (a) our primal ancestors believed it, however, this is not a basis for belief; (b) miraculous proofs have been handed down from antiquity; (c) and it is impious or forbidden to question their authenticity.

Freud denied that experience of trances or some sort of Spiritism could justify religion. These experiences only show some sort of subjective mental state of the person who has fallen into them. Some inner human feeling of dependence on religion (or some indescribable or indefinable being) is not reason enough for one to accept the validity of religion. An unknowable, indefinable, or indescribable God is of no interest to human beings. Freud also thought that a rational reason for moral restraint was far better than a religious mandate.

On the other hand, Freud did however find some benefits to religion. He believed that there may be some truth in religion, in fact, some religions may be true and they provide great significance. Its truths maybe true from the standpoint that they cannot be disproved. There is a sense, from its adherents, of a feeling of dependence associated with religion where it provides great comfort. This comfort shared by the brotherhood comes to the aid when there needs to be some ease from suffering. It seems as though religion has played a part in influencing culture for the good.

Freud's Response to the His Objectors

Reason and Science are too slow. Responding the objection that “reason and science are too slow in providing needed comfort and answers,” Freud replied that reason is persistent and that it is better in the long run. Freud admitted that there are no guarantees of reward when looking only at reason and science. Such a guarantee can only be achieved by selfishness because reason is less selfish than religion. He also admitted that his own view might be an illusion and considered that the weakness of his view does not prove religion is right. If faith in reason is also intolerant and dogmatic, than at least reason can be given up and with no penalty for disbelief. However, religion cannot, because there is a penalty. Freud response is that, truth or not, human beings cannot do without religious consolation. However, they must eventually grow up.

Human beings are too passionate to be ruled by reason. To this objection, Freud replied: How does society know whether they are, for it has never been tried? In fact, religion is too dogmatic and intolerant. Further, there is no penalty for disbelief in reason, as there is in religion.

Moral chaos will result without religion. Not so, Freud claims. For reason is a better basis for morals. It also is untrue that we are helpless without religion, for we have science and the ability to resign ourselves to the handling of our own problems.

Reason is dangerous to the institution and work of religion. Freud’s response to this objection is brief and unconvincing to many. He claims that the truly religious person will not be moved by his view.

Evaluating Freud

Freud is not against religion per se, but only against dogmatic, authoritarian pietism, the kind of dependence upon religion promoted by Schleiermacher. Indeed, he even make allowance for himself being wrong regarding dogmatism and the benefits that religion may have in regards to what Schleiermacher means in that it may be necessary and true. In light of this, it seems as though Freud’s previous blanket rejection (see list above) may seem prejudiced, unreasonable, and even cruel. Indeed, he seems not to care that religious beliefs may be true, have altruistic goals, provide comfort, and have a good influence on society.

Incentives Associated with Religion

Those, including Freud, who assume that the desire for religion is based only upon comfort, are misdirected. He assumes religion has some connection to childhood immaturity and its need for comfort fixation. However, some religious obligations are not comfortable. Some religious activity is done out of a motivation of duty to God and others. Those who suffer persecution and martyrdom certainly are not finding comfort under their ill-treatment.

Second, assuming that some of our religious ancestors may have acted out of ignorance should not disqualify their religious conclusions. Not all did. Further, even among more modern and educated persons, there are premeditated agendas which instill unwarranted prejudices through secular worldviews that are anti-religious.

Historically, religion has stimulated many persons to help others in time of need. Further, religion has aided society rather than draining energy from it. William James (see) has shown that religious persons can be very strong. He wrote in *Varieties of Religious Experiences* that those who are in touch with a ‘higher world’ have more motivation to change the world they live in. Neither is it wrong to want justice or rightness when justice is due resulting in evil being punished or the down-trodden rescued. Nor is it wrong or selfish to reward the good.

Experience has shown that true religion does not contribute to uncontrolled passions except when they are manipulated to serve in inappropriate national or racial purposes. Freud claims that reason and science is a better basis for morals rather than a foundation based on religious underpinnings. In addition, religion represses and control human passions. However, it is often religion that ignites the fire that motivates morality that provides the catalyst for commitments to values. It is the driving force behind the control of passion. Lastly, Freud is correct that wish-fulfillment, belief in the face of absurdity, belief contrary to reality, subjective mental states, and ancestral beliefs are inadequate bases for belief. Religion should *not* be accepted simply because it is consistent, and certainly *not* because it is absurd. A completely indefinable God is of little interest to man. Religion should be based on objective rational, historical and livable truths.

In response to Freud's charge that religion perpetuates dependence, it should be noted that humans never outgrow their dependence on their environment or on the Universe or All. Creatures are dependent beings by their very nature. Only the Creator is totally independent. Further, dependence does not mean weakness. Dependence means that creatures realize that they are dependent beings who are in need and are willing to receive assistance from their Creator. To state that an acknowledgement for real aid received from the Creator is a sign of psychological weakness but is a fact of ontological contingency. It is not a psychosis to be dependent on food, water and air. Everyone has true needs or what Paul Tillich (see) called an "ultimate commitment." This need he speaks of is also echoed by those like Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre. The issue here is whether or not one is committed to the ultimate reality to supply his needs. Even Freud was commitment and dependent on the god he called Reason (Logos).

Further, just because many fail to use religion properly does not invalidate it any more than a person committing adultery invalidates marriage. Freud rejects the Bible as a historical manuscript without checking into its authenticity. Many who have enquired have found more evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ than for any other event from antiquity (see Frank Morrison, *Who Moved the Stone?*). Further, Freud gives no attention to the rational or experiential arguments for the existence of God (see N. L. Geisler, *Christian Apologetics*). Freud, did not base his conclusion on sound reason nor evidence. He published no research based on the study of believing clients to support his view. He simply wished it away. Indeed, it is not a psychological fact, based on extensive research, that those who believe in God live more healthy and happy lives than those who do not.

Freud's Claim that Reason Will Replace Religion

Freud insists that believer's unwillingness to give up religion is a sign that their belief is an illusion—based on wish fulfillment. However, Freud will not give up on reason and science and yet he claims this is not an illusion. Why then should a religious belief unwilling to give up on God be called an illusion? Thus, it could be argued that atheism is both dangerous. Belief in God is absolutely foundational to most forms of religion. Neither science nor resignation can replace religion. This is shown by the despair of those who reject and are without God (see Postmodernism below). Reason alone is found lacking because man needs God to explain the universal reasons for doing certain things —either doing the good ending in reward or the consequences for doing evil and suffering pain and punishment.

The question is not whether one has an ultimate commitment to something, but whether what he is committed to is really the Ultimate. Contrary to Freud, religion is needed. Human beings will never be able to control everything nor be content alone. Augustine was right when he said the soul is

restless until it finds its rest in God. Even the modern existential atheists acknowledged their need for God (see Sartre). Freud's claim that it is only a question of time where religion will replace religion, is only a hope (or wish); it is not a fact. Nearly a century has passed since Freud, and there is no evidence that religion is dying.

Responding to Freud's Claim That Religion is an Illusion

If Freud's position could be put in the form of a proposition, perhaps the following is how it could be stated.

Premise 1: An illusion is something based only in wish, not in reality.

Premise 2: The belief in God has the characteristics of an illusion.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, belief in God is a wish not based in reality.

Premise two can easily be challenged. Not all who believe in God do so simply because they wish for a Cosmic Comforter. Others search for and find God because they thirst for reality. Yet others are in search for truth and find in God truth. These simply are not motivated because they are concerned about feeling good.

There are though some discomfoting dimensions to the Christian belief in God. Not only is he a loving Father, he is also a fair and just Judge who punishes evil. Though Christians believe in hell as a place for punishment for the unrepentant, yet no one really wishes it to be true.

Is it possible that Freud may have his conclusion backwards in regards to this father image? Perhaps our images of earthly fathers are patterned after God, rather than the reverse. Maybe God has created man (and according to Christianity, God has done as such) in his image/likeness instead of the exact opposite—creating God in the image of man. Perhaps the Christian's belief in God is not based on the desire to *create* a Father in their minds. Maybe the atheist's belief that there is no God is based on their desire to *kill* the Father. It was Psychologist Paul Vitz (in *Faith of the Fatherless*) who turns Freud on Freud and shows that believers do not create the "Father" [God] but rather the atheist actually kills the "Father." He illustrates this by showing that an examination of the great atheist reveals they all had a non-existent or dysfunctional father and were projecting anger on the Father (God). Mere human desire for the existence of God is not the only basis for believing. There are many reasonable grounds for believing in God existence. At best, Freud's arguments would only apply to those who had no solid basis other than their own wishing so. Just because there may be some who do not believe in God does not negate the possibility of His existence.

Further, Freud confuses *wish* and *need*. What happens, as even many atheists have admitted (see postmodernism below), if there is a real *need* for God. If this is truly the case, then Freud's analysis of religious experience is quite inadequate. It is possible that Freud's belief in the non-existence of God is itself an illusion. If one does not want to be under the direction and care of God, including obedience to keep one from the undesirable consequences or punishment resulting from sin, then it is easier to assert that God does not exist. Indeed, if one is living in sin and rebellion against God, it may be temporarily comforting for them to believe that neither God nor hell exists.

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R. C. Sproul, *If There is a God, Why Are There Atheists?*

Introduction

There are primarily seven major worldviews that oppose the classical theistic worldview. Each of these is incompatible with the others. Logically speaking, only one worldview can be true, thus negating the rest. Likewise, neither can one hold consistently to more than one worldview because the central premises of each are opposed by the others. These other views listed below are opposed to traditional theism.

Theism holds that there is an infinite, personal God who is both “out there” (beyond the universe) who created it, sustains it now, and acts within the world in a supernatural way. God is also “in here” meaning that He is transcendent—His indwelling presence is in the universe—and immanent.

Deism claims that God is beyond the universe but that He does not intervene in it. Deism is similar to theism except it denies the possibilities of miracles. God is said to be transcendent but is not supernaturally immanent in it. Though deism holds that God did create the world, it holds more to a naturalistic perspective where God wound up the world like a clock and turned it loose and let it go. Proponents of deism are those such as Francois Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine.

Another view similar to theism is Finite godism which says that the finite God exists beyond the universe. Though God is beyond the universe and active in it, He is *not* infinite in nature or in power. Like the deist, the Finite Godist generally accepts the creation of the universe but denies any miraculous intervention in it. They claim that God’s apparent inabilities are to blame, for example, for the lack to the solution to the problem of evil. Examples of adherents to this view are: John Stuart Mill, William James (see profiles above), Peter Bertocci (1910—1989) wrote *Towards a Metaphysics of Creation* (1964), and Rabbi Harold Samuel Kushner (b. 1935) wrote *When Bad Things Happen to Good People*.

Atheism claims that God does not exist anywhere. The universe, a self-sustaining thing, is all that there is or ever will be! Some of the more famous proponents, such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre, have been previous covered above.

Polytheism believes that there are numerous finite gods thus denying the singular infinite theistic God that is beyond the physical world. However, the polytheistic gods are active in the world, each having their own domain. The idea that there is one finite god who rules over all others is a sub-view of polytheism called henotheism. The major representatives of polytheism are the ancient Greeks, the Mormons, and Pagans, and Wiccans.

Pantheism claims that there is no Creator beyond the universe. The Creator and creation are two different ways of viewing one reality. God *is* the universe (or the All) and the universe *is* God in this singular reality. Pantheism is represented by certain forms of the following religion: Hinduism, Zen Buddhism, Christian Science, and most New Age religions.

Panentheism hold that God is in the universe. The basic premise is that the universe is God’s “body” and his other pole (of his two-pole nature) is his eternal and infinite potential beyond the actual physical universe. God however is in a constant process of change. This view is represented by Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, and Lewis Ford.

Historical Roots of Process Theology

There have been several who could be considered as forerunners of a process view of God. Among the Greek views, there was Plato's (c. 400 B.C.) *Demiurgos*, who eternally struggled with the 'Chaos' to form it into the 'Cosmos.' This is an example of dualism that provides a backdrop for the promotion of the two poles of God. Prior to Plato's *Demiurgos*, was Heraclitus's (c. 500 B.C.) flux philosophy which is also similar to the process idea. He asserted that the world is a constantly changing process.

In modern times, there was George W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) who was promoting a progressive unfolding of God in the world process. This is yet another significant step toward the teachings of process theology (a.k.a. Panentheism). In addition to this teaching there is the cosmic evolutionism of Herbert Spencer (1820—1903) who views the whole universe as an unfolding and developing process. Shortly thereafter, Henri-Louis Bergson (1859—1941), French Philosopher, promoted immediate experience and intuition over rationalism and science for understanding reality) proposed a creative evolution (1907) of a Life Force (*élan vital*) that drives evolution forward in leaps. He later identified this Force with God (1935). Prior to this, there was Samuel Alexander's (1859—1938, British philosopher) who wrote *Space, Time and Deity* (1920). He pioneered a process view of God's relationship to temporal universe.

Central Beliefs of Process Theology

Process theology—the view that says that God is a changing Being—can also be called Panentheism. Other names that represent Process Theology are Dipolar Theism, Neo-Classical Theism, and Organicism. God permeates the world in his concrete pole (see below) but does not destroy man's individuality. Therefore, the world is in God but yet is distinguishable from it though not separated from it (see *Man's Vision of God*, p. 348.). This view can be considered halfway between theism and pantheism. Panentheism is not to be confused with pantheism which literally means *all* ("pan") is God ("theism"). By comparison, bipolar theism believes that God has two poles, an actual pole (the world) and a potential pole (beyond the world). Organicism holds to the view that *all that actually is* consists of a gigantic organism. Neoclassical theism believes that God is finite and temporal. These positions commonly view God as a finite and changing director of the world's affairs working in cooperation with the world in order to achieve some greater perfection. This is counter to the classical view of God who is infinite, unchanging sovereign Creator of the world who brought it into existence.

Panentheism says that God is to the world as a soul is to a body. The universe is God's 'cosmic' body. God is more than the world, not identical to it. As in theism, the world needs the existence of God but like in pantheism, God also needs the world in order to express himself. God makes himself real in the world and therefore God must always be changing along with the world. God is in the *process* of becoming all that He can be. This view was held by Alfred North Whitehead (see above), Charles Hartshorne (1897—2000), American philosopher focusing on philosophy of religion and metaphysics, developed Whitehead's process philosophy into process theology), Shubert Ogden (b. 1928), and others where these views are based on ideas found in Plato. Even though no major religions hold to this doctrine it is being taught in some Christian seminaries.

God's becoming or being is in process characterizes all of reality. This reality of God is not to be thought of as being, which is viewed as static and uncreative, rather, creativity pervades all that exists. God is the supremely creative One and is eternally *becoming*. He is also viewed as personal. However, there is disagreement over whether he is one actual entity (promoted by Whitehead) or an

ordered series of actual entities (promoted by Hartshorne). Nevertheless, almost all Panentheists believe that God is personal.

The following chart illustrates the basic idea of the panentheistic two-pole God.

<u>Primordial Nature</u>	<u>Consequent Nature</u>
God’s “mind”	God’s “body”
God’s vision	God’s achievement
Potential pole	Actual pole
Unconscious drive	Conscious realization
Conceptual	Physical
Abstract	Concrete
Beyond the world	The actual world
Eternal	Temporal
Absolute	Relative
Unchanging	Changing
Imperishable	Perishable
Unlimited	Limited
Necessary	Contingent
Eternal Objects	Actual entities

Panentheism is not just a scholarly discussion that has no effect on normal people. Its effect is already being felt in the Christian community. The Perkins School of Theology at Southern Methodist University, where Schubert Ogden teaches, is devoted to process theology, as is Clairmont School of Theology where John Cobb and David Griffin teach. In the evangelical community, several important thinkers have concluded that God is not timeless and eternal, but everlastingly in time. (There is a significant difference between an Eternal God and One who only exists everlastingly.) This view has been embraced by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Clark Pinnock, and J. Oliver Buswell. While these writers have not accepted a complete panentheistic worldview, they have made an important concession to it by allowing change in God. For if He has any potential for change, then He cannot be the necessary Being who is Immutable.

Panentheism’s View of Evil

Panentheism posits that God is not omnipotent, rather He directs the world only through influence. Therefore, not all of the world recognizes or is controlled by His influence, so evil exists. God simply cannot control it, nor can He guarantee that evil ever will be eliminated. However, they believe that evil opens new possibilities for the self-realization of God and presents new opportunities for growth to become more perfect, so it is not necessarily undesirable. There are some senses in which God does not want to do away with evil.

Panentheism’s View of Values

Like theists, process thinkers hold that values are rooted in the nature of God. However, just as the nature of God is different in the two views, so too is the nature of their values. Since God is constantly changing, values change as well. There may be some ideal good in the primordial nature of

God, but what must concern us is that we create beauty in our lives in the real world, without reference to some imagined future state of things. Man can never expect to create perfection, but only strive to do more good. Values, then, can only be defined in general terms, and the term most often used is beauty or aesthetics. As Hartshorne writes, “The only good that is intrinsically good, good in itself, is good experience, and the criteria for this are aesthetic. Harmony and intensity come close to summing it up ... *to be ethical is to seek aesthetic optimization of experience for the community*” (Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics,” *Ethics* 84 (April 1974): 214). According to this standard, man is to avoid disputes and boredom in the community as well as for himself. Kindness brings about beauty and harmony while cruelty brings on ugliness and discord. Concern breeds intensity, and apathy is its opposite. All moral standards must be derived from these principles and suited to influence the present experience for the better.

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ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD (A.D. 1861 - 1947)



His Life and Writings

Alfred North Whitehead was born in 1861 at Ramsgate on the British Isle of Thanet. He spent his childhood in an Anglican country parsonage. His early education at Sherborne in Dorset included the classics and history, not so much in a rigorous scholastic fashion, but more in a practical way that illustrated general concepts. Mathematics was also a concentrated study for Alfred.

Whitehead went to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1880 with a scholarship in mathematics and four years later, he was elected a fellowship at Trinity. The up-and-coming English philosopher and mathematician, Bertrand Russell (1910—1913) was one of Whitehead's most outstanding students. From 1900 through 1911 the two of them collaborated on a work titled *Principia Mathematica*. This work intended to prove that mathematics could be reduced to premises found in formal logic. It was to be the first modern systematic symbolic logic book.

In 1910, Whitehead resigned from his lecturing position at Cambridge and relocated to London, teaching there until 1914. He later became professor of applied mathematics at the Imperial College of Science and Technology. It was during this time that Whitehead concentrated on the philosophy of science. At age sixty-three, Whitehead took a position of chair of philosophy at Harvard University. This allowed him to intensify his studies in the area of philosophy of science which led to a full-scale metaphysics.

Whitehead's works can be categorized into three periods: from 1898 to 1910 where he focused on mathematics which led to the writing of *A Treatise on Universal Algebra* (1898) and *Principia Mathematica* with Russell; the middle period was from 1910 to 1924 where he focuses on the philosophy of science which includes his work *Introduction to Mathematics* (1911); his later years extended from 1924 to 1927 while in America writing on metaphysics, stressing the philosophy of history and reality as well as cosmology and metaphysics.

There are philosophical underpinnings that can be found in his earlier works as well as some mathematical references that can be found in the later writings. During the second period, he wrote "Space, Time, and Relativity" (1915), *The Organization of Thought* (1917), *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919), *The Concept of Nature* (1920), and *The Principle of Relativity* (1922). The transitional period (1925—1927) brought forth *Science and the Modern World* (1925), *Religion in the Making* (1926), and *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (1927). His mature works in this field came from 1927 to 1947 and produced the epic *Process and Reality* (1929), *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), *Modes of Thought* (1938), and *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (1947).

Whitehead had a great deal of influence on others, such as Charles Hartshorne (see below)

and Schubert Ogden. Hartshorne was Whitehead's assistant at Harvard and Ogden was a student of Hartshorne at the University of Chicago. Whitehead also influenced John Cobb (b. 1925), American United Methodist theologian who played a crucial role in the development of Process Theology and David Griffin (b. 1939), American professor of philosophy of religion and theology who also promoted Process theology. In addition, Lewis S. Ford wrote a book titled *The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism*. In this work, Ford stresses God's role as a Cosmic Enticer who never overpowers free creatures but merely woos them to embrace his overall purpose.

Whiteheads Philosophy of Religion: "Religion in the Making"

Whitehead is the father of Process Theology which is also called Panentheism, Dipolar Theism, Neo-Classical Theism, and Organicism. Whitehead's interest in religion is dispersed through his whole philosophy. He focused on it more so in his latter period when he wrote on natural theology. It was his understanding of religion that has made him a landmark influence in modern thought. Whitehead observed that religion did play a part in an individual's life, both in his social interactions and in the experiences of life itself. However, if his understanding of religious dogma was correct, then it would negate the orthodox Christian belief in the inspired and infallible Word of God, the Bible. Whitehead's view is sometimes called "process theology"—all things are in process of becoming, including God.

According to Whitehead, rational religion is an attempt to find a permanent, intelligible interpretation of experience and is defined as follows: It is "[a] system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended." Religion then emerged into *ritual*—habitual performances of acts irrelevant to physical preservation. Following ritual, it then manifested itself in *emotion*—definite types of expressing ones religious feelings that followed after the ritual. Belief (*myth*) then followed, providing definitive explanations for the ritual. Finally, there came *rationalization*, the organization and clarification of beliefs and application to conduct. As rituals encouraged emotions (cf. holy-day and holiday), so myths begot thought. Religious experiences however, are related to dogmas in that dogmas are attempts at precise formulations of religions experience. Rational religions are an attempt to find a permanent and intelligible interpretation of experience and are expressed in three main concepts: first, the value of the individual; second, the value of diverse individuals for each other; and third, the value of the objective world for the existence of a community of individuals. "Religion is world-loyalty," though it begins with consciousness of value within the individual. There are three main concepts of God among the rational religions. There is the Asiatic where God is an impersonal world order having extreme immanence. There is the Semitic where God is a personal entity on whom the world depends and shown by examples of extreme transcendence. Lastly, there is the Pantheistic God who is personal only and totally immanent where in the Monistic world, He only "appears." When making a comparison between Buddhism and Christianity, it is observed that they differ in that the latter is 'metaphysics seeking a religion,' whereas the former is 'religion seeking a metaphysics.' In Buddhism, evil is necessary, but in Christianity it is only contingent. While Buddhists seek relief from the world, Christians seek to change the world. Buddha gave doctrine to enlighten, but Christ gave his life to save. Buddhism begins from general principles, but Christianity begins with facts and generalizes on them.

Whitehead concluded that the Pantheistic view makes the world only illusory. The Asiatic view reduces God to impersonal world order and the Semitic view places God outside of metaphysical and rational consideration. There is basically no way to reach beyond the actual world

to prove the existence of a transcendent God.

Whitehead's Metaphysical Religion

Whitehead's metaphysics comes out in his *Process and Reality* where it becomes evident that he holds a pluralistic position. In order to apply his model of metaphysics, he uses the scientific background and mathematical principles found in the electro-magnetic fields of activity that pervades all space and time (*Science and the Modern World*, 138). When he compares the metaphysical and cosmological natures of the universe, he poses that the latter is the general character of the present stage of the universe and the former is true of every stage or epoch found in the process of the world. The plural position of reality is similar on one hand to atomic structure in that there are many 'actual' entities. Second, there are also entities that exhibit 'potential' states, these being the eternal objects following the Platonic view. This results in his metaphysical view illustrated as follows: "The true method of discovery is like the flight of an airplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation." (*Process and Reality*, 7). He suggests that one cannot base religious beliefs on history because history presupposes a metaphysics. The past can only be interpreted by current known principles. Religion has to have an a priori metaphysics in order to provide some criterion for meaning and as a check point for its related emotions. These religious experiences provide part of the data of the real world used by the metaphysics positing some criteria for metaphysical truth that needs to be adequate, logically coherent, exemplary, and explanatory in regards to the actual world.

The Nature of God

Whitehead called the ordering of the world "the primordial nature of God" where God is represented as "the principle of concretion" where the actual processes make their advance. God is not the creator of actual entities but rather supplies to them the impetus of self-creation. Each entity, including God, is the outcome of "creativity." This "creative" path is a continual process where the elements in the world are synthesized into new unities, each are called "concrescence," a "production of novel togetherness." It is this advance into novelty where God acquires a "consequent nature." Both *process* and *permanence* interplay as aspects of reality. Permanence is a *potential element* of reality and temporal (or time). Permanence is found in eternal objects where non-temporal permanence is found in God (or at least in God's primordial nature). Whitehead's principle of progress is where actual entities become what they are. Being is the potential for becoming (known as the principle of relativity). However, as in Plato's *Sophist*, they never fully become a complete being but only pass from subjectivity to objectivity (immortality). Once the objective destiny has been achieved then they can act by efficient causality on others. This corresponds to Aristotle's doctrine of becoming (or perishing). They pass from subjectivity to objectivity (immortality). The outcome is that they do not find their own causality or subjective aim. Once they have become 'objectified,' then they can act by efficient causality on others from past to the present.

Whitehead's view of God is bipolar. God's actual pole is the universe, the cosmos and posits God as finite and limited. "To be an actual thing is to be limited." God cannot be infinite in his actual pole or he would be all things that actually are—evil as well as good (PR, 144). This pole is in constant change as God prehends more experiences or entities. God's potential pole is beyond the actual world. It is the infinite world of eternal and unchanging potential. There is a self-caused movement in God from his potential pole to his actual pole. God is a self-caused 'being' who is

constantly becoming. Thus the process of creation is an eternal ongoing process of God's self-realization (see "The Creation of the World" below).

All actual entities are bipolar where the physical pole is needed to realize the vision of the conceptual pole. This primordial nature relates only to eternal objects since the principle of relativity demands that something relate to actual entities. Without God, the actual world would fall into chaos. In addition, this *superject nature* of God is merely the consequent nature as enriched by God's prehensions and as available for prehension by other actual entities—a never-ending process. Evil is incompatibility; what is evil does not fit into a given order of the world process. (See "Whitehead's View of Evil" below.) Whitehead's God has both a *primordial nature* and a *consequent nature* or God's *superject nature*. The latter is the being which is being continually enriched by God prehends. It is necessary for God to have this *consequent nature* because God is the orderer of actual entities. The former is the orderer of eternal objects which are pure potentials which, like Gottfried Leibniz's monads, cannot relate themselves. The ontological principle demands that there be an actual entity behind them, since only actual entities are real causes.

When it comes to actual entities, they are bipolar by nature as well. The *conceptual pole* (potential aspect) is simple and can be negatively prehended in total. What is conceptual or potential is not now. The *physical pole* (actual aspect) is complex and can be prehended partly negatively and partly positively. It is some things; it is not other things. The ontological principle is that the only real causes of anything come from the physical pole. Only actual entities become real causes, final facts. This moving from this pole-to-pole progression is a mental process of seizing and incorporating into self an apprehension of the surrounding world. It actually goes beyond "apprehending" or "comprehending" knowledge to uniting with the world being apprehended, Whitehead incorporates the seldom used term called *prehension*. *Prehension* is a process of feeling going beyond objective handling of objective realities. It absorbs what is prehended into the unity and satisfaction of the actual entity that is prehending. There are two kinds of prehension—negative or exclusive and positive or inclusive. There are three factors associated with prehension: 1) The occasion of experience (the subject, actual entity); 2) The data prehended (the object prehended); 3) The subjective form (how the datum is prehended).

When considering the previous concepts of God (Asaitic, Semitic, Pantheistic gods mentioned above), it may be easier to understand Whitehead's contrasted view.

- The Eastern Asiatic concept illustrates an impersonal order who self-orders the world resulting in its conformity as compared to the world obeying an imposed rule.
- The Semitic god is a definite, ultimate, metaphysical, personal, individual entity fact who is absolute and un-derived. This God ordered the derivative existence called the actual world.
- The pantheistic concept is similar to the Semitic except the actual world is a *phase* within the complete fact of the being of God.
- The completed fact is the ultimate individual entity of God. Conceived apart from God the actual world is unreal and is only conceived as a part of the description of God. In itself, it is merely a certain mutuality of "appearance" where it is only a phase of the being of God. This is the extreme doctrine of monism held by bay Parmenides and Shankara (in Hinduism.) (*Religion in the Making*, 66, 67).

Whitehead rejected these views and held that Christianity is a form of the “Semitic” view even though Christian doctrine attempted to add some immanence to the transcendent simple Semitic Being. (It is this ‘otherness’ of the Semitic God that he rejects and the all-sufficiency concept of God as well.) He states the following: “There is no entity, not even God, ‘which requires nothing but itself in order to exist’” (RM., 71).

Rejection of the Traditional Arguments for God’s Existence

Whitehead rejects the ontological argument for God—the nature of God’s existence. In this vein, the cosmological argument can only go so far in its argument as well. In their place, Whitehead sides with the “aesthetic argument” based upon order found in creation being orchestrated by God. There is a God in the world, because “The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order. . . . this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God” (RM., 115). God functions as the ground for creativity necessary for the attainment of value in the world. “God, as conditioning the creativity with his harmony of apprehension, issues into the mental creature as moral judgment according to a perfection of ideals.” Thus, “the purpose of God in the attainment of value is in a sense a creative purpose. Apart from God, the remaining formative elements would fail in their functions” (RM, 110, 114). However, the world is dependent on God *and* God likewise is dependent on the world. Apart from God, there would be no actual world; apart from the dynamic creativity of the world, there would be “no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God.” Actual entities are the only real causes, the final facts. In a sense, everything is somewhere. Eternal objects are simple forms of definiteness that never seem to change. These objects are eternal actualities where no novel ones ever appear. Change is seen as the becoming of continuity that has no continuity of becoming. Actual entities are in the process of becoming without becoming in the process.

Whitehead’s Denial of Pantheism

Pantheism is denied because its being is too immanent. However, the alternative that Whitehead takes most seriously is to reduce God to an impersonal Force, as the Asiatic concept does, resulting in the demeaning of God’s religious significance. However, this is against the classical theistic position that states that God is personal and intimately related to the world. In addition to the reduced God, His transcendent independence and self-existence is also rejected. God is either finite, or he *is* the universe, including its evil. God is not *beyond* the world nor is he *identical* with it. God is *in* the world. Whitehead says that “God is that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial as to our own interests. Further, God is the actual realization (in the world) of the ideal world. ‘The kingdom of heaven is God’ ” (RM, 148, 151).

Future Destiny

Since the claim is that there is an ongoing evolutionary process, God is achieving more and more value where it is being stored in His consequent nature, which, as enriched, is called God’s “superject nature.” However, “neither God, nor the world, reaches static completion” (PR, 135, 529). Therefore, evil is recalcitrant, and no final victory over it is ever possible. Hence, Whitehead concludes, “In our cosmological construction we are, therefore left with the final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—that is to say, the many in one—flux and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World” (PR, 518).

Since God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, even God does not know how the world

process will eventuate. For “during that process God, as it were, has to wait with bated breath until the decision is made, not simply to find out what the decision was, but perhaps even to have the situation clarified by virtue of the decision of that concrete occasion” (Loomer, 365).

The Creation of the World

God and the world are not actually different. God *is* the order (and value) in the actual world. The world is God’s consequent nature and is the sum total of all actual entities (events) as ordered by God. The world is in process and is constantly changing. Therefore, God in his consequent nature is constantly in flux. Even though the universe is eternal, God does not create eternal objects. He is dependent on them as they are on him where God “is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation” (Ibid., 392, 521). He does not bring the universe into existence; he directs its progress. God is seen more as a ‘Cosmic Enticer’ who lures the actual out of potential by final causality the way one is drawn by an object of their love. In this sense, the origin or “creation” of the universe is *ex material*—out of preexisting matter. But this eternal matter is not material but the realm of eternal forms or potentials which are there available for God to order and to urge into the world process as various aspects of actual entities. But since the realm of eternal objects is God’s primordial nature, the movement of creation is also *ex deo*—out of God’s potential pole into his actual pole (the world). Reality moves from the unconscious to the conscious, from potential to actual, from abstract to concrete, from forms to facts. What prompts this movement? What actualizes it? The answer is *creativity*. “‘Creativity’ is the principle of *novelty*.” Creativity introduces novelty into the actual world. “The ‘creative advance’ is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.” Even God is grounded in creativity. “Every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies.” Hence, “all actual entities share with God this character of self-causation” (PR, 31, 32, 135, 339).

The world is pluralistic. On a whole, it is God’s “body” and is constructed of many “actual entities,” what Whitehead calls “final facts,” “drops of experience,” or “actual occasions” (*Primordial Nature of God*, 95). The world is an atomistic series of events.

On a molecular level, it is this creativity of conjunction and continuity that fills in the gaps between the atoms that grounds the world process, and that makes many-ness into oneness. It is the “substance” of which all actual entities (even God) are the “accidents.” Despite the atomic distinctness and continual change in the universe, there is order. This order is given by God and it is His primordial nature that provides order to all eternal objects (forms) and the “consequent nature” of “God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe” (PR, 134).

Human Beings and Freewill

Human beings are a personal being with a free will. Each person has “subjective aims,” for which ends are purposed and final causality is achieved. God provides the overall aim—the initial direction, but where the creature goes from there is his or her own responsibility (Ford, 202–3).

Whitehead’s description of the mind-body relation is that it is a coordination of actual occasions. Each person (God included) is a society of actual entities that constantly change. There is no changeless, enduring “I.” An individual’s unity is not found in any unchanging essence or being, it is a self-caused becoming. Whitehead wrote: “I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions,

enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions—all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity—which is Descartes’ “*I am*”—is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feelings. I shape the activities of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world” (Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 228).

A person’s identity is produced moment by moment within the community of actual events. As in the broader world, there is no continuity in becoming; there is only this becoming in continuity (RM, 112). When it comes to immortality, this ends up not being an essential part of Whitehead’s dogma. He saw no scientific evidence for it, however, neither did he oppose it. He simply noted that at present it is generally held that a purely spiritual being is necessarily immortal. His doctrine is entirely neutral on the question of immortality, or on the existence of purely spiritual beings other than God (RM, 107–8).

Whitehead’s View of Evil

Evil is incompatibility, viz., what does not fit into a given order of the world process. God’s self-realization is never perfect, nor is it totally incomplete; the actual world is neither purely orderly, nor purely chaotic. The immanence of an ordering God makes pure chaos impossible (PR, 169). God is doing all he can to achieve the most possible out of every moment in the world’s history. When considering the process of God it can be seen that “[t]he image under which this operative growth of God’s nature is best conceived, is that of a tender care that nothing be lost” (PR, 525). It is seen then that evil can be defined as whatever is incompatible with these divine efforts at any given moment. What a finite God cannot persuade to fit into the overall unity of the actual world is evil. Evil is incompatibility; it is incongruence. Since God does not force the world, but only persuades it, he cannot destroy evil. God must simply work with it and do the best he can to overcome it. “[The theory of] divine persuasion responds to the problem of evil radically, simply denying that God exercises full control over the world. Plato sought to express this by saying that God does the best job he can in trying to persuade a recalcitrant matter to receive the impress of the divine forms” (Ford, 202). Evil is like the left-over pieces of glass that did not fit into the stain glass window. Only this “picture” or order changes every split second. What does not fit one moment may fit later. Evil, then, must be conceived of as relative.

For Whitehead, good and evil “solely concern inter-relations within the real world. The real world is good when it is beautiful” (Ibid., 269). Goodness always comes in comparative degrees, just as things are more or less beautiful. But nothing is either most beautiful or most perfect. “Morality consists in the aim at the ideal. . . . Thus stagnation is the deadly foe of morality” (Ibid., 269–70). There is at best, for both God and human beings, only a relative achievement of more good.

Ethics and Values in Whitehead’s World

Therefore, in the ever-changing world of a kaleidoscope, there is no absolute evil, so there are no absolute values. Values change and are subjective. Whitehead claims that “[t]here are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.” (PR, 35). God is the measure of all value, but God is no more stable than is anything else. Nothing in the world is not changing.

On the other hand, value is specific and concrete because God wants man to attain value. This search for value is also creative. Whitehead makes the following claim: “The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order [of value], and the aesthetic is derived from the immanence of God”

(RM, 97, 100–1). The problem with the theistic Christian ethic is that it looks to an end of the world—definite goals and an absolute way to go. Christians give free rein “to their absolute ethical intuitions respecting ideal possibilities without a thought of the preservation of society” (*Adventures of Ideas*, 16).

The development of religious dogmas according to Whitehead is that they are an expression of inward experiences manifesting themselves in some outward sign. These inward experiences must be rooted in history. Historically, since language has no stopping point, then dogma associated with language must continue to be fluid. Therefore, dogma cannot be final either. Since religious dogma is tied to inspiration and some final word, religious dogma too dies. It follows then that there must be an avoidance of some extreme impersonal order or creator of the world. In its place should be some ‘actual entity’ that can introduce ideal forms into the temporal world. Whitehead posits "This ideal world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of God. Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms" (RM, 148). "The world gives by its incarnation of God in itself" (RM, 149).

An Evaluation of Whitehead's Views

It is difficult to make a comprehensive evaluation due to the fact that his presentations are complex and far-reaching. Nonetheless, some brief evaluations can be offered.

First, his epistemological position is for the most part stands on the relativity of truth. But the claim that all truth is relative and perspectival is a non-relative and non-perspectival truth claim. Thus, in the final analysis, his view is self-defeating.

Second, there is a mutual and incompatible self-dependence in the God/world relationship. For God is dependent on the world and the world is dependent on God. Whitehead's God is grounded in creativity and creativity is grounded in God. However, this mutual co-dependence and co-creativity is impossible and leads only to chaos.

Third, how can God orchestrate the world if He is not infinitely, omnisciently, and causally mindful of the future? Whitehead's God can only urge the world in some direction and hope for the best in this cooperative.

Fourth, when it comes to solving the problem of evil, a finite God cannot resolve the problem of evil. Only the omniscient, omnipotent, theistic God of Christianity can and will provide victory over evil.

Fifth, according to Whitehead's view, God is in space, in time and in matter. This means God is subject to the second law of thermodynamics—God is running down in His useable energy. This also means that God cannot think any faster than the speed of light. This means He cannot know the whole universe.

Sixth, when it comes to man, he is a different person every split second (about 1/10 of a second). There is no continuing “I” beneath all the change. This means that within ten minutes there are 6,000 “I's” that have existed. One cannot even say, “I am I.” This would destroy the Law of Identity which is at the basis of all rational thought

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Introduction

Although Alfred Whitehead is the father of Panentheism, His student Charles Hartshorne has developed and defended this worldview. He produced a number of books on the panentheistic model of God, including the following: *A Natural theology for Our Time*, *Man's Vision of God*, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, and *The Logic of Perfection*.

His Philosophy

His View of God.

Hartshorne rejected traditional theism held by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas which is labeled 'mono-polar' theism. Instead, he holds to a di-polar (two-pole) perspective—one concrete pole and one abstract pole—thus stating that God is not “merely infinite or merely finite, merely absolute or merely relative, merely cause or merely effect, merely agent or merely patient, merely actual or merely potential, but in all cases both, each in suitable respects or aspects of his living reality, and in such a manner as to make him unsurpassable by another. He is even both joy and sorrow, both happiness and sympathetic participation in our grief” (*A Natural Theology for Our Time*, 74, 75). The concrete pole is how God *is* existing at any given moment in his changing experience; the abstract pole is that which is common and constant in God's character given any possible or actual world. God as concrete is God as he actually is now; God as abstract is God as he must always be. The abstract pole is an abstraction from the divine concrete pole (*Divine Relativity*, 79-81). For Hartshorne, all reality is characterized by becoming, not being, by relativity, not absolutes, by contingency, not necessity.

According to Hartshorne, the Divine is in a state of becoming-being. He says that “becoming is not a special mode of reality, rather it is its overall character.” In fact, “becoming is reality itself.” And since the past has already become and the future has not yet become, only the present moment can become (that is, be in the process of being created). Consequently, when he speaks of reality he means “as of now” (*Creative Synthesis*, 13, 118). On a cosmic scale, this means every being, including God, exists in a great flux—every new event means new atoms, new cells, etc.—even a new God. When considering the human experience, these present ‘nows’ occur some ten to twenty times per second (“Personal Identity from A to Z,” *Process Studies* 2 (Fall 1972): 210.).

Though Hartshorne maintains that God is personal, he does not view God as an actual entity but rather sees God as “an enduring society of actual entities” (“The Dipolar Conception of Deity,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 21 (December 1967): 287. Similar to individual who change, God too in his present state is not identical to himself in his previous state (nor in his future state). When someone serves God today it is not the same God who they served yesterday nor may it be the same

God they will serve tomorrow (*A Natural Theology*, 104).

Love, according to Hartshorne is the “realization in oneself of the desires and experiences of others, so that one who loves can in so far inflict suffering only by undergoing this suffering himself, willingly and fully.” It can therefore be surmised that human beings love for one another is inadequately because they cannot fully know or enter into another’s experiences and desires. God, however, can adequately love all because he feels all desires for what they are and experiences all experiences as they are. Only he “unwaveringly understands and tries to help” his creatures; only he “takes unto himself the varying joys and sorrows of all others”; only his happiness is eminently capable of alteration as a consequence (*Man’s Vision of God*, 31, 111, 165, 166.). Because God loves all fully, cares about all differences, and is sympathetically responding to them accordingly, God is the perfect lover (“Is God’s Existence a State of Affairs?” in *Faith and the Philosophers*, ed. by John Hick, 30).

His View of Man’s Destiny

Man’s end is physical death—no afterlife in a literal heaven nor is there hell. He considers the notion of heaven and hell a dangerous and huge error that has ever been suggested to the most dangerous that ever occurred to the human mind. “Death is not destruction of an individual’s reality,” rather it is “[m]ore than you already have been you will not be. For instance, the virtues you have failed to acquire, you will now never acquire. It is too late. You had your chance.” True immortality is everlasting and only belongs to God. For man to live forever is a value prehended in the cosmic memory of God (Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, 254, 259, 262). In brief, there is no individual immortality; one survives only in the mind of God.



Introduction

Schubert Ogden is a theologian whereas Alfred Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne were both philosophers, even though Ogden has adopted their views (Ogden, “Bultmann’s Demythologizing and Hartshorne Dipolar Theism,” in *Process and Divinity: Philosophical Essays Presented to Charles Hartshorne*). Ogden learned the di-polar doctrine of God from Hartshorne and believes that this, coupled with Heidegger’s analysis of man is the “right philosophy for Christian theology” and can be used to supplement Rudolph Bultmann’s existentialism (Ibid., 511, 498). He rejects the classical view of God and only offers two opposing principles that he believes can show the incoherence to the classical position. What he does say seems to be similar to those other panentheists. His most comprehensive position is stated in his *The Reality of God and Other Essays* (1963). He also wrote the following: *Toward a New Theism*, *In Process Philosophy and Christian Thought*, *Faith and Freedom*, and *Theology in Crisis*.

His Philosophy

His View on God

The classical theist believes that (1) God freely (not by necessity) created the world and (2) creation is one with God’s own eternal essence. Ogden considers that these two beliefs result “in the hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary creation of a wholly contingent [freely created] world” (*The Reality of God and Other Essays*, 17.). In addition, the classical theist understands that the end of man is to serve and glorify God through obedience to His will and commandments. He also states that the classical theist service to God is a “statically complete perfection incapable in any respect of further self-realization. God can be neither increased nor diminished by what we do.” Ogden objects and concludes that whatever man can do cannot truly be *for* God because our service cannot make any difference *in* God (Ibid., 17-18.). Coinciding with these is a third claim against classical theism where he offers an argument from “existential repugnance.”

If what we do and suffer as men in the world is from God’s perspective wholly indifferent, that perspective is at most irrelevant to our actual existence. It can provide no motive for action, no cause to serve, and no comfort in our distress beyond the motives, causes, and comforts already supplied by our various secular undertakings. But, more than that, to involve ourselves in these undertakings and to affirm their ultimate significance is implicitly to deny the God [of classical theism] who is Himself finally conceived as the denial of our life in the world (Ibid., 18).

His conclusion: there is no benefit to refer to a wholly indifferent God, the creator of the universe guiding it to fulfillment, as a loving heavenly Father who is revealed in Jesus Christ. One needs to

understand that classical theism undercuts modern man's belief in "the importance of the secular"—that is, his affirmation "that man and the world are themselves of ultimate significance"—then he should reject classical theism as existentially repugnant (Ibid., 18, 19, 44. cf. 48–56.).

Ogden's god is more than the abstract pole of the dipolar Panentheism. To him, God is the world-whole in the concrete pole (not that God and the world are identical as in Panentheism). God is independent "of the actual world (in his abstract identity)" and also inclusive "of the actual world (in his concrete existence). God has always existed with "*some* actual world of creatures, any such world was itself created 'out of nothing,' in the sense that there once was when it was not." This new world did not actually exist before God co-created it—it was only potentially existent in the "conjoint actuality of God and of the creatures constituting the precedent actual world (or worlds)" (*Reality of God*, 62, 63.). Ogden considers the world to be God's body and is therefore necessarily dependent on a world of other things" (Ibid., 61, cf. 176), not just any world, only some world or other. Thus God and the world are independent—God needs the world to so that he mayprehend (remember) the value actualized by his creatures and the world needs God to give it ultimate significance ("Toward a New Theism," p. 186.).

Ogden challenges the literal interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis. He says this conflicts with the idea of an infinite past because it describes a world process that had a first stage. His challenge the literal interpretation because it misunderstands the nature of myth. The nature of myth is "to illumine the essential structure and meaning of our life in the present." It is only when one demythologizes the text that the existential meaning comes out for today's understanding which is that the "doctrine of creation affirm[s] primarily that the one essential *cause* of each moment is God's boundless love for it" (*Reality of God*, p. 214. cf. "Toward a New Theism," 177.).

As a theologian, Ogden is concerned with showing how a process view, coupled with Bultmannian existentialism, can give meaning to the principle that God acts in history in order to recognize that "every creature is to some extent God's act" and "is also partly God-created in the sense that creaturely freedom has definite limits ultimately grounded in God's own free decisions" (*Reality of God*, 180–81).

His View of Man's Destiny

Both God and man are historical beings, both having a past, present and a future. Each are actualized again and again. God's history never began (and never ends) whereas man's did have a beginning. There is no individual afterlife for man. However, there is the value man has contributed to God's experience *before* man's death. Hence, the goal for man is to advance some real good in the world which is done for the glory of God as an imperishable gift to God's ever-growing perfection

An Evaluation of Process Theology

From a positive perspective, panentheists recognize that a piecemeal perspective of the world is inadequate and they attempt to find some comprehensive and reasonable explanation for the existence of the universe. They grant the possibility of a supreme being where the world must depend upon it for its beginning and sustaining. They seem to posit some relationship between God and the world without destroying the relationship as the pantheist seems to do. There seems some purpose for man in the panentheistic perspective. Lastly, they attempt to couple a scientific worldview with their position of creation and God.

A contrast between the classical view of theism and the panentheistic view in chart form will

help illustrate the fundamental distinctive. Classical theism is the traditional Christian view of God—the God of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, the Reformers, the Puritans, and most present-day evangelicals. Classical theism is rooted in the belief of a personal, infinite, all-knowing, eternal, oneness, simplicity (is not composed), aesity (self-existing), pure actuality, necessary, immutable, omniscient God who created the world *ex nihilo*, sustains it, and has supernaturally intervened in the world from time to time. The following summarizes these differences.

Contrasting the Two Views

THEISM

Creator of the world
Creation: *ex nihilo*
Sovereign over the world
Independent of the world
Unchanging Being
Absolutely perfect
Mono-polar
Actually infinite

PANENTHEISM

Director of the world process
Creation: *ex Deo*
Working with the world
Mutually dependent on the world
Changing Being ('becoming')
Growing in perfection
Di-polar (two poles)
Actually finite

From the perspective of traditional theism, panentheist are charged with promoting both a finite and an infinite God, a necessary and a contingent Being, an absolute and a relative, where these are contradictory when applied in the same sense. However, Hartshorne responds to these accusations by saying that each of these alleged metaphysical contradictions are applied separately to each of the two poles. Therefore, they are *not* applied to God in the same sense (Hartshorne, *Aquinas to Whitehead*, 22-24, and *Man's Vision of God*, 322.).

Second, it is charged that the notion of God being self-caused is problematic and incredible and at the same time non-credible. How could a being exist prior to itself in order to bring itself into existence? However, their response may be that God creates his *becoming* and is producing changes in himself, but did not cause his own existence. Hence, God did not exist prior to himself to cause himself to exist, but rather he actualizes his own potential for growth.

The problem above creates another problem. If God causes his own becoming and not his own being, then what or who sustains God's existence? How can a being change without there being an unchanging being that grounds the changing being's existence? When anything changes, it passes from potentiality to actuality, from what is not to what is. Therefore, there must be a being other than what the process philosopher views as God that sustains him in existence. If this is true, then the panentheistic God is not really God, but the Being that sustains him is really God.

Further, from a practical perspective, the panentheistic concept of personhood appears to conflict with man's everyday experiences of himself. Man sees that he is a personal being who, to some degree at least, endures change. However, most people do not believe that they become new persons each moment of their existence. In fact, to even say that "I become a new person each moment I exist" assumes that there is something that endures, namely, the "I" to which the changes occur. If nothing endures, then can it be said that anything changes? Hartshorne suggests that when one is sleeping or has lapsed into unconsciousness he goes out of existence (Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, 220, 221.). However, the problem still exists.

Also, how can one know that everything is changing if there is not some unchanging standard by which to measure change? Because we are moving along with it, we don't notice that the world is rotating on its axis or revolving around the sun. How can we know that everything is changing unless we can look at something that is not changing? Process Theology has no explanation for this because it holds that even God is constantly changing?

While Hartshorne claims that "God is the wholeness of the world" (*Logic of Perfection*, p. 126.), however, this does *not* mean that God is identical to the world as in the pantheistic view. God does permeate the world but does *not* destroy the individuality of his creatures. Thus, the world is in God, but he is distinguishable though not separable from the world (*Man's Vision of God*, 348.). Second, He does hold to the truth that 'something exists' is a necessary truth. The proposition that 'nothing exists' is necessarily false and meaningless—never being able to be experienced (*Creative Synthesis*, 159, 161, 162.). However, he does reject the theistic view of creation *ex nihilo*. Hartshorne maintains that God creates the world *ex materia*, meaning that God makes "new actualities" from "past events" (*Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970* [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972], 195.)

One particular implication of Panentheism that needs mentioning is that supernatural acts (miracles) are impossible. Their claim of the 'cosmic' world as the body of God would render that nothing apart from God can be interrupted. God is a passive sympathetic being rather than an active one. Second, to many Panentheists, miracles are rejected because they are out of line with contemporary scientific views of the world ruling out the possibility of miracles.

Panentheists agree that man is free such that man is a co-creator with God and of God. Man helps God not only determine the course of human and 'cosmic' events but also the course of God. Man actually ends up being a course of the events in history in his becoming, not his being. Man's end is to serve God by contributing value to his ever growing experience.



Introduction

In contrast to traditional theism, pantheism denies the classical attributes of infinity, immutability, impassability, simplicity, and eternality (timelessness). Nelson Pike wrote one of the best explanations of the process view of God's timelessness.

God and Timelessness

In Nelson Pike's, *God and Timelessness*, he objects to the timelessness (eternality) of God, claiming that God is not an infinite being outside of the time-space continuum. This notion of timelessness promoted by Pike eliminates foreknowledge ascribed to God. If God is timeless then he sees everything *now* but does not 'foresee' (in advance) everything. But the Bible states that God is timeless and has foreknowledge. Therefore, God does see everything (past, present, future) in one 'eternal now' and in this sense foresees nothing. In addition, the idea of timelessness as promoted by Pike conflicts with the doctrine of Creation because a timeless being cannot act in time but only in eternity. However, this creation has been and is created in time and is a temporal world (as seen from man's perspective). It follows then according to Pike that a timeless being could not have created this temporal world.

The idea of timelessness conflicts with the personality of God says Pike. Whatever cannot respond intellectually, emotionally, and willfully (the aspects of personhood) to persons is less than significantly personal himself. This means that a timeless God cannot respond in these ways since timelessness implies immutability and immutability cannot change thoughts, feelings, and will. Hence, a timeless God is less than a significant person. This being the case, worship with the mind, feelings, and will (the whole person) conflicts with the worshipability of God. A Supreme Being who is able and willing to respond to worshippers is more worthy of worship than one who is unapproachable. If God cannot respond to persons (for this would involve change), then a timeless god is not worthy of worship as a temporal god.

According to Pike, this idea of timelessness is incompatible with the biblical and creedal language concerning God. Their accounts claim that the Bible confesses to God as being in time and as changing. However, an eternal being cannot be in time (because he is outside of time) and cannot change (because he is immutable). Therefore, there are two options available: either God is temporal or the historical biblical record is untrue. Second, this idea is coupled to the incarnation. In the incarnation, the eternal enters into and lives in time. But timelessness says that the eternal cannot live in time and the changeless cannot live in a changing way. Therefore, the incarnation is impossible when considering the timeless view of God relating to the incarnation.

A Response to Pike's Notion of Timelessness

The following are some responses to Pike's 'timeless God.' The elimination of foreknowledge is not necessarily wrong. By eliminating foreknowledge then the problem of how God can know future contingents is solved. The Bible is speaking from only a human temporal viewpoint. God did not create *in* time but rather it was the creation *of* time. Time is only ontological and not chronological. Timelessness does not make God *less* personal but the most personal. God can and does respond to mankind in a way that is most fitting and absolutely perfect, in other words, with changeless consistency. Since God is love, he is the most personal of all. Timelessness makes God the most worthy object of worship. Any being that is less than absolutely perfect and is subject to change would not be the most worthy object of worship.

When considering the incarnation, the Eternal did not become temporal in Christ; rather, he assumed an addition, a temporal dimension, to His eternity. God did not become a man but rather Christ assumed a fleshly human nature. There are two natures in one person, a hypostatic union, co-joined but not con-fused.

Most of the bible language is metaphorical—evocative—but not metaphysical. The Bible speaks of God as changeless (Psa. 102:27; Mal. 3:6; Isa 1:17; 2 Tim. 2:13; Num. 23:1; Heb. 6:18; 1 Sam. 15:29) as well as changing (Gen. 6:6; 1 Sam. 15:35; Jonah 3:10). It makes more sense to understand the changing ones in light of the unchanging ones.

The Benefits of an Eternal (Timeless) God

A proper understanding of an eternal God helps solve the problem surrounding determinism and foreknowledge for future free acts (cf. Rom. 9:29). There is no fore-knowledge with God in the sense of seeing into the future. God sees all in one eternal *now*. There is only knowledge with God. God's eternity (or timelessness) preserves the immutability of God. A proper understanding fits well with the doctrine of analogy which is the only alternative to monism. It also avoids the insuperable problem of finite godism which: 1) does not explain how a finite god can exist without a cause; 2) it does not adequately answer the problem of evil; 3) nor does it contain a God who is worthy of worship in the highest sense. A proper understanding of an eternal and immutable personal loving God provides security and grounds for ultimate commitment of the believer. Lastly, a proper understanding provides the most adequate account of all the biblical data.

Introduction

Another view with basic similarities with Process Theism has emerged. While attempting to retain some features of traditional theism, it adopts crucial aspects of Process Theology. It is self-labeled as “Open Theisms.” It is also known as Free-Will Theism or Neo-theism.

Classical Theism versus Open Theism

In order to provide a proper evaluation of Open Theism, it must be contrasted with the Classical Theistic approach of traditional Christianity. The Classical approach is based on a literal hermeneutic interpretation of the Scriptures and is aligned with the traditional Christian view of God. The representatives of classical theism were St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas.

The Bible claims that God has made man in His image (Gen. 1:26); however, modern theology (e.g., Process Theology and Neo-theism) attempts to reverse this. There are serious consequences in creating God in the image of man, especially by those who claim to be evangelical.

In recent years, there seems to have been a movement emerging in Arminian circles called the “Openness of God” view or “Free Will Theism” (see Clark Pinnock, *The Openness of God*, Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1994). Since this new movement has some significant similarities to Process Theology (see Pinnock, “Between Classical and Process Theology,” *Process Theology*), it is included here.

The proponents of this new view include Clark Pinnock, John Sanders, Richard Rice, William Hasker, and David Basinger, who collaborated on a work titled *The Openness of God*. There are others who similarly share in this view, such as Greg Boyd, Stephen Davis, Thomas Morris, and Richard Swineburne. According to Pinnock in *Openness of God*, Open Theists are distinguished by five characteristics. 1) “God not only created this world *ex nihilo* but can (and sometimes does) intervene unilaterally in earthly affairs.” 2) “God choose to create us [mankind] with incompatibilistic (libertarian freedom—freedom over which He *cannot* [emphasis added] exercise total control.” 3) “God so values [human] freedom—the moral integrity of free creatures and a world in which such integrity is possible—that He does not normally override such freedom, even if He sees that it is producing undesirable results.” 4) “God always desires our highest good, both individually and corporately, and thus is affected by what happens in our lives.” And 5) “God does not possess exhaustive knowledge of exactly how we will utilize our freedom, although He may very well at times be able to predict with great accuracy the choices we will freely make” (*OOG*, 156).

As a result, Open Theists have ‘created’ a new perspective that is not identical to the traditions of Arminius or Wesley, nor is it identical to Process Theology/Panentheism. Recall that for the Panentheists, God did not create the world *ex nihilo*, he is only the director of world progress, a sort of co-operative work between God and man. God does this through his di-polariness, an ongoing process of God’s self-realization. The nature of God, being the most fundamental of all doctrines of theology, is the key to all other doctrines. On it stands or falls all the other major doctrines. Orthodox Christianity has been uncompromising on the major doctrines since its very inception. The following chart is a summary of the major issues surrounding the controversy. Included in the list will also be a comparison to the Panentheism teaching. (See Geisler, *Creating God in the Image of Man*, 1997).

Theism, Neo-theism, Panentheism Comparison

God’s Attributes

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Nontemporal	Temporal	Temporal
Simple	Complex	Complex
Pure Actuality	Actuality and Potentiality	
Unchangeable will	Changeable will	Changeable will
Unqualified omniscience	Qualified omniscience	Not omniscient
Foreknowledge of freedom	No certain foreknowledge	No certain foreknowledge
Of free acts	of free acts	
Cannot learn anything	Can learn something	Can learn many things
Unchangeable nature	Changeable nature	Changeable nature
Infinite	Infinite and Eternal	Finite
Omnipotent	Omnipotent	Not omnipotent

God’s relation with the world

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Independent of the world	Independent of the world	Mutual dependence on the world

Divine actions on free acts

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Highly persuasive (or coercive)	Overall control	No control

Providence

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Occasional miracles	occasional miracles	No miracles

Providence

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Specific	General (from without)	General (from within)

Petitionary prayer

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Does not change God’s will or nature	Does change God’s will not his essential nature	Does change God’s will and nature

The future

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Completely determined	Determined in general	Completely undetermined

The problem of evil in men

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
‘Allowed’ and could have been prevented prevented	‘Unknowingly’ permitted and could have been prevented	Not planned and could not have been

Determinism and freewill

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Compatible	Incompatible	Incompatible

Foreknowledge of free acts

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
What will and could happen What could happen	What will, not could, happen	Neither what will nor

God’s knowledge

<u>THEISM</u>	<u>NEO-THEISM</u>	<u>PANENTHEISM</u>
Complete: past, present and future	Complete: past and present; partial future	Partial: past, present,

Some Concluding Remarks

The theological basis for Neo-theism against the traditional classical view falls short of the mark—there is no real reason to discard the traditions theistic. For no inherent contradictions have been demonstrated.

There are also serious logical flaws within Neo-theism. While it does affirm some of the common tenants of classical theism, such as those attributes of God like transcendence, uncausality, necessity, and creation *ex nihilo*, nonetheless, these are coupled to other attributes of God that the neo-theist rejects, such as nontemporality, unchangeability, and pure actuality. Logically, they cannot have it both ways. If some are accepted, the rest come with the package.

Further, Neo-theism fails to establish a biblical basis for its beliefs based on sound philosophical and traditional theological grounds. One of the proponents of Neo-theism has admitted that they have not presented a compelling case for Neo-theism: “I do not consider our model to be logically superior to all others. . . . Nor do I believe the open model to be experientially superior. . . .” He continues on to say that he finds it only to be “the most plausible, appealing conceptualization of this relationship” (Geisler, *The Openness of God*, 176). Does this debate really matter? Yes. Ideas have consequences (see Richard Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*). Good ideas have good consequences, and bad ideas have bad consequences. Logically, Neo-theism leads to a denial of the

full omniscience of God, the value of predictive prophecy, and the tests for false prophets. In addition, it undermines confidence in the promise of God, his ability to answer prayer, and any ultimate victory over sin and evil.

Sources on Neo-Theism

For further study, see Norman Geisler. *Creating God in the Image of Man* , 1997; *The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neo-theism*, 2001; *Systematic Theology: God, Creation, Part One: Chapters*, 2003.

A Brief Historical Background

Prior to 1650 A.D. was considered the ‘pre-modern era.’ It is here that metaphysics was the dominant study of being (reality). Modernism began with Descartes around 1650 and changed the focus to epistemology—how we know what we know. Even though the exact date cannot be agreed upon as to when the transition was made into the post-modern era, it did not really take shape until around 1950. Its roots are tied with Nietzscheism but it was Heidegger who took center stage resulting from his discussions with Derrida. The primary concern in postmodernism is the deconstruction of hermeneutic—the method of interpretation. Summarizing these three positions can be understood through the illustration of a referee calling the pitch in a baseball game.

The Pre-modern referee says: “I call them like they are.”

The Modern referee claims, “I call them like I see them.”

The Post-modern referee declares: “They are nothing until I call them.”

Forerunners of the Post-modernism Era

Modern empiricism began with John Locke and David Hume stressing the senses were the *a posteriori* source of all knowledge. By contrast Rene Descartes’ *a priori* rationalism stressing the mind. Then, Immanuel Kant who synthesized the two by stating that the senses provide the content of knowledge and the mind gives it form. Without the senses, the mind is empty; the senses without the mind are blind. His brilliant synthesis led to agnosticism—one cannot know reality as it is in itself. Another result: metaphysics—knowing reality in itself—is impossible. Agnosticism led to Søren Kierkegaard’s fideism and Friedrich Nietzsche’s atheism. Kierkegaard suggested a “leap of faith” to the “wholly other” God whereas Nietzsche’s “leap of faith” was to an unknown God whom he pronounced “dead.” Nietzsche’s “death of God” meant there was no Absolute Mind which led to absolute truth, meaning, or history. Nietzsche claims that God won’t die until the author does because the author implies that there is structure and meaning. Add to this, his God cannot be gotten rid of until grammar is gotten rid of. This downward spiral led to textual and hermeneutical relativism. Following close behind is philosophical relativism and the denial of laws of thought (logic and anti-foundationalism). Absolute purpose is gone as well along with moral absolutes.

In the absence of an Absolute Mind providing absolute meaning, Ludwig Wittgenstein built on Frege’s conventionalism and concluded that all are shut up in a linguistic bubble—there cannot be any meaningful statements made about the mystical (metaphysical) beyond. Therefore, God-talk is dead or meaningless.

The ‘later’ Martin Heidegger borrowed Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and posited a new hermeneutic which rejected any metaphysical knowledge of reality. From this influence, Jacques Derrida contrived his hermeneutical system of deconstructionism that deconstructs a text to then reconstruct it over and over and over again.

The following chart illustrates the trends associated with Modernism and Post-modernism. Generally speaking, the shifts are from epistemology to hermeneutics; from absolute truth to relative truth; from seeking the author’s meaning to finding the reader’s meanings; from the structure of the text to destructing the text; from the goal of knowing truth to the journey of knowing:

<u>Modernism</u>	<u>Postmodernism</u>
Unity of thought	Diversity of thought
Rational	Social and psychological
Conceptual	Visual and poetical
Truth is absolute	Truth is relative
Exclusivism	Pluralism
Foundationalism	Anti-foundationalism
Epistemology	Hermeneutics
Certainty	Uncertainty
Author's meaning	Reader's meanings
Structure of the text	Deconstructing the text
The goal of knowing	The journey of knowing

Two of the most prominent figures in the Post-modernism era are Jacques Derrida and Paul-Michel Foucault who wrote the following: *Madness and Civilization* (1961); *Death and Labyrinth* (1963); *The Order of Things* (1966); *Discipline and Punish* (1975); *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1976), and *History of Sexuality* (1976-1984).

It is perhaps Bertrand Russell who describes it best when he wrote about a world without God. "Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving.... His origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms.... All the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system.... Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built" (Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship" (in *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*, p. 67).



Introduction

According to David Hirsch in *The Deconstruction of Literature: Criticisms after Auschwitz*, there seems to be a recontextualization that offers insight on deconstructionism and postmodernism as an intellectual movements. This aids in finding out how these ideologies caused a turn in American academic settings as well. Some believe were three aspects associated with French literary criticism that attempts to quiet parts of history. First, there was the silencing of the personal pasts of the deconstructors from 1940 to 1945. Second, the silencing of the historical past of the French nation occurred during this same time-frame. Third there is the silencing of the Holocaust literature that began its appearance in France as early as 1946. Included in the list of several “silencers” is Michel Foucault.

His Life and Works

Paul-Michel Foucault was born in Poitiers, France in 1926. His father, whom he despised as a young man, was a surgeon. Both of his grandfathers were surgeons as well. Paul-Michel’s mother was independently wealthy. Young Foucault was raised Roman Catholic and subsequently attended the Jesuit educational system in 1940. This was not a positive experience for the Paul-Michel because he ended up leaving the Catholic education with a hatred towards religion. In 1945, he boarded at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris in 1945. It was here that he read philosophy that prepared him for entrance into the acclaimed Ecole Normale Supérieure. This is how he began his path into the humanities. It was also here that he studied with great thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Hyppolite, and Louis Althusser. He later received a degree in philosophy in 1948, a degree in psychology in 1949, and an additional degree in philosophy in 1952. He was also associated with the communist party but later broke ties with them in 1951.

From 1953 to 1954, Foucault taught psychology at the University of Lille-Nord de France in Lille, France. In 1954, he published his first book *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, a work he later disavowed. From 1955 to 1958, Foucault taught at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. In 1960, he returned to France to complete his doctorate and to take a post in philosophy department at the University of Clement-Ferrand (also known as Blaise Pascal University) in France. Foucault became well known both for his academic and political positions through his associations, his writings, and travels. In Paris, he died of an AIDS-related illness in 1984.

His first major work was *Madness and Civilization*, (1961, later titled *The History of Madness*, Routledge, 2006). Later he wrote, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, (1963, English trans. 1973), *Death and the Labyrinth* (1963, English trans. 1986), *The Order of Things* (1966, English trans. 1970, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science*), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), *Discipline and Punishment* (1975, English trans.

1977), *The History of Sexuality* in three volumes: *The Will to Knowledge* (1976, English trans. 1977), *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self* (1984, 1985 resp. English trans. 1985, 1986 resp.) and a fourth unpublished volume titled *Confessions of the Flesh* held privately according to the restrictions of his estate.

His Philosophy

Both Foucault and Derrida thought that theology should be avoided and jettisoned from post-modern thinking. Foucault observed that the “death of God” (promoted by Nietzsche) occasioned the “birth of man.” Some have claimed (e.g., Foucault scholar Jeremy Carrette) that Foucault was an atheist abandoning any traditional theological worldview. In fact, Foucault’s primary influence came from Nietzsche. Overall, Foucault has shaped philosophy, influenced theology, and has had a great effect on post-modernism.

His Anti-humanism

Since the postmodern Foucault is anti-theology and carries with him the tenets of deconstructionism, it is easy to see that he is an anti-humanist as well in the sense of the crumbling of the Enlightenment man. As J.C. Merquior writes in *Foucault* (as quoted in *Engaging Deconstruction Theology*, Michener.): “Foucault invites us to awake from the “anthropological slumber” which is the oxygen of modern knowledge. For we are haunted by history and humanism; and we are a prey to history as a form of thinking because of our humanist obsession—our man besotted way of looking at reality” (51).

Nietzsche had a profound influence on Foucault. Like Nietzsche, he too implies the death of God, but he adds that it is actually synonymous with the death of man as well. According to Foucault, who claimed that he was not a Nietzschean, the end of man is actually a return to the beginning of philosophy expressed as “nihilist optimism.” Here he states: “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think” (*The Order of Things*, 342 as quoted in *Engaging Deconstruction Theology*, Michener.).

Foucault did not deny the existence of human beings, but rather he redefined him as being made through the use of language. In other words, humans are not the foundational basis for language. Hence, the death of humans means the death of the author where his speech is not longer his own. The author only exists as a circulator of words within society. Others are the interpreters of the words.

Interpreting Discourse

His View of Truth

Truth is produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraint and linked to systems of power (see *Power and Knowledge*). Each society has its regime of truth. Knowledge is linked to both power and discourse where this discourse establishes the basis of knowledge claims. However, this power is a complex mode of interaction where the boundaries which have become social truths must be deconstructed. The job of philosophy is to challenge these dominating levels in society and observe how they compete with one another, not asserting what is true or false. It follows then Foucault is not concerned with what is true or false but rather how the power knowledge and language *function* as true or false—the effects of truth. This power not only says what should not be done (a negative force) but what should be done (a positive force) in forming knowledge, producing discourse, and

inducing pleasure (Ibid., 119).

His View of History

Foucault's view of history springs from his view of knowledge and power. History cannot make disinterested and objective claims. Again, the influence of Nietzsche comes out—power as it relates to the fabrication of truth and knowledge (see Moore, *Poststructuralism and the New Testament*, p. 130 as cited in Michener). So, he is concerned with the rules of analysis as it pertains to discourse. This emphasis removes any tie to objective truth allowing new perspectives to take place. It is here where his worldview is apparent—challenging the assumption that history is teleological and as a progressing movement. Foucault is renouncing faith in the historical record and any force behind the destiny of the world. Instead, history consists of ambiguous and disjointed events.

Theological Implications

The biggest challenge to theological truth comes from the deconstructive postmodern opponents. Foucault set forth the notion of truth is produced in the context of power relationships. Truth is not verifiable evidence or logical propositions. Instead of asking “What is truth?” the question from the deconstructionists is “How and why is this statement true?” Foucault is redefining the traditional notion of truth making all truth claims equally valid. It is observed that the Foucaultian method presupposes the absence of the personal God of truth.

Second, the Foucaultian tradition presents a significant challenge to a theologically based historical record. It also denies transcendent authority and any metaphysics associated with history. It proposes that history be deconstructed in order to find those oppressed nuggets of ‘truths’ which may have been culturally and socially repressed. Even though historical record may contain several entangled events, this does not mean that any conscious directions gained from history can be abandoned—this is too big of a metaphysical leap.



His Life and Works

Jacques Derrida was born in Algeria in 1930 into a Jewish family. He was the third of five children. Jacques spent his youth in El-Biar, Algeria. On his first day in 1942, Jacques was expelled from secondary school by his French administrators. The administrators were implementing anti-semitic quotas set by the French government. Rather than attend school under these conditions, he secretly skipped school for a year. His youthful dreams gave rise to interests in becoming a football player. During his adolescent period, he read works by Rousseau, Nietzsche, and André Paul Guillaume Gide (1869—1951, French author), which was instrumental in his revolt against the family and society. He also read Camus and Sartre.

After Derrida visited the Husserl archives in Leuven Belgium, he completed the civil service examinations (the philosophy *aggregation* on Edmund Husserl) for particular positions in the public education system. He later received a grant for studies at Harvard University spending the 1956—57 academic year reading James Augustine Aloysius Joyce's *Ulysses*. Joyce (1882—1941) was an Irish novelist and poet and was considered one of the most influential writers in the new radical modernist movement of the twentieth century. In 1957, Derrida married the psychoanalyst Marguerite Aucounturier. Rather than participate in the military activity of Algerian War of Independence, he received permission to teach soldiers' children from 1957 to 1959, teaching them French and English.

After the war ended, Derrida taught philosophy from 1960 to 1964 at the University of Paris where he was the assistant of Suzanne Bachelard (1919—2007, a French philosopher), Georges Canguilhem (1904—1995), French philosopher, physician, epistemologist, and philosopher of science, Paul Ricoeur (1913—2005), French philosopher known for the combination of phenomenological descriptions and hermeneutic interpretations, and Jean Andre Wahl (1888—1974), French philosopher. In 1964, Derrida received a permanent teaching position at one of the most prestigious French schools for higher education known as the École Normale Supérieure. He remained there until 1984. He was also associated with a group called the Tel Quel, an innovative magazine comprised of a group of literary and philosophical theorists. His involvement there lasted for seven years. Subsequently, he distanced himself from the group after 1971 due to his reserved position concerning their embrace of Maoism and the Chinese Revolution.

Derrida's work titled "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in a 1966 conference at John Hopkins University began his international prominence. In 1967, he published three books: *Writing and Difference*, *Speech and Phenomena*, and *Of Grammatology*. Later in 1980, he later *Thèse d'État* which, when translated to English, was titled *The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations*. In 1983 and in a joint effort with Ken McMullen (b. 1948, film director and artist from London) they made a film titled "Ghost Dance."

Derrida was also director of studies at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris and later in 1983 co-founded the Collège International de Philosophie (a.k.a. the CIPH) aimed at providing a location for philosophical research. Later in 1986, he became professor of humanities at the University of California at Irvine and was visiting professor at a number of other American and European universities. He was also awarded honorary doctorates from a number of universities as well, even though many criticized his analytic philosophical abilities. Jacques Derrida was diagnosed with cancer in 2003 and subsequently died the following year.

Derrida's Philosophy

Jacques Derrida is atheistic regarding the existence of God and agnostic concerning the possibility of knowing absolute truth. He is anti-metaphysical—no metaphysics is possible. He believes that humans are locked up in their own linguistic bubble (see Wittgenstein).

Derrida has been given the label Father of Deconstructionism (a.k.a Postmodernism) though he personally disavows the popular meaning. He is usually regarded as a contemporary French philosopher though some have reservations about this title. Aspects of his thinking were drawn from the following predecessors: Immanuel Kant (metaphysics), Friedrich Nietzsche (atheism), Ludwig Wittgenstein (view of language), Friedrich Frege (conventionalism), Edmund Husserl (phenomenological method), Martin Heidegger (existentialism), and William James (pragmatism and the will to believe). However, his views are difficult to understand because of either inadequate translations or the nature of his positions. As such, he does not embrace nihilism, advocate anarchism (the abolition of government), nor is he an antinomianism—the belief the one is freed from all laws, moral and cultural, though his writings may appear to imply such thoughts at times.

Deconstructionism

Deconstructionism is a form of hermeneutics—the interpretation of text. Derrida is not out to destroy meaning but only to reconstruct it through abandoning the established rules of textual analysis. The deconstructionist reads, rereads the text *in search for a new, deeper, forgotten meaning*. The following distinction needs to be pointed out. Deconstruction is not a negation from dismantling the text but rather it is a critique that remodels the text, rather than a grammatical-literal-historical foundation associated with the text under consideration.

There are other characteristics associated with his deconstructionism.

- It embraces *conventionalism*—meaning is relative (not absolute or complete) to a culture and situation. There is no meaning prior to language.
- It accepts *perspectivalism*—truth is conditioned by one's perspective
- It holds to *referentialism*—no perfect reference or one-to-one correspondence between words and the meanings they confer. Therefore, meaning is ultimately *untransferable* between the writer and reader suggesting that the context is limited.
- It is *differentialism*—rational structures leave something out where the reader approaches the text with suspicion looking for some “differences” and in search for “something” that is “not there.”
- It embraces a form of *linguistic solipsism*—inability to escape the limits of language. Linguistic concepts can be broadened but limits of it keep the reader corralled.

- It holds to *semantic progressivism*—all possible meanings are never exhausted. A text can always be further deconstructed.

Understanding Derrida's Philosophy

Three factors are key to understanding Derrida's philosophy—grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Grammar expresses acceptable phrases with appropriate modifying words. Logic recognizes the absurdity of contradictory phrases. Rhetoric shows how and when to use the phrases mastered through grammar and logic. Needless to say, according to Derrida, however, grammar is relatively superficial, having to do with keeping the signs of language in good order. Logic and rhetoric are more profound, dealing with the use and interpretation of signs.

In addition, Derrida rejects the history of Western philosophy in which language is based on logic. That would mean there is a logical underpinning of reality which he denies. In addition, Derrida also rejects Plato, Aristotle, the rationalists and empiricists, and even the linguistic analysts such as Russell. He also sets aside phenomenologists like Husserl for assuming that there is a logical underpinning to reality.

Some Precursors to Derrida's Thought

Frege's distinction between sense and reference that played a part. The operational definitions in science and the recursive definitions in mathematics provide meaning or sense but rather only effective criteria for use in expression. Charles Peirce's pragmatic meanings for clarifying ideas was used in Derrida's operational definitions. John Austin's view of speech acts that are a rhetorical basis for meaning also had an influence on Derrida. Wittgenstein's language based in "forms of life" involved a turn from making demands to making observations which resulted in redirection away from logic-base to use-based meaning. Meaning then became a rhetorical force, viz., the role it plays in human activity. It follows that experience ends up being the basis of meaning—"Only in the stream of life does an expression have meaning." Rhetoric and the actual context of life is an essential feature of all linguistic meaning.

According to Derrida, language is *not* based on logic but is rather logic is based on rhetoric. One must "deconstruct" language based *in* logic in order to learn how linguistic expressions are used in human activity. Language based on logic entails a mistaken belief that there are "private languages" with "inner speech" and "private mental life." If logic is sovereign, then a private language is possible. If logic is formal, then ideas would not vary with circumstances.

Rhetoric as a Basis of Language

Derrida held that meaning is based in rhetorical force, namely, the role it plays in human activity. Rather than an underlying formal logic, meaning comes out of the stream of life where words express time-bound experiences. In order to understand what a text means, one must first fully understand its actual life context. Derrida's central arguments may be seen in the following five points.

1. All Meaning is *Complex*. No pure and simple meanings stand behind the signs (words) of language. If all language is complex, then no essential meaning transcends time and place.
2. All Meaning is *Contingent*. Every object of language and meaning is contingent upon a changing life reality. There is no objective meaning.

3. All Meaning is *mixed*. No pure experiences exist without reference to transient experience. There is no private mental life that does not presuppose an actual world. One cannot even think about a concept without contaminating it with some reference to our own past or future.
4. There is *no* such thing as a *perception*. Deconstructionists do not reject everyday experience. They reject idealized concepts disconnected from the everyday world. The nature of what is signified is not independent of the sign that signifies it.
5. Rhetoric is the basis of all meaning. All written language is dependent on spoken language. It is not dependent on the meaning of spoken signs but is instead dependent on the pattern of vocalization (phonemics). Phonemes are parts of sound that can be represented by a letter. Without this difference in phonemes, letters are impossible. “Difference” is the key to meaning, since all sounds must be differentiated to be distinct and form meaningful sounds. There cannot be any simple signs, since signs can't be transcribed into writing without both time and reference to another system (which are complex)

Derrida also rejected the view that meaning is rooted in timeless ideas. He saw this as: (1) a radical disjunction results between sign and what is signified; (2) a residual Platonism occurs that explains actual in terms of the ideal; (3) a radical distinction between sense and reference (between the timeless, context-free and the time-dependent contextual variant) is created; and (4) a resolution of basic issues ends up depending upon one's own concept of time and eternity. Derrida concludes: "It remains, then, for us to speak, to make our voices resonate throughout the corridors in order to make up for the breakup of presence [i.e., reality manifesting itself to us].”

What is the final result? The end of Western philosophy and the closure of metaphysics! Many believe Western philosophy comes to an end when incorporating Derrida's philosophy such that Western philosophy literally self-destructs as it deconstructs. But Derrida himself believed that goes on endlessly in continuous deconstructions or reinterpretations.

Evaluating Derrida's Deconstructionism

Derrida deconstructionism illustrates how the linguistic tradition leads to agnosticism—the view that nothing can be known about reality. Making a pointed critique of Western thought, he reveals that, unless one's philosophy begins in reality, it can never logically end in reality. His critique that “private language” and esoteric thought cut one off from reality, and his deconstructionism is open his view up to serious evaluation.

Derrida's position is laced with obscurity and ambiguity, making it difficult to understand and evaluate. His view contains many apparently contradictory claims, such as: “The history of philosophy is closed.” or, “Metaphysics has come to an end.” For in order for such claims against philosophy and metaphysics to be made, one cannot avoid using philosophy and metaphysics. His claim that we cannot know anything about reality is self-defeating. How does he know this unless he knows something about reality? What sort of epistemological status should be given to his statements? If they were true, they would be false. If they are mere poetical protests, then they do not destroy objective meaning or metaphysics. Even considering his rejection of (or protest against) metaphysics, Derrida uses metaphysical presuppositions. The very fact that he inquires about the “the real” indicates an underlying of metaphysics. In addition, when he claims that language depends on a relation to the world, this assertion strongly implies a metaphysical view of the world.

Further, Derrida's denial of logic is highly problematic, if not self-defeating. The very

language that denies logic is based in logic; otherwise it would be meaningless. He posits his logical statement in order to refuse the acceptance of logic statements.

His view is a form of nominalism and radical empiricism (the “real” is what is immediately before me in sensory experience). As such, deconstruction reduces to a type of empirical solipsism and is subject to the same criticism of these views. Moreover, the primacy difference over identity departs from common sense and makes all real communication impossible. Indeed, Derrida could not even communicate his own position to anyone if his view was right. The sentences conveying his view would have no meaning on a conventionalist theory of meaning. In short, he appears to have left himself no ground to stand on—even to express his own view.

Finally, Derrida’s “speech” is no better than Kant’s unknowable “noumena,” Wittgenstein’s “silence,” or Hume’s “flames.” For none of them tell us anything about reality.

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
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JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD (A.D. 1924 - 1998)



His Life and Works

Jean-Francois Lyotard was born in Versailles in 1924 to Jean-Pierre Lyotard and Madeleine Cavalli. He was a sales representative by vocation. Jean attended French schools in Paris. He began studying philosophy at the University of France, graduating with a Master's degree in 1950. His dissertation investigated apathy and detachment associated with Zen Buddhism, Taoism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism. He began teaching philosophy in Constantine in French East Algeria. He later earned his Ph. D. in literature and presented a dissertation titled *Discourse, figure* which was published in 1971. During the 1950' to the early 60's, he was party with a left-wing Marxist group and an active participant with the French political uprising in 1968. The influences of phenomenology and Wittgenstein helped shape his worldview towards social modernism.

Loytard also lectured at the University of California, Irvine, Johns Hopkins, Berkeley, Yale and the University of California, San Diego. Prior to his death, he divided his time between Paris and Atlanta, where he taught at Emory University as the Woodruff Professor of Philosophy and French.

He married twice and had three children. He was best known for influence on the death of the meta-narratives. Meta-narratives are 'stories' or 'grand narratives' that only interpret things because of a lack of objective truth, thus requiring proof upon proof ad infinitum. He wrote *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* which was published in 1979 introducing the term "postmodernism." Lyotard died unexpectedly in April 1998 from a case of leukemia that had advanced rapidly.

His Philosophy

Lyotard rejects the over-arching narrative about the world. According to Lyotard, Western modern times are characterized by meta-narratives that seem to posit the notion of guaranteed progress through the application of reason. Its efforts can be applied to politics, capitalism, speculations, and morality. However, according to Lyotard, the faith in these meta-narratives during present modern times seems to have been lost. Following Nietzsche's "death of God movement" is the death of history and progress as well. The result of this demise is that the ideological plans for a unified society must be rejected. How is this death of society shown? By wars, fascism, totalitarianism, and genocide. The Enlightenment concepts of the past pointing towards unity can no longer be depended upon because their promises—those meta-narratives—have not been kept. The promises of freedom have failed, poverty still exists, and human bondage and lack of rights continues. Adding to these failures is the fact that technology—such as the pervasive use of the internet, email, and increased television viewing—has harmed human interactions.

"Language-games"

Smaller narratives are called language games (cf. Wittgenstein). Lyotard attempts to dethrone

the Enlightenment's ideal that science was the standard of rational objectivity. He considered science as one of many "language games." The postmodern scientist tells stories and is not held to governing methodologies. Even though the scientist tells these "stories," they are still held to the verification process. However, the verification process allows freedom in knowledge and the possibility of new discoveries, a sense of breaking the old rules of the particular scientific language game. These new "rules" are associated with traditional logic where there is some unconscious false reasoning that can take place, thus making room for creativity. This is in contrast with sophism—a deliberate form of reasoning with a motivation to deceive. In summary, Lyotard is making a call to reject science as the ultimate which allows making room for creativity, invention, tolerance for the unknown, and cultural pluralism.


The Loss of the Self.

The postmodern idea of the 'self' promoted by Lyotard means humans *do not* yield to God. Humans are to live in a web of language games and network of expressions. The human being of coherent independence is out of fashion. Humans live in exchanges found in this modern "language game" surrounded by a web of unestablished rules. This 'new freedom' does not bind us to normative ethical or moral values for all people for all times but rather ties him to maximum freedom and creativity pointing away from previously established universality.

The Impact of Lyotard on Theology

Lyotard denies "grand narrative" associated with theology as well as science. There is no ultimate objectivity in either area. Attempts only end in scientism (in science) and dogmatism (in religion)). In the world, there are many smaller narratives that conflict, even though some 'truth' may be found in them. The promises of freedom they posed had indeed failed. Moreover, his view of 'freedom in knowledge and the possibility of new discoveries, a sense of breaking the old rules' applied to Christianity causes a serious problem.

RICHARD RORTY (A. D. 1931 - 2007)



His Life and Works

Richard Rorty was born in New York City in 1931. Both his parents were activists, writers and social democrats. His maternal grandfather was Walter Rauschenbusch who was influential in the Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century. Richard's father suffered from two nervous breakdowns and Richard likewise suffered from depression.

Shortly before turning fifteen, young Richard entered scholastic studies at the University of Chicago earning a bachelor's degree in philosophy in 1949 and subsequently a master's degree in the same area of study in 1952. Furthering his interests, he went to Yale University and earned his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1956.

Rorty taught at Wellesley College from 1958 to 1961, Princeton University from 1961 to 1982, and was professor at the University of Virginia from 1982 to 1998. He became Professor Emeritus in 1998. He was also Professor of Comparative Literature and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University in California.

Rorty began his academic career as an analytic philosopher believing that the tools of logic and painstaking analysis of language could organize answers to complex philosophical questions. In 1967, he wrote a philosophical and linguistic work titled *The Linguistic Turn*. However, he began questioning modern philosophy and developed an interest in continental philosophy (known as the 19th and 20th century mainland European philosophy) including the French post-structuralists and the Nietzsche's perspectivism. Rorty later published *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), criticizing the notion that the mind reflects the representation of external reality, i.e., the correspondence theory of truth. By 1982, he abandoned foundationalism in favor of liberal pragmatism to later write *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989) and *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1* in 1991.

He married twice, first an academic from Harvard University and then to a bioethicist from Stanford University. He had children from both marriages. Richard Rorty died from pancreatic cancer in 2007 at his home.

His Philosophy on Truth and Language

Like Derrida, Rorty dismissed the ideal associated with the modern notion positing philosophy's insight regarding the nature of truth. Instead, he suggests that philosophy offers literary or cultural critiques and criticisms. This idea he attaches to his denial of the realists view of language. In addition, he advocates what he calls an "anti-representational" accounting which does not render knowledge fitting with reality. Knowledge, then according to Rorty, is a series of habitual actions acquired in order to deal with reality. Concepts only echo reality. Therefore, sentences are not

true because they correspond to reality but instead truth is a human convention mediated by language. Hence, 'knowledge' is 'like truth.' Truth claims are only associated with their present context.

Rorty was pragmatic and his motivation was politically on the liberal side. He proposes three characteristics associate with pragmatism. First, when applied to truth and knowledge, it needs to be based on non-essentialism, thus denying an intrinsic property tied to the object. Second, he denies any difference between facts (what *is*) and values (what *ought* to be). Lastly, he recommends that there be an unlimited inquiry not held to constraints. It is here that it can be observed that he is post-modern; he rejects the notion of man as an independent thinking being (as promoted by Kant). Truth then is socially and contextually fenced in. He wanted to replace religious or philosophical accounts of a suprahistorical basis with liberal narratives of history that allows free and equal dialogue.

Rorty on Theological Matters

There are two areas of concern when evaluating Rorty on theological issues. These areas are in ethics, his idea of utopia, and his position regarding hermeneutics. First, Rorty views of God as some impersonal "thing" in which we have the capacity to suspend some judgment regarding Him, or, God may be used as an inadequate symbol mistaking the name for just simply a word or a form of language (Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 97-98, cited in Michener, *Engaging Destructive Theology*, p. 130).

Rorty's ethic emphasized a division between the public and the private. His ethic is primarily focused on the community. Human rights are *not* based on some universal truth claim, nor are they based on a truth associated with human nature. Hence, there are no human rights and no universal moral truth codes. However, there is a focus on minimizing cruelty and respecting the values of another allowing freedom when it comes to others lifestyles and religious beliefs. We must see the 'other guy' as a human like ourselves and these realizations can come from literature. Ronald Michener in *Engaging Deconstructive Theology* suggested that biblical narratives could do such a thing—illustrating to its readers how to care for the poor and the unjustly treated. These early narrative accounts identify their sufferings making the reader more sensitive to suffering in the world today.

When considering the ideals of morality, Rorty suggests that when it comes to moral dilemmas, that they not be resolved by any change of heart but rather by a form of "redescription" based upon our own voice in the community of common language. Hence, he does not believe in a supernatural Being that has the power to transform the moral deviant. Rorty's utopia then is his elimination of suffering and a guarantee of free expression. This can only happen through local social reform and political change. However, he does not claim to be a relativist.

Rorty Compared to Derrida

Rorty sides with Derrida in that he sees an epistemological bankruptcy. As a solution, he used deconstructive tools whereby reminding us that philosophy is not a dispenser of truth but rather is just simply a form of writing. On the other hand, Rorty wants philosophy to be an ethically responsible voice compared to Derrida's suggestion of it being totally disintegrated through his deconstruction.

AN EVALUATION OF POSTMODERNISM (DECONSTRUCTIONISM)

The Postmodern Attack on Foundationalism

Postmodernism's atheism and relativism has attacked foundationalism and the views on history, and textual interpretation, which form the basis of Christian thought. Foundationalism states that there are self-evident principles which form the basis for all knowledge. There are two basic types of foundationalism: deductive and reductive. Deductive foundationalism is based upon the notion that certain axioms are defined as self-evident truths and from these, all other truths are deduced from them. The problem with this is that not all axioms are necessary and some are empty yielding no knowledge of reality. Reductive foundationalism, on the other hand, states that all truths are reducible to self-evident first principles, i.e., non-evident statements are evident in terms of something else. The problem here is that there cannot be an infinite regress of non-evident statements.

The remedy is found in the first principles of knowledge which are in themselves self-evident—the predicate is reducible to the subject. These first principles are as follows and are provided in relation to Being (B):

1. The Law of Existence: "Being is." (B is.)
2. The Law of Identity: "Being is being." (B is B.)
3. The Law of Non-contradiction: "Being is not non-being." (B is not non-B.)
4. The Law of Excluded Middle: "Either Being or non-being." (Either B or non-B.)
5. The Law of Causality: "Non-being cannot cause being." (Non-B cannot cause B.)
6. The Law of Contingency: "No contingent being can cause its own existence." (Contingent B cannot cause itself.)
7. The Law of Analogy: "An effect is similar to its efficient cause." (B's effect is similar to its efficient cause.)

These first principles are all first principles of thought and being and, as such, they apply to reality and to metaphysics. They are undeniable in the sense that if there is any attempt to deny them, its affirmation is used in its denial. The claim that I do not exist implies that I exists in order to make that claim. These first principles can be used to demonstrate the existence of God. For if something exists (#1 above, et. al.), it cannot cause its own existence (#6). Second, non-being cannot cause a being (#5) therefore, this being that causes another being to exist is Being itself (#2), and it cannot not exist and exist at the same time (#3). Further, either it is or it is not existing (#4). Hence, this being (the effect) resembles its efficient cause, Being (#7). For being applies to both the existing Cause of being and the being which it causes. Being produces being since it cannot share with another what it does not have to share. It cannot give what it hasn't got.

Critiquing Post-Modernisms Claims

Its View of History

Post-modernism claims that all historical accounts are relative. As one historical relativist claims, "The event itself, the facts, do not say anything, do not impose any meaning. It is the historian who speaks, who imposes a meaning" (Carl L. Becker, "What Are Historical Facts?" in *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, 131). This assertion would destroy Christianity since it is a historical religion, based as it is on the life, death, and resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 15:1-19).

Their own claim however is self-defeating. How can one know that something is not objective history unless he has some objective knowledge of history that enables him to say that a particular view of history is not objective? Charles Beard, the apostle of historical relativity himself, wrote: "Contemporary criticism shows that the apostle of relativity is destined to be destroyed by the child of his own brain." For, "If all historical conceptions are merely relative to passing events...then the conceptions of relativity is itself relative."

Its View of Hermeneutics and Meaning

First, their view is based on conventionalism—all meaning is culturally relative (see above). They claim that all hermeneutic meaning is subjective (thus denying objective meaning). These claims are self-destructive. In their attempt to deny that statements correspond to reality, they make a statement which they believe corresponds to reality. Recall that Derrida claims that all are locked inside a “linguistic bubble” unable to get out. However, the claim that all statements that imply one can know *nothing but* what is inside the linguistic bubble simply implies that one has knowledge of *more than* what is inside the bubble in order to make the claim. The post-moderns claim that logic is language is dependent. However, logic transcends all culture. To make the claim that the Law of Non-contradiction is not applicable to all cultures is itself a non-contradictory statement about all cultures. Further, the claim that no macro-statements or macro-narratives can be made is itself a macro-statement about reality. Lastly, the post-modern claim that meaning is determined by the reader and not the author is crippling. The post-moderns fully intend to have their meaning retrieved from their texts and do not want the reader to interpret something other than what they mean. Hence, a contradiction is produced based on their own proposition.

Its View of Meaning and Truth

Post-modernism embraces a conventionalist theory of meaning which affirms that all meaning is culturally relative. It rears its ugly head in literature and television (including the internet and the ever-growing film industry). These media promote the idea that there are no universal truths and that all is particular through the small stories while neglecting the grand narrative. Life is something that is just ‘done’ when there is nothing to view on television—hence, life’s meaning is lost. It equalizes and abolishes any class distinctions. It ends up trivializing life itself—after viewing a murder, the network moves right to a commercial.

In the post-modern world, truth ends up being perspectival and pluralistic. There is a shift from propositional concepts to the visual where even though words are understood, pictures are recognized. There is a stress over on the effects (feelings) rather than the cognitive (thinking). When it comes to the area of ethics, there is a focus on the antinomian individualism—the idol of the self. There is also the reductionistic naturalism that centers on the empirical sensationalism. Multiculturalism and political fragmentation become evident in society. Ultimately, all these lead to narcissistic hedonism that sets up sensuality as its god and a crash landing of the moral immune system. The God of the universe is replaced by the man-god of post-modernism.

The Essential Problem with Post-Modernism

The problems with post-modernism could be summed up in a neat package, it could be stated as follows. 1) It cannot be *thought* consistently; 2) It cannot be *spoken* consistently. 3) It cannot be *lived* consistently. Why is it an inconsistent worldview? Because it is based on atheism, and atheism cannot be thought, spoken, or lived consistently. Its inability to think or speak consistently has already been shown by the self-defeating nature of their central claims. Its inability to be lived

consistently has come from its own atheist proponents as illustrated below.

Jean Paul Sartre: “I reached out for religion, I longed for it, it was the remedy. Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself... I needed a Creator....” (*The Words*, 102).

Albert Camus: “For anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful” (*The Fall*, 133). He also declared that “Nothing can discourage the appetite for divinity in the heart of man” (Camus, *The Rebel*, 147).

Friedrich Nietzsche: He wrote a poem to an “Unknown God”: “Unknown one! Speak. What wilt thou, unknown-god?... Do come back with all thy tortures! To the last of all that are lonely, Oh, come back!... And my heart’s final flame --Flares up for thee! Oh, come back, My unknown god! My pain! My last—happiness!” (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part Four, “The Magician”).

Bertrand Russell: “Even when one feels nearest to other people, something in one seems obstinately to belong to God...at least that is how I should express it if I thought there was a God. It is odd, isn’t it? I care passionately for this world and many things and people in it, and yet...what is it all?” *There must be* something more important one feels, though *I don’t believe* there is” (emphasis his).

The Existential Failure of Post-modernism

This aching to have the inner void filled is reminiscent of Blaise Pascal (1623—1662), French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher who insisted that there is a God-sized vacuum in the human heart which nothing but God can fill. He wrote: “What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him... though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself” (Pascal, *Pensées* # 425).

Even the skeptic David Hume (1711—1776) could not live out his own skepticism. He wrote: “Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds [of doubt], nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of the philosophical melancholy and delirium...” (*A Treatise on Human Nature* 1.4.7). His solution? “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse...; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther” (ibid. 1.4.7).

Atheist Sigmund Freud (1856—1939), Austrian neurologist who founder of the discipline of psychoanalysis, claimed that “What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes.” As for “religious doctrines,” “all of them are illusions and insusceptible of proof” (*The Future of an Illusion*, 49-50). As it turns out, however, it is the atheist who has the illusion. Freud never made a study of believers on which he based his views. And recent studies show that belief in God leads to a better and happier life. Paul Vitz did a study of the great atheist and found that those who were fatherless actually wither of functionally. He wrote, “Indeed, there is a coherent psychological origin to intense atheism” (p. 3). “Therefore, in the Freudian framework, atheism is an illusion caused by the Oedipal desire to kill the father (God) and replace him with oneself” (*Faith of the Fatherless*, 13).

The famous historian and philosopher William James Durant (1885—1981) wrote, “I survive morally because I retain the moral code that was taught me along with the religion, while I discarded

the religion.... You and I are living on a shadow.... But what will happen to our children...? They are living on the shadow of a shadow” (*Chicago Sun-Times* 8/24/75 1B).

It was John-Paul Sartre (1905—1980, French existentialist philosopher) who affirmed that he had given up on God. However, as is obvious from the following quote, God had not given up on him. Before his death, he is recorded as saying, “I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured. In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here” (*National Review*, 11 June, 1982, p. 677).

Former Atheist Francis Collins (b. 1950, American physician-geneticist) who headed up the human genome project made this inquiry: “Why would such a universal and uniquely human hunger [for God] exist, if it were not connected to some opportunity for fulfillment?... Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A duckling wants to swim: well there is such a thing as water” (*The Language of God*, 38).

As the above citations show, even atheists themselves when evaluating atheism conclude it is like living on a “*shadow of a shadow*.” It is *not* “*bearable*.” It is “*dreadful*,” even “*cruel*.” It even leads to “*delirium*.” The main point is that postmodernism *is not only unthinkable and unspeakable, but it is unlivable*.

Some Final thoughts

The British *Humanist Magazine* charged that Humanism is almost “clinically detached from life.” It recommends they develop a humanist Bible, a humanist hymnal, Ten Commandments for humanists, and even confessional practices! In addition, “the use of hypnotic techniques—music and other psychological devices—during humanist services would give the audience that deep spiritual experience having them emerge refreshed and inspired with their humanist faith...” (1964). There services could even include the following ‘humanist’ hymns: “Socrates, Lover of My Soul,” “No One Ever Care for Me like Plato,” and “My hope is Built on Nothing Less than Jean Paul Sartre and Nothingness”! A humanist poem might read something like this:

*Open my eyes that I may see,
More of my own subjectivity.
Help me, Derrida, ever to be
All absorbed in uncertainty.
Then I'll know what it is to be
Lost forever in postmodernity.*

---N.L. Geisler

THEOLOGICAL POSTMODERNISM: THE EMERGENT CHURCH

The Influences Behind Postmodernism

The post-modern movement finds its roots in Friedrich Nietzsche and the death of God movement he spawned (see above). The entire post-modern movement can be cast in this context. Nietzsche wrote: “*God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves?*” (“The Madman” in *Gay Science*, 125). After the pronouncement of the death of God, then the rest of post-modernism logically follows. If there is no absolute Moral Law Giver, then there can be no absolute moral law (subjectivism). Likewise, if there is no absolute Mind, then there can be no absolute meaning (conventionalism) or absolute truth (relativism). Further, if there is no objective meaning, then there cannot be an objective interpretation of a text. Hence, deconstructionism follows. Therefore, the death of God leads to the death of every other area of thought and life as illustrated below:

1. “Death of God” *Atheism*
2. Death of objective truth *Relativism*
3. Death of exclusive truth—*Pluralism*
4. Death of objective meaning *Conventionalism*
5. Death of thinking (logic)—*Anti-Foundationalism*
6. Death of objective memory---*Reconstructionism*
7. Death of objective interpretation *Deconstructionism*
8. Death of objective values *Subjectivism*

The Influence of Postmodernism in Theology

The North American father of post-modernism in evangelical theology, Brian McLaren, wrote: “But for me...opposing it [Postmodernism] is as futile as opposing the English language. It’s here. It’s reality. It’s the future.... It’s the way my generation processes every other fact on the event horizon” (McLaren, *The Church on the Other Side (COS)*, 70). He added, “Postmodernism is the intellectual boundary between the old world and the other side. Why is it so important? Because when your view of truth is changed, when your confidence in the human ability to know truth in any objective way is revolutionized, then everything changes. That includes theology...” (McLaren, *COS*, 69).

Post-modernism in theology has been called by a variety of other names as well, such as Post-Protestant, Post-Orthodox, Post-Denominational, Post-Doctrinal, Post-Individual, Post-Foundational, Post-Creedal, Post-Rational, and Post-Absolute. However, in reality, “Post” actually means “Anti” not “after” since post-modernism itself is opposed to everything listed above which they see as part of the modern world.

Key Works of the Postmodern Theology

There are a variety of works promoting postmodern theology. Brian McLaren wrote *The Church on the Other Side*, *A Generous Orthodoxy*, and *A New Kind of Christian*. Stanley Grenz, the grand-father of the movement wrote: *A Primer on Post-Modernism*, *Beyond Foundationalism*, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology*. Rob Bell recently hit the front page of *Time* magazine with his denial of Hell in his book, *Love Wins*. Bell also wrote *Velvet Elvis: Repainting the Christian Faith*,

and *Jesus Wants to Save Christians: A Manifesto for the Church in Exile*; *Love: A Book about Heaven, Hell, and the Fate of Every Person Who Ever Lived*. Doug Pagitt and Tony Jones penned, *An Emergent Manifesto of Hope* and Tony Jones wrote, *The New Christians: Dispatches from the Emergent Frontier*. Donald Miller, *Emergent Manifesto* and *Blue Like Jazz*. Steve Chalke and Allan Mann wrote *The Lost Message of Jesus* and Dave Tomlinson wrote *The Post-Evangelical*. Spencer Burke and Barry Taylor penned *A Heretics Guide to Eternity*. There is also a website that can be visited: www.emergentvillage.com.

The Fundamental Beliefs of Postmodern Theology

There are many beliefs in post-modernist theology. Below is a listing and summary of the key views and a response. The apostle Paul urges Christians to do what he was doing when the Church at Corinth was experiencing anti-Christian teaching: “We destroy arguments and bring every thought captive to Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5).

Anti-Absolutism

McClaren wrote: “Arguments that pit absolutism versus relativism, and objectivism versus subjectivism, prove meaningless or absurd to postmodern people” (McClaren, “The Broadened Gospel,” in “Emergent Evangelism,” *Christianity Today* [Nov. 2004], 43).

As will be illustrated, the root problem with post-modern thought is that it is self-defeating. It cannot state its view without contradicting itself. For example,

1. Relativism stated: “We cannot know the absolute truth.”
2. The self-refutation: We know that we cannot know absolute truth.

Anti-Exclusivism

Another aspect of post-modern thought is its pluralism or anti-exclusivism. McClaren wrote: “Missional Christian faith asserts that Jesus did not come to make some people saved and others condemned. Jesus did not come to help some people be right while leaving everyone else to be wrong. Jesus did not come to create another exclusive religion” (*A Generous Orthodoxy*, 109).

“But Christianity’s idea that other religions cannot be God’s carriers of [redemptive] grace and truth casts a large shadow over our Christian experiences” (Samir Selmanovic, in Pagitt, *An Emergent Manifesto of Hope*, 191). “Christianity is a non-god, and every non-god can be an idol” (Ibid., 192). “God cannot be hijacked by Christianity” (Ibid., 194). “If a relationship with a specific person, namely Christ, is the whole substance of a relationship with the God of the Bible, then the vast majority of people in world history are excluded from the possibility of a relationship with the God of the Bible...” (Ibid., 194). “To put it in different terms, there is no salvation outside of Christ, but there is salvation outside of Christianity” (Ibid., 19). “Would a God who gives enough revelation for people to be judged but not enough revelation to be saved be a God worthy of worshiping? Never!” (Ibid., 195). Now for an evaluation of their focus.

Anti-Exclusivism

1. The anti-exclusivism claim: “It is wrong to make a claim that one view is exclusive truth as opposed to opposing views.”
2. The self-refutation: The anti-exclusivism claim is exclusively true as opposed to exclusivism.

Anti-exclusivism is just another term for pluralism. The problem is clear—the claim that no

view is exclusively true is an exclusivistic truth claim itself.

1. The Claim of Pluralism: “No view is exclusively true.”

2. The self-refutation: It claims that its view (that no view is exclusively true) is exclusively true.

Anti-Foundationalism

Stanely Grenz noted in the title of his book *Beyond Foundationalism* that the post-modern movement is opposed to epistemological foundationalism. That is, they are opposed to the view that there are self-evident principles at the basis of all thought. Tony Jones writes, “The theory that at the bottom of all human knowledge is a set of self-inferential or internally justified beliefs; in other words, the foundation is indubitable and requires no external justification. For the conservative, the sacred text of Christianity is indubitable, established by an internal and circular reasoning: “The Bible claims to be God’s truth, so therefore it’s true.” (Jones, *The New Christian*, 19).

The basic principles of foundationalism include the laws of logic, such as the following:

1. The Law of Identity (A is A).
2. The Law of Non-Contradiction (A is not non-A).
3. The Law of Excluded Middle (Either A or non-A).
4. The Laws of rational inference.

For example, it is a rational inference to conclude that:

- (a) If all A is included in B.
- (b) And all B is included in C.
- (c) Hence, All A is included in C.

However, there are different kinds of rational inferences. There is the categorical inference as shown above. There is also the hypothetical inference as illustrated below:

- (a) If all human beings are sinners, then John is a sinner.
- (b) All human beings are sinners.
- (c) Therefore, John is a sinner.

In addition, there are also the disjunctive inference, such as: Either a person is saved or else he is lost (but he cannot be both at the same time and in the same sense). Therefore, if he is not saved, then he must be lost. Given these kinds of principles being the bedrock of foundationalism, it is difficult to see what one could have against these venerable laws of thought.

Nonetheless, Stanley Grenz wrote a whole book against Foundationalism titled: *Beyond Foundationalism*. McLaren, adding his thoughts on the topic, writes: “For modern Western Christians, words like authority, inerrancy, infallibility, revelation, objective, absolute, and literal are crucial.... Hardly anyone knows ...Rene Descartes, the Enlightenment, David Hume, and Foundationalism—which provides the context in which these words are so important. Hardly anyone notices the irony of resorting to the authority of extra-biblical words and concepts to justify one’s belief in the Bible’s ultimate authority” (McLaren, *Generous Orthodoxy* 164).

To reduce their view to a simple proposition, making the following claim:

1. The claim of anti-foundationalism: “Opposites can both be true.”
2. The self-refutation: They hold that the opposite of this statement (that opposites can both be true) cannot be true.

However, this must be false. But if the opposite of true is false, then they are using a foundational logical principle to deny foundational logical principles. The result? A self-defeating proposition.

Anti-Objectivism

Another characteristic of post-modern thought is subjectivism. Grenz wrote: “We ought to commend the postmodern questioning of the Enlightenment assumption that knowledge is objective and hence dispassionate” (Grenz, *A Primer on Postmodernism*, 166). Put in simple form:

1. The Claim of anti-objectivism: “There are no objectively true statements.”
2. The self-refutation: It is an objectively true statement that there are no objectively true statements.

In short, their anti-objectivism makes an objective truth claim. Hence, it is hanged on its own epistemological gallows and ends in self-destruction.

Anti-Rationalism

Another characteristic of post-modernism theology is anti-rationalism. It is a form of fideism that denies that reason has any place in matters of faith. Grenz chided, “Twentieth-century evangelicals [who] have devoted much energy to the task of demonstrating the credibility of the Christian faith...” (Grenz, *PPM*, 160) are “Following the intellect [that] can sometimes lead us away from the truth” (Grenz, *PPM*, 166). Of course, he seems blissfully unaware of the fact that not following basic rational thought will lead you there a lot faster!

McLaren, added: “Because knowledge is a luxury beyond our means, faith is the best we can hope for. What an opportunity! Faith hasn’t encountered openness like this in several hundred years” (McLaren, *COS*, 173). He continues and offers this advice: “Drop any affair you may have with certainty, proof, argument—and replace it with dialogue, conversation, intrigue, and search” (McLaren, *Adventures in Missing the Point*, 78). Here again there is a self-defeating claim:

1. The Claim of Fideism: “There are no reasons for what we believe.”
2. The self-refutation: There are good reasons for believing there are no good reasons for what we believe.

To state it another way,

1. The Claim of Fideism: “Knowledge is a luxury beyond our means.”
2. The self-refutation: We have the luxury of knowing that we can’t have the luxury of knowing.

And Again, Anti-Objectivism

The term that describes anti-objectivism in meaning is Conventionalism. It claims that all meaning is culturally relative. There is no fixed meaning. Meaning is not objective. Here again the reader is faced with self-destructive claims:

1. The Claim of Conventionalism: “There is no objective meaning.”
2. The self-refutation: It is objectively meaningful to assert that there is no objective meaning.

The post-modern dilemma is painful. It cannot even express its view without borrowing from its opposing view. It literally has no ground of its own on which to stand. It is living on borrowed capital.

Anti-Realism

According to post-modern theology, there is no objective world that can be known. Rather, “the only ultimately valid ‘objectivity of the world’ is that of a future, eschatological world, and the ‘actual’ universe is the universe as it one day will be” (Grenz, *Renewing the Center*, 246).

1. The Claim of Anti-Realism: “There is no real world now that can be known.”
2. The self-refutation: We know it is really true now (i.e., true in the real world now) that there is no real world now that can be known.

One cannot know now that there is no real world now. For “really” implies there is a reality to know. And, if there is a real world now, then one cannot deny it without implying it.

Anti-Certainty

Protestants believe the Bible is infallible (Mat. 5:17-18; John 10:35), but not any interpretation of it—like an alleged infallible Papal pronouncement. However, lacking infallibility in

all matters of Faith does not mean we lack certainty in some matters. The principle of perspicuity (clarity) affirms that the main teachings of Scripture are clear and we can be certain of them. For in the Bible the main things are the plain things, and the plain things are the main things. Of these, the believer can have moral certainty. Post-modern Christians challenge the notion that one can have any certainty in the knowledge of the Bible. McLaren put it this way: “Well, I’m wondering, if you have an infallible text, but all your interpretations of it are admittedly fallible, then you at least have to always be open to being corrected about your interpretation, right?... So the authoritative text is never what I say about the text or even what I understand the text to say but rather what God means the text to say, right?” (McLaren, *NKC*, 50).

1. The claim of Anti-Certainty: “My understanding of the text is never the correct one.”
2. The self-refutation: My understanding of the text is correct in saying that my understanding of the text is never correct.

In short, the claim that one is certain that he can never be certain about anything the Bible teaches is a self-refuting claim.

Anti-Propositional

It is an essential truth of evangelical Christianity that the Bible contains propositional truth claims. That is, regardless of the literary form (story, parable, poetry, or proverbs), the Bible contains truth that can be stated in propositional form. In other words, the Bible contains doctrinal truths. However, Grenz and other post-modern theologians claim that: “Our understanding of the Christian faith must not remain fixated on the propositional approach that views Christian truth as nothing more than correct doctrine or doctrinal truth” (Grenz, *PPM*, 170). Therefore, “Transformed in this manner into a book of doctrine, the Bible is easily robbed of its dynamic character” (Grenz, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology*, 114-115).

1. The Claim of Anti-Propositionalism: “Our view of the Christian faith must not be fixed on propositional truth (doctrine).”
2. The self-refutation: We must be fixed on the propositional truth that we should not be fixed on propositional truth.

What the anti-propositionalist fails to see is that denying propositional truth is a propositional truth. Denying doctrine is a doctrine. Denying creeds is a creedal statement.

Another post-modern claim connected to this is the following:

1. The Claim of Anti-Propositionalism: “Doctrinal truth is not dynamic.”
2. The self-refutation: It is a dynamic doctrinal truth (of post-modernism) that doctrinal truth is not dynamic.

But doctrine is dynamic! Ideas have consequences! $E = MC^2$ is a proposition that had dynamic consequences—it produced an atomic bomb. Likewise, biblical truth has consequences as well. The truth of the Gospel has consequence—it is the power of God unto salvation (Rom. 1:16). To deny the Gospel or its underpinning doctrines is to destroy the power of the Gospel.

Anti-Orthodoxy

Post-modern Christian Dwight J. Friesen speaks out against orthodoxy—the belief in orthodox doctrines of the Bible. He wrote: “Jesus did not announce ideas or call people to certain beliefs as much as he invited people to follow him into a way of being in the world.... The theological method

of ortho-paradox surrenders the right to be right for the sake of movement toward being reconciled one with another, while simultaneously seeking to bring the fullness of conviction and belief to the other.... Current theological methods that often stress... orthodoxy/heresy, and the like set people up for constant battles to convince and convert the other to their way of believing and being in the world” (Friesen, in *EMH*, 205). Therefore, “in ortho-paradox theology propositions and truth claims are more important than ever but not as litmus tests of correct belief or practice; rather, truth claims become launching pads for differentiated relationship.... Ortho-paradox theology is less concerned with creating ‘once for all’ doctrinal statements or dogmatic claims and is more interested in holding competing truth claims in right tension” (Friesen, in *EMH*, 209).

1. The Claim of Post-Orthodoxy: “We should not insist on being right about doctrine.”
2. The self-refutation: We insist on being right in our doctrine that we should not insist on being right in our doctrine.

The creed on non-creedalism is itself a creed. One cannot deny orthodox doctrine without believing that his doctrine (teaching) on this matter is orthodox.

Anti-Condemnationalism (Universalism)

Much of post-modern theology embraces various forms of universalism—the belief that ultimately no one will be lost. All will eventually be saved. Getting to the point—there is no hell—at least no place with anyone in it. McLaren tried to side-step the issue by claiming, “More important to me than the hell question, then, is the *mission* [in this world] question.” (McLaren, *Generous Orthodoxy*, 114). Jesus reconciled “all things, everywhere.” And “Hell is full of forgiven people.” Rob Bell wrote: “Our choice is to live in this new reality or cling to a reality of our own making” (Bell, *Velvet Jesus*, 146). He added, “So it is a giant thing that God is doing here and not just the forgiveness of individuals. It is the reconciliation of all things.” (Bell in “Find the Big Jesus: An Interview with Rob Bell” in www.beliefnet.com). His recent book *Love Wins* claims that God will keep on loving everyone in this life and in the next until everyone accepts it.

1. The claim of Universalism: “All persons (free agents) will be saved.”
2. The self-refutation: All persons (free agents) will be saved, even those who do not freely choose to be saved.

C. S. Lewis pinpointed problem with universalism: When one says, “All will be saved,” my reason retorts, “Without their will, or with it?” If I say, “Without their will,” I at once perceive a contradiction; how can the supreme voluntary act of self-surrender be involuntary? If I say, “With their will,” my reason replies, “How, if they will not give in?” (*The Problem of Pain*, 106-107).

Elsewhere, Lewis states it this way: “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will (oh God) be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end. ‘Thy will (oh man) be done.’ All that are in Hell chose it. Without that self-choice there could be no Hell” (*The Great Divorce*, 69).

Jesus said as recorded in one of the Gospel accounts, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,...how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but *you were not willing*” (Mt. 23:37). Contrary to Rob Bell, it is because God is loving and man is free that there must be a hell. God cannot force people into heaven any more than we can force someone to love us. Love always works persuasively but never coercively.

Anti-Individualism

Another dimension of much of emergent thinking is anti-individualism or collectivism. McLaren writes: “He said he had been raised, as I had, to believe that the central story of the Bible was about saving individual souls. The gospel, as he (and I) had understood it, was about getting individual souls to heaven.... First, it smacked of selfishness. Would God want a heaven full of people who wanted to be ‘saved’ but didn’t want to be good?... Second, in a postmodern context, he said, the individualism of this approach sounded downright evil...” (McLaren, *A New Kind of Christian*, 62).

Unfortunately, it is self-defeating to claim God is interested in group but not in individuals. For all groups are made up of individuals. And while good wants us to belong to a body and to have unity in our community of believers, nonetheless, in the final analysis all salvation is individual. God does not save people by groups or even families. He saves them one by one, individual by individual. This, of course, plays into the hands of ecumenism and the world-church movement which, as we know, is a characteristic of the end-times. Salvation is only found in the whole, not in each person or part. Indeed, the bible says, “Each one of us shall give an account of himself to God” (Rom. 14:12).

This anti-individualism is manifest in the post-denominationalism of the post-modern church. As Dwight J. Friesen put it, “Ortho-paradox theology may be understood as supporting a form of ecumenism, which broadens the conversation beyond the church to include and engage cultural voices” (Friesen, in *EMH*, 209). Of course, this post-denominationalism will lead ultimately to the super-denominationalism of the world church. Tony Campolo tells how this union of seemingly opposed views may emerge. In his book *Speaking My Mind* he says: “A theology of mysticism provides some hope for common ground between Christianity and Islam. Both religions have within their histories examples of ecstatic union with God, which seem at odds with their own spiritual traditions but have much in common with each other. I do not know what to make of the Muslim mystics, especially those who have come to be known as the Sufis. What do they experience in their mystical experience? Could they have encountered the same God we do in our Christian mysticism?” (149,150).

Anti-Innerantism

Evangelical Christians affirm that the Bible is the inerrant (without error) Word of God. Why? Because the Bible is the Word of God, and God cannot error (Jn. 17:17; Heb. 6:18). So, the Bible cannot err.

This historic and biblical position is opposed by the anti-inerrantism of postmodernism. McLaren wrote: “Incompleteness and error are part of the reality of human beings” (McLaren, *COS*, 173). Grenz added, “Our listening to God’s voice [in Scripture] does not need to be threatened by scientific research into Holy Scripture” (Grenz, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology*, 116). He adds, “The Bible is revelation because it is the [errant] witness to and the [errant] record of the historical revelation of God” (Grenz, *ibid.*, 133).

McClaren rejects the view that: “The Bible is the ultimate authority.... There are no contradictions in it, and it is absolutely true and without errors in all it says. Give up these assertions, and you’re on a slippery slope to losing your whole faith” (McLaren, *GO*, 133-134). He claims that “Hardly anyone notices the irony of resorting to the authority of extra-biblical words and concepts to justify one’s belief in the Bible’s ultimate authority” (*GO*, 164).

However, the anti-inerrancy view is also trapped in self-contradiction. Consider the following:

1. The Claim of Errantists: “No human writing is without error.”
2. The self-refutation: This claim (that no human writing is without error) is without error.

Dwight J. Friesen’s adds still another dimension in Orthoparadoxy: “‘A thing is alive only when it contains contradictions in itself’ Just as he [Moltmann] highlights the necessity of contradictions for life, so I declare that embracing the complexities of contradictions, antinomies, and paradoxes of the human life is walking the way of Jesus” (in Pagitt ed., *An Emergent Manifesto of Hope*, 203).

Anti-Substitutionism

Steve Chalke claims: “The fact is that the cross is a form of cosmic child abuse—a vengeful father, punishing his son for an offence he has not even committed. Understandably, both people inside and outside of the church have found this twisted version of events morally dubious and a huge barrier to faith. Deeper than that, however, is that such a construct stands in total contradiction to the statement ‘God is love.’ If the cross is a personal act of violence perpetrated by God towards humankind but borne by his son, then it makes a mockery of Jesus’ own teaching to love your enemies and refuse to repay evil with evil” (Steve Chalke, *The Lost Message of Jesus*, 184).

Responding to Chalke’s criticism, the Bible speaks to the motivation as to the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ. For starters, God gave His Son because He loved the world (Jn. 3:16) and it was Jesus who freely gave His life because he loved humankind (Jn. 10:14, 18). Second, it was the sacrifice of His life that was necessary for man’s salvation (Lev. 17:11; Rom. 3:21-26; Heb. 9:22; Mark 10:45 cf. Isa. 53; 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Peter 3:18).

Anti-Trinitarianism

Emergent Church proponent Donald Miller wrote: “I asked him if he believed that the Trinity represented three separate persons who are also one” (*Blue Like Jazz*, 202).

However, when the Trinity is said to be three separate persons, then this illustrates the tenants

of the heresy called Tritheism. Orthodox Trinitarianism affirms that there are three distinct (but not separate) *persons* (like three distinct corners on one triangle). The persons of the Trinity are not three separate persons (like cutting off the three corners from a triangle or having three separate triangles).

Closing Comments on Self-defeating Statements

Like all the foregoing self-defeating claims of post-modernism, they set the trap and fall in it themselves. Jesus declared while looking up to heaven: "Your Word [oh Father,] is truth." (John 17:17). He added elsewhere, "If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken." (John 10:34-35). "Laying aside the commandment of God, you hold the traditions of men..., making the word of God of no effect through your traditions." (Mark 7:8, 13). Paul declared that "All scripture is given by inspiration of God...." (2 Tim. 3:16). The Scripture is the Word of God (Rom. 9:6) and God cannot err (Titus 1:2). Jesus said, "'It is written'...by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God." (Mat. 4:4). Since the Bible is the very words of God, then to attribute error to the Bible, is to attribute error to God.

This is not to say that there are no difficulties in the Bible. There are. But St. Augustine's dictum put it well: "*If we are perplexed by any apparent contradiction in Scripture, it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either [1] the manuscript is faulty, or [2] the translation is wrong, or [3] you have not understood.*" (Augustine, *Reply to Faustus* 11.5)

The Emerging Problems with the Emergent Church

Post-modern theology is self-defeating. It stands on the pinnacle of its own absolute and relativizes everything else. It is an unorthodox creedal attack on orthodox creeds. It attacks modernism in the culture but is an example of postmodernism in the church. In an attempt to reach the culture it capitulates to the culture. In trying to be geared to the times, it is no longer anchored to the Rock. It is not an emerging church; it is really a submerging church.

As Mark Driscoll aptly put it, "The emergent church is the latest version of liberalism. The only difference is that the old liberalism accommodated modernity and the new liberalism accommodates postmodernity" (Mark Driscoll, *Confessions of a Reformation REV*, 21).

The Emergent Church inconsistency can be summarized as follows:

It says that everything must change—*But nothing that is essential should change.*

It promotes a manifesto of hope—*But it is a declaration of disaster.*

It tries to refocus the faith—*But it distorts the true faith.*

It tries to renew the center—*But it rejects the Core.*

It is trying to repaint the faith—*But instead it repudiates the Faith.*

It claims to be a generous orthodoxy—*But it is a dangerous unorthodoxy.*

It is the Church on the other side—*But it ends up being on the other side of the Church*

It is a primer on post-modernism—*But it ends up being a primer on New Modernism*

The Emergent Church is built on sand, and will not stand. Christ's Church is build on Stone, And it cannot be overthrown. (Mat. 16:16-18).

Answering a Final Objection

Some post-modernists try to avoid the painful logic of their own self-defeating statements by claiming that they are not making any truth claims. Strange as this may seem, it does not solve their problem. C. S. Lewis pinpointed the problem of 'anti-truth claims' well when he wrote in *Miracles*

“You can argue with a man who says, ‘Rice is unwholesome’: but you neither can nor need argue with a man who says, ‘Rice is unwholesome, but I’m not saying this is true.’ I feel that this surrender of the claim to truth has all the air of an expedient adopted at the last moment. If [they]...do not claim to know any truths, ought they not to have warned us rather earlier of the fact? For really from all the books they have written...one would have got the idea that they were claiming to give a true account of things. The fact surely is that they nearly always are claiming to do so. The claim is surrendered only when the question discussed...is pressed; and when the crisis is over the claim is tacitly resumed” (Lewis, *Miracles*, 24). In short, either the post-modernist is making truth claims or he is not. If he is, then his views are self-defeating. If he is not, then he is not even in the stadium. He can’t play the “game” unless he is on the field. By claiming that he is making no truth claim, then he has disqualified himself in the arena of truth.

An Important Distinction: Emerging, not Emergent

Not all emerging beliefs are bad. Kevin De Young and Ted Kluck summarize it well. The emergents “have many good deeds. They want to be relevant. They want to reach out. They want to be authentic. They want to include the marginalized. They want to be kingdom disciples. They want community and life transformation...” However, “Emergent Christians need to catch Jesus’ broader vision for... a church that is intolerant of error, maintains moral boundaries, promotes doctrinal integrity, stands strong in times of trial, remains vibrant in times of prosperity, believes in certain judgment and certain reward, even as it engages the culture, reaches out, loves, and serves. We need a church that reflects the Master’s vision—one that is deeply theological, deeply ethical, deeply compassionate, and deeply doxological” (*Why We’re Not Emergent*, 247-248).

Some Works Addressing the Emergent Church Issues

The following list shows present-day works that evaluate post-modernism in theology and are recommended for further study.

- Adler, Mortimer. *Truth in Religion*.
- Carson, D. A. *Becoming Conversant with the Emerging Church*.
- Carlson, Jason. “My Journey Into and Out Of the Emergent Church.”
- (www.Christianministriesintl.org)
- Driscoll, Mark. *Confessions of a Reformation REV*.
- DeYoung, Kevin and Ted Kluck. *Why We’re Not Emergent*.
- Driscoll, Mark. *Confessions of a Reformation REV*.
- Geisler, Norman. DVD on Post-modernism
- Geisler, Norman. *Systematic Theology in One Volume*.
- Gibbs, Eddie and Ryan Bolger. *Emerging Churches*.
- Howe, Thomas ed., *Christian Apologetics Journal*, volume 7, No. 1 (Spring, 2008, www.ses.edu/journal.htm)
- Kimball, Dan. *The Emerging Church*.
- Myron Penner ed., *Christianity and the Postmodern Turn (pro and con)*
- Rofle, Kevin, *Here We Stand*.
- Smith, R. Scott, *Truth and The New Kind of Christian*.
- Weber, Robert, *Listening to the Beliefs of Emergent Churches (pro and con)*

- Anthony Flew, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2 ed. Revised (New York: Gramercy Books, 1999).
- William Barrett, *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958).
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Abstract. That which exists in the mind rather than the external world; the conceptual as opposed to the objective; the general as opposed to the particular.

Absurd. In logic, a contradiction, as in "round square." In existentialism, the impossibility of objective or ultimate meaning.

Accident. A property or quality not essential to a thing.

Ad hoc. Literally, "to this"; pertaining to one case alone.

Ad hominem. Literally, "to the man"; in logic, an attack on or appeal to the personal rather than to reason.

Ad infinitum. Carried on without end; forever.

Aesthetics. The study of beauty.

A fortiori. Literally, "with greater force"; in logic, the argument with the form, "If this is true, then how much more is that true."

Agnosticism. The belief that one cannot, or at least does not, know reality, or especially, God.

Analytic judgment. According to Kant, a proposition whose predicate is deducible from the subject, as in, "All husbands are married men."

Analytic philosophy. A movement in philosophy, primarily in England and North America, which advocates the analysis of language as the heart of philosophy.

Antinomy. A contradiction comprised of a thesis and antithesis.

Apologetics. Literally, "defense"; in philosophy, the discipline of rationally justifying one's beliefs.

A posteriori. From experience, as opposed to a priori.

A priori. Prior to or independent of experience.

Atheism. The world view which claims that no God exists; the universe is all there is.

Atomism. The ancient belief that the universe consists of innumerable tiny, indivisible pellets of reality.

Axiology. The study of values, as in ethics, aesthetics, and religion.

Being. That which is or exists; the real.

Cause. The necessary and sufficient condition for an effect.

Coherence theory of justification. In epistemology, the theory that there are no immediately justified beliefs; justification is a relationship among beliefs, none of which is epistemologically prior.

Coherence theory of truth. A test for truth which considers self-consistency determinative.

Contingent. Dependent on another for its existence or function.

Correspondence theory of truth. Definition of truth as that which corresponds to reality.

Cosmological argument. The argument from the contingent, changing world (cosmos) to the existence of God.

Deduction. Arguing from the general to the particular; also a logical argument whose conclusion follows necessarily from one or more premises.

De facto. Actually; as a matter of fact.

Deism. The belief that God created the world and is transcendent; denies that God is immanent in the world, especially in any supernatural way.

Deontology. The ethical view that stresses duty rather than consequences (see *teleology*).

Demiurge. Plato's concept of a creator or god who formed the world (cosmos) out of the chaos.

Determinism. The belief that all events in the universe (including man's actions) are controlled by previous conditions.

Dialectic. Drawing out truth through dialogue that leads to logical conclusions.

Dialectical. A process of thought or of history which by the tension between thesis and antithesis leads to a synthesis.

Dualism. The world view which teaches the existence of two ultimate

realities (such as God and evil, or Spirit and matter).

Efficient cause. The agent by which an effect is produced.

Emanation. In pantheism (Plotinus), the flowing of the universe necessarily from God, as rays flow from the sun or radii flow from the center of a circle.

Empirical verifiability principle. In logical positivism, the belief that only those propositions which are verifiable through sense experience are meaningful.

Empiricism. The theory of knowledge which holds that all knowledge begins in sense experience.

Epistemology. Theory of knowledge or how we know.

Equivocation. Use of the same term with two different meanings.

Eschatology. Study of last things (the future).

Essence. Qualities or attributes of a thing which are necessary; its nature.

Essentialism, ethical. The ethical view that God wills moral rules because they are right, and flow from His essence or character (see *voluntarism*).

Ethics. The study of right and wrong, of what one ought to do.

Exemplar cause. The pattern or blueprint after which something is made.

Existentialism. A philosophical movement which stresses that existence is prior to essence; the concrete

and individual is over the abstract and universal.

Ex nihilo. The Christian belief that God created the world "out of nothing."

Fallacy. A logical error of inference, relationship, or conclusion.

Fideism. The view that there are no rational ways to justify one's beliefs; faith alone is necessary.

Final cause. The end or goal for which an agent acts; the ultimate.

Finite. Having specific boundaries or limits.

Finite godism. The world view that affirms there is a god but that he is limited in power and/or love (see *theism*).

First principle. Basic axiom or proposition; self-evident assumption.

Formal cause. The structure or form of which something consists.

Foundationalism. In epistemology, the belief that knowledge is based on first principles or immediately justified beliefs.

Gnosticism. Early religious cult which held God is good, matter is evil, and man is saved by knowledge (*gnosis*) of special hidden truths.

Hedonism. The ethical view which claims that pleasure is the greatest good.

Humanism. The belief that man is the highest value in the universe.

Idealism. The philosophy which holds that reality consists of minds and ideas rather than matter.

Identity, principle of. The law of logic which says a thing is identical to itself, that is, A is A.

Identity theory. The belief that mind and matter are manifestations of one reality, matter. This is a sophisticated form of materialism.

Immanent. Indwelling. God's immanence is His presence within the universe (see *transcendent*).

Immortality. The doctrine that man will live forever.

Indeterminism. The belief that at least some events, especially human behavior, are uncaused.

Induction. Arguing from the particular to the general.

Infinite. Without limits or boundaries.

Infinite regress. The belief that causes are infinitely dependent on dependent causes; it is impossible to arrive at a first principle (see).

Instrumental cause. The means or tools through which an agent acts.

Intuitionism. In ethics, the view that in every situation the right action is self-evident.

Logic. The study of valid thinking and argument.

Logical positivism. The philosophy which holds that metaphysical and theological propositions are meaningless unless they are empirically verifiable.

Material cause. The stuff or matter out of which something is made.

Materialism. The belief that all of

reality is material, that no spiritual entities such as the soul or God exist.

Metaphysics. The study of being or reality.

Monism. The metaphysical view that all reality is one (see *pluralism*).

Mysticism. The belief that there are states of mind or reality beyond sensation and reason.

Natural law. In ethics, the view that there are innate or natural moral laws known by all men.

Naturalism. The belief that the universe is all there is; everything operates by natural law (without miracles).

Necessary Being. A Being who cannot not exist, whose very essence is existence.

Necessity. That which must be or cannot be other than it is.

Nihilism. The view that there is no value or being in the universe.

Nominalism. The belief that universal forms or ideas exist only conceptually; all that exist in the real world are particulars.

Non-contradiction, law of. A proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same sense.

Non sequitur. A conclusion that does not follow from the premises.

Noumena. According to Kant, the "thing-in-itself" or real world, as opposed to the world of appearance (see *phenomena*).

Objectivism. The belief that there

are external objects outside mere states of consciousness.

"Ockham's razor." See *parsimony, principle of*.

Ontological argument. The argument devised by Anselm for God's existence which claims that from our idea of God's essence we can conclude God must exist.

Ontology. The study of being; generally synonymous with *metaphysics*.

Panentheism. The world view which holds that "all is in God"; God is to the world as a soul is to a body.

Pantheism. The world view which denies God's transcendence and identifies God with His immanence in the universe.

Parsimony, principle of. The principle of simplicity; one ought not multiply explanations or causes unnecessarily. Also called "Ockham's razor."

Petito principii. Begging the question or arguing in a circle.

Phenomena. According to Kant, the world of appearance, as opposed to reality (see *noumena*).

Phenomenology. A philosophical movement which attempts to avoid all presuppositions and begin with the pure data of human consciousness.

Pluralism. The metaphysical view that reality is many (see *monism*).

Polytheism. The belief in many gods.

Positivism. The philosophy which repudiates metaphysics and attempts

only a scientific understanding of the world.

Pragmatism. The philosophy which makes practical consequences the criterion for truth.

Proposition. The meaning conveyed by a sentence. Some philosophers claim that a proposition is identical with a sentence.

Rationalism. The epistemological view that stresses reason or rational explanations.

Realism. The philosophy which holds that there is a real external world which can be known.

Relativism. The belief that there are no absolutes.

Skepticism. The belief that one should doubt or suspend judgment on philosophical questions.

Solipsism. Metaphysically, the doctrine that "I alone exist." Epistemologically, the view that one knows only himself, nothing more.

Subjectivism. In ethics, the belief that there are no objective, universal principles of conduct.

Substance. According to Aristotle, the underlying essence; that in which all qualities of a thing inhere.

Sufficient reason. The principle (from Leibniz) that everything must have a rational explanation or cause.

Syllogism. A concise deductive argument, usually consisting of two premises and a conclusion.

Syncretism. The reconciliation or union of conflicting beliefs.

Tabula rasa. Literally, "blank slate." The empirical belief that man is born with no innate or inborn ideas.

Tautology. In logic, a statement that is true by definition, such as, "All triangles have three sides." Hence, an empty statement which affirms nothing about the real world.

Teleological argument. The argument from the design or purposiveness of the world to the existence of a Designer (God).

Teleology. In ethics, the view which stresses the end, result, or consequences of our actions (see *deontology*).

Theism. The world view that affirms the existence of a personal, infinite Creator of the world, who is immanent in the world, unlimited in power and in love.

Transcendent. That which is more than our experience or goes beyond the world. Theists say God is transcendent because He is outside of or beyond nature (see *immanent*).

Universal. The general concept or idea of a thing, as opposed to a particular instance or example.

Univocal. Literally, "of the same voice," or with the same meaning, as opposed to *equivocal*.

Utilitarianism. In ethics, the view that one should act to bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

Veridical. True or accurate.

Voluntarism, ethical. The ethical view that traces moral principles to God's will; something is right because God wills it (see *essentialism*).

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